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1Introduction
“If your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
—Clarence Page
Why This Book?
Most people working in centralized government regimes believe that those who are 
supposed to govern in decentralized systems are losing control. This book will attempt 
to prove that what is lost in the course of decentralization is nothing more than the 
illusion of control, for centralized management is based on illusory convictions. One 
such misconception is the expectation that regulation changes the behavior of the ac-
tors of education service delivery automatically. Another is the conviction that teachers 
do everything according to the expectations of the regulators behind classroom closed 
doors. However, what has been obvious for the majority of scholars since the 1970s is 
not necessarily obvious for policymakers and professionals today, who may never have 
experienced anything but extremely centralized management, or have rather disappoint-
ing experiences with certain kinds of decentralization, such as the self-management 
system of the former Yugoslavia.
One of the most important arguments in favor of decentralization is that almost 
nobody likes to work in a centralized system. Even if many actors are interested in 
preserving strong central control for various reasons, centralization curtails all the 
actors in education from both the pain and pleasure of facing challenges and solving 
problems independently. Centralization erases the feeling that one is doing something 
important and creating added value. The “secret agenda” of this book is to prove that 
education systems can be reformed, in which large numbers of teachers, school direc-
tors, local administration oﬃcials, development experts, and even ministerial staﬀ may 
ﬁnd working a rewarding enterprise. The other “message” in this book is that change, 
even at this scale and complexity, is not impossible. There are many European education 
systems that produce high-quality and eﬀective education without the daily interven-
tion of omnipotent states. The fact is that the instruments of decentralized governance 
really work and have much greater potential than those applied in centralized regimes.
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Therefore, the foremost reason for this book is to support knowledge transfer in an 
organized way along three lines. First, key contemporary concepts will be introduced 
that determine how the governance of education is designed and operated in European 
countries. These concepts all originate from a rather dramatic paradigm shift of education 
science and educational policy over the last two decades. However, the emphasis here 
is not on theory, but rather on the very practical implications of the new mainstream 
patterns of policies on governance and management. The second purpose is outlining 
how decentralized education governance systems work in practice and assessing their 
instruments within the context of South Eastern European. What will be oﬀered is 
one possible approach to decentralized governance with a large amount of trade-oﬀs 
and alternative solutions. What matters is their suitability within the context of South 
Eastern Europe. This book is designed to inform and orient local discourse on the most 
appropriate direction of future decentralization measures. The third purpose of this book 
is to confront the early steps towards decentralization in South Eastern Europe with the 
key characteristics of decentralized governance. Although none of the countries in the 
region went very far with the decentralization process, there were certain initial steps 
made in almost all of them that, if assessed within a regional comparative framework, 
will provide useful insight and lessons for the design of future ones.
The primary audience of this book is experts in public management and educa-
tion who are working for public administration organizations at any level or in those 
institutions that have a stake in governance and education. Since most readers will be 
specialists, it is important to indicate the risk that this book takes. Brieﬂy summarizing 
a little bit of everything in one volume is a brave—or blind—enterprise. For example, 
an educator might be dissatisﬁed with the depth of the chapter on teaching, and educa-
tion economists will be short-changed by the chapter on ﬁnancing. The purpose of this 
book, however, is not necessarily to add to the knowledge of specialists. The underlying 
assumption is that anybody working in any role in the governance and management of 
education systems has to be a generalist; beyond the narrow technical competencies of 
their work, they should have a broad understanding of how various segments of decentral-
ized education systems are connected to each other. For this reason, this book does not 
focus on any of the speciﬁc aspects of decentralization, such as ﬁscal decentralization or 
the public management system. A broad brush stroke is applied to the decentralization 
process that incorporates genuine educational considerations in order to explore the 
connections among the various “strands” of decentralization. If anything can be labeled 
the “punch line” of this book, then it is those aspects of education governance that are 
typically dealt with in an isolated way yet are very much interwoven.
This book will use a large number of examples from South Eastern Europe (and some 
from Central Europe). The purpose is not simply to make the text more “digestible” for 
the audience; a serious eﬀort will be made to embed the discussion on decentralization 
within the South Eastern European context. Although it might be the reader’s impression, 
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this book’s intention is not to be “hyper critical” of the work of those who are running 
education governance and management systems. Rather, the book is designed to explore 
the latitude within which major systemic changes can be considered. It will be served 
by a regional comparative approach concurrent with the application of international 
mainstream knowledge and experience to the realities of the region. As will be seen, 
in spite of the diversity of the realities of the region’s distinct countries, the similarities 
among them are surprisingly salient. 
Having lagged behind Central and Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe is poised 
to learn from the rich experience of its northern and western neighbors that nearly all 
underwent major systemic changes in their education governance systems. The lesson 
we can learn from Hungary is especially valuable, due to their over two decades of ex-
perimentation within the framework of an extremely decentralized management system. 
While most of South Eastern Europe is struggling with the problems of dealing with 
important education related challenges within a centralized system, Hungary’s problems 
are diﬀerent: how to deal with the same challenges within a radically decentralized one? 
The same added value can be found through comparisons with other Central European 
countries—of course, not with the intention to promote the introduction of anything 
that is alien to the context of the South Eastern European countries.
The Thematic Focus and Structure
If nothing else, the overwhelming complexity of education sector decentralization is ap-
parent from a ﬁrst glance in this book, the scope of which is deliberately broad because 
of the interplay among various aspects of decentralization. 
There are two subsystems of the education sector in relation to which decentralization 
should be dealt with in a diﬀerent way: higher education and adult learning. In higher 
education, decentralization emerges as two interrelated problems: (1) the autonomy of 
higher education institutions, and (2) the extent to which certain regulatory and quality 
assurance functions actually performed by the central government are deployed to the 
cooperation frameworks of higher education institutions or to the institutions them-
selves. (In terms of decentralization, the matters related to post-secondary education 
are closer to those of higher than pre-higher education.) As far as regulatory functions 
(e.g., qualiﬁcation requirements) for adult learning are concerned, in an optimal setting, 
these are identical, or at least partially identical, with those underlying regulations for the 
formal schooling component of vocational education and training (VET). In relation to 
other aspects of adult learning: (1) they are much more connected to the decentraliza-
tion or deconcentration of labor services than that of education; (2) to a large extent, 
adult learning services are provided by training organizations on the training market as 
business services; (3) the policies in relation to promoting adult learning at workplaces 
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are either regulatory measures or ﬁnancial incentives with which lower-level manage-
ment actors have very little to do; and (4) a relatively large segment of adult learning is 
provided by cultural services or by the media. 
Therefore, higher education and adult learning are beyond the scope of this book. 
In acknowledging that vocational education and training is part of the secondary 
school system, the speciﬁc vocational components (as opposed to the general education 
components of VET) will be discussed only in connection to those matters in which 
their separation would be overly problematic, such as in the case of content regulation. 
Therefore, this book will only touch on those levels of education in relation to those 
lower-level actors who may have a substantial mandate: preschool education, primary 
education, general secondary education, and the formal schooling segment of vocational 
education and training. At the appropriate juncture, the entire picture will become ap-
parent, in order to understand the cohesion of the subsystems discussed here. 
In addition, this book oﬀers only limited coverage on the private segments of the 
primary and secondary education systems: schools owned by NGOs, churches, business 
enterprises, or foreign governments. The number of private schools in South Eastern 
Europe is insubstantial, and the role of local education management actors in relation 
to these autonomous actors is limited.
The book is organized into four sections, describing: decentralization, education 
service delivery, the major strands of decentralization in education, and policymaking 
in decentralized systems. It might not be obvious to readers why a book on governance 
and management would devote an entire section to matters such as learning, teaching, 
or school organization. However, as the chapter on the various rationales for decentral-
ization in education will indicate, many of them are strongly connected to the essential 
purpose of education: promoting eﬀective learning. Incorporating a relatively short 
overview on genuine educational considerations shows that they have indirect or direct 
implications for how primary and secondary school systems are governed and managed. 
The underlying logic of the discussion in Parts Two and Three of this book is simple: 
an overview of the expectations demanded from education, against which we can then 
assess the eﬀectiveness of learning; the characteristics of eﬀective learning, against which 
we assess the quality of teaching; the required features of teaching, against which we 
assess the characteristics of the operation of schools; and ﬁnally the consequences of 
our quality expectations of governance and management. Without going through this 
simple algorithm, the discussion on governance would be a sterile one, disconnected 
from its essence: ensuring high-quality education services via eﬀective governance of the 
education system. An introduction to educational policy planning and implementation 
in Part Four is much needed, because decentralization dramatically changes the very 
nature and purpose of policymaking in education.
Part One of the book provides an introduction to all the general aspects of de-
centralization, especially concerning education. It concludes in a practical analytical 
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framework that was already applied in the design of education sector strategies in Bul-
garia and Croatia. Part Two goes on to discuss the foundations for the reconsideration 
of contemporary education governance systems: the changing meaning of eﬀective-
ness, quality, cost-eﬀectiveness, and equity in education, as well as major themes such 
as learning, teaching, the work of schools as organizations, and the management of 
schools, concluding with a summary of the governance of education service delivery. 
Part Three provides brief descriptions of those ﬁve functional governance instruments 
that are the most relevant ones from the point of view of decentralization: manage-
ment of education, the management of inputs to educational services (ﬁnancing and 
human resources), content regulation (curriculum and standards), quality evaluation 
(evaluation and assessment), and professional services, wrapping up with a description 
of the mainstream pattern of education governance systems. Part Four deals with the 
implications of decentralization on educational policy. A short introduction describes 
the governance context of policy, the various functions within policymaking and the 
various policy implementation strategies that can be applied in decentralized educa-
tion systems, concluding with a summary on the systemic conditions of high-quality 
policymaking in decentralized education systems.
The summaries at the end of each of the book’s four parts oﬀer a conceptual frame-
work to help the reader to structure and organize the extremely diverse range of issues, 
problems, and terms in each part. Because the main purpose of this book is to structure 
complex problems and not to spare the discourse on how to solve them within the 
speciﬁc circumstances of diﬀerent countries, the text is supported by two additional 
instruments: a large number of ﬁgures and comprehensive overviews designed to aid 
conceptualization, and boxes that generally oﬀer supplementary information relevant 
to the theme being discussed.
The Main Sources
Since the primary aim of this book is to inform and orient policymaking and develop-
ment, it is not based on the digestion of the vast literature on education decentralization. 
However, a distillation of a selected number of key volumes on this topic has contrib-
uted to this volume. Notably, the muscle on the skeleton has been mainly produced 
by local and international analysis and ﬁndings of experts and consultants who were 
accumulating a large body of knowledge and experience for very practical purposes. 
Where research results and international comparative data were available, they were 
used, but most of the issues touched upon in this book are dealt with in an extremely 
information-poor environment in most countries in the region. It is never as striking 
as in issues addressed by Part Two. Empirical research in education in South Eastern 
Europe is very limited in quantity and scope, and confronting international mainstream 
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ideas on local educational practices is nearly impossible, or certainly much harder than 
in relation to the three other themes in this book. Schools in South Eastern Europe are 
still very much like black boxes, and only the personal experiences of the author and 
anecdotal information from local experts oﬀer an insight on how teachers teach or how 
schools are operated. In general, interviews with a large number of various actors (staﬀ 
of municipalities, school directors, teachers, experts, etc.) combined with expert studies 
or consultant reports act as substitutes for decent research and data analysis.
PA R T  O N E
Decentralization 
in Education

9C H A P T E R  1
Centralized Governance Systems: 
Their Limits and Inertia
1.1 The Limits of Central Rationality
All the allies who promote decentralization in education have one thing in common: the 
“shared antithesis” of bureaucratic centralization. “Bureaucratic centralization implies 
concentrating in a central (“top”) authority decision-making on a wide range of mat-
ters, leaving only tightly programmed routine implementation to lower levels in the 
organization” (Lauglo 1996). The underlying logic of centralized governance systems 
is that central governments are trustees of rationality. Therefore, it is based on the as-
sumption that objectives should be set exclusively at the national level and they should 
be converted to prescriptive regulations that guide the work of everyone residing in the 
lower levels of the system. 
Before engaging in any discussion on the diﬀerent approaches to decentralization, 
this point of departure begs the question: are we sure that centralized management of 
education really does not work? Anyone who has ever had the chance to spend some 
time in an education ministry in Macedonia, Bulgaria, or Serbia as an outside observer 
would get the impression that things would work much better, even without ravaging 
the whole system with major decentralization initiatives. Little things like eﬃcient ﬁling, 
having written proposals, mandatory internal conciliation procedures, etc., would solve 
a lot of problems that are perceived to be the negative features of bureaucratic central 
control. However, the biggest problem with centralized control is not necessarily the 
lack of its operational eﬃciency, that is, all those malfunctions that are widely associ-
ated with bureaucracies. In fact, centralized regimes have two typical limits: (1) their 
weak capacity to absorb those views, interests, and experiences that are external to the 
administrative machinery; and (2) their weak implementation potential.
It is important to note that even the formally rigid central administrative manage-
ment systems are never unmitigated. They are always alleviated in many diﬀerent ways. 
Sometimes it is done formally, but more often, it happens informally. The typical form 
of formal alleviation is sharing central decision-making authority with other groups. 
This was the case in Serbia following the elections in 2004 when the Education Council 
(mainly consisting of pedagogy experts) received extraordinary approval authority, or 
in Bulgaria where teacher unions have a huge inﬂuence on policymaking far beyond 
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the traditional employment-related matters via the strong mandate that was given to 
the tripartite consultation mechanism. The true nature of these power sharing settings 
is that they are exclusive; a strong mandate given to one of stakeholder groups weakens 
the position of others. The recognition of the exceptionally powerful inﬂuence of experts 
(if they can be considered “stakeholders” at all) in Serbia leaves little room for teacher 
unions, while the recognition of teacher unions in Bulgaria does not leave much latitude 
for the inﬂuence of other stakeholder groups. Although sharing power with the above 
groups can be easily explained with simple populist arguments, such formal alleviations 
of strong central control can hardly be regarded anything but sophisticated means of 
shifting responsibility from the decision-making centers.
Another problem with formal alleviation is its typical lack of an essential condition: 
the eﬀective internal organization of stakeholder groups. Representing the “profession” 
or “teachers” presumes that the views and interests of the represented groups have been 
eﬀectively amassed and articulated. However, the internal paradox imprinted into cen-
tralized governance systems is that, in most cases. they are mismatched with eﬀective 
stakeholder self-organization. The reader should be reminded that what we are actually 
referring to is not democracy deﬁcit; it is a simple eﬃciency problem. Assimilating 
various views and interests is the sine qua non condition of quality of decision-making. 
The involvement of stakeholders is a “reality check” as well as an essential condition of 
implementation.
As far as the informal alleviations to centralized governance are concerned, the best 
illustration for this is what a curriculum expert1 once referred to as the “conspiracy of 
silence.” It describes the attitude of teachers towards decision-makers at the national 
level: “We know that you know that whatever you do, we do whatever we want.” In 
other words, everybody is aware of the fact that teachers behind classroom closed doors 
are deviating from the centrally-devised syllabi. (The author of this book, while teach-
ing history in an academic secondary school in the early 1980s in Hungary, carefully 
completed the paperwork according to the oﬃcial curricula, but taught something 
very diﬀerent, as many other teachers also did.) In times of mildly or rigidly oppressive 
regimes, this behavior among teachers was considered a brave safeguarding of educa-
tion from the inﬂuence of the ideologically driven decision-making center and, as such, 
was lauded by many. However, recently, it is nothing more than a salient failure of the 
rule of law within education. This conspiracy of silence is not only characteristic of the 
relationship between ministries and teachers; it can also be applied to the behavior of 
textbook publishers, inspectors, pedagogical advisors, and many other important ac-
tors in education. It says, simply: everyone must learn how to live under the “central 
rationality” of governance. Forcing the actors of education to comply is probably the 
most destructive eﬀect of centralized management regimes.
Another major reason to have serious doubts about the potential of centralized 
systems to capably manage education is their low capacity to implement their own deci-
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sions. Since the 1970s, a great amount of literature emerged in public policy research on 
implementation in order to provide the missing link between decision-making and the 
outcomes of policies. The purpose of these academic endeavors was rather supportive: 
helping decision-makers to design better-implemented policies (Hill 1997). However, 
when we are looking at increasingly sophisticated lists of the conditions of perfect top-
down implementation through hierarchical bureaucratic organizations (see Box 1.1), 
the suspicion emerges that an “implementation deﬁcit” in centralized governance sys-
tems is almost inevitable. Although the evaluation of the impact of central government 
initiatives in education in South Eastern Europe is not a routine daily exercise, we may 
assume that the recent history of educational policy in the region basically consists of 
poorly implemented policies. (We will return to this problem several times in this book.)
Box 1.1
The Preconditions of Perfect Top-down Implementation
1. Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints.
2. Adequate time and sufﬁcient resources are made available to the program.
3. Not only are there zero constraints in terms of overall resources but also, at each 
stage in the implementation process, the required combination of resources is 
actually available.
4. The policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect.
5. The relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few, if any, 
intervening links.
6. There is a single implementing agency that need not depend upon other agencies 
for success or, if other agencies must be involved, the dependency relationships 
are minimal in number and importance.
7. There is complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be 
achieved; and these conditions persist throughout the implementation process.
8. In moving towards agreed objectives, it is possible to specify, in complete detail 
and perfect sequence, the tasks to be performed by each participant.
9. There is perfect communication among, and coordination of, the various ele-
ments involved in the program.
10. Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect obedience.
—Hogwood and Gunn 1984
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The relative inability of centralized governance regimes to ensure the quality of 
decision-making by assimilating the diverse views, experiences, and interests of stake-
holders and to implement its own decisions amounts to a situation that is commonly 
known as “legitimacy crisis.” 
1.2 The Inertia of Centralized Governance
Arguments in Favor of Maintaining Central Control
The discourse on decentralization is not simply the debate among those who pursue 
diﬀerent rationales for it; it is the debate between the promoters of unity, integration, 
and strong central control and those who promote decentralization for any reason in 
the ﬁrst place. From a global perspective, the great majority of countries operate under 
centralized education governance systems, and most of them are “developing countries.” 
The arguments for maintaining control over education at the national level might be 
rooted in many diﬀerent value-based orientations. Here are a few examples of those 
that may have speciﬁc relevance in South Eastern Europe:
 • Modernization—the perceived backwardness by comparison to the most devel-
oped parts of Europe, especially following the lost opportunities due to the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia, are strong compelling forces for “catch-up” campaigns. 
However, modernization (that is, improving certain indicators connected to 
being modern, such as Internet penetration or the length of highways) is in 
most cases achieved through strong state intervention, or through the use of 
state-channeled foreign resources. From this perspective, losing control over 
education may result in leaving one of the most important modernization in-
struments at the mercy of local forces that are not considered to be committed 
to modernization objectives.
 • Nation building—an inﬂuential concern in South Eastern Europe for many, it 
may resort to its historical patterns from the European past: building strong 
“modern states.” From this perspective, decentralization may appear to be the 
luxury object of countries having had strong nation-states for centuries. If nation 
building as a positive program is matched with the feeling of endangerment as 
a nation, a strong state is regarded as an instrument of self-defense. The strong 
state (i.e., state exercising central control) is often considered to be the best 
guarantee against the “detrimental impact” of globalization. The implications 
for education are salient: strong state control in order to preserve the language, 
culture, religion, and traditions of the ruling nation. 
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 • Egalitarian social engineering—those who are concerned about social or ethnic 
inequalities very often turn to state control as the key instrument for reducing 
or eliminating disparities that are perceived to be unfair. The underlying as-
sumption is an egalitarian one: inequalities can be reduced by the state via equal 
(re)distribution of opportunities. The illusion that education has the potential 
to change the socio-economic status of entire social macro-groups (e.g., that of 
Roma) is widely shared in the region. This approach calls for standardization of 
inputs and processes and strong central control in order to ensure compliance 
with these standards. According to this approach, decentralization per deﬁnition 
leads to greater inequalities or to greater social gaps along ethnic borders.
 • Integrity and unity—there are situations where major historical events lead to 
extreme fragmentation of the state, such as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(Sometimes, even the fear of such events may provide the basis for any measures 
that could be perceived as “weakening the state,” for example, how the territorial 
autonomy of Vojvodina was viewed by many in Serbia after the secession of 
Kosovo.) The “constitutional fragments” of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika 
Srpska and the cantons) operate highly-centralized education management 
systems. However, overcoming the fragmentation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is a genuine centralization matter. For example, the initiative of adopting a 
curriculum for the whole country clearly served centralization purposes for the 
sake of the unity of the country.
 • The size that matters—in several countries of the size of Montenegro or Slovenia, 
where a minister of education may personally know the directors of all secondary 
schools, decentralization may have certain logical limits. However, the small size 
of a country sometimes serves as an argument against transferring control over 
primary education to municipalities or against strengthening school autonomy. 
Obstacles to Decentralization: Reasons for Reluctance
The rationales for decentralization that will be outlined in the next chapter are quite 
convincing—at least at the level of intellectual deliberation. One would assume that 
these arguments in favor of decentralization are strong enough to incite the actors of 
governance and management of education to rush to initiate new decentralization 
measures. But this is deﬁnitely not the case; most countries in South Eastern Europe 
made only minor and cautious steps in this direction. The question is: why? Are all of 
the decision-makers in these countries promoters of strong bureaucratic central control? 
Of course, there are simple explanations, for example, the possibility that the majority of 
actors are not aware of these arguments, or the fact that all systems that are settled for a 
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long period of time produce their supporters: those who are interested in maintaining the 
system. Apart from these very general reasons, there are several obstacles that explain the 
reluctance of many. The most important ones are the following: (1) strong dependence 
on the state, (2) mistrust, (3) lack of political commitment, (4) fear of losing control, 
(5) lack of comprehensive educational strategies, (6) weak management capacities, and 
(7) the resistance to change and to take on greater responsibility.
 • Perceived dependence on the state. In countries with relatively weak self-governance 
traditions or with long periods of extremely centralized governance, most people 
can hardly imagine any major changes without the intervention of the state. 
Running schools or teaching biology without central government interference 
is one thing; changing how the school is operated or how biology is taught 
is something entirely diﬀerent and should be done by changing the “state of 
aﬀairs.” These contradictory attitudes towards the role of the state create an 
atmosphere in which shifting responsibility (i.e., blaming the government for 
everything) is an immediate reaction to almost any problem. Well after the 
collapse of dictatorial regimes, the perception of the omnipotence of the state 
is rarely challenged. However, the situation is not helped by the great public 
redistribution of incomes by the state and the low incomes of independent ac-
tors as well as by the prevailing pressure of overwhelming regulations from the 
center. Due to its mandatory participation, primary and secondary education 
is a public service; if a country’s public matters are controlled and managed 
centrally, then education that consumes a large proportion of the state budget 
hardly can be an exception. 
 • Mistrust. Decentralized systems are based on the cooperation among ac-
tors who have clearly deﬁned but complementary roles. If the mutual trust 
among all the relevant actors is weak, there is pressure to create positions with 
ambiguous authorities. For example, if school directors do not trust local self-
governments, they will argue for preserving the decision-making competencies 
of deconcentrated branches of central government. Also, if directors are not 
trusted, their management authorities will be “balanced” by school boards or 
by decision-making competencies deployed to the teaching staﬀ. The mutual 
mistrust among education managers is strong in South Eastern Europe. (As a 
result, the ﬁrst steps of decentralization escalate the shifting of responsibility 
game to the relationships among local actors, too.) There are three major sources 
of mistrust. The ﬁrst is widespread corruption, still unconstrained despite calls 
for stronger accountability mechanisms and transparency. The second is the 
overwhelming inﬂuence of politics, even at local and institutional levels. And 
the last is that professional failures or successes remain invisible; therefore, the 
eﬀectiveness of any actor is judged only upon anecdotal information. And even 
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if central governance is regarded as more corrupt, more overpoliticized, and 
more unprepared for the task, the abuse of authority by those who are closer, 
neighbors and community members, is somewhat less acceptable for many.
 • Weak and unsustainable political commitment. The continuity of policies for a 
longer period of time than the term of a government is a rather illusory expec-
tation in a centralized governance regime, in which politics is almost the only 
reference framework for policymaking. Decentralization—being a complex and 
long process—is a “stop-and-go” type of systemic change. (Decentralization is 
not a single project; rather, it is a pile of consecutive measures that add up to 
a major systemic change.) However, due to the lack of strong institutionalized 
setting for policymaking and implementation, “reconsidering” the policies of 
the previous government is even easier. For example, the government of Serbia 
between 2004 and 2008, as well as that of Romania after 2000, retreated from 
a lot of decentralization initiatives. In other cases, in spite of the prevailing 
rhetoric, the real steps of the government show very ambiguous commitment, 
just like in Croatia during the entire postwar period. The conviction or fear of 
being “reconsidered” by the next government may impose two diﬀerent reac-
tions; neither is instrumental in promoting decentralization. The ﬁrst is the lack 
of courage that constrains the scope of initiatives to incremental changes within 
the existing highly centralized system. The second is desperate trepidation in 
order to achieve a critical mass of changes that make the process irreversible, but 
that almost inevitably leads to mistakes that often discredit the whole process.
 • Fear of losing control. In a system that is based on control, losing control is a 
major fear. Those who exercise control cannot simply admit that their work 
is, to a large extent, based upon illusions about the eﬀectiveness of the means 
of central supervision. However, the signs of ineﬀectiveness are very much vis-
ible, which is a source of frustration for many employees of central governance 
agencies. Not reacting to the lack of compliance with even more central control 
requires a great deal of deliberation and strategic thinking. Nevertheless, the 
typical reaction to failures is frustration; in psychological terms, working for 
central government agencies in a highly centralized system is not very rewarding. 
However, even in a very advanced stage of decentralization or liberalization, the 
perceived powerlessness may result in turning back to the good old instruments 
of central control. For example, in Hungary, which has the most decentralized 
and liberalized education governance system in Central Europe, the Ministry of 
Education, led by a liberal minister, reacted to the “white ﬂight” (the secession of 
non-Roma students from schools where the proportion of Roma student reaches 
a certain point) with central administrative restrictions on local enrollment poli-
cies that were obviously evaded very easily. Another example was the reaction of 
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the same ministry to the law on the quality of textbooks published by private 
publishing houses by extremely rigid and detailed regulations that proved to be 
ineﬀective and were abandoned in most European countries. The fear of losing 
control is not the specialty of government agencies only. For example, due to 
the very centralized human resource management system in Bulgaria, teacher 
unions are oriented to inﬂuence central government policies, which they do 
rather eﬀectively. The decentralization of the major employment-related deci-
sions to schools would force the teacher unions to build strong representation 
in each individual school, without which they would lose a huge proportion of 
the inﬂuence they actually have.
 • Lack of comprehensive education reform strategies. The development of educa-
tion reform strategies is often dominated by educationalists. As a result, these 
strategies carefully consider the necessary changes and instruments in relation 
to the “software” of education (curriculum, teaching methods, in-service teacher 
training, etc.) and often ignore the “hardware” of education (management, 
ﬁnancing, inspection, etc.). This weakness of strategic planning at the national 
level leads to the lack of balance among the various decentralization measures. 
For example, policymakers in Serbia—recently facing the problems of imple-
menting contemporary policies for the inclusion of special needs children, the 
integration of Roma pupils, or self-evaluation based school development—use 
a management, ﬁnancing, and quality-evaluation system that has not changed 
very much in the postwar period. The challenge is comparable to running 
the newest Microsoft operating system on a decade-old PC. The weakness of 
these strategies’ design has an additional impact. Being that such strategies are 
important communication instruments, they should convince professionals in 
the “frontline” of management that the changes are necessary. If reform strate-
gies focus exclusively on pedagogical matters, the immediate reaction will be 
to generate resistance against those very changes by local actors who will not 
regard them to be feasible.
 • The perceived weakness of management capacities. Due to the fact that investing 
in the capacities of local self-government staﬀ or school directors by large-scale 
training programs is relatively easy, the lack of capacities as a main obstacle 
to decentralization measures is often overestimated. (For example, the staﬀ 
of municipality administrations in Croatia claims that they would be able 
to perform more autonomous tasks without any problems.) However, since 
there was no need to apply sophisticated management competencies during 
the long period of centralized governments, the relatively weak competencies 
at the regional and local levels and in schools really became an obstacle. For 
example, almost the only success criteria for school directors in Croatia are 
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the quality of school facilities, furniture, and ICT equipment. Also, there are 
huge diﬀerences in this respect between larger and smaller institutions. The 
important point here is the existence of three major conditions: organizational 
capacities, performance evaluation, and available support systems. Most 
governments, while deploying additional tasks, seriously underestimate the need 
for supplementary administrative management capacities that they generate 
at lower levels. Decentralization has its costs, both in terms of ﬁnancial and 
human resources. Also, there are certain changes that call for more than making 
additional resources available; they may require major organizational changes at 
the lower levels, too. (These changes in schools will be an important theme of 
this book.) More responsibility should be matched with more accountability, 
too. Also, the cumulative impact of increased responsibilities and accountability 
automatically results in increased demand for capacity building. (Capacity 
building, of course, should be more than training: these are also advisory and 
consulting services that automatically adjust to the actual needs of their clients.) 
A typical problem in most South Eastern European countries is applying an 
inverse logic: building capacities for nonexistent tasks with weak or nonexistent 
professional accountability systems. Since the impact of this type of investment 
is rather limited, the perceived lack of local capacities remains an argument for 
caution surrounding decentralization.
 • Resistance to change. All systems that are settled for a period of time produce 
their supporters. There are many who are successful in a centralized system; 
therefore, they are not very much interested in shaking things up without the 
guarantee of still being successful in a diﬀerent role in a very diﬀerent envi-
ronment. And even if someone suﬀers as a result of the “oppressive nature” of 
strong central control, change might be frightening; dealing with uncertainty 
or replacing old routines with new ones is not easy. Reason is not always the 
factor that determines behavior. In the many cases, when deliberation and the 
lack of interest or self-conﬁdence required for change are in conﬂict with one 
another, the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance often results in turning to 
the arguments in favor of maintaining central control over education. Being 
concerned about changes with the potential of resulting in the replacement 
of several persons in various positions is a matter of great concern in South 
Eastern Europe, because personal networks often play a much bigger role in 
the success of individuals than formal institutional settings. In several cases 
the resistance to change feeds upon the resistance to take more responsibility. 
For example, growing eﬃciency problems in education, that is, the growing 
discrepancy between the number of children enrolled and the capacities of the 
schools, requires interventions that inevitably generate a lot of tensions at the 
18
G O V E R N I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z E D  E D U C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
local level. Taking over the task of dealing with these conﬂicts, together with 
new management tasks, is not something that oﬀers a lot of political or moral 
payback. In other cases, there is a well-justiﬁed concern of local administration 
staﬀ and school directors that more responsibility will not go together with the 
reduction of old ones. For example, due to the huge reporting load on school 
directors in Bulgaria (directors have to produce more than one hundred reports 
on a regular basis), they are not convinced that they can (or want to) handle 
more.
The Decentralization Agenda and International Organizations
Most of the obstacles to decentralization are domestic ones. However, there is an ad-
ditional international dimension involved in this matter: international organizations 
that impose an outstanding impact on the reform agendas of South Eastern Europe. 
(The inﬂuence of the World Bank’s development strategies was strengthened by the fact 
that, due to the scarcity of domestic resources, ﬁnancing almost any large-scale changes 
that a given government wanted to promote, depended very much on the availability 
of World Bank funds. Also, the role of World Bank was strengthened by the fact that 
its experts were very instrumental in determining the problems to be addressed and the 
actual design of the programs.) It is no accident that most decentralization initiatives 
and programs in education in the region are funded by World Bank loans; the World 
Bank has a clear and elaborate decentralization agenda, reﬂected in the cases of Croatia, 
Romania, and Serbia. However, the more money out of World Bank loans that was 
spent on building the institutional conditions and the required capacities for decen-
tralization, the greater the discrepancy between the actual readiness of the governments 
to share power with lower levels, and the underlying decentralization strategies of the 
World Bank programs that became more visible. For example, the World Bank funded 
a decentralization program in Serbia that was still being implemented when the new 
government removed decentralization from the policy vocabulary.
However, the European Union gradually took over the role of the World Bank in 
inﬂuencing government agendas in most countries of the region. It happened earlier 
as the ﬁrst of the South Eastern European countries joined the European Union (Bul-
garia and Romania), and will most likely happen again in the countries with candidate 
status (Croatia and Macedonia). Even in the rest of the countries, the IPA (Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance) funds of the EU are playing a remarkable and growing 
role. We should be aware that the EU agenda in this respect is rather ambiguous. Due 
to the limited “constitutional mandate” in education, the EU cannot nurture a ﬁrm 
position on how education systems are governed. Although education was dragged into 
the Open Method of Coordination, the overwhelming diversity of governance systems 
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in the member states prevents them from adopting governance patterns at the level of 
the European Union. As a result, EU initiatives are either connected to the levels of 
educational service delivery (e.g., quality assurance in schools in order to strengthen the 
trust behind the mutual recognition of qualiﬁcations since 1991) or to the outcomes of 
educational services that are set by EU indicators and benchmarks within the Lisbon 
Process. There are only two exceptions to the lack of policies addressing the actual way 
of governance: the policy on external quality evaluation systems from the end of the 
1990s (to the extent to which they are directly connected with school-based quality as-
surance) and, more recently, the national qualiﬁcation systems (to the extent to which 
they are considered to be the instruments for the implementation of the European 
Qualiﬁcations Framework). 
This ambiguity determines the impact of the EU on the decentralization agenda in 
South Eastern Europe. In theory, the strongest instrument of the EU is negotiating the 
education and training “chapter” during the admission process, but without having a 
clear policy mandate, such expectations are set only informally, if ever, for the countries 
preparing for EU enlargement. (The perception of the EU expectations by Croatians, 
Serbians, or Macedonians is a diﬀerent problem that is not necessarily strongly con-
nected to the expressed expectations.) A good example is Croatia: the European Union 
provided technical assistance to Croatia to design decentralization strategies for all rel-
evant public sectors, namely for education, among others. However, since the results of 
strategic planning could not be connected with accession negotiations, the ﬁrst chapter 
that was accomplished and closed was the one on education, without any follow-up of 
the strategy on education sector decentralization.
Other international donor agencies that are active in South Eastern Europe, such 
as UNESCO, the Open Society Foundations, USAID, or other government donor 
programs, are rather neutral in terms of the governance of education. Their programs 
are very much problem-oriented and focused on speciﬁc issues, such as early childhood 
education, inclusive education, civic education, in-service teacher training, or the edu-
cation of Roma children. These programs are working within the given framework of 
management and rarely address the systemic conditions of governance.
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C H A P T E R  2
The Rationales for Decentralization
When considering the possible reasons for decentralization in education, there are 
certain justiﬁcations that are general, that is, based on theoretical considerations or 
value orientations. But there are others that ﬂow from rather practical and contextual 
reasons, that is, from problems that decentralization has the potential to solve or reduce. 
In the discourse on decentralization, in most cases, the two kinds of argumentations 
are combined, sometimes mixed up and, very often, practical arguments are very much 
based on theoretical convictions and values. (Value orientations are not always consid-
ered to be a legitimate basis of argumentation in South Eastern Europe.) Although this 
summary of the rationales for decentralization will focus on the contextual relevance of 
practical justiﬁcations, it will start with a few insights on the general kinds of underlying 
reasons. As far as the practical rationale for decentralization is concerned, the possible 
reasons are summarized by many authors in many diﬀerent ways (Fiske 1996, Lauglo 
1997, Winkler 2000, Fiszbein 2001, Halász 2001). The second and third sections of 
this chapter are not new versions of already existing ones with the ambition of academic 
generalization; it selects from those justiﬁcations that are more relevant within the South 
Eastern European context. In addition to these, it supplements these arguments with 
others that were emphasized by Bulgarian2 or Croatian3 experts in the course of the 
development of strategic planning processes.
2.1 The Legitimacy of Decision-making: 
 Who Is Best Qualiﬁed to Decide?
The problem of legitimacy crisis as a common point of departure for decentralization 
eﬀorts was mentioned in the previous chapter. However, when it comes to the actual 
justiﬁcation of decentralization—and as a result, to the actual type of decentraliza-
tion—the diversity of underlying concepts and assumptions is striking. One aspect 
that has the potential of oﬀering a classiﬁcation for justiﬁcations for decentralization 
is the answer to the question: who is best qualiﬁed to make decisions, if not central 
government bureaucracies? In other words, what ensures the legitimacy of decision-
making? There are two possible sources of legitimacy: democratic decision-making and 
the professional quality of decisions. There are certain rationales for decentralization that 
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emphasize democratic legitimacy, while other justiﬁcations are based on professionalism 
that ensures eﬃciency and quality.
The requirement of democratic legitimacy calls for open decision-making procedures 
even at the expense of professionalism. From the point of view of decentralization the 
question is: who do the schools belong to? Are educational services the exclusive con-
cern of national interests, or they should serve the interest of local communities and/
or the clients of the service, too? The answer rarely locks out the interests of the second 
group. Ensuring local control over public services of local interests is one of the stron-
gest arguments in favor of decentralization. Decentralization aiming at strengthening 
democratic legitimacy of decision-making, often called political decentralization, that 
is, “assigning power to make decisions on education to citizens or their representatives 
at lower levels of government” (Fiske 1996). In practice, it means placing schools into 
the chain of local accountability relations (see Chapter 9). Decentralization is often 
based on direct political agendas. For example, in the mid-1980s in Hungary the main 
concern behind strengthening the autonomy of schools was kicking out the political 
inﬂuence of the ruling Communist Party from education. Also, one of the key goals of 
the education reform wave at the very beginning of the new century in Serbia was the 
democratization of education.
However, there is something that Jon Lauglo calls “populist localism.” According 
to this concept, schools are not the extensions of the state bureaucracy and not the 
property of professionals. Therefore, they should be governed directly and locally “by 
the people” (Lauglo 1996). It reminds us of two major implications. First of all, none 
of the rationales for decentralization may claim exclusivity in determining the direc-
tion of changes; they should be considered as the underlying basis for marking out 
the emphases of the design of the process. The other implication is a signal that we 
should try to avoid confusing value-based ideals with the concrete context of exercis-
ing authorities. For example, the “local community”—as it is referred to several times 
by education development programs—is an Anglo-Saxon Protestant social construct 
that, as such, does not necessarily exist in Central or South Eastern European countries. 
(For example, the equivalent term in Hungarian translates as “local society” that better 
reﬂects the highly-stratiﬁed character of the population of a village or an urban neighbor-
hood.) Lauglo also speaks about “sponsored populist localism,” when “non-government 
organizations coming in from outside the community, support informal educational 
initiatives in order to mobilize the poor” (Lauglo 1996). Again, our judgment on this 
must very much depend on the context. For example, if formal education systems are 
failing to reach out to Roma settlements and Roma are excluded from self-governance 
of the municipality, such initiatives should not be labeled as populist.
Rationales for decentralization that emphasize ensuring professional legitimacy are 
very diverse in terms of the kind of eﬃciency of decision-making they focus on. One of 
them is based on the assumption that market eﬃciency—being the perfect and ideal form 
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of accountability relations—should be applied in the realm of public services, too. We 
will return to the pros and cons of the arguments about market eﬃciency later in this 
book. Only one thing should be advanced here: the counter-arguments simply declaring 
that “education is diﬀerent” are unconvincing. Education is diﬀerent indeed, but not 
because of its esoteric humanistic nature, but because of the discretionary character of 
educational (or health) services (see Chapter 9). 
A rather traditional way of emphasizing professional legitimacy is the one based 
on administrative eﬃciency. The main concerns of the rationales under this heading are 
the old-fashioned requirements of public administration, all those aspects in which 
nineteenth-century bureaucracies were very successful, but are rarely achieved by 
government agencies at the beginning of the new millennium in the South Eastern 
Europe. The old concerns about reliability, calculability, accuracy, procedural unity, 
or the rather new ones about responsiveness or a client-centered civil service may call 
for administrative decentralization. In fact, in order to ensure that standards and other 
forms of regulations are complied with, management should be moved closer to the 
supervised area of state concern.
Another type of rationales emphasizing professional legitimacy is the one focusing 
on technical eﬃciency of decision-making. According to this alignment, what really 
matters is the eﬀectiveness of exercising authority that is measured partly by the extent 
to which the desired performance is achieved, and partly by the use of contemporary 
management techniques. It is often called managerialism but is viewed by many who 
regard education as a humanitarian mission simply importing management methods 
from business. (Speaking about performance management in education still sounds 
somewhat perverse in many countries.) To a certain extent this view is unfair; there is a 
great deal of work invested in the adaptation of management techniques to the speciﬁc 
realm of public services in general, among others to the governance and management of 
education. Moreover, sometimes it is the public sector that invents management solu-
tions that are taken over by business organizations. Nevertheless, when, for example, 
industrial quality assurance experts are forced to work together with educationalists, a 
real cultural clash may result from which both sides may beneﬁt a lot.
Promoting pedagogical eﬃciency (quality) is probably the most inﬂuential ratio-
nale for decentralization in education. Almost all aspects of education are extremely 
knowledge-intensive, high added-value activities performed by highly-trained special-
ists. Regardless of the perceived status of the teaching profession, the consensus about 
its high professional requirements is undiminished and the expectations of teachers are 
high. Therefore, the fact that educationalists are making certain decisions on their own, 
is something that is rarely challenged, in general. Pedagogical eﬃciency is a complex 
phenomenon; therefore, references to it are, rather, based on the matter of the impact 
of decision-making on the quality of educational services—whatever quality really 
means (see Chapter 5).
24
G O V E R N I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z E D  E D U C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
However, there is something that we may call “populist professionalism” (what Jon 
Lauglo calls participatory democracy). It refers to the attitude regarding the decision-
making in education as the natural monopoly of teachers, who should have a decisive 
role in exercising authority and who should govern the schools in a participatory way. 
Indeed, there are several education systems in which school-based decision-making is, to a 
large extent, deployed to the teaching corps and not to those who have any management 
authority. Also, teachers are often present in the local self-government councils in charge 
of education, or ministries of education are almost completely captured by teachers. 
Professional populism is deeply rooted in syndicalism; most of the time, this type of 
argumentation serves to protect the interests of teachers. (For example, the president of 
the largest teachers’ union in Bulgaria asked the minister of education and his advisors 
at a conference: “Did anybody behind the president’s table ever teach in a school?”)
The type of legitimacy that is emphasized is not simply a kind of argumentation. 
During the transition period of the 1990s, most Central and Eastern European coun-
tries went through a deep systemic change process that included a speedy or gradual 
decentralization of their education management systems. There are countries (such as 
Hungary) that moved towards democratic-political management systems that emphasize 
the political legitimacy of decision-making, while others (such as the Czech Repub-
lic) built administrative-professional management systems, in which the main focus is 
on expertise in decision-making (Radó 2001a). Therefore, the distinction between 
the two types of legitimacy is a handy tool to grasp certain systemic characteristics of 
management systems, too. It deﬁnitely does not mean that the power of intellectual 
approaches determine the systemic feature of education management systems. In fact, 
the evolution of institutional changes and the underlying justiﬁcations are both deeply 
rooted in the traditions of the countries, the political context of institutional change, 
and the characteristics of the inherited public administration systems. It is important 
to note that by referring to the two education management types (or to the two types 
of rationales) we do not mean to suggest that they are mutually exclusive. Our concern 
should be the opposite: in democratic-political management systems special attention 
should be paid to the professional quality of decision-making and vice versa.
Returning to the rationales of decentralization in education, the diﬀerent justiﬁ-
cations are very much based on social value orientations. However, some caution is 
recommended in connecting values, political alignments, and actual policies. Even in 
mature democracies where the ideological values of political parties are reliable selectors 
among policy options, shortcuts among values and policies would be problematic. It is 
even more than problematic in South Eastern Europe—it is impossible. Nevertheless, 
there are certain typical value orientations that have—rather indirect—implications for 
the rationale for decentralization (see Box 2.1). The reader should be reminded again, 
that in spite of the inﬂuence of these social value-based approaches on the type of ar-
gumentation, they do not directly determine the construct of the diﬀerent rationales 
for decentralization.
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Box 2.1
Value Orientation Approaches to Education
“The same for all.”—An egalitarian leftist approach with strong centralization align-
ment, often based on the reminiscences of the communist past.
“Quality for those who deserve it.”—An elitist, often conservative approach based on 
the ideologies and interests of the ruling elites, that typically promotes liberalization 
but not necessarily decentralization.
“Quality for those who can afford it.”—A free-market approach promoting decen-
tralization and privatization that emphasizes the power of the clients of educational 
services.
“Quality for all.”—A democratic liberal approach promoting decentralization and 
liberalization, emphasizing choice and equity in education at the same time.
—Radó 2001a
2.2 The Educational Agenda for Decentralization
Poor Results of Educational Services
A common feature of South Eastern Europe is the lack of a reliable internal assessment 
system that would provide information about the eﬀectiveness of educational services 
beyond the traditional statistical or anecdotal ones. (The results of talented children spe-
cially coached for competitions are still important “indicators” of the success of schools 
in the entire region.) However, in spite of the sporadic participation of the countries of 
the region, the major international student assessment surveys do provide some inter-
national comparative information. The picture they draw of the relative performance 
of the national educational systems of South Eastern Europe is rather mixed. According 
to the traditional ways of measuring student achievement (i.e., assessment on the basis 
of the common curricular elements), such as PIRLS and TIMMS, Bulgaria is among 
the top-performing European countries, while the education systems of Romania and 
Macedonia are performing poorly.
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Figure 2.1
The Achievement of Fourth Grade Students in Reading Literacy 
in Selected European Countries
Source: PIRLS 2006.
However, if the measurement is disconnected from the curricular basis and based 
on the assessment of everyday practical competences, as it happens in the PISA surveys, 
a diﬀerent picture emerges. According to the 2006 PISA survey, three eastern Balkan 
countries represent a clear regional pattern, while Croatia and Slovenia perform at the 
level of Central European countries.
This eastern Balkan pattern is even more striking when we look at the proportion 
of those 15-year-old students in the same PISA survey, who are performing at level one 
or lower (i.e., the proportion of functional illiterate students).
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Figure 2.2
Average Literacy Scores in Selected European Countries
Source: PISA 2006.
Figure 2.3 
Percentage of Pupils with Reading Literacy Proﬁciency Level One 
and Lower in Selected European Countries
Source: PISA 2006.
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It is important to note that performance indicators are proxies; they indicate certain 
quality-related problems but they are not identical to them. However, these signals are 
strong enough to urge policymakers to reconsider the traditional pattern of governing 
education. For example, some Central European countries (e.g., Germany, Austria, and 
Hungary) with much better PISA results went through a “PISA shock” when it turned 
out that their education curricula do not serve well the contemporary needs of the 
economy and social engagement. Since the beginning of this decade, most European 
countries invested large resources to foster the realignment of their education systems 
according to the lessons they learned from PISA. In most South Eastern European coun-
tries, however, PISA results did not cause much bother. For example, most Bulgarian 
experts are, rather, paying attention to the more favorable PIRLS data, while the Serbian 
Ministry of Education just recently made the ﬁrst steps to digest the signals that were 
sent already by a 2000 PISA survey.
The ‘Mystery’ of Bulgaria: Lessons 
By performing well in PIRLS yet performing far below the European average on the 
PISA survey, Bulgaria does not ﬁt well into the eastern Balkan performance pattern. 
Explaining this diﬀerence might be instructive for other countries of the region and 
may have certain implications for the decentralization agenda, too. 
Figure 2.4
Country Performance in Reading Literacy in PIRLS and PISA (2006)
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The two surveys each measure reading literacy using a diﬀerent criteria and at a 
diﬀerent age. Two possible interpretations of this huge diﬀerence of the performance 
of Bulgarian education system in the two assessment programs are: (1) inappropriate 
curricula (i.e., subject knowledge replicated in the curricula are not focused on the 
development of basic competencies), in addition to (2) a radical shift from classroom 
teaching to subject teaching, after which the development of reading comprehension 
of Bulgarian pupils stops. Keeping in mind the extreme diﬀerence between the perfor-
mances in the two surveys, we may assume that both reasons are relevant for Bulgaria. 
These problems deﬁnitely indicate serious quality problems that lead to poor overall 
average performance of the systems. 
We further approach an the explanation of the Bulgarian performance pattern if 
we look at the equity indicators of the countries of the region.
Figure 2.5
Relationship between Student Performance in Reading Literacy 
and the PISA Index of Economic, Social, and Cultural Status (ESCS) 2006.
(Score Point Diﬀerence Associated with One Unit on the ESCS Scale) 
These results show that the impact of the socio-economic and socio-cultural status 
of students on their learning in Bulgaria is huge (the highest in Europe), while other 
South Eastern European countries are closer to the European average in this respect. 
A secondary analysis of the PISA results for Hungary and other Central European 
countries proves that this strong relationship between student background and 
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achievement is the characteristic of highly selective education systems; unfair 
institutionalized selection magniﬁes the detrimental impact of social disadvantages 
on learning (Radó 2009). In other words, while the poor performance of Bulgaria is 
partly caused by unequal distribution of (traditional subject knowledge) quality, in 
Romania and Serbia relatively poor quality is “distributed more equally.” As a result, 
while the appropriate decentralization agenda in Bulgaria should focus on professional 
accountability systems in order to identify and improve underperforming schools, the 
agenda for Romania and Serbia might pay less attention to professional accountability 
and much more on the conditions for school-based development of education (see 
Chapter 12).
Quality-related Rationales for Decentralization
 • The narrow scope of quality in education. Due to the very centralized feature of 
the governance of education the only aspect of quality of educational services 
that is emphasized in South Eastern Europe is the compliance to central stan-
dards. Other aspects, such as clients’ satisfaction with the services, are almost 
completely ignored. Due to demographic reasons (the decline of the number of 
children) and the surplus capacities in all of the education systems of the region, 
those schools that attract more pupils and successfully ensure the satisfaction of 
parents have a greater chance of survival. Even if one does not emphasize the 
imperative of any services, the “satisfaction of the client” and the pure survival 
interest will force greater responsiveness from schools regarding the expectations 
of the pupils’ parents. Here, it is important to keep in mind that eﬀectiveness 
and client satisfaction are two distinct aspects of quality; parents and pupils 
are not necessarily the most satisﬁed with those schools that produce the best 
learning outcomes.
 • The heterogeneity of the clientele. As will be seen in Chapter 11, curricula reform 
in Romania or the introduction of new standards in Croatia did not dramatically 
change the centralized feature of the governance of education. The source of seri-
ous quality-related problems is the fact that the space within which schools can 
adjust to the very diverse needs of their students or respond to the characteristics 
of the social and cultural environment is very limited. We should not forget that 
the huge number of functionally illiterate 15-year-old students is not the failure 
of the students; it is the failure of the schools that are educating them. The in-
ability of schools to adjust leads to huge numbers of students who fail, both in 
terms of traditional progression indicators (e.g., dropout rates) and in terms of 
outcomes of learning. In addition, it is not simply about less central standards 
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and process regulations. The problem is that despite any eﬀorts, strong central 
regulation instruments—being controlled by specialist—tend to be extremely 
elitist by transmitting the exclusive cultural code of the educated middle class. 
The ﬁrst condition of any inclusive education is allowing the latitude for schools 
and teachers to opt out of these expectations.
 • Low motivation to change. One of the perceived obstacles in the region to the 
improvement of the quality of educational services is the very limited professional 
autonomy of teachers and schools. The limited space within which schools and 
teachers can consider the aims and goals of their own work and within which 
they are able to initiate changes for the sake of greater professional success, in 
many cases, causes informal deviation from the central regulations. It creates 
the feeling that high-quality work is not an expectation, what is needed is the 
relatively low added-value work of implementing centrally-set procedures. All 
these features of centralized systems seriously discourage teachers. International 
research proves that teachers are easily motivated by symbolic means and by 
greater professional responsibilities than by ﬁnancial incentives. For example, 
several examples prove that diﬀerentiated payment schemes, if not matched with 
greater autonomy and responsibility, are overridden by egalitarian in-school 
compensation policies.
 • Growing scale and complexity. The expansion of upper-secondary and tertiary 
education and the growing number of learning pathways that students can 
consider are making education systems increasingly complex. This complexity 
cannot be handled by rigid, centrally-set standards and direct central manage-
ment anymore. In addition to this, the more choice is introduced and the 
more diversity is allowed in the school network (that is the direct impact of the 
previous item in this list of rationales), the more central authorities will lose 
control over educational services. In this respect, decentralization might be 
promoted in order to regain control. Maintaining strong central control is not 
simply a hopeless endeavor; it is also not desirable. Contemporary mainstream 
educational policies (i.e., the lifelong learning paradigm) emphasize learning 
instead of teaching and diverse learning pathways rather than rigid school 
structures. The essential point here is the need to reconsider curriculum policy, 
professional services, quality evaluation, and other governance instruments in 
order to enhance the capacity of the system to handle its own complexity.
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2.3 The Non-educational Agenda: 
 Governance, Management, and Financing
Governance and Management
 • Connecting education with other services. During the last two decades there was 
a solid shift in the way mainstream international and most domestic policies 
consider the aims of education, and therefore how goals are set for educational 
services. The traditional intrinsic aims, such as the development of the personality 
of children or the transmission of cultural heritage are up for reconsideration, in 
light of the prominent instrumental aims, such as economic functions, ensuring 
social cohesion, strengthening political legitimacy, or modernization. Due to 
the prevailing instrumental approach to education, the need to better connect 
educational services with other public services serving the same goals (e.g., 
welfare and health services, labor market intervention, housing, etc.) is greater 
than ever. However, connecting all these instruments within the frameworks of 
policies targeting complex social or economic problems at the national level is 
extremely hard. (This is the reason why governments typically fail in dealing with 
extremely complex problems such as low labor market activity or the marginal-
ization of Roma.) Even if policy coordination were improved or sectoral policies 
were put under stronger government control (as was the case in this decade in 
the United Kingdom or in Hungary), educational policies would remain very 
much determined by the internal logic of the sector. However, at lower levels, 
by engaging territorial development systems or by deploying control over public 
service delivery to local self-governments, the integration of sectoral policies is 
much easier. 
 • The political agenda: democratization and openness. After many decades of com-
munist regimes, democratization of the governance of education was deﬁnitely 
one of the most decisive underlying purposes of the many reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. This aspect of governance seems 
to be less emphasized in most South Eastern European countries, partly because 
of weaker self-governance traditions and partly because of disillusionment in the 
postwar Balkan period. Additionally, citizens’ consciousness as taxpayers (whose 
natural right is to inﬂuence how public resources are spent) is even weaker in 
this region than in Central Europe. Nevertheless, there are certain political 
forces and a strong NGO sector that are keeping the expectations related to 
open democratic governance alive. Also, important stakeholders’ groups not 
involved in decision-making processes often claim more transparent and open 
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governance procedures. However, in certain cases, promoting “democratic solu-
tions,” such as the appointment of directors by school boards, is simply based 
on the kind of mistrust that was brieﬂy discussed in the previous chapter.
 • Managing ethnic diversity. A unique feature of the postwar situation in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia is the great emphasis on reducing ethnic 
tensions and supporting reconciliation. Cooling ethnic conﬂicts is an aspect 
that inﬂuences major decisions on governance and management of education, 
too. The most obvious example is the Ohrid Framework Agreement signed in 
2001 by the representatives of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and the central 
government. The agreement prescribes the decentralization of education to the 
level of municipalities. This was the basis of decentralization measures imple-
mented from 2005. This aspect is revealed in relation to the “municipalization” 
of management of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, too. In general, even if 
the ethnic dimension is not referred to overtly in other countries in the region, 
due to strong ethnic and religious identities than dwarf civic identity, this lurk-
ing consideration often inﬂuences approaches to decentralization.
 • Problems in the ﬂow of information The information basis of governance in the 
centralized systems of South Eastern Europe is typically poor. The type of infor-
mation that is used rarely goes beyond raw statistical data on participation (not 
available at a lower aggregation level than the schools), anecdotal information, 
that is, the necessarily limited personal experience of policymakers and the 
information provided by the huge administrative reporting burden of actors at 
lower levels that are rarely processed fully. Therefore, when struggling with the 
contemporary challenges to education, a frequent complaint is the lack of infor-
mation: lack of data on dropouts, special needs children educated in integrated 
settings, the participation of Roma, or any other matters of policy relevance. 
One way of dealing with this problem is moving decision-making closer to 
those who have easier access to the necessary information and channel it into 
the decision-making. However, there is a paradox that renders the identiﬁcation 
of this solution more diﬃcult: we should know a lot in order to recognize how 
much we do not know. Many of the employees of the central administration 
of education share the “optimism of the poorly informed.” Therefore, anything 
more than the types of available information are often relegated to the realm of 
“research” and investment into information systems is not necessarily a main 
concern of policymakers. Another similar obstacle is the problem of informa-
tion monopolies; sharing information is like sharing power. Since the access to 
information of public interest is not properly ensured and, due to the lack of 
online information management systems, access even to existing information 
is rather diﬃcult.
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Financing of Education
 • Scarcity of public resources. By international comparison, most South Eastern 
European countries spend less on education than other European countries. 
The reason for this is partly the very small contribution of municipalities and 
parents to the cost of education. Since space for increasing central budget 
spending is limited, the governments are seeking additional resources that 
can be channeled into the ﬁnancing of education. Putting more of the cost of 
education on parents also has its political price. Therefore—choosing the path 
of least resistance—this is one of the strongest practical arguments in favor of 
deploying the responsibility for education to municipalities.
Figure 2.6
Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP (2004)
 • Low eﬃciency of funding. Financing educational services on an “historical basis” 
(that is, on the basis of the previous year’s budget) is ﬂexible, and in the course 
of annual budget bargaining, it can adjust to major changes in terms of the 
service tasks that the schools perform. However, under the pressure of eﬃciency, 
problems mainly caused by the declining number of students, the apparent lack 
of eﬃciency of this allocation mechanism becomes more visible. Therefore, 
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most countries moved or are planning to move to a formula-based normative 
allocation system typically calculated on the basis of the number of students 
enrolled (per-capita ﬁnancing). However, while it ensures the basic conditions of 
eﬃciency, it is rigid and does not easily adjust to diversities of the speciﬁc costs 
of the service. As a result, moving to normative ﬁnancing almost automatically 
generates the need to build those mechanisms at the local level that create the 
balance between eﬃciency and ﬂexibility (see Chapter 10). These mechanisms 
are even more important if choice and program diversity are introduced in 
education; if it happens, correcting the per-capita-based central ﬁnancing by 
program and service speciﬁcations based on local ﬁnancing regimes becomes a 
major requirement for the eﬃciency of ﬁnancing.
 • Low eﬀectiveness of the use of development funds. It is not only the regular ﬁnancial 
allocation system that is the subject of eﬃciency-related concerns. Due to the 
limited absorption capacity of the municipalities and schools, the actual use of 
development resources also raises several questions. If development of educa-
tion is not based on situation analysis and planning in the municipalities and 
schools, development is either based on the “one-size-ﬁts-all” type of spending 
or on showering money on schools without any hope that these resources will 
really generate change. One of the examples for this concern is the allocation 
of small EU structural funds to ﬁnance grants to schools for extracurricular ac-
tivities in Bulgaria that do not necessarily impose any impact on the quality of 
mainstream teaching and that are most probably unsustainable. As seen in the 
previous section about the educational rationale for decentralization, building 
the conditions for the eﬀective use of domestic or international development 
funds also calls for greater local and institutional autonomy.
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C H A P T E R  3
Decentralization: 
Deﬁnitions, Taxonomies, and Functions
Since the purpose of this reading is rather practical, a comparative overview on the vast 
literature of decentralization or an in-depth academic discussion of its underlying theo-
retical foundations will not be attempted. However, precisely because of the diversity 
of approaches and the uses of specialized terms, some clariﬁcation of the meaning of 
decentralization is inevitable. Apart from bringing certain intellectual order to the use 
of terminology (at least for the purposes of this volume), this chapter aims at oﬀering an 
analytical framework that allows for “unpacking” and structuring the extremely diverse 
and complicated matters strategies for decentralization should concern. Also, this exercise 
will allow for streamlining the discussion in the following chapters by determining those 
aspects of decentralization that are most relevant to South Eastern Europe.
3.1 The Forms and Targets of Transferring Authority
In the most general sense, decentralization is transferring authority from the central level 
to lower levels of management. Therefore, at ﬁrst glance, decentralization refers to the 
locus where certain education management authorities are exercised. The heart of the 
transfer of authorities is the distribution of decision-making competencies among the 
actors of management at diﬀerent levels. 
The reallocation of decision-making authorities can happen in many diﬀerent ways. 
The most typical ones are deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. However, the 
more time we dedicate to exploring the meaning of the terms used for describing the 
various forms of decentralization in the literature, the more confusion we may face. 
Since this book does not serve pure academic purposes, with the reader’s permission, 
we can simply bypass the comparative analysis of the terminology and instead oﬀer a 
description of each of the forms with limited academic legitimacy, but with the poten-
tial of practical applicability. Nevertheless, since these terms are used in many diﬀerent 
ways in diﬀerent languages independent from the diversity of deﬁnitions in the English 
language, in certain cases the diﬀerent understandings of the three forms of decentral-
ization will be indicated.
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Deconcentration
Deconcentration is considered to be the weakest form of decentralization. It refers to 
the transfer of certain administrative authorities to lower levels of administration that 
is directly subordinated to a central government agency. The purpose of transferring 
decision-making is simply to bring it closer to the users of the service, that is, decon-
centration is aiming to increase the eﬃciency of central administration. However, the 
central agency (e.g., the Ministry of Education) remains responsible for the actual task 
and for the actions of its deconcentrated agent. For example, the directors of the schools 
are appointed in Bulgaria by the Regional Inspectorates on behalf of the minister of 
education. The Regional Educational Oﬃces in Serbia (Skolska Uprava, sometimes 
translated as Regional Departments) are not only managed directly by the Ministry of 
Education, they are part of the organization of the ministry. In most cases the deconcen-
trated decisions are typically implementation types of matters, and strategic and policy 
decisions are kept at the central level. For example, ﬁnancial management, that is, the 
allocation of resources to individual schools, is administered by the Regional Depart-
ments in Serbia. Deconcentrated agencies not necessarily organized for the diﬀerent 
sectors are separate units. For example, in Croatia, the Ministry of Science, Education, 
and Sports does not operate its own deconcentrated agencies, but it is the County State 
Oﬃces that participate in the implementation of educational policies. However, the 
typical pattern of deconcentration in South Eastern Europe is to stuﬀ everything into 
one single organization; the Regional Departments in Serbia or the Regional Inspector-
ates in Romania and Bulgaria are the depositories of diverse administrative, professional 
support, professional evaluation, and ﬁnancial management tasks.
Obviously, the geographical dispersion of speciﬁed administrative functions is not a 
real transfer of authority among the diﬀerent levels of management. “Deconcentration 
does not weaken the role of the state. (…) It would seem, that deconcentration is an 
eﬃciency measure that is more suited for expanding the state services than for slim-
ming down those that exist” (Lauglo 1997). Due to its potential to increase eﬃciency 
of central governance of education, deconcentration is widely used even in extremely 
decentralized education systems. For example, in Hungary the regional branches of the 
Education Authority (an executive oﬃce of the Ministry of Education and Culture) 
perform certain external assessment-related tasks.
Delegation
Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralization. Through delegation, central 
governments transfer decision-making authorities to organizations that are not fully 
controlled by the center. Although these organizations may have a great deal of discre-
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tion, the statutory basis of decentralization is, in most cases, rather weak. In the case of 
delegation, the transfer of decision-making is temporary, and the delegated task can be 
withdrawn quite easily. Therefore, decentralization by delegation does not create the 
necessary stability for medium- or long-term planning and allows little room to clearly 
(re)deﬁne the roles of the actors at the lower levels. The same applies to cases when 
certain services are delegated (contracted out) to private services; when the contract 
expires, the delegation decision is automatically reconsidered. It protects the higher-level 
agency in the case of delegating educational or professional services but might be very 
detrimental in the case of genuine public administration functions. Privatization is a 
particular form of delegation, because it does not necessarily move the actual service 
out from the realm of public services. For example, the owner of a private school may 
also obliged to implement the national core curriculum or public health and safety 
regulations that are set for schools at the national level.
A good example is Bulgaria, where decentralization measures so far were based on 
“delegation,” that is, while keeping their responsibility for certain tasks, management 
actors “delegate” some of their decision-making competences to lower-level actors. This 
pattern applies to all relevant levels: funds and related decision-making competencies 
are delegated to municipalities; municipalities delegate decision-making competencies 
either to the directors of the schools or to submunicipal entities (the kmestvo). It creates 
a chain of delegation that leaves the “constitutional framework” of public administration 
untouched. In Bulgaria, the delegation of management authorities from the central level 
to the municipalities is based on the distinction between local tasks and delegated tasks. 
Local tasks are those rather marginal services that are not compulsory to provide, and 
therefore are funded by the revenue of the self-government. All other public services 
that all citizens should have access to are tasks of “national interest,” and therefore kept 
within the responsibility of the central government. For example, it is still the ministry 
that is entitled to open or close a school. As a result, delegation is not based on legisla-
tion; the tasks delegated to municipalities are regulated by a government decree on an 
annual basis.4 
Devolution
Devolution is the transfer of authority over speciﬁc public functions to subnational levels 
or autonomous organizations. The distinctive feature of devolution is its statutory nature; 
the fact that it occurs on the basis of legislation. “Devolution is the most far-reaching 
form of decentralization in that the transfer of authority over ﬁnancial, administrative, 
or pedagogical matters is permanent and cannot be revoked at the whim of central of-
ﬁcials” (Fiske 1996). In most cases, it is not simply the decision-making authority that 
is deployed to regional or local self-governments or to schools; rather, certain mandatory 
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tasks are devolved, that are entailing certain decision-making obligations. For example, 
in Hungary it is the mandatory task of local self-governments to provide primary edu-
cation services to children living on their territory. If the self-government decides to 
provide educational service by an own school, the director of the school is appointed 
by the council of the self-government simply because the school is its own institution. 
(As it would be the same in the case of a local water supply or forestry enterprises.) 
Although the central government may interfere in the way devolved tasks are performed 
(e.g., by setting qualiﬁcation requirements for directors), it is only the law that may 
constrain the autonomy of the actors at the lower levels. Typically, decentralization by 
devolution goes together with the expansion of the latitude within which autonomous 
actors (self-governments, schools, etc.) regulate matters that were once regulated by 
the central government in the centralized system. This latitude depends on the actual 
scope of autonomy determined by laws. As will be seen, decentralization by devolution 
has major implications for all other aspects of decentralization in education beyond 
decision-making authorities.
The Targets of Authority Transfer
As far as the targets of authority transfer are concerned, it can be any of the lower levels of 
management of education or any private organizations. In general, we are diﬀerentiating 
four major levels of public management: the national, regional, local, and institutional 
levels. However, the diversity of administrative divisions in diﬀerent countries does not 
always make the comparison easy and unambiguous. For example, when we refer to 
regions, it may mean three diﬀerent territorial units with typically diﬀerent functions. 
Sometimes larger territorial areas (NUTS 1) established on a historical basis, such as 
Dalmatia (Dalmacija) in Croatia, or Transdanubium (Dunántúl) in Hungary. The other 
possible regional units are the “statistical regions” (NUTS 2) that serve as statistical 
units within the European Union. Finally, there are smaller regional territories than the 
statistical ones (NUTS 3) that in most countries are called counties (oblast, judet, megye, 
etc.) or regions. The local level is no less ambiguous. Since in South Eastern Europe 
the average size of municipalities is rather large, the individual settlements often form 
a submunicipal level of self-government.
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Box 3.1
The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
(NUTS, Nomeclature d’unités territoriales statistiques)
NUTS is a standard for referencing the administrative divisions of countries devel-
oped by the European Union. The NUTS divisions do not necessarily correspond to 
administrative divisions within the separate countries, and it serves mainly statistical 
purposes. It also provides the framework for the allocation of the structural funds 
of the EU. There are three NUTS levels with two levels for local administrative units 
(LAUs, NUTS 4 and 5 levels). The local levels were ofﬁcially abolished in 2003. The 
minimum population size requirements and classiﬁcation procedural rules also were 
set in 2003 to ensure greater uniformity within the European Union. This may cause 
problems, for example, in Croatia, where the population size of ﬁve historical regions 
does not allow for establishing separate statistical regions for each. In other coun-
tries (e.g., in Hungary) the establishment of statistical regions gradually entails the 
development of a new administrative unit partly by deconcentration to the NUTS 2 
level, partly by the evolution of an integrated territorial development system.
Determining the actors at any lower levels is no less complicated. The identiﬁcation 
of the decision-maker is obvious in the case of deconcentration (branches of central 
government agencies), and in the case of privatization (a private organization selected by 
open tendering). It must be noted that from the point of view of public services, all non-
public types of organizations are considered to be “private”: associations, foundations, 
trade unions, churches, private enterprises, international organizations, individuals, etc. 
In all these cases private organizations provide public service on a contractual basis—in 
theory—on equal terms. Just to broaden the blur around privatization, it should be 
mentioned that there are quasi-private organizations, such as the “public foundations” in 
Hungary that are organizations established by government agencies or self-governments 
operating under the legislation on nonproﬁt organizations.
In the cases of devolution and delegation (apart from privatization), the targets are 
very often much less obvious. The most plausible targets for authority transfer would be 
regional and local self-governments and schools with certain ﬁnancial, organizational, 
and professional autonomy. Indeed, in most cases in the course of decentralization, 
educational management authorities are devolved to these actors. However, it often 
happens that the delegation or devolution of decision-making mandates evades local 
self-governments or the management of schools. This happens if school boards are 
established to govern a local network of schools or individual institutions. 
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To a large extent, determining the actual target (level and agent) depends on the 
underlying value orientations already outlined in Chapter 1. However, there are other 
aspects that may distort the obvious implications of values or other strategic consider-
ations. One of the most important is the perceived technical (organizational, ﬁnancial, 
and professional) capacity of the actors. What really matters in this respect is perception; 
very often, the typical argumentation is based on perceptions about the capacities of 
various actors without seriously considering the improvement of the required capacities. 
Another typical aspect in South Eastern Europe is the lack of trust in certain actors. 
For example, local self-governments are often mistrusted by professionals because of 
the extensive political interference or the widespread corruption that may lead to the 
reorganization of local school system in order to liberate school facilities for “privatiza-
tion.” In other cases, school directors are mistrusted by teachers or local self-government 
representatives because of the potential abuse of their extended managerial power. As a 
result, sometimes school boards are established in order to balance “the threat” of the 
power of local self-governments, mayors, or school directors. Sometimes local actors seek 
“protection” from the central government that is the major obstacle to decentralization 
initiatives. Historical experiences with certain forms of management may also distort 
the “logical” distribution of authorities. For example, in the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, decentralization is often identiﬁed with the “self-management” system.
Subsidiarity
Due to the top-down nature of decentralization in education, the basic questions are 
related to the appropriate levels and actors to whom the authorities of the central 
government are to be delegated or devolved. However, on the basis of the principle of 
subsidiarity an opposite logic might be applied: what should be kept centralized and why? 
Subsidiarity is an organizing principle according to which central authority should 
have subsidiary (supplementary) functions only. It means that central governments 
should perform only those tasks that cannot be performed eﬀectively at a more im-
mediate level, that is, those tasks that are closed to the actual action and where the 
necessary information is available. It applies to lower hierarchical relations, as well; if a 
task can be performed in a school, the decision should not be pushed to the local level, 
etc. (Subsidiarity is best known as the guiding principle of the European Union as it 
was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.) 
The promoters of decentralization very often refer to the principle of subsidiarity, but 
its underlying logic is very rarely applied. For example, in the discourse on decentraliza-
tion, the type of argumentation that justiﬁes why certain authorities should retain some 
matters for central governance is rather used by the opponents of decentralization, not by 
those who are seeking to deﬁne the borders of decentralization. The point of departure 
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of devolving everything to institutional or local levels with certain well-justiﬁed excep-
tions is an approach pursued only in historically federal states. The focus of the design 
of decentralization initiatives in Central and South Eastern Europe is very much the 
top-down identiﬁcation of decision-making authorities to be deployed to lower levels. 
However, the principle of subsidiarity is still relevant for a non-federalist constitutional 
context, too. An educational governance and management system is never clearly cen-
tralized or decentralized. Decentralization of certain authorities may create the need for 
much more clearly-deﬁned central authorities or even the establishment of new ones. 
For example, decentralized and/or privatized in-service teacher training systems may call 
for the introduction of a central quality assurance system. The principle of subsidiarity 
is a useful mental tool for the redeﬁnition of the role of upper levels of management.
A Connected Instrument: Deregulation 
There are authors who consider deregulation—by which central government control 
is reduced or eliminated—as a distinct form of transferring authority to lower level 
management (Halász 2001a). Indeed, if our point of departure is the assumption that 
if something not expressly prohibited or regulated can be done freely, then deregula-
tion (the withdrawal of regulations) in fact transfers authority in an indirect way by 
widening the latitude of actions at lower levels. However, the underlying purpose is not 
necessarily weakening or eliminating central control; in several cases the justiﬁcation 
for deregulation is the assumption that fewer and simpler regulations increase the eﬃ-
ciency of control. In addition to this, one of the typical characteristics of the behavior 
of lower-level actors in very centralized systems, who are overwhelmed by the huge 
administrative burden, is that they are doing only that which was deployed to them 
as a regulated mandate. Deregulation is an instrument that can be used in connection 
to any forms of decentralization or even without any transfer of authorities. On the 
other hand, devolution of decision-making authorities cannot be achieved without the 
removal of old regulations or without replacing them with procedural regulations. Also, 
decentralization may generate the need for new types of regulations, such as setting 
quality standards for services that are not managed centrally anymore.
Summary: Types of Decentralization
We often talk about diﬀerent types of decentralization. These types are constructed partly 
on the basis of the underlying purpose of decentralization measures (the rationale) and 
partly on the basis of the actors to which former central government authorities are 
deployed. The most frequently mentioned types are administrative, political, professional, 
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and economic (market) decentralization. Administrative decentralization simply moves 
the locus of decision-making to a lower level of administration without involving non-
administrative actors. Political decentralization implies deploying authority to regional 
or local bodies that are elected through a political procedure, or to administrative 
actors who are appointed and supervised by politically-elected bodies. Professional 
decentralization (or service delivery decentralization) means deploying decision-making 
authorities to the professional staﬀ of schools (i.e., to management and teachers). 
Economic decentralization is contracting out certain functions to market organizations. 
We will later return to the decentralization of certain functional governance instruments, 
such as the decentralization of the allocation of ﬁnancial resources (often referred to 
as ﬁscal decentralization) or the decentralization of curriculum (often referred to as 
decentralized curriculum policy). All of these core types of decentralization may apply 
to the decentralization of these instruments, although not all of the combinations are 
typical or even plausible.
The major types of decentralization—with the mild risk of simpliﬁcations—can 
be connected with the diﬀerent forms of transferring authority. The obvious cases are 
administrative decentralization that is achieved by deconcentration and economic de-
centralization, because it is achieved only through delegation. (If the control of certain 
services is “devolved” to market organizations, they are no longer public services.) Politi-
cal decentralization can be achieved either by delegation or devolution, but due to the 
constitutional nature of self-governance the previous case is rare. The primary meaning 
of professional decentralization is delegating or devolving authorities to schools. 
Table 3.1
Targets and Form of Authority Transfer
Targets of authority transfer Forms of transferring authority
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Regional branches of central government Administrative — —
Regional or local self-governments — Political Political
Schools — Professional Professional
Private organizations — Economic —
It is important to note that the long process of decentralization almost never occurs 
according to a clear pattern. There might be phases in which political decentralization is 
the main goal, while the next government may focus on professional decentralization. 
Also, although professional legitimacy might be the main concern in certain phases of 
decentralization, it is often connected with certain elements of political decentralization. 
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In the case of delegation or devolution to lower levels of education management, the 
professional guarantees of the quality of decision-making are also considered.
3.2 Decision-making Competencies and Functions
The Taxonomies of Decision-making
The extent to which an education management system is centralized or decentralized is 
measured by the actual distribution of decision-making authorities among the diﬀer-
ent levels. By mapping out decision-making assignments, the weight of diﬀerent actors 
can be assessed and the skeleton of the whole of governance and management can be 
described. All sorts of analyses prove that in most countries certain functional segments 
of management systems are equally rarely “centralized” or “decentralized.” 
The use of this measure leads to the development a taxonomy of decisions made 
in education management on a regular basis. These taxonomies are not always devel-
oped for pure analytical reasons; very often they group these decisions into diﬀerent 
“functions.” For the sake of demonstration, a few examples for education management 
functions follow in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2
Four Examples of Education Management Functions
Welsh and McGinn 
1999
Winkler and Gershber 
2000
Halász
2001a
Winkler
2001
• Mission
• Operations
• Personnel
• Client
• Finance
• Organization of 
instruction
• Personnel 
management
• Planning and 
structures
• Resources
• Organization of 
teaching
• Personnel
• Planning and 
structures
• Student progression
• Ensuring quality
• Ensuring financial 
resources
• School organization
• Curriculum and 
teaching methods
• Examinations and 
supervision
• Teacher recruitment 
and compensation
• Finance of recurrent 
costs
• School construction 
and finance
These taxonomies of decisions might be good instruments for institutional analy-
sis. However, in spite of the similar elements of these clusters, they are not necessarily 
instrumental in determining the major functions of management of education. The 
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main reason for this is the fact that decentralization is not simply the redistribution 
of responsibilities for the same functions among diﬀerent actors, for in the course of 
decentralization the functions are changing themselves. For example, simply mapping 
out the decision-making mandates of diﬀerent actors in relation to the curriculum does 
not necessarily gives any insight about the actual type of curriculum (e.g., is it oriented 
towards regulating inputs, processes, or outcomes?). In fact, these types of decisions 
combine two aspects: the classic management functions (planning, organizing, staﬃng, 
directing, and controlling) and the functional areas of educational management, such as 
curriculum and standards, the allocation of ﬁnancial resources, or quality evaluations. 
Table 3.3
Taxonomy of Education Management Decisions
Taxonomy of Education Management Decisions
• Governance
 – Policy
 – Planning
 – Implementation
• School Organization
 – Structure
 – Minimum requirement
• Financing
 – Recurrent
 – Development
• Training
 – In-service
 – Pre-service
 – Management
• Curriculum
 – Subjects
 – Textbooks
 – Textbook provision 
 – Language policy
 – Instructional methods
 – Evaluation of teachers
• Monitoring
 – Accreditation
 – Examinations
 – Pupil promotions
 – Discipline
 – Data systems
 – School evaluation
• Research
 – Needs
 – Conduct
 – Implementation
Sharing of Decision-making
Mapping out the distribution of decision-making competencies is further complicated 
because decision-making is frequently shared among diﬀerent actors, and very often 
among diﬀerent levels. The sharing of decision-making authority is growing even more 
widespread in the course of decentralization, so we may say that decentralization is 
equally about delegation/devolution and power sharing. So the changing nature of the 
functional areas of governance and management makes them multiplayer instruments. 
For example, within the framework of a national core curriculum, schools may develop 
school-based curricula that are approved by local self-governments as the owners of the 
schools. Estimating the actual weight of authority of all the players involved is extremely 
diﬃcult, and it is not a simple question of decision-making authority anymore. Keeping 
with the same example, a local self-government may have priorities based on the view of 
the potential of how the schools should contribute to local social and economic policies. 
In this case the expectations of the owners might be incorporated into the pedagogical 
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program of the school. In other cases, the only matters that local self-governments may 
consider are the ﬁnancial implications of the school curriculum. In both cases the actual 
authority of the local self-governments is the same, although the role they play in the 
decision-making process is very diﬀerent.
To a certain extent, by the devolution of decision-making competencies, procedural 
regulations replace the role of discretional, ad-hoc, case-by-case, or regulated administra-
tive decision-making at the upper levels of government. It is partly caused by the fact 
that devolution to lower level does not cancel the responsibility of the central government; 
simply, the way this responsibility exercised is changing. Therefore, by setting procedural 
rules and by issuing standards that to a certain extent determine the content of decision 
made at the lower level, central government remains an important actor of decision-
making. However, procedural regulation might be very remote and indirect. For example, 
a law may prescribe for local self-governments to adopt a statute that ensures the open 
selection of school directors in line with the centrally-issued qualiﬁcation requirements.
The sharing of decision-making contains another distinction: participation in 
decision-making is not identical to actual decision-making authority. There are several 
actors involved in decision-making in various consultative roles. At the national level, 
a government decision on the curriculum is preceded by mandatory consultations with 
expert councils that sometimes have very strong mandates. For example, the government 
can issue new curricula or standards only with the consent of the Education Council 
in Serbia or that of the National Public Education Council in Hungary. At other levels 
even narrow decision-making competencies are deployed to consultative bodies, such 
as those governing the allocation of certain funds by regional development councils. In 
Hungary, local self-government should make their decision on the approval of the peda-
gogical programs of schools partly on the basis of the assessment of independent experts. 
Separating the formal and informal consultative roles is important. Before the 
appointment of a school director, a city’s mayor may consult with the teachers in an 
informal way in order to check how much internal support will be provided to his or her 
nominee for the position. This hint of wisdom on the part of the mayor does not mean 
that teachers are part of the decision-making process in any consultative role. However, 
if any central regulation or the statute of the city self-government prescribes this con-
sultation, without which the major is not authorized to forward his or her proposal to 
the council of the city, the teachers then become actors in the formal decision-making 
process. This distinction applies to any level of governance and management and to 
all types of decisions. (As will be seen in Chapter 15, the scope of consultation in the 
course of the design and management of policymaking is much wider; before making 
policy decisions, all relevant stakeholders are to be consulted regardless of their formal 
involvement in decision-making. For example, when setting qualiﬁcation requirements 
for school directors, the association of school directors is worth involving, even if the 
Ministry of Education has no any regulated mandate in this respect.)
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To sum up, mapping out decision-making authority could be done using the 
underlying logic of the educational management matrix, which connects the speciﬁc 
types of decisions that are made on a regular basis (without which the normal opera-
tion of education systems can not be ensured) and the speciﬁc actors participating in 
decision-making procedures. When listing individual decisions, it is important to do 
some “unpacking”; if a decision is shared, then all individual components of the actual 
decision should be separated. For example, during the complex appointment process 
of school directors, separate lines should be created for the decision on the required 
qualiﬁcations, on the decision on nomination, on the actual decision on appointment, 
and the decision on contracting (that set employment conditions). When the actors 
of decision-making are listed, it is not enough to incorporate only those who have (or 
will have) actual decision-making authority. Those who have a regulatory mandate and 
those who are involved in the process in any formal consultative role also should be 
incorporated.
Two Distinct Approaches to Decentralization
Setting the framework for discussion on decentralization should be based on making 
the distinction between two possible approaches to decentralization in education. We 
are often talking about decentralization in a narrow technical sense on the basis of a 
management-oriented approach, or sometimes in a broader sense from an educational 
service provider point of view. The two approaches are diﬀerent in terms of their scope 
and their points of departure. 
According to the public administration (management) approach, decentralization 
refers to the distribution of decision-making competencies among the levels and actors 
of management of education. Therefore, the scope of management decentralization rarely 
goes beyond a strong focus on public administration and ﬁscal decentralization. For 
example, within the framework of this meaning, the directors of schools are regarded 
as the lowest level administration agents.
According to the service delivery (educational) approach, decentralization refers to the 
division of labor between genuine public administration agents and educational service 
delivery institutions with professional, organizational, and ﬁnancial autonomy. From the 
point of view of schools—in spite of the actual priorities of the staﬀ of the institutions 
in this respect—how diﬀerent decision-making competencies are distributed among 
the national, regional, and local public administration levels is not necessarily a mat-
ter of great concern. What matters is the extent of their autonomous decision-making 
authority. Returning to the previous example, according to this approach, the directors 
of schools are regarded as the managers of school-based professional decision-making 
and development.
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Also, the scope of this approach is diﬀerent. Schools are not only subjects of manage-
ment and ﬁnancing; their work greatly depends on all other resources they consume (such 
as in-service training programs and all sorts of professional support services). Therefore, 
from an institutional point of view, the extent to which they control the supply of these 
essential recourses is also part of the decentralization saga. An additional aspect of school 
autonomy is quality evaluation. The work of the schools is evaluated by professional 
bodies (inspectorates) in a great majority of European countries. The extent of the pro-
fessional autonomy of schools determines the type of external evaluation: whether it is 
oriented to external control of the work of the school staﬀ on the basis of rigid national 
standards or designed to support the self-evaluation of rather autonomous schools that 
set goals for themselves within frameworks set at the national level? 
The distinction between the two approaches is partially inﬂuenced by the lenses 
through which educational, economic, or public administration experts view the world. 
(Moreover, due to the very weak public policy approach to education in Central and 
South Eastern Europe, communication among the experts of diﬀerent professions is 
rather sporadic.) However, the relevance of this distinction ﬂows from something more 
than the diﬀerent perspective of various professionals. It is the emerging whole-school 
approach to education that makes this distinction even more explicit. 
The whole-school approach is the result of the gradual shift of emphasis from 
teacher-centered educational services to those focusing on the teaching of students. 
Especially, since the contemporary goals of education are not determined in a manner 
that easily allows for their assignment to individual teachers, the need to reconsider how 
teachers cooperate and how their work is managed is attracting some attention. We will 
return to the details of the whole-school approach in Part 2 of this volume. What is 
important to indicate here is that this approach has major implications for governance 
and management of education: their primary target is not teaching and the individual 
teacher anymore—it is the school as an organization. In Part 3 we will see that all major 
governance instruments are also reorganized accordingly.
3.3 The Systemic Environment: 
 Functional Instruments of Governance
An obvious consequence of these two previous approaches to decentralization is that 
an analytical framework should equally incorporate the characteristics of service delivery 
institutions (schools) and the systemic environment of schools. The systemic environment 
is composed by those functional governance instruments that are (1) used in order to 
set goals for educational services, (2) through which all sorts of resources like ﬁnancial 
and human resources, knowledge and information, instruments used in the process of 
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teaching and learning, etc., are allocated to the schools. Together, these components 
create a space within which schools are operated and managed, and within which the 
staﬀ of the schools can consider how they provide educational services. In decentralized 
education systems most policies are implemented through these instruments. The most 
important ones are the following:
 • Management of education,
 • Allocation of ﬁnancial resources,
 • Curriculum and standards (“content regulation”),
 • Quality evaluation,
 • Initial teacher training,
 • Professional services (among others: in-service training),
 • Textbook publishing and the supply of teaching materials, and
 • Information systems, research, and development.
Later, it will become clear that one of the most important impacts of service delivery 
decentralization is the rapid growth of the kind and amount of various services that 
schools, teachers, and students consume. The provision of knowledge, information, new 
types of content carriers (e.g., digital learning object) and new types of school-based ac-
tivities that require external support lead to the evolution of a more and more diversiﬁed 
external support system. The process is very similar to the evolution of modern armies, 
in which the number of soldiers who actually ﬁght (“frontline professionals”) is decreas-
ing, while the number of those who support the ﬁghters is increasing and their activities 
are becoming more diversiﬁed. Likewise, the evolution of modern education systems 
is similar, with the additional feature of decentralization that speeds up this process.
Figure 3.1
The Systemic Environment of Educational Service Delivery
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As a result of the ongoing functional diﬀerentiation, all of these governance instru-
ments are becoming separate subsystems. (In certain cases they even integrate subsystems 
within the subsystem, such as in the case of the separate pillars of quality evaluation: 
external assessment of the performance of students and schools, external school evalua-
tion, and the information system of education.) These subsystems have distinct functions, 
they are organized into relatively or completely separated institutions, they are funded 
from separate budget lines through distinct allocation mechanisms, they are operating 
with more and more sophisticated methodologies, they are forming specialized profes-
sions for which specialists are trained in separate university programs, and they have 
their separate international cooperation networks. What is important here is that the 
diversiﬁcation and expansion of these functional instruments increase the number and 
type of decisions at all levels of governance and management of education.
Decentralization of these functional governance instruments rarely happens side by 
side in a balanced way. In fact, managing major systemic reforms in all of the relevant 
segments of the systemic environment of schools is far beyond the capacity of any gov-
ernment. Therefore, decentralization is not a project; it is rather a “stop-and-go” type 
of systemic change process, within which the directions and priorities are reconsidered 
from time to time. The initial (or the next) steps of the process are determined by the 
driving forces behind decentralization. The most obvious distinction in this respect is 
that between the education-reform-driven and the public-administration-reform-driven 
decentralization agendas. A good example of the ﬁrst case is Serbia in which the ﬁrst steps 
of decentralization at the very beginning of the 2000s were genuinely educational: the 
implementation of a curriculum reform and the introduction of school improvement in 
the center of the changes. Examples for the second case are Croatia, which transferred 
the ownership of schools to local self-governments in 2001, and Bulgaria, which initi-
ated ﬁscal decentralization in 2007 and 2008. An example that allows a comparison is 
that of Hungary, which has the longest history of education sector decentralization in 
Central Europe. The process started in Hungary in the mid-1980s by strengthening the 
autonomy of schools. It was followed up with rapid decentralization of management 
and ﬁnancing in 1990, then with curriculum decentralization in 1995. 
Though the diﬀerent strands of decentralization were never implemented in parallel, 
the mismatch between the pace of changes in the diﬀerent segments of the management 
systems have always created “systemic tensions.” For example, by taking over the property 
of school buildings in 2001, Croatian self-governments became responsible for all sorts 
of capital investments. However, they often ask the question: why should they invest in 
a service that they cannot inﬂuence in any way? Another example is the introduction of 
formula-based ﬁnancial allocation through the municipalities in Bulgaria that created 
tensions in relation to the appointment of directors by the regional inspectorates (in fact, 
the deconcentrated agencies of the Ministry of Education). Therefore, the authority of 
school directors is increasing while their status and role remains extremely ambiguous, 
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especially in relation to the municipality self-governments. These examples demonstrate 
that focusing on the priority areas of change is a legitimate approach; however, any major 
changes in the system of any of the functional governance instruments eventually will 
require adjustments in others. 
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C H A P T E R  4
The Horizontal Aspect of Decentralization: 
Roles of Different Levels
4.1 Horizontal Decentralization
Redeﬁnition of Roles at Each Level of Management
In the previous chapters we have been focusing on the vertical aspect of decentralization, 
that is, on the redistribution of authorities among the diﬀerent levels of governance 
and management. Another, no less relevant aspect of decentralization is the horizontal 
dimension, otherwise known as the changing role of actors at each level. Horizontal 
decentralization is sometimes referred to as the concentration of authorities at a certain 
level (McGinn 1997). Indeed, most decentralized systems give preference to a speciﬁc 
level or to a particular actor, such as self-governments or schools. However, disregarding 
the actual weight of diﬀerent levels, the role of all actors at all levels will change in the 
course of decentralization. Without the deliberate redeﬁnition of the complementary 
roles of each level and that of the functions performed by each actor, the cohesion of 
an increasingly complex system of governance and management cannot be maintained. 
Therefore, the question is: how do the diﬀerent decision-making authorities add up at 
each level of the governance and management of education? And vice versa: how are 
the functions and decision-making competencies ﬁt into a deﬁnite role?
Depending on the actual context, a wide variety of diﬀerent function might be de-
ployed to actors at diﬀerent management levels. What is important is to identify the core 
functions that certain actors perform in decentralized education systems. Determining 
and describing these core functions may help select among the various possible targets 
of decision-making authorities and might be instrumental in considering the role of 
diﬀerent actors that operate the diﬀerent functional governance instruments.
According to the contemporary approach to governance and management of 
education, the focal point of the system is the service delivery institution: the school. 
The actual scope of organizational, ﬁnancial, and professional autonomy of schools 
determines the organization, alignment, and management of all the functional instru-
ments that compose the already brieﬂy described systemic environment of educational 
service delivery. In fact, school autonomy sets a ﬁrm line between service delivery and 
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the systemic environment. (In very centralized systems in which ministries of educa-
tion perform even administrative micro-management, this line is almost invisible. For 
example, just a few years ago in Serbia, rules issued by the minister of education deter-
mined the amount of cleaning supplies that can be used in schools.) Therefore, when 
describing the basic role of the major actors in decentralized education systems, we will 
proceed “in reverse order,” from the schools to the ministries of education.
A Short Detour: The Structure and Organization of Schools
The deﬁnition of the role of diﬀerent actors is often considered in relation to the structure 
of schools. Indeed, the enrollment areas of diﬀerent types and levels of schools partly 
determine the management level in which responsibility is worth placing. In decentral-
ized systems, preschool is often considered to be a community service, primary schools 
in most cases are operated by local self-governments, while general and vocational 
secondary schools are operated at higher levels or by local self-governments of larger 
settlements. However, the assignment of levels of education to levels of management 
is not a great help in determining the role, and thus the actual functions performed at 
these management levels. (In this book we regard the task of managing school structures 
as one of the areas of management decisions, and not as the determinant of the role 
and function of the actors of management.) In addition to this, due to the diversity of 
school structures in Europe, simply referring to the major types of educational services 
(e.g., primary or general secondary) does not necessarily help to connect the levels of 
education with the levels of management on an international scale (Box 4.1).
The decreasing number of students in most South Eastern European countries gener-
ated an increasing mismatch between the capacities of the school system and the number 
of students enrolled. Ensuring the eﬃciency of ﬁnancing requires the rationalization of 
the school network; therefore, this problem is on the policy agenda of several countries 
and to a certain extent “pollutes” the discourse on decentralization. In very general 
terms, the problem is that centrally-driven and centrally-administered rationalization 
initiatives proved to be ineﬀective because of their extremely low sensitivity towards the 
local educational, economic, and social context. However, during periods of required 
large-scale school network adjustments strong, central intervention is needed, because 
municipalities, when transformed into the owners of schools, are very much interested in 
avoiding local political conﬂicts by preserving their existing education service capacities. 
The question is: how to create ﬁnancial and other incentives in the course of de-
centralization that allow municipalities to create a fair balance between the capacities of 
local school networks and the tasks of the institutions? The solution to be developed is 
not a matter of short-term intervention. According to demographic projections, in the 
following decades the decline of the population of the region will continue; the problem 
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of the declining number of students entering schooling will remain. Therefore, those 
actors managing education and who will take over direct responsibility of the manage-
ment of schools and the services they provide (most likely, municipalities) should be 
able to deal with the perpetual pressure of eﬃciency problems and should count on 
perpetually descending educational capacities.
Box 4.1
International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (UNESCO/OECD 1997)
A multidimensional integrated statistical framework for the levels and types of 
formal education:
• ISCED 0—pre-primary education
• ISCED 1—primary education: grades 1–6
• ISCED 2—lower secondary education: grades 7–10
• ISCED 3—upper secondary education: grades 11–12
 – 3/a—general secondary
 – 3/b—technical
 – 3/c—vocational
• ISCED 4—post-secondary, non-tertiary education
• ISCED 5—higher education
 – 5/a—bachelor (B.A.)
 – 5/b—master (M.A.)
• ISCED 6—post-graduate, advanced research qualiﬁcation
—UNESCO 2006
4.2 School Management: Operating Autonomous Schools
So far, we may have created the impression that school autonomy is a value per se, but 
this is not the case at all. From the point of view of the service providers, the process of 
decentralization should lead to a greater level of professional, organizational, and ﬁnan-
cial autonomy that is a precondition for the improvement of the quality of services (see 
Chapter 7). Schools should be empowered to respond to very diverse external expecta-
tions that may vary from settlement to settlement, from school to school. In other words: 
schools should be operated in a way that allows for perpetual adjustment to the various, 
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changing needs of students, parents, and the local communities as they are transmitted 
by the local self-governments, as well as to legitimate national interests transmitted by 
goals and targets set by laws and government expectations. All these external expecta-
tions should be reﬂected upon and should be transformed into organizational goals that 
are the basis for holding individual teachers and other staﬀ of the schools accountable. 
A school that is able to achieve all of these adjustments is an institution that operates 
the “engine” of perpetual development: a quality management system. Quality manage-
ment is a continuous and systematic activity to narrow the gap between the goals of the 
organization and its actual daily practice (Setényi 1999). It has two basic components: 
(1) self-evaluation that allows for setting institutional goals and for reconsidering old 
ones, and (2) cycles of school improvement that aim at developing the pedagogical and 
organizational work of the schools alongside the independent goals of the institution. In 
order to ensure the basic conditions for self-evaluation-based school improvement (i.e., 
school-based quality management), not only the hitherto nonexistent tasks should be 
deployed to the schools, but also the necessary organizational, ﬁnancial, and professional 
autonomy should be ensured that will allow for internal adjustments. The underlying 
assumption is that the school is an organization that mediates between external expectations 
and the actual teaching-learning process. 
Obviously, organizational goals should focus on the very purpose of education: 
the learning of students. Improving learning entails improving all activities within the 
schools that can be described as the “core business” of the institution: the program (cur-
riculum) of the schools, the way teaching and learning are organized, and the methods 
of teaching. Even on the basis of same goals for education (i.e., without introducing 
choice in education) the diversity of the background and the personal characteristics of 
students entails diversity in how these core components of the work of schools should 
operate. We should be aware of the fact that schools are diﬀerent, even if we do not 
like to admit this and hide the issue of diversity behind the illusory facade of uniﬁed 
central regulations.
However, even minor changes to the program, the organization of learning, and the 
teaching methods have implications for other organizational aspects of the work of the 
schools. (We will return later to the problem of the too-slight impact of “pedagogical 
innovations,” which in many cases collide with a wall of unchanged organizational en-
vironment.) Adjustments in terms of the use of available human, ﬁnancial, and material 
resources, as well as changes in the internal cooperation and management frameworks, 
are the sine qua non conditions for the improvement of the “core business.”
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Figure 4.1
The Framework for the Adjustment to Desired Learning Outcomes in Schools
Therefore, autonomy is the condition that makes it possible for schools to become 
more than mere executors of guidance and directives from the top. We should not have 
any doubts about the fact that no schools can be developed from the outside; only the 
management and the teachers of the schools can improve their own work themselves. 
This whole-school approach calls for a very diﬀerent pattern of school organization and 
management (see Chapter 8).
However, this increased autonomy should be matched with increased account-
ability. Since the school are mediating between external expectations and the actual 
teaching-learning process, contemporary quality evaluation systems are adjusting to the 
whole-school approach that follows from this. In other words: not individual teachers 
but schools should be held accountable for the failures and successes of the learning of 
students (see Chapter 12). Needless to say, holding schools accountable for the learning 
results of their students does not have to mean maintaining the rigid process of control 
that is the main handicap of centralized management systems.
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4.3 Local Self-governments: Ownership
In spite of the prevailing rhetoric of decentralization, the current role of local self-
governments in providing educational services is marginal in South Eastern Europe. 
Local self-governments were given property rights over school facilities in Romania 
and Croatia; they have a limited role in ﬁnancing recurrent costs in Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Croatia; but they do not control the service provided by the schools in the least. 
So far, devolution of the responsibility for primary and secondary education—even as 
a long-term vision—did not appear on the decentralization agenda in the majority of 
these countries.
However, at the level of self-governments the essence of the authority that might be 
devolved to them is the creation of full ownership over the schools and the service they 
provide. This means, that basically the same “package” of functions should be allocated 
to the owners, regardless of the type of self-governments or the type of education. In 
other words, ownership deployed to local self-governments (municipalities) or to re-
gional self-governments (counties) is not a diﬀerent set of authorities. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned earlier, the same content of ownership does not necessarily mean the same 
level of ownership; diﬀerent levels of education may logically be deployed to diﬀerent 
levels of self-governments. 
Ownership is created by devolution; in fact, it is not the school that self-governments 
are taking over, it is the task to provide educational services for all students who are 
at the age of mandatory schooling and livng on the territory of the self-government. 
Ownership of schools ﬂows from the mandatory task of service provision. The concept of 
“ownership” in relation to schools is not necessarily diﬀerent from that of corporations. 
On the one hand, it includes decision-making on strategic issues, such as the approval 
of strategic documents or the budget of the schools, appointment of schools directors, 
etc. On the other hand, it does not include any form of “micro-management,” that 
is, interference with the internal ﬁnancial and organizational management or human 
resource management. There are countries in which the concept of the ownership of 
schools is “sector neutral”: the same rules apply for public and private schools. In other 
countries, the mandate of school owners or “school maintainers” is set only for local 
governments. If ownership is devolved to diﬀerent level self-governments, it is essential 
that the central government not exercise such authority over any schools.
The new role of the self-governments means that the owners will act as “interfaces” 
between national governance and school management: beyond the authority that ﬂows 
from their autonomous authority, they will mediate and transfer national/regional 
policies and rules. However, the transmission of national policies is also a matter of 
interpretation; it does not mean that the owners have no priorities and expectations of 
their own. The framework for the harmonization of national and local expectations is 
created almost automatically over the course of decentralization, if the management of 
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education is more or less integrated into the mainstream line of public administration. 
For example, it would be the case in Croatia if further decentralization steps would be 
initiated. However, if there is a separate line of education management, the creation of 
the integrated ownership role is a diﬃcult process. For example, it would require the 
complete reconsideration of the functions of the Regional Departments in Serbia, or 
detaching all management related functions from the Regional Inspectorates in Bulgaria 
and Romania that—in spite of their core evaluation function—are performing a great 
deal of administrative management tasks. The same applies to ﬁnancing: in a decen-
tralized system in which ownership is devolved to local and regional self-governments, 
they serve as “interfaces” between the diﬀerent underlying logics for ﬁnancing the 
self-governments, which should be determined on the basis of the number of students, 
and ﬁnancing schools, in which expenditure is determined by the number of classes 
(see Chapter 10).
The deﬁnition of the actual functions to be deployed to local self-governments 
partially ﬂows from the required autonomy of schools. Assuming that the scope of 
school autonomy is somewhat similar to the “ideal type” described in the previous 
section, the division of labor between the owners and their institutions is based on 
the fact that education is a public service funded by public resources. Therefore, in a 
decentralized system the major core functions of the owners are: (1) the approval of all 
documents of the schools that determine the goals of the service, (2) the approval of the 
budget containing all costs of the service provision, (3) the employment of the director 
who is responsible for service delivery and for the use of public resources. All concrete 
decision-making competencies deployed to the owners are ﬂowing either from these 
three functions or supplementary ones.
The other question is the division of labor between the central government (with 
its deconcentrated administrative branches) and the owners of the schools. In other 
words, what are the functions that self-governments perform within the scope of their 
autonomy and what are those central functions that they transmit through their own 
administration (if this transmission task is not deployed to deconcentrated agencies)? 
In this respect the concept of the ownership role is one of the selection criteria, again. 
The three most important such functions are the following:
 • In a decentralized system, self-governments that are gaining control over the local 
networks of schools should also receive the instruments that allow for balancing 
the supply of educational services (school capacities) with the demand (number 
of children to be enrolled). Therefore, national service provision standards should 
allow space for local considerations. (For example, by a state budget ﬁnancial 
allocation to the self-governments that is not earmarked.)
 • To a certain extent, local self-governments mediate between the needs of the 
clients (parents) and the schools and convey the needs of the local community. It 
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means that setting goals for education at the national level should leave enough 
space for local interpretation and/or setting supplementary local goals.
 • Financial, legal, and professional accountability are ensured by mainstream 
supervisory and control organizations, as well as by national educational in-
spectorates. However, in decentralized systems in which local public services are 
being funded by the budget of the self-government, performing regular legal 
control and ﬁnancial audit is an obligation. In terms of professional account-
ability, the task of the self-governments is regular performance evaluation of 
the school directors.
There are two other functions that—although not necessarily ﬂowing from owner-
ship—might be part of the self-governments’ task portfolio:
 • Several decades of experience show that a narrow and isolated sectoral (health, 
labor, education, housing, etc.) approach has not ensured greater equity for 
disadvantaged groups, such as Roma and other minorities, displaced persons, 
etc. Those local governments will be successful that can connect all these public 
services with the ﬂexibility that allows adjustments to the diverse lives of families 
and individuals. Therefore, local self-governments should have special mandate 
in this respect.
 • For more than a decade, the reigning pattern of educational development has 
connected cooperating schools within development consortia as an instrument to 
promote horizontal learning. It is even more eﬀective if the cooperating schools 
are institutions in the same local school networks, within which the horizontal 
and vertical mobility of most students occurs. Local self-governments that are 
coordinating local development consortia may connect development with their 
long-term service provision plans (see Chapter 16).
All of these functions, if deployed to local self-governments, have implications for 
how the major functional governance instruments—especially ﬁnancing and manage-
ment functions (such as planning)—are reorganized.
The evolution of the relationship between local self-governments and the schools 
in the course of decentralization has its typical patterns. The degrees of the intensity of 
ownership are the following:
 • “Supporting the schools”—in completely centralized management systems local 
self-governments do not control any aspects of the operation of schools. How-
ever, due to the sentiment of “ownership,” self-governments strive to support 
“their” schools with minor assistance, such as painting the walls during the 
summer vacation, purchasing small equipment, or providing free housing for 
teachers if they settle in the village where the school is located.
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 • “Financing the schools”—in most cases the task of ﬁnancing the recurrent 
maintenance costs (all recurrent costs apart from salaries) is deployed to self-
governments. Sometimes self-governments supplement it with minor capital 
investments. Also, sometimes self-governments contribute to the costs of certain 
extracurricular or other supplementary activities of the schools. However, taking 
part in ﬁnancing still does not entail any inﬂuence on the core service provided 
by the schools.
 • “Maintaining schools”—in rather decentralized systems the above-described own-
ership is established in legal terms. However, self-governments are still intent on 
ensuring the work of the service provider institution without interfering with the 
goals and content of the actual service. The typical concern of self-government 
within this type of relationship is the “problem-free” operation of the school.
 • “Using the schools”—here, the school owner tends to regard the school as a strate-
gic instrument that has the potential to serve local social, economic, or cultural 
objectives. In this case, all instruments at the disposal of the self-government 
are used in order to inﬂuence the content of the service provided. 
4.4 The Levels of Regions: Separating Diverse Functions
In general, regions refer to several diﬀerent levels of management; ﬁrst are the “statisti-
cal regions” (NUTS 2) and the counties (NUTS 3). In addition, in countries where 
each individual settlement is a separate local self-government, the territorial units with 
the average size of a Serbian or a Bulgarian municipality are considered to be “small 
regions” (e.g., in Hungary). In South Eastern Europe, however, the NUTS 2 level is 
almost empty. Even if EU member or candidate countries (like Bulgaria or Croatia) 
established the statistical regions, no serious functions were deployed to them. The 
exceptions are those countries where the constitutional framework of governance is 
fragmented (Bosnia and Herzegovina) or allows for the autonomy of certain historical 
regions (Serbia). In fact, Vojvodina and Republika Srpska are quasi NUTS 2 regions, 
even if they are not established as such. 
As a result, most South Eastern European countries placed all major regional func-
tions within their respective counties. In most of these education systems, the county 
level is a depository of various distinct—and sometimes contradictory—functions. Their 
key characteristics are: (1) a compression of functions in the counties that are typically 
placed at multiple levels in most Western European countries, and (2) the institutional 
integration of diverse, very often contradictory, and mutually exclusive functions.
In relation to the governance of education, ﬁve clusters of regional functions 
deserve special attention: (1) ownership of schools, (2) deconcentrated educational 
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administration, (3) professional accountability institutions (inspection), (4) professional 
services, and (5) integrated territorial planning.
Concerning the ownership of those schools that enroll students from a larger area 
than their own municipalities, the most important issue is the existence and scope of 
self-governance that might be the target for transferring the authority described as 
ownership. For example, in Bulgaria there is no self-governance at the level of coun-
ties; therefore, ownership over general secondary and vocational schools will be still 
exercised by deconcentrated government branches, even if municipalities would take 
over the primary schools. In South Eastern Europe the other end of the spectrum is 
Croatia, where self-governance at the level of counties is much better established than 
in the municipalities. In an ideal case the composition of ownership-related decision-
making “packages” is basically the same, regardless of the level of management or the 
type of the school.
Although the owners of the schools take over a large number of educational ad-
ministration tasks in the course of decentralization, there still are certain functions that 
remain in the pool of central government responsibilities (such as legal and administra-
tive control). Nevertheless, it is worth bringing them closer to the owners and to the 
service delivery institutions. Also, there might be new agencies or instruments that are 
created by the modernization of the governance of education (such as the administra-
tion and quality assurance of external examinations and student performance surveys). 
Although it might be logical and more cost-eﬀective to concentrate these deconcentrated 
administrative oﬃces at the NUTS 2 level, it is not an option in the medium term 
for most countries of the region. The important point to be emphasized in relation to 
deconcentrated administration is the need to separate these functions from everything 
else: from ownership, from professional accountability mechanisms (inspection), and 
from professional services. (As reported earlier, this is not the case in most of South 
Eastern Europe.)
The external evaluation of the schools (inspection) and professional services will be 
discussed in detail in separate chapters (see Chapter 12). Two considerations should 
be advanced here. As with deconcentrated administration, in order to ensure the work 
of these functions at their possible potential, as well as in order to ensure the basic 
conditions of their professionalization, both functions should be institutionalized and 
separated from all other functions. In general, integrating diﬀerent functions within the 
same organizations always damages all the functions involved. Piling up several contra-
dictory functions within county-level organizations (such as inspection, administrative 
management, ﬁnancial management, professional support, information gathering and 
reporting, etc.) is common to Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Croatia. For example, in 
Croatia professional inspection (“expert pedagogical monitoring”) is run by the Educa-
tion and Teacher Training Agency (Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje). In fact, the tasks of 
the Agency are composed of contradictory support and accountability functions, within 
PA R T  O N E :  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  I N  E D U C A T I O N
63
which the support functions, such as in-service teacher training are the dominant ones. 
Since the director of the Agency is aware of this contradiction, he only runs inspections 
in the event of conﬂicts. However, this co-habitation is detrimental to the in-service 
training system, too. Training programs provided by the Agency’s advisors (savetnici) 
rarely extend more than a few hours, the topic of which is determined by the advisors, 
themselves.
The second point is a very important distinction between inspection and professional 
services: while inspection (external professional evaluation of schools) is a state-run 
quality assurance mechanism through which the central government exercises its respon-
sibility for the quality of educational services, such constraints for professional services 
do not exist. The task of providing certain professional services for schools, teachers, 
and students can be devolved to self-government. In this case the owners of services 
provider institutions will be the self-governments, and the status of these institutions will 
be very similar or even identical to that of the schools. Also, in demand-driven (partly 
privatized) systems the service providers can be any type of organization. (Providing 
certain types of services that remain government responsibilities does not mean that it 
entails government-run service provisions; such responsibilities can be exercised by a 
central ﬁnancial contribution to the service provision.)
There might be a diﬀerence between inspection and professional services in terms 
of the appropriate regional levels at which they are placed, too. If the construct of 
public administration will allow for this, due to its lower human resource intensity 
and its (partly) standardized nature, inspection can be organized at the NUTS 2 level. 
In relation to professional services, it is much harder to point at the most appropriate 
level, because it might be very diﬀerent in the case of diﬀerent services. For example, 
for services that should reach out to all students on a regular basis (such as dyslexia or 
dysgraphia prevention), even the counties might be too large. There are others, (such as 
advisory support to school-based quality management) that can reach out to all schools 
if placed in county pedagogical centers. The third type is those services that require 
well-equipped, expensive facilities (such as teacher training centers) that are better to 
establish within larger regions. However, creating a professional service system that is 
present at too many levels also makes it overly fragmented and does not allow for the 
coordination of and eﬀective investment in such capacities.
While in the case of the previous four clusters of regional functions the only harm 
that placing them in the counties (instead of operating larger NUTS 2 regions) is making 
them more expensive, the case with the ﬁfth regional function of integrated territorial 
development is diﬀerent. For most aspects of territorial development, the counties are 
too small, and these mechanisms deﬁnitely call for NUTS 2 level institutionalization. 
(Of course, it does not apply to small countries like Montenegro where this function 
is identical to national level development.) However, the relevance of educational ser-
vices as a pool for human resources is uncertain if the sectoral logic of governance is 
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not balanced with an integrated framework for territorial development. Although this 
system is rather weak or hardly exists in most South Eastern European countries, the 
establishment of such a mechanism and/or the integration of the current mechanism 
is inevitable. For example, in Croatia quite recently, the allocation of central funds 
for capital investments in education or the planning of secondary vocational school 
network was not connected to wider regional planning. In the long-run, part of these 
functions is better placed within the frameworks for territorial planning and develop-
ment in NUTS 2 regions.
A full-ﬂedged integrated regional development system includes the following 
main functions: (1) planning, or regional planning on the basis of the combination of 
bottom-up and top-down planning; (2) stakeholder consultation, or the involvement 
of all relevant stakeholders, such as business enterprises, professional organizations, 
universities, self-governments, the representatives of interested ministries, etc.; (3) the 
allocation of decentralized development funds (domestic and EU structural funds), meaning 
the allocation decisions and the management and monitoring of the resource alloca-
tion; (4) sometimes the operation of information systems that serve regional planning.
4.5 National Level: Strategic Steering and Policymaking
Decentralization can have a dramatic impact on the role of national level governance of 
education, though this is often ignored or brushed aside. (Both the academic literature 
on decentralization and decentralization strategies of diﬀerent countries focus almost ex-
clusively on the changing role of lower levels of management.) In a centralized education 
system, governance and management are not very distinct terms: governance rarely goes 
beyond management that serves administrative and—sometimes—strategic purposes. 
However, in the course of decentralization, the great majority of administrative tasks 
are delegated or devolved to lower levels of management that—by “liberating” central 
government agencies—can change the pattern of how the core functions of central 
government agencies are exercised. To a certain extent, decentralization works to de-
tach governance and management. But obviously, it does not reduce the responsibility 
of governments. What changes is that the direct tools of administrative management are 
replaced with the indirect tools of strategic steering. Governments must set expectations; 
inﬂuence the ﬂow of students, human and ﬁnancial resources, knowledge, and informa-
tion within the education system; and verify the outputs of the system without having 
direct control over the related decisions (Radó 2004).
In a decentralized education system, governments are working through autono-
mous actors. However, this does not mean that ministries necessarily lose control over 
management. For example, the school policies of local authorities can be inﬂuenced by 
the use of a wide range of direct (e.g., regulation) and indirect (e.g., incentives) instru-
PA R T  O N E :  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  I N  E D U C A T I O N
65
ments. It changes the very nature of central regulation. The point of departure to create 
this system is serious deregulation; the great majority of detailed secondary regulations 
should be withdrawn, while some of them are to be replaced by the mandate given to 
local self-governments and schools to regulate within broadly deﬁned frameworks cre-
ated by national laws. For the sake of illustration, we are returning to the example of 
the appointment of directors: instead of the minister of education appointing the school 
directors (as was the case at the beginning of the decade in Macedonia), in decentralized 
systems the ruling pattern is procedural regulation: deploy the mandate for making a 
decision on the appointment and prescribe the procedural rules for an open selection 
procedure specifying the qualiﬁcations of any potential job candidate. Also, an indi-
rect instrument of governance that gains its importance only in decentralized systems 
is inﬂuencing the decisions by inﬂuencing the behavior of the clients of educational 
services (i.e., parents and students). For example, informing parents about the quality 
and eﬀectiveness of the services provided by the schools (combined with the free choice 
of schools) is an instrument by which their decisions can be inﬂuenced eﬀectively. The 
underlying assumption behind the use of indirect means of governance is that local ac-
tors (school-owning self-governments and their clients) will hold the service providers 
accountable, and that guarantees a certain level of quality and eﬀectiveness (see Chapter 
9). These indirect means of inﬂuence have the potential to generate strong adjustments 
within the schools.
Figure 4.2
Direct and Indirect Central Governance
Central governance 
of education
Local self-governance
Citizens/Clients Schools
Direct 
 impact
Indirect 
impact
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The important consequence of decentralization—beyond making central govern-
ment control over educational services remote and indirect—is the fact that it also 
dramatically increases the number of administrative and non-administrative actors in-
volved. The growing complexity of the governance and management system makes the 
instruments of central governance more complex and sophisticated, too. Thus, although 
the claim that decentralization should lead to the radical reduction of the number of 
staﬀ in ministries in education is well justiﬁed, this should not necessarily apply to the 
overall number of professionals who are involved in the various functions and diﬀerent 
institutions of governance.
As far as the role of the ministries of education is concerned, parallel to the slashing 
of redundant capacities, it should build new ones, though not exclusively inside the 
ministry. The eﬀective governance of decentralized education systems has its systemic 
conditions. These conditions can be grouped into three categories: (1) improvements 
that enable central government agencies (the ministries responsible for education) for 
strategic steering, (2) instruments that ﬂow from the indirect nature of governance, and 
(3) instruments and mechanisms that ensure the quality of the operation of autonomous 
actors. We will return later to most of these instruments in details in the chapters on 
management, ﬁnancing, or other functional strands of decentralization. However, a 
preliminary list of the major functions in relation to the changing role of ministries is 
a good indication of the metamorphosis of central governance.
The improvement of central governance hinges upon:
 • Eﬀective policy coordination. Although the most important player in governing 
education systems at the national level is the ministry of education (that very 
often holds other responsibilities, such as those for culture, sports, youth, or sci-
ence), in many cases responsibility is shared with other ministries (for example, 
ministries of labor may supervise formal and adult vocational training). Apart 
from this sharing of responsibilities, almost all other ministries are interested 
in the operation or results of the education system. (For example, the ﬁnanc-
ing of self-government might be part of the budget of the ministry of interior, 
the state budget is planned by the ministry of ﬁnance, while ﬁnancial planning 
for education is managed by the ministry of education.) The eﬀectiveness of 
coordination among the diﬀerent departments of the ministries of education 
is also essential. But relative weakness of formal intergovernmental cooperation 
is a common feature of the region. Since decentralization increases the demand 
for intergovernmental cooperation, which cannot succeed without the improve-
ment of formal decision-making procedures, governments risk losing control.
 • Institutionalized stakeholder involvement. Institutionalized formal stakeholder 
consultation systems are operated to improve the quality of decision-making 
at the central level and to increase the “implementability” of decisions. However, 
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a side-eﬀect of such a system is that the ministry of education becomes the 
focal point of decision-making by balancing direct political inﬂuence on 
professional and policy decisions. In a sense, increasing the weight of the 
views and interests of various stakeholder groups by open consultation proce-
dures contributes to the partial depolitization of governance decisions. (Note: 
Any decisions with implications on the use of public resources are by deﬁnition 
political decisions. The need for depolitization refers simply to the dominance 
and direct inﬂuence of political parties on governance or management deci-
sions, such as the appointment of directors of certain institutions or the actual 
content of curriculum.)
 • Professional self-regulation. Due to the required sophisticated methodology the 
legitimacy of certain types of decisions cannot be ensured properly if they are 
made by political or administrative actors. For example, while the legitimacy 
of curricula or standards can be ensured by the involvement of educational 
councils and professional organizations, there are certain instruments that can be 
legitimized only by a specialist (e.g., examination or assessment tests or criteria 
of school evaluation). Therefore, it is worth considering delegating the control 
of the development and use of such instruments to independent professional 
bodies, such as national evaluation councils or independent, self-governing 
national inspectorates.
 • Diversiﬁed network of support agencies. One perpetual problem for ministries of 
education in the South Eastern Europe is the lack of suﬃcient organizational 
and professional capacities for the implementation of changes. It is partly caused 
by the fact that nearly all of the functional governance instruments (that will 
be discussed in Part 3) are operated directly by the staﬀ of the ministries or 
by individual experts commissioned to ad-hoc task forces. In spite of the lack 
of policy and program evaluations, we may assume that most initiatives have 
not been fully implemented. Removing some professional functions from the 
ministry is also the condition of “liberating” the ministry from any functions 
that contradict its new strategic steering and policymaking role.
 • Strategic communication. Convincing autonomous actors about the objectives 
of central initiatives and supporting their interpretation requires a very inten-
sive professional communication about these strategic objectives. However, 
the behavior of central governance agencies in the region is still based on the 
illusion that if something is regulated, then the actors at the lower level will 
automatically adjust. 
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The adjustments to the indirect nature of central governance depend upon:
 • Standards, benchmarks, and procedural rules. Decentralization requires a great 
deal of revision to existing regulations. For South Eastern Europe, the primary 
way to ensure local and institutional autonomies would be a radical reduction 
of ministerial regulations and increasing the weight of regulating by laws, or 
regulating at the level of the government on the basis of the mandate given by 
law.
 • Financial incentives. The allocation of ﬁnancial instruments does not simply aim 
to make the necessary resources for service delivery available. It is also one of 
the most important instruments for change. For example, ﬁnancial incentives 
can be used to promote school-based development, and ﬁnancial disincentives 
might be very instrumental to combat separation and segregation in educa-
tion. However, incentives in the form of small grants allocated through open 
competition do not necessarily promote sustainable solutions to educational 
problems. Therefore, the mainstream allocation system should be enabled to 
incorporate the use of incentives on a normative basis.
 • Multilevel planning system, planning of capacities. Autonomous decision-making 
should be matched with mandatory mid-term planning at all levels of the 
management system. Importantly, the creation of a multilevel planning system 
also changes the role and type of planning at the national level, because min-
istries of education are not entitled to plan on behalf of autonomous actors in 
a decentralized system. (It does not mean that national planning should not 
incorporate those instruments that inﬂuence planning at lower levels.)
Ensuring the quality of autonomous management actors relies upon:
 • Professional, legal, and ﬁscal accountability. In a decentralized system it is not the 
ministry that should operate legal and ﬁscal accountability assurance institu-
tions and procedures. (Of course, the ministry should have a department for 
legal and ﬁscal control over its own institutions.) However, it is the ministry of 
education that should ensure that the mandate and the actual operation of such 
state agencies are covering all actors in the management of education, that the 
ﬁndings of these agencies are followed up, and that the mandate of lower-level 
management agents in this respect are clear. The area that is under the direct 
responsibility of governance of education is operating professional accountability 
systems (i.e., external school evaluation). 
 • Empowerment of actors, capacity building. It is a widely shared view among public 
management experts that the border eﬃciency of decentralization is deter-
mined by the preparedness of the actors at the lower levels to take over certain 
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authorities. Indeed, without the appropriate organizational and professional 
capacities in place, decentralization may lead to the decline of the quality of 
management. Therefore, all decentralization measures should be matched with 
heavy investments in capacity building. However, in the practice the underlying 
logic of change is somewhat the opposite; several times—partly because of the 
pressure of the limited time given within one government term—authority is 
devolved to lower levels too rapidly and all the actors are forced to catch up to 
the requirements of the new responsibilities.
 • Mandatory self-evaluation and quality management in schools. To a certain extent, 
decentralization is about abandoning the illusion that quality of educational 
services can be ensured by anybody outside of the schools. Deploying the pri-
mary responsibility for quality to the staﬀ of the schools should be matched 
with deploying the mandate to operate the instrument of quality assurance. It 
is the most important instrument that has the potential to generate internal 
professional accountability, as well as the tool that enables the schools to respond 
to the signals of external accountability systems.
 • The information basis of management. Sharing responsibility for all of the man-
agement functions, such as decision-making, planning, or staﬃng, also means 
sharing the information that is needed for performing these functions. How-
ever, it is not a simple task to making available those educational statistics that 
the ministry has at its disposal; this is partly because the type of information 
needed at the local and institutional levels is not necessarily the same aggregated 
information that ministries use. (For example, local decision-making without 
a statistical system that does not allow for the tracking of individual students 
is very hard.) Also, since decentralization dramatically increases the number of 
players, sharing information is not a simple task anymore; it requires sophisti-
cated information management systems. In addition, new types of governance 
instruments to be developed, such as the external measurement of the perfor-
mance of students and schools, must have feedback mechanisms that can be 
incorporated into the mainstream information system.
 • The knowledge basis of education. Education, that is, the transmission of knowl-
edge, is one of the most knowledge-intensive services. In spite of the triviality 
of this statement, the actors of educational service delivery in most countries 
of the region are working in a very poor knowledge environment. Apart from 
traditional channels of knowledge sharing, like printed pedagogical periodicals 
or one-day “seminars,” knowledge management in education means the use of 
several other channels: (1) the free market of working ideas, programs, methods, 
content carriers, and instruments that are available online, (2) the operation 
of knowledge multiplication through institutionalized advisory and consulting 
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services, (3) operating institutions that, by connecting educational research with 
the actual needs of the actors of service delivery, do knowledge management 
(mainly targeting directly the agents of knowledge multiplication), and (4) 
deliberate investment and import of knowledge and international professional 
cooperation.
Box 4.2
The Functional Map of Centrally Institutionalized Services
(The Network of “Background Institutions”)
• Empirical educational research, system monitoring, and policy analysis
• Curriculum and program development, the development and veriﬁcation of edu-
cational achievement standards
• Development of education (methodology and knowledge basis of development, 
pilot programs, support to those agencies that work directly with schools)
• External assessment (the international and national measurement of the perfor-
mance of students, examinations)
• Technical operation of development funds and programs
• Quality assurance of INSET providers and programs
• National inspection (the external evaluation of schools)
• Operating the information system of education
Having all these instruments at the disposal of ministries of education may ensure 
the operation of the governance and management system; however, it does not necessarily 
ensure that the required changes are implemented in order to solve certain problems. 
Decentralization is changing the pattern of policymaking and implementation, too 
(see Chapter 14).
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An Analytical Framework That Fits the 
Context
An Analytical Framework for Decentralization in Education
Clearly, decentralization in education can be understood as an extremely complex pro-
cess with its own set of distinct problems and many tangents leading to matters that 
are only remotely connected with the governance of core educational functions. Also, 
some aspects of decentralization are more relevant to South Eastern Europe than others. 
In order to avoid getting lost, an analytical framework should be oﬀered that might be 
instrumental in the design of any further systemic changes in the governance of education 
in the region. Therefore, there is a need to provide the reader with a conceptual skeleton 
that brings some streamlining into the complexity of decentralization-related matters. 
Several taxonomies of decentralization have been created by many authors on the 
basis of the forms and targets of transferring decision-making authorities. However, due 
to the diversity and contextual nature of the actual content of these types, they are rather 
metaphors; they may well serve academic and practical professional discourse but do not 
necessarily help to design the required changes. For the sake of ease and understanding, 
the deﬁnition of decentralization that will be applied in the following chapters and the 
selection of the most relevant aspects will be based on the disaggregation of the various 
types of decentralization.
First, not all of the forms of transferring authority to lower levels will be addressed 
in the following pages. For example, deconcentration—that is a strong feature of the 
inherited centralized management systems in almost all the countries in the region—is 
not very relevant for two reasons. Although it is extremely important, ensuring the 
technical eﬃciency of public administration in general is not the main concern of this 
book. Matters such as rule of law and transparency public administration issues will not 
be discussed in detail. The division of labor between national government agencies and 
their deconcentrated branches are important only as they connected to the conditions 
of applying other forms of authority transfer. The other reason for the marginal role that 
will be given to deconcentration is the fact that it does not really respond to the most 
important rationales for decentralization of any regional relevance. For example, in a 
centralized system the impact of deconcentration is the incrementation of the already 
overwhelming power of the center. Due to these two considerations, the two forms of 
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authority transfer to be focused on are those that do not simply change the locus of 
decision-making but also involve non-administrative (political or professional) actors.
The same limited attention will be paid to the delegation of authorities to private 
enterprises (i.e. to privatization). This book concentrates on the levels of education that 
are provided almost entirely within the period of mandatory schooling. The privatization 
of primary and secondary schooling at best plays a very marginal role in the European 
education systems. 
Therefore, the scope of the working deﬁnition of decentralization in education 
that this book will apply is not complete. On the following pages, by decentraliza-
tion we will mean the delegation or devolution of the authorities from central government 
agencies to actors at the lower levels of management by involving non-administrative actors 
in decision-making. In this sense, decentralization means two changes, both of which 
are equally important. Its obvious meaning refers to the locus of decision-making: the 
delegation or devolution of decision-making competencies to lower (regional, local, or 
school) levels of management. The second, rarely emphasized component refers to the 
actors of management, that is, to the involvement of non-administrative actors in the 
decision-making, such as the involvement of politically-elected representatives of lo-
cal self-governments or the involvement of teachers in school-based decision-making. 
In other words, decentralization is per deﬁnition power sharing; it deploys authority to 
autonomous actors.
Beyond setting the working deﬁnition of decentralization, other decisions are to 
be made in order to design the guiding analytical framework. The ﬁrst one concerns 
the scope of the framework: it should integrate the public administration and the 
service delivery approaches to decentralization. The major concern, why the design of 
decentralization measures should attempt to integrate the two approaches, is the require-
ment of systemic cohesion within the education sector. For the sake of illustration, we 
will cite a few examples: centralized, government-controlled curricula may reduce the 
impact of ﬁscal decentralization to the realm of recurrent maintenance costs because it 
standardizes the labor needs of the school programs. Also, increased school autonomy 
and responsibilities will deﬁnitely increase the professional support needs of schools 
(e.g., professional in-service training, counseling, evaluation, consulting, management 
coaching, methodological support, guidance, assessment, etc.). If the external profes-
sional service mechanism remained centrally managed and “supply driven,” schools 
will be unable to meet growing external expectations. An additional trap might be 
the mismatch between self-evaluation in schools and the traditional control-oriented 
inspection. In general, changes in one segment of the governance system generate the 
need for inevitable adjustments in other segments. 
Another matter that oﬀers the opportunity for streamlining is a selection among 
the diﬀerent components of the entire systemic environment of schools. These diﬀerent 
components (functional governance instruments) of the systemic environment are 
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not equally relevant from a decentralization point of view. For example, the supply 
of textbooks and other teaching materials is provided by market enterprises, or initial 
teacher training is the service of autonomous higher education institutions. Therefore, 
the connection between these resources and the actual way in which education systems 
are managed is rather remote and indirect. (Of course, the type of curriculum or 
ﬁnancing has major implications for these services, too.) On the contrary, how in-service 
training is provided is part of the overall problem of professional services, connected 
to the actual scope of school autonomy. Therefore, the remaining ﬁve functional 
governance instruments that will be regarded as the major strands of decentralization in 
education are: management, ﬁnancing, curriculum, quality evaluation, and professional 
services.
Table C.1.1
The Integrated Framework of Decentralization in Education
Major roles 
at each level
The strands of decentralization
Management Financing Curriculum Quality 
evaluation
Professional 
services
National level
(Strategic steering 
and policymaking)
Functions and concrete decision-making competencies
Regional levels
(Ownership and 
diverse intermediary 
functions)
Local level
(Ownership)
School level
(Autonomous 
improvement of 
service delivery)
All these considerations add up to an analytical framework that allows for the 
structuring of a more detailed discussion on how decentralized governance and 
management systems work. The framework is a matrix that determines the major strands 
of decentralization, on the one hand, and identiﬁes the major roles (core functions) 
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that should be performed at each level, on the other. By ﬁlling up the “cells” of this 
matrix, the actual allocation of functions and concrete decision-making competencies 
can be analyzed. 
The Initial Steps So Far: An Overview
Although the pace of changes was diﬀerent, during the 1990s Central Europe went 
through a very similar process of decentralization that was based on fast (Hungary) or 
gradual (Czech Republic and Poland) devolution of authorities to local self-governments 
(Davey 2002). Slovakia started the decentralization process only after 2000, and initiated 
decentralization in education according to the logic of its neighbors in Central Europe, 
too. In certain periods major decentralization measures were driven by non-educational 
agendas, while in other periods they served the implementation of education reform 
strategies. In Hungary, for example, the strengthening of the autonomy of schools was 
based on an educational agenda in 1985, the devolution of ownership of schools to self-
governments in 1990 was completely driven by a major public administration reform, 
and then a curriculum reform was adopted in 1995 on the basis of another educational 
reform strategy. Another, more recent example is Slovakia in which the 2005 public 
administration reform was followed by a curriculum reform in 2008.
The ﬁrst steps of the decentralization in the countries of the South Eastern Europe 
were made only during this decade. The only exception is Romania, where major changes 
were implemented already in the second part of the 1990s. The initial steps were de-
termined by the context: the dynamics of the competing rationales and the obstacles 
to decentralization. Therefore—apart from the lack of comprehensive education sector 
strategies—it is hard to ﬁnd any common regional patterns about how the diﬀerent 
countries engaged in decentralization. The process of decentralization is fragmented 
and keeps certain strands of the governance system untouched, and due to the fact that 
only minor changes were introduced so far, grasping patterns or major directions even 
within the individual countries is impossible. Therefore, instead of providing a com-
prehensive regional overview, a few examples will be provided in order to demonstrate 
the diversity of contexts.
In Romania, initial steps were made with gradual ﬁscal decentralization in 1995, 
1998, and 2001. (After 2002, the scope of ﬁscal decentralization was narrowed.) In 1998, 
the implementation of a new National Core Curriculum and school-based curricula 
started. In Croatia, the ownership of school buildings was transferred to municipal and 
county self-governments in a ﬁrst wave of decentralization. As far as education itself is 
concerned, any major changes since 2001 resulted in further centralization. Planning 
for a second wave is in progress but the government is unsure of what steps to take. 
Nevertheless, the capacity for redesigning the educational agenda is still underdeveloped. 
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In Serbia, the implementation of an overall education reform started in 2001 with 
a very strong focus on curriculum reform, the reform of in-service teacher training, 
and on pedagogical school development. Although the implementation of the reform 
was slowed down after 2004, the major changes initiated earlier were not completely 
abandoned. On the basis of the developments of the reforms at the beginning of the 
decade, a new reform project has recently started on the realignment of external school 
evaluation. Due to the lack of any mainstream public ﬁnance or public administration 
reform initiatives, these segments remained untouched. In Macedonia, as the follow-up 
to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, education management changes were implemented 
in 2005 by strengthening the decision-making competencies of mayors and by the 
reorganization of local management responsibilities. Also, ﬁnancing responsibilities 
for all recurrent costs apart from salaries were transferred to the municipalities as a ﬁrst 
wave of ﬁscal decentralization. Bosnia and Herzegovina is still struggling with its frozen 
constitutional fragmentation, having thirteen ministers of education with various degrees 
of competencies in a country with a population of 3.8 million. Although at ﬁrst glance 
the governance system may look very decentralized, in fact all constitutional fragments 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina operate small but highly-centralized education management 
systems. As a result, the main concern remains to be centralization and not the devolu-
tion of authorities. In Bulgaria, the ﬁrst decentralization measures were introduced in 
ﬁnancing: experiments with the so-called “delegated budgets” in a few municipalities in 
2006, the introduction of uniﬁed cost standards and a new per-capita-based ﬁnancial 
allocation system to the municipalities, then extending the formula-based “delegated 
budget” to the ﬁnancial relationship between municipalities and the schools in 2008. 
These measures have an interesting feature: in spite of the fact that the initiative comes 
from the ministry of ﬁnance, ﬁscal decentralization in education is not part of an over-
all public ﬁnancing reform; education is the only sector where partially decentralized 
ﬁnancing was introduced. All other segments of the governance of education remained 
untouched so far.
Generally speaking, ministries of education are much more concerned about major 
reforms in the “software” of education, but these changes (such as the reform of the 
matriculation exam in Bulgaria, the revision of textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
or the introduction of new achievement standards in Croatia) rarely have any direct 
implications on the centralized nature of governance.
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Summary of the Key Points of Part One
The key points of the previous chapters that provide the conceptual framework for the 
interpretation of the ﬁrst decentralization steps of the countries in the region so far, as 
well as those that provide the basis of the construction of an analytical framework for 
the rest of this book, are the following:
 The major deﬁciencies of centralized governance and management systems in educa-
tion are the very weak involvement of the key stakeholder groups in decision-making 
(i.e., weak democratic political legitimacy) and their low capacity to implement 
decisions (i.e., low professional legitimacy). These deﬁciencies add up to the so-
called “legitimacy crisis” of centralized systems.
 Centralized systems have a strong potential to maintain their existence due to their 
strong inertia. This inertia can be explained by the power of arguments in favor of 
maintaining central control within South Eastern Europe and by the reluctance of 
many actors to subscribe to the major systemic changes that bring uncertainty and 
unpredictability.
 In very general terms, decentralization in education is about restoring democratic 
political and professional legitimacy of decision-making.
 The contextual justiﬁcations for decentralization are partly based on “genuine edu-
cational” considerations, such as the relatively poor performance of these education 
systems, and partly on the redeﬁnition of quality in education, to which contem-
porary governance systems in the region do not accommodate well. The other 
group of practical justiﬁcations is following from governance and ﬁnance-related 
considerations.
 In general, the major forms of transferring decision-making authorities to lower 
levels are deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. The possible targets are 
mainly management actors at each level, and in the case of certain forms of author-
ity transfer (delegation or devolution), with the involvement of non-administrative 
actors.
 The various taxonomies of decision-making competencies in education are good 
instruments for institutional analysis. However, these taxonomies do not easily add 
up to the identiﬁcation of distinct functions and may cause diﬃculties when map-
ping out various authority-sharing relationships.
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 There are two relevant approaches to decentralization in education: a public ad-
ministration (management) approach that focuses on the distribution of authorities 
among the actors at diﬀerent levels, and the service delivery (educational) approach 
that focuses on the scope and extent of the autonomy of schools.
 An operational approach to decentralization can be extracted from the inherent logic 
of the workings of governance systems. It is partly based on the distinction between 
schools and their systemic environment, as well as on the basis of taxonomy of the 
separate functional governance instruments within the systemic environment. (The 
practical relevance of these distinctions is larger in decentralized than in centralized 
systems.)
 Horizontal decentralization means the redeﬁnition of the role of major actors at 
diﬀerent levels in the course of vertical decentralization (i.e., transferring authorities 
to lower levels). A core set of functions (i.e., roles) can be determined for each level 
of management. 
 The basic role of schools in decentralized systems is adjusting their core educational 
functions and organizational operations to the actual goals set for the learning of 
students within their organizational, professional, and ﬁnancial autonomy.
 The basic role of local and regional self-governments is to perform those functions 
that ﬂow from the scope of their ownership over educational services that are pro-
vided locally.
 Management at regional levels (NUTS 2 and 3) performs various additional roles, 
such as territorial planning and development, deconcentrated administration, qual-
ity evaluation (professional inspection), and professional support services. These 
distinct functions are to be institutionalized separately.
 In decentralized systems, governance at the national level is free from administrative 
decision-making tasks and performs strategic steering and policymaking-related 
functions.
 For the sake of ease and convenience, the deﬁnition of decentralization applied 
in this book does not include every possible aspect of decentralization. By decen-
tralization we mean the delegation or devolution of the authority from central 
government agencies to the actors at the lower levels of management by involving 
non-administrative actors in decision-making. Therefore, decentralization is by 
deﬁnition power sharing.
 An integrated framework of decentralization in education determines the functions 
and corresponding decision-making competencies deployed to various actors within 
a matrix that includes: (1) the ﬁve major decentralization relevant functional gover-
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nance instruments that are the strands of the decentralization process, and (2) the 
major functions that diﬀerent levels of management play in decentralized systems.
 The initial steps towards education’s decentralization in South Eastern European 
countries—with very few exceptions—were basically made after 2000. These steps 
were rarely based on a comprehensive sector strategy and were initiated in one 
strand only; ﬁscal decentralization was partial (Romania, Macedonia) or more radi-
cal (Bulgaria), about management (Macedonia and partially in Croatia), or about 
curricula (Serbia).
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C H A P T E R  5
Key Concepts Reconsidered
5.1 The Aims of Education
During the period of mandatory schooling, education is a public good; therefore, it 
is a public service funded almost exclusively by public money. If our children already 
spend a large proportion of their active time in schools, we expect that the schools 
will contribute to the development of their personalities. However, the reason why we 
introduce a state monopoly into this service is our expectation that education will have 
a maximum social and economic impact by producing high and equally-distributed 
outcomes in the service provider institutions and by operating at the lowest possible 
cost. In other words, we are expecting the highest possible eﬀectiveness, equity, quality, 
and cost-eﬀectiveness. However, education is not generally eﬀective; it is eﬀective ac-
cording to something. Thus, the ﬁrst logical step is considering the aims of education 
against what we judge the eﬀectiveness, quality, equity, and cost-eﬀectiveness of the 
educational services. We will discuss later how goals and educational targets are set for 
education. What is needed here is a brief outline about how the aims of education (i.e., 
goals at the level of theoretical generality) can be considered in order to signal certain 
contemporary shifts of emphasis and to grasp the practical implications of these shifts.
When thinking about the aims of education, we can follow two dimensions: re-
sponding to individual and social needs, as well as on the basis of the distinction between 
intrinsic or instrumental aims (Winch and Gingell 1999). In most cases individual and 
social aims are two sides of the same coin. For example, improving the social skills of 
individual students can be considered the condition for educating good citizens. It does 
not necessarily apply to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental aims; there 
are certain aims that are rather related to the very nature of pedagogy, such as the devel-
opment of personality (self-reliance, autonomy, identity, etc.) in children, while others 
are related to aims that are external to the teaching-learning process, such as serving the 
needs of the labor market or ensuring social cohesion. The diﬀerence ﬂows from diﬀerent 
references: in the case of intrinsic aims, the references are based on the anthropological 
and/or psychological foundations of education, while the references for instrumental 
aims are external to education, extracted from the economic and social environment. 
However, these two kinds of aims are not opposable; whatever we emphasize, we should 
consider both types—of course, in the light of the actual emphasis. 
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The typical aims of education that in most cases determine the goals set in an explicit 
or implicit way are the following (Halász 2001b):
 • Cultural reproduction is the transmission of all those instruments (e.g., language) 
and content (e.g., accumulated common knowledge, values traditions, behavioral 
codes, etc.) that determines the communication pattern that we call culture. A 
widely shared simpliﬁcation of this aim is the strong focus on the transmission 
of a set of knowledge that is considered to be the part of the cultural code of 
the well-educated middle class (the “intelligentsia”).
 • The development of the personalities of individuals is the shaping and inﬂuencing 
the process through which those psychological characteristics of the individu-
als develop and that determine their cognitions, motivations, and behaviors. 
In fact, all other aims incorporate certain personality development goals as the 
basis of the teaching-learning process. The only reason for separating this aim 
is that it is often emphasized in contrast to any instrumental aims in order to 
“protect” education from any external interference.
 • Reproducing or changing the social structure. On the one end of the spectrum, 
there is the conviction that the main purpose of schooling is to imprint exist-
ing inequalities in a society. On the other hand, there are others who consider 
education to be an instrument that alone is able to change the status of entire 
societal macro-groups. 
 • Economic function. The supply of skilled labor, according to the actual and future 
needs of the economy, is often referred to as the human resource development 
function of education. The relevance of educational services, in other words, its 
compliance and responsiveness to the demand on the labor market, is one of 
the main concerns. It is important to mention, that educational services do not 
simply serve the needs of the economy: education is the part of it. For example, 
the employment of teachers is part of the labor market, or the value produced 
by educational services contributes to the gross domestic product.
 • Ensuring the integration of the society. In the broadest sense, this refers to all 
sorts of possible contributions by education to the requirements that ensure the 
operability of diﬀerent, separate functional subsystems of a society (economic, 
political, cultural, etc.). In this respect this aim incorporates all the other ones. 
In a narrow sense, however, it refers to the potential of education to reduce the 
inequalities among diﬀerent groups that could endanger the stability of the 
society. This function is often believed to ensure social cohesion.
 • Service providing functions are those that are beyond—or connected to—the 
core function of education that is a service by itself. In most countries schools 
PA R T  T W O :  E D U C A T I O N  S E R V I C E  D E L I V E R Y
85
are performing several supplementary functions that have very little or nothing 
to do with learning, such as welfare, health, cultural, or community services. 
In most cases, they are justiﬁed by the contribution of such services to the core 
educational functions (e.g., hungry children cannot learn) or simply deployed 
to schools because other service providers would fail to reach out to their target 
groups, as in the case of some social allowances or dentistry for children. In all 
education systems there is an aspiration to connect educational and supplemen-
tary services as much as possible.
 • Modernization is especially emphasized in Central and South Eastern Europe, 
where “organic development” (that is, modernization through market mecha-
nisms) would hardly ensure “catching up” to the most developed countries. 
This function is emphasized in relation to certain aspects of development that 
are considered to be “modern,” for example, the use of information and com-
munication technologies or the protection of the environment.
While again reminding the reader that the distinction is quite artiﬁcial, it can be 
added that the ﬁrst two aims are mainly intrinsic ones, while the rest are rather instru-
mental. It is important to keep in mind that education in and of itself is not the only 
factor that contributes to the achievement of any of these aims. In addition to this, the 
relevance of the diﬀerent aims might vary across diﬀerent levels and types of educa-
tion. For example, in the initial phase of primary education even the most important 
instrumental aims are served mainly through the appropriate achievement of intrinsic 
ones. (That does not mean that external references are less important.) 
Obviously, the choice among the emphasized aims of education is not independent 
from values. Also, it often happens that the political struggles in the “symbolic space” of 
politics result in the distortion of the real meaning of certain aims (such as setting “nur-
turing” against “service” that is often heard in the region). However, what is important 
here is the distinction between diﬀerent traditions that are not independent from the 
lenses of the various professions. According to the two dimensions of the possible aims 
of education—while taking the risk of unjust simpliﬁcations—there is a “pedagogical 
approach” putting greater emphasis on rather intrinsic aims (usually called the liberal 
tradition) that brings individual values, and there is a “public policy approach” (or in-
strumental approach) that emphasizes the external (economic and social) references of 
the goals set for education. 
The reason for using this somewhat ambiguous separation of the two traditions is to 
indicate a visible shift of emphasis from intrinsic to instrumental aims that has taken place 
over the last couple decades, with major implications for the governance of education. 
This shift is a consequence of the ever-accelerating transition of the external references 
of educational services. Some of these changes are global ones, such as the use of new 
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information and communication technologies. Meanwhile, there are others that are 
more speciﬁc to developed countries, such as the changing structure of modern econo-
mies, which has a huge impact on the composition of the labor force, the fragmented 
conﬁguration of the middle-class that diversiﬁes the expectations of education, or the 
postmodern reappraisal of rigid, socially-bound cultural codes. Finally, there are those 
changes that have regional relevance, such as demographic declines that can nearly 
empty schools in rural areas. Likewise, a similar change is the transformation of the 
political superstructures of the society that result in changing the dynamics among their 
representative, corporative, and direct participatory institutions and that reorganize the 
power relations among diﬀerent groups, each touting diﬀerent expectations of educa-
tion. The cumulative impact of all these changes is the increasing pressure on education 
systems to adjust to the weight of various public policy considerations at the expense of 
traditional “pedagogical” deliberation.
One of the reasons why various intrinsic and instrumental aims are often regarded 
as conﬂicting—or even mutually exclusive—is the perception that serving diﬀerent goals 
should be achieved within the same limited teaching time. However, as will be seen in 
the next chapter, this contradiction exists only if we think that all the possible aims cor-
respond to a certain pool of knowledge, that is, to the appropriate content of education.
5.2 External Effectiveness: The Impact of Education
The pressure on education to adjust has inspired policymakers to better connect these 
two distinct aspects of expectations: external eﬀectiveness, that is, the social and economic 
impact of education, and internal eﬀectiveness, that is, educational outcomes. Better 
connection means that internal goals are derived from external ones, while the validity 
of internal goals is assessed against external references. 
In most cases, how we determine our goals is very much inﬂuenced by how and 
what we measure. Indicators play an outstanding and growing role in setting goals for 
education; in fact, they often serve as substitutes. While setting measurable goals is a 
basic condition of informed governance, we are facing a trap as with any measurements: 
what we measure has the tendency to become a veriﬁable problem, whereas what we do 
not measure remains invisible. As far as external eﬀectiveness is concerned, and educa-
tion being a public service, in most cases public goals are emphasized: the impact of 
education on employment indicators, on spending on health services, on crime rates, 
or on political attitudes. Promoters of the liberal tradition often criticize the use of 
such indicators, claiming that they impoverish the way of thinking about education by 
narrowing the scope of our approach. Indeed, we should be aware that indicators are 
proxies, and that they simply indicate complex problems and are not identical to them. 
However, as will be seen in the third part of this book, indicators are policy instruments, 
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and as such, they are used for public purposes. We do not measure the “happiness” of 
individuals; not only because it is quite hard to measure, but because it is simply not 
the business of the governance of education.
Here, education’s impact can be considered on the basis of the individual approach, 
that is, we may analyze the impact of participation in education on the basis of the 
competitiveness or well-being of individual learners, or we may follow a collective ap-
proach that focuses on the relative position and status of various social groups or nations. 
In the huge evaluation literature, almost all relevant aspects of economic or social life 
are connected with education. The most typical economic aspects are the return of 
investments in education in terms of earnings, employment opportunities, as well as 
its impact on innovation capacities or consumption patterns. Various social impacts 
regarding educational attainment could include a basket of issues such as teenage 
pregnancy, juvenile crime, drug use, health, or technological literacy. Also, its impact 
on political participation or on the patterns of the consumption of cultural products is 
often analyzed. The aspect of the impact of education that is emphasized—to a certain 
extent—is contextual. For example, one of the indicators widely used in the United States 
is spending on charity, which is rarely measured in European countries. Nevertheless, 
whatever our main concern, the correlation between educational attainment and the 
related indicators has almost always proved to be strong.
Box 5.1
Human and Social Capital
Human Capital
Human capital is the ability of labor to produce economic value. This ability is partly 
gained through participation in education and training but also by accumulating 
experience in the practice (credentials). Human capital is one of the resources of 
production, such as physical means. Therefore, investment in human capital brings 
additional output such as investment in technology. It is not important only for the 
renewal of the structure of capital; if the development of human capital does not 
keep up with the development of physical capital, it becomes a barrier to economic 
growth. In contemporary developed economies the return of investment in human 
capital is higher than that in physical capital. Human capital is substitutable but not 
transferable. There is a distinction often made between speciﬁc human capital that is 
required for a speciﬁc job or for a certain employer, such as certain vocational skills, 
and general human capital that is useful in any job and almost for all employers, 
such as literacy skills. The value of human capital is not carried only by individuals; 
in “high human capital environments,” the economic value that individuals may 
produce is higher.
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Box 5.1 (continued)
Social Capital
Social capital is a concept that refers to connections within and between social 
networks, as well as connections among individuals. The underlying assumption of 
the concept is that social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups. 
In this sense, social capital is a resource that is based on more or less institutional-
ized relationships of mutual recognition and support that facilitate certain actions 
within the network by trust, reciprocity, and shared norms. The operation of social 
networks is often associated with the operation of institutionalized frameworks of 
cooperation among individuals. However, due to the weakness or dysfunctionality 
of institutional settings and widespread distrust in a society, sometimes informal 
social networks serve as substitutes. Contemporary community sites on the inter-
net opened new channels through which social capital has been accumulated and 
maintained. The typical indicators of social capital are associational membership 
and social trust. Education contributes largely to the development of social capital. 
However, the mechanisms through which learning contributes to the accumulation 
of social capital are not clear.
—The Well-being of Nations 2001
5.3 Internal Effectiveness: 
 Students’ Progression in the Education System
Participation
The traditional meaning of the internal eﬀectiveness of education is based on the simple 
fact that the more time somebody spends in formal education (the higher level of 
qualiﬁcations she or he obtains), the better. Of course, this simple method is corrected 
by two factors: (1) what kind of further participation the actual level of completed 
education makes possible, and (2) the relevance of the labor market to actual educational 
attainment. For example, completed secondary education that entitles graduates to apply 
for admission to higher education or a secondary vocational qualiﬁcation that allows 
graduates to seek better-paid jobs with lower risks of unemployment are considered 
to be more valuable than others. Due to the increasing average length of participation 
in formal schooling, especially because of the expansion of general secondary and 
higher education, the “threshold of success” is perpetually rising. (For example, the actual 
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related indicator of the European Union is the proportion of students with completed 
upper secondary education.) It inevitably leads to the devaluation of the attainment 
of middle-aged and older generations that the supply of adult education attempts to 
compensate.
The most important aspects of participation in formal education are the following:
 • The length of participation in formal education. The most typical indicators are 
the average years spent in education, the expected average years that ﬁve-year-
old students are expected to spend in education, the highest level of education 
completed, etc.
 • Progression in formal education. The typical indicators are the enrollment rates 
at diﬀerent levels and types of education.
 • The diﬀerent forms of failure and the use of correction routes. The most widely-
used indicators are year repetition rates, dropout rates during the period of 
mandatory schooling or at diﬀerent levels or school types, and enrollment in 
so-called “second chance” programs or in adult education programs for those 
with low educational attainment.
Progression in primary and secondary education is partly determined by the struc-
ture of the schools, by the actual number of seats that diﬀerent schools oﬀer, and—in 
theory—the success of the individual students. It is important to note that a large num-
ber of problems that are often attributed to fragmented schools structures (e.g., unfair 
selection) are generated by other deﬁciencies, such as the selection pressure generated 
by the low inclusive capacity of schools. The analysis of PISA surveys proves that the 
most fragmented school structures with early selection are not necessarily those with the 
largest school performance diﬀerences. In an education system there are always certain 
selection points. But the question remains: how fair is the selection at these points (i.e., 
how much is the meritocratic ideal prevailing) and how smooth are the transitions from 
one level to another? 
When we talk about school structures, we refer to three distinct matters: school 
types, programs types, and pedagogical phases. The typical characteristic of centralized 
systems is that these aspects are almost interchangeable. In general, in education—dis-
regarding the special-function institutions, such as those for art education, national 
minorities, and/or special needs children—there is no program diversity, and curricular 
regulation is simply adjusted to school types according to distinct levels of education. In 
these systems the program type mainly refers only to the proﬁle of vocational schools. 
However, if choice and program diversity are introduced, and if curricular regulation 
of general education is uniﬁed into a single core curriculum for twelve grades (within 
which setting pedagogical phases do not necessarily concur with school types), then 
the distinction among the three aspects becomes very visible. Increasing diﬀerentiation 
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among school types, programs, and pedagogical phases makes standardization diﬃcult 
yet makes the whole system ﬂexible.
Another factor that has a major impact on student progression pathways is the aspi-
rations of those who are making the decisions: the parents and students. As the results 
of an empirical research in Hungary suggest, the aspirations of the parents are deeply 
connected to their educational attainment (educational status); therefore, the decisions 
they make may reinforce the selective character of the system. Ensuring the dynamic 
balance between the supply and demand of educational services implies a diﬀerent logic 
of planning than the traditional one based only on the number of children and the 
presumptions of central decision-makers about the “needs of the society and economy.”
Box 5.2
The Aspirations of Parents in Hungary
• The aspirations of parents play a decisive role in enrollment decisions.
• At the beginning of the learning career of their children, more than half of parents 
cannot formulate their goals. However, as time passes, these goals become more 
and more articulate, partly because the feedback from the schools shapes the 
aspirations of the parents.
• Only a small fraction of the parents want their children to ﬁnish school and to 
start earning money as soon as possible.
• The determining underlying consideration of parents is to avoid that their child’s 
status will be lower than that of the parents. For this, they are ready to make any 
sacriﬁces and to pay any price.
• As a result, for parents with the highest educational status, any other options 
than those offering the highest qualiﬁcations are unacceptable. 
• Parents with lower educational status may consider more options. In the case 
of educational opportunities, offering upward mobility for the child is a rational 
investment—the return calculation is dominant.
—Lannert 2003
This book focuses on the governance of pre-higher education. Nevertheless, there 
is a relatively new phenomenon occurring at later stages that deserves attention because 
of its potential implications: the “transition from learning to work.” Earlier, the exit from 
the education system and the entrance to the labor market was a speciﬁc moment of 
someone’s personal career. Recently, it became a—sometimes decade-long—period of 
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life for young adults. The individual pathways became extremely diverse, within which 
the “learning then working” logic was very often reversed. Many young adults interrupt 
learning with a period of work, and often learning and work are done in parallel. “Double 
dipping,” that is, going for two diﬀerent qualiﬁcations at the same level and at the same 
time or staying much longer in higher education is becoming increasingly typical. Also, 
experiencing unemployment under the age of 30 is already a mass phenomenon.
As the following section illustrates, there are other indicators than the ones related 
to participation. However, the governance of education in most South Eastern European 
countries still relies on participation data that generates a certain set of consequences:
 • For a long period of time only participation-related data about educational 
attainment was available; the strong correlation between educational and 
impact-related indicators created a climate within which opening channels for 
social mobility—that increases the well-being of individuals—appeared to be 
the main purpose of educational services. It still goes without saying that in 
spite of much more sophisticated analysis, the availability of information on 
learning outcomes is just possible.
 • Expectations formulated in terms of a desired impact usually are set directly 
for teachers and schools. For example, schools should ideally contribute to the 
integration of Roma into mainstream society. Beyond the fact that education is 
deﬁnitely not the only public service that should be charged with this task, it is 
problematic because such expectation cannot be interpreted and translated into 
daily pedagogical practice. The only thing that it may lead to is strengthening 
self-protection mechanisms, as responsibility drifts to parents.
 • On the basis of participation indicators, educational-outcome-related goals are 
weak; apart from keeping students in education as long as possible, they can be 
determined mainly in negative terms: lower dropout, lower repetition, etc. As a 
result, processes that are overly regulated make the relationship between educa-
tional goals and expected economic and social impact far too remote to be useful.
 • Parallel to the increasing complexity of education systems (due to the increas-
ing diversity of student progression patterns), as well as that of economies (due 
to the increasing diversity of professions), the system of qualiﬁcations that is 
supposed to inform employers about the value of educational attainment of 
individuals is unable to fulﬁll its function. On the one hand, it makes labor 
selection more expensive; on the other hand, it enforces the reconsideration of 
qualiﬁcation systems on a new basis.
The tendency that participation-related indicators are gradually devalued is not 
independent from the fact that most European countries have achieved a very high level 
of participation in education; therefore, they can aﬀord to turn to indicators with much 
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stronger ability to explain successes and failures of educational services. However, in 
spite of their generous participation rates, most South Eastern European countries have 
serious student participation problems that deserve a lot of attention. For example, pre-
primary enrollment in Serbia is among the lowest in Europe (it is less than 40 percent5), 
and the proportion of those Roma students who are not completing primary education 
is estimated to be between 62 and 87 percent.
Lifelong Learning
Contemporary changes in the patterns of participation in education resulted in a new 
overarching approach: the lifelong learning paradigm. This approach became a prevail-
ing international educational policy paradigm in the mid-1990s, not only because 
it responded well to changes, but also because of its potential to contribute to the 
emancipation of education from labor policies and because it opened new spaces for 
the further expansion of the education sector. Lifelong learning has four major char-
acteristics (Radó 2004):
 • A systemic and holistic approach to learning. Learning occurs in various settings 
at various times, and formal education has no monopoly on providing learning 
opportunities. Therefore, we should not frame learning opportunities in terms 
of standardized types and levels of formal education. Rather, the point of de-
parture should be the question: at diﬀerent stages of the human lifecycle, what 
kind of options can the learner consider and what kind of learning pathways 
can be built up by the choices that learners make. As a result, the traditional 
supply-driven isolation of general, vocational, higher, and adult education can 
no longer be sustained. Also, the formal settings of learning should be connected 
with other (informal) learning opportunities; that is, formal education should 
not compete with any other forms of learning (e.g., media, internet, hobbies, 
etc.) and they should be considered as complementary learning opportunities.
 • Reconsideration of the relationship between supply and demand, strong focus on 
learning. Learning should not be based exclusively on the agenda of the educa-
tion service providers, and the latter should adjust to the needs of the learner. 
Therefore, instead of operating teacher and teaching-centered education sys-
tems, learner and learning-centered educational services should be built. This 
shift of emphasis from the supplier to the client (a trivial requirement in most 
services, with the exception of education and health) has major consequences 
for governance: it weakens the legitimate basis for standardizing processes. The 
other consequence is the requirement that any educational services provided 
for learners should be quality-assured. In addition to these, if our assumption 
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is that the primary decision-maker is the learner (to a certain age, his or her 
parents), then he or she should be provided with the necessary information.
 • Tailor-made approach: emphasis on autonomous and motivated learning. A service 
that has a strong drive to adjust to demand is also interested in generating de-
mand. In theory, no other services are as lucky as education: generating demand 
for further learning, that is, strengthening the motivation to learn is a legitimate 
goal in education. What is already a practice in private language schools, that is, 
the measurement of the results of prior learning and adjusting the programs, is 
not necessarily a daily practice in formal learning settings. But, formal schooling, 
being a giant machinery of mass education, can be tailor-made only through 
separate, individualized teaching according to some educationalists. However, 
through the enrichment of learning opportunities and teaching methods, even 
formal schooling can be made much more responsive to individual needs, learn-
ing styles, and interests of learners at any level of education.
 • Reconsideration of goals: connecting internal and external eﬀectiveness. As mentioned 
earlier, the external references to the design of concrete educational targets are 
increasingly important. Focusing on the learning needs of the learners puts even 
greater emphasis on the labor market and social relevance of education. If the 
invested time and eﬀort of the learner does not yield any returns, autonomous, 
motivated, and active learning remains an illusory expectation. As far as primary 
and secondary education is concerned, learning to learn must be a goal of special 
weight.
In South Eastern Europe, lifelong learning is often misconstrued as simply meaning 
participation in adult education. It is a serious mistake; as the previous characteristics of 
the lifelong-learning approach indicate, they all have serious implications for all levels 
of education from preschool education till “third generation” learning (i.e., learning 
during retirement).
5.4 Internal Effectiveness: Learning Outcomes
The Transformation of the Relevant Knowledge in Education
One of the basic underlying questions of educational programs of any kind is how to 
select the pool of knowledge that is relevant, that is, the knowledge that should be taught 
and learned till the end of a speciﬁc level or program. “School-relevant knowledge” has 
been under pressure by the accelerated accumulation of knowledge for a long time. 
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However, the crisis of the traditional selection method was not caused by the exhaustive 
amount of knowledge; it was the underlying logic of setting goals for education that 
was increasingly questioned.
This crisis was caused by several parallel processes; a few of them have been indicated 
already. The most important processes are the following:
 • The dissolution of consecratory knowledge codes. The content of education is very 
much determined by the cultural codes of educators, themselves. As highly-
trained intellectuals, educators transmit their own consecrated knowledge codes 
via their expectations of the students—regardless of the actual means of trans-
mission (e.g., curricula, textbooks, or daily pedagogical practice). These cultural 
codes are very much rooted in the traditions of each country. For example, due 
to the excellent and popular translations made by a famous Hungarian poet, 
Hungarian secondary school students learn much more about Francois Villon 
than French students. However, these intellectual codes are increasingly dissolv-
ing in emerging and diverse subcultures.
 • The accumulation of knowledge and the transformation of the sciences. The accu-
mulation of knowledge leads to the diversiﬁcation of the structure of sciences 
mainly by the birth of new independent disciplines and by the emergence of 
others that are multidisciplinary. In contrast, the organization of school subjects 
still reﬂects old academic divisions of knowledge that cause diﬃculties in teach-
ing complex phenomena like the greenhouse eﬀect or evolution. 
 • Pragmatic and instrumental approaches gain dominance. As has been suggested 
several times, the need to better connect education with its external references 
in order to make it more relevant for learners puts an ever greater emphasis on 
practical and applicable knowledge. Its application being contextual by deﬁni-
tion, the huge variety of possible contexts devalues those pieces of knowledge 
that are not constructed with their applicability in mind.
 • An open future. “Preparing students for work and life,” traditionally considered 
to be the main purpose of education, is increasingly a hopeless endeavor, because 
the professions they will practice, the technology they will use, the means of 
entertainment they will enjoy, the work organizations within which they will 
cooperate with others, etc., do not even exist yet. Anyone who tries to set goals 
for education, even for the period of mandatory schooling, shoots at a moving 
target. Therefore, instead of transmitting knowledge that becomes obsolete 
very fast, education should concentrate on the development of the capacity of 
students to adapt to changes.
 • Knowledge as an economic resource. Knowledge has always been an asset; however, 
knowledge became the most important asset when it became the most impor-
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tant source of economic added value in the so-called “knowledge economies.” 
Therefore, human resource development considerations overwrite the old liberal 
tradition of education.
 • The end of the knowledge monopoly of schools. Due to the pressure on the curricula, 
the amount of knowledge taught in schools is increasing. However, this is not 
comparable to the billion-fold ballooning of information that can be reached on 
the Internet in minutes. Memorizing information is not attractive to students 
when it can be “Googled” with the stroke of a key on the computer. 
 • Accumulating our knowledge about knowledge. During the last two decades, brain 
research and cognitive psychology accumulated a great deal of understanding 
about how eﬀective learning occurs, while traditional ways of teaching very often 
handle the minds of learners as black boxes that simply replicate knowledge 
input.
Due to the cumulative impact of all these reasons, goals for educational services 
should be set in terms of competencies. The shift from the way of setting subject 
knowledge goals for educational services has distinct stages: making knowledge more 
applicable by “subject competencies,” then experimenting with cross-subject competen-
cies, such as problem solving and communication (see Chapter 11).
The Learning Outcomes: Competencies
Competencies, that is, the complex ability to do something for speciﬁc purpose in a speciﬁc 
context, are constructed by knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Reconstructing the evolution of 
the concept of competencies is far beyond the purpose of this book. What is important 
here is that emphasizing the three key components of competencies is the appropriate 
means of balancing the two traditional approaches to the desired learning outcomes: the 
strong focus of general education on knowledge versus the limited scope of vocational 
training of practical occupational skills. Nevertheless, many regard the emphasis on the 
development of competencies as the “vocationalization” of general education, while 
others share the suspicion that it is no more than a new attempt to smuggle general 
education back to vocational training. Nevertheless, competencies became the prevailing 
underlying concept of setting goals for education. As a result, contemporary learning 
outcomes and competencies are often used as interchangeable terms that indicate the 
career of competencies. In very general terms, learning outcomes are “statements of 
what a learner knows, understands and is able to do on completion of a learning process” 
(CEDEFOP 2008). 
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This career of competencies originates in the eﬀort of the mid-1980s to make voca-
tional education and training more relevant by the functional analysis of occupations. 
Vocational training being oriented towards the application of knowledge, it is almost 
a natural development. However, due to the needs generated by the reconsideration of 
relevant knowledge in education, in the second part of the 1990s determining goals in 
terms of competencies started to spill-over to general education, too. The Deﬁnition 
and Selection of Competencies (DeSeCo) Program launched by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1997 (and that provided the 
framework for the PISA surveys from 2000), played an instrumental role in the “expan-
sion” of competencies. Since competencies, in general, can be as varied as the number 
of possible contexts within which knowledge is applied, there was a need to select those 
“key” competencies on which education should focus. The selection of key competencies 
in the DeSeCo Program was based on three criteria (Rychen 2006):
 • The competencies that are playing a part in the achievement of those outcome 
results that are highly valued for their contribution to successful life and well-
functioning society at the levels of the individuals and society as a whole.
 • The competencies that contribute to performing serious and complex require-
ments within a wide range of contexts.
 • The competencies that are important for all.
Partly on the basis of the results of the DeSeCo Program, the European Union 
developed its Reference Framework of Key Competencies in the early 2000s. The EU’s 
key competencies for education are divided into eight groups (Eurydice 2002):
 • Communication in mother tongue,
 • Communication in foreign languages,
 • Mathematical competencies and basic competencies in science and technology,
 • Digital competence,
 • Learning to learn,
 • Interpersonal, intercultural and social competencies, and civic competencies,
 • Entrepreneurship, and
 • Cultural expression.
All the detailed descriptors of the key competencies refer to the “abilities to ….” 
The EU key competencies fall into three categories: (1) measurable cognitive competen-
cies (e.g., mathematical competencies), (2) competencies that require a high degree of 
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cross-curricular organization (e.g., learning to learn) and (3) certain underpinning trans-
versal competencies (e.g., problem solving or creativity) (CEDEFOP 2008). The EU 
reference framework provided the basis of the revision of curricula in several member 
states, as well as the development of the European Qualiﬁcations Framework.
The Learning-outcomes Approach
The prevailing underlying concept of international mainstream educational policies is 
currently based on the learning-outcomes approach. This approach is the result of two 
parallel processes: the growing emphasis on learning and learning pathways instead of 
emphasizing teaching and school structure (lifelong learning), and the gradual reconsid-
eration of relevant school knowledge, i.e., the growing focus on applicable knowledge 
(competences) that is, on the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that enable the learner to 
do things in diverse contexts. 
Determining the goals for education in terms of learning outcomes opens a wide 
range of opportunities for the governance of education, and some of them are related to 
the diﬃculties that ﬂow from the use of participation-related indicators. First, the focus 
on learning outcomes instead of (teaching and learning) processes makes it possible to 
create a direct chain of interpretation that connects external references of education 
with concrete educational goals. 
Figure 5.1
Connecting Goals with External References: The Interpretation Chain
The second impact of the learning-outcomes approach is that, here, education’s 
relevance to the labor market is not a question that applies only to the design of voca-
tional programs. Due to the shift of emphasis from employment to employability, that 
is, to the potential of the individual to hold onto and to be successful in the workplace, 
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general education’s contribution and relevance to the labor market is increasingly con-
sidered. Also, the learning-outcomes approach weakens the monopoly of professional 
educators in determining education’s goals, because focusing on competencies makes it 
possible to involve laymen, too. (Not surprisingly, the contribution of stakeholders to 
the identiﬁcation of new competencies in certain countries was vastly more useful than 
the conceptual work done by experts.) As a result, involving employers in the discourse 
on the goals for the initial phase of primary education is not regarded as “perverted” 
anymore.
An additional advantage is the much easier translation of goals that are set in terms 
of learning outcomes to teaching. For example, certain social policy goals, such as the 
integration of minorities, sustainable development, or promoting democratic civic at-
titudes, are becoming interpretable for pedagogy; therefore, they can be broken out from 
the “ghetto” of extracurricular activities and can be integrated into the mainstream of 
education. In general, detaching the problems of participation and qualiﬁcations from 
the actual outcomes of learning makes the interpretation of participation-related mat-
ters much easier. Focusing on learning outcomes instead of inputs and processes allows 
education to better serve certain lifelong learning-related goals, such as connecting the 
subsectors of education (i.e., general, vocational, higher, and adult education) to the 
competencies to be developed or the recognition of informal learning. 
The learning-outcomes approach, departing from subject knowledge and from process 
orientation, is a paradigm shift; as such, it has major implications for the content of all 
other major public policy expectations of educational services like quality or equity. It 
also inﬂuences all aspects of education and has implications for teaching, for the work of 
schools, and for the pattern of governance, too. All these implications will be discussed 
in the following chapters.
5.5 The Impact of the Learning-outcomes Approach 
 on Other Key Concepts
Quality of Education
In very general terms, quality is suitability for the purpose. Thus, the actual meaning of 
quality is essentially determined by the purpose, that is, the goals we would like to serve 
with a tool or a service. In the case of services, the external criteria against which we 
may measure its quality are: (1) the compliance to certain standards, (2) the compli-
ance to criteria that are ﬁxed in a contract, and (3) the satisfaction of the clients. All 
these measures can be translated to the realm of primary and secondary education. The 
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“standards” are educational goals, speciﬁc targets, and service speciﬁcations that are 
regulated by governments or (in decentralized systems) lower-level management. Of 
course, the most important ones are those institutions or individuals that set goals for 
the service: curricula and achievement standards, such as examination requirements 
or qualiﬁcation requirements. Although in centralized education systems the meaning 
of a “contract” is typically rather limited (all schools oﬀer the same), if curricular and 
program diversity is introduced, all schools “oﬀer” something in their school-based 
programs, and parents who decide to send their children to the school are entitled to 
expect the fulﬁllment of the oﬀer. (This is the reason why introducing major changes 
in the program to those who have been already learning in the school for several years 
is considered to be a “discourtesy,” even in centralized systems.) Also, a school program 
that responds to the needs of its “constituency,” that is, to the needs of the local com-
munity, also can be considered as a kind of “contract.” The third measure of quality, 
that is, the satisfaction of parents and students, does not require any explanation; it is 
as relevant to education as to any other service. 
To recap, the main characteristic of centralized systems is the use of a narrow ap-
proach to quality in education that is restricted only to the compliance to centrally-issued 
standards. However, since our contemporary understanding is based on a balanced view 
of the three major criteria, the two other sources of requirements are equally important. 
Therefore, education services that assert their high quality also should respond to the 
actual expectations of their local environment and the clients. In theory, the implication 
of the leaning-outcomes approach in this respect is that when local self-governments 
determine their expectations of their schools on behalf of the local community, they 
supplement the centrally-set learning outcome goals with their own. Of course, in prac-
tice it does not work so nicely, especially if local owners of the school are improperly 
supplied with comparative performance-related information. (In addition to this, the 
owners may have various expectations beyond measurable performance.) However, this 
does not mean that responding to local expectations is not something that schools can 
ignore without compromising the quality of the service they provide. 
The case with the satisfaction of parents and students is diﬀerent. Research results 
prove that parents are not necessarily the most satisﬁed with those schools that produce 
the highest scores in performance surveys. Also, in spite of the expectations of adults 
who have diﬃculties recalling their childhood, students do not necessarily feel good in 
those schools that help them to achieve the highest learning performance. (Something as 
trivial as table tennis equipment for use during the breaks between classes, or other small 
things inﬂuencing the climate in the school, are much more important in this respect.) 
There are various implications of using diverse criteria for quality. First of all, quality 
is fundamentally contextual. Quality of education means something completely diﬀerent 
in downtown Soﬁa, in the Roma urban ghetto in Plovdiv, or in a small village in the 
Rhodope Mountains. Also, quality may mean responding to rather diﬀerent expectations 
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in two diﬀerent schools within the same settlements, or in the case of diﬀerent student 
groups of diﬀerent socio-economic or ethnic background. This important feature of our 
contemporary understanding of quality—to a certain extent—devalues the centrally-
issued quality standards that previously carried (and in several South Eastern European 
countries still carry) an absolute weight. 
The second implication is that quality is a moving target. Even in the case of service 
outcomes, as they are increasingly connected to external (economic and social) refer-
ences, their perpetual change forces all service providers to reﬂect upon the changes 
and to strive to adjust. To put it simply: as goals change, the actual meaning of quality 
changes, too. This also applies to the expectations of the local governments and the 
clients of the service; their views, interests, and perceptions are not static in the least.
Sometimes we use the terms quality and eﬀectiveness as exchangeable concepts. In 
fact, quality is less and less the feature of the results and increasingly that of processes. As 
a result—as it is demonstrated by a possible taxonomy of the aspects of quality bel-
low—eﬀectiveness is one of the components or aspects of quality that is a much broader 
concept, even in terms of the results of education. Poor performance results that are 
increasingly measured in terms of learning outcomes indicate quality problems but they 
are far from being identical to them.
Figure 5.2
The Aspects of Quality and Eﬀectiveness in Education
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The conclusion from the above deﬁnition of quality is its organization-connected 
nature. If quality is tied to goals and various external expectations and to the processes 
that must be designed to serve all these expectations, it becomes so contextual that 
makes it very diﬃcult to talk about across the entire education system; where we can 
grasp quality is always a speciﬁc organization (school), with speciﬁc goals operating in 
a speciﬁc environment.
Equity of Education
Equity has been one of the major concerns of educational policies in Europe for many 
decades. The rationales for promoting equity are extremely diverse and vary from 
value-based orientations (such as gender equity, multiculturalism, egalitarianism, etc.) 
to value-neutral considerations (such as investment in human capital, the reduction 
of social safety costs, or strengthening social cohesion). The approaches to educational 
equity vary between the two extreme positions of a wide spectrum. On the one end is 
a pessimistic approach that is rooted in the sociology of the 1960s, according to which 
schools are the products of modern societies that are based on deep social inequalities. 
Therefore, the very purpose of education is ingraining and reproducing inequalities. 
On the opposite end is the enthusiastic approach of “alternative pedagogies,” according 
to which “all children can learn.” It was strengthened by the ruling egalitarian “social 
engineering” approach of the former communist countries that was based on the illu-
sion that the social positions of entire societal macro-groups can be changed through 
education (Radó 2009).
The prevailing “mainstream” approach to equity is a rather balanced one: although 
the social background of the students determines their educational outcomes to a huge 
extent, education still has a certain space to compensate for the negative impact of low so-
cial status or other dimensions of social and personal inequalities on educational outcomes. 
Therefore, the question is how to enhance this compensation capacity of schools. This 
balanced view is the underlying approach of the deﬁnition of equity produced by an 
OECD expert group in 1997: 
  Educational equity refers to an educational environment in which individuals 
can consider options and make choices based on their abilities and talents, not 
on the basis of stereotypes, biased expectations, or discrimination. The achieve-
ment of educational equity enables males and females of all races and ethnic 
backgrounds to develop the skills that are needed in order to be productive, 
empowered citizens. It opens economic and social opportunities regardless of 
gender, ethnicity, race, or social status.
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Figure 5.3
The Conceptual Framework for Understanding Inequities in Education
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show a rather favorable picture for most countries in Europe, especially from a global 
perspective. The real reason, however, for the need to renew the interpretation of equity 
in education is the new emerging paradigm of learning outcomes. The implication of 
this approach to equity is that inequalities are worth considering through the prism of 
the very purpose of educational services: the results of learning. Identifying inequities, 
that is, performance diﬀerences that are considered to be illegitimate either because of their 
degree (such as gender inequities) or because of their type (such as performance diﬀerences 
caused by discrimination), is not simply a shift in the methods of identiﬁcation. It has 
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However, as mentioned earlier, in several cases of inequities, participation diﬀerences 
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access and participation still has to be maintained. But even in these cases, the analy-
sis of information on learning outcomes gaps provide an essential insight on the way 
inequities are generated in the education system, without which participation-related 
problems can not be dealt with properly.
Cost-effectiveness of Education
We will discuss ﬁnancing of education in centralized and decentralized governance 
systems in a separate chapter. However, in order to demonstrate the impact of the 
learning-outcome approach, we have to anticipate a few considerations.
The cost-eﬀectiveness of education is the relationship between all sorts of expenditures 
and their outcomes. The relation between the two can be improved either by reducing 
expenditures or by improving educational outcomes. This measure is one of the most 
important public policy requirements, even if the principle of “value for money”—that 
all citizens in South Eastern Europe carefully consider while shopping—is not often 
applied to public services. The reason why governments still have to strive to improve 
the balance between inputs and outputs of educational services is the fact that education 
systems in the region are facing enormous challenges, meanwhile increasing the amount 
of public resources deployed to education has serious limits. 
Education in a given country can be considered eﬀective or ineﬀective only by com-
parison to another country. Therefore, indicators allowing for international comparison 
play a key role in judging the cost-eﬀectiveness of education. The basic indicator is 
spending per student (e.g., per capita expenditure). As far as educational outcomes are 
concerned, there are various participation and learning-outcome indicators that can be 
set against per capita spending. Due to the availability of learning-outcomes data, they 
are increasingly replacing participation-related indicators in measuring cost-eﬀectiveness. 
As the data for four Central and Eastern European countries illustrate, the “price” of 
learning outcomes in diﬀerent countries can be calculated. 
Table 5.1
The “Price” of the Results in Central and Eastern European Countries6
Expenditure7 
(USD purchasing power 
parity)
Mathematic scores 
in PISA8
Expenditure/PISA scores
Slovakia 17,612 498 35
Czech Republic 28,444 523 54
Poland 26,544 490 54
Hungary 30,556 490 62
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When comparing the cumulative per capita spending on primary education with 
mathematics scores in PISA in the OECD countries, it turns out that there is a statistical 
correlation between the two. Nevertheless, there are countries that perform better than 
would be expected on the basis of the level of funding, while there are other countries 
that perform lower. The comparison suggests that the closer the average achievement 
data are to the expectations on the basis of the level of spending, the better is the 
balance between expenditure and outcomes. In Serbia, however, because of the poor 
average performance of the Serbian education system in spite of the relatively low level 
of funding, the education system of the country performs much lower than expecta-
tions (Teodorovic 2008). It suggests that there is a space to improve the eﬀectiveness of 
primary education even at the level of recent funding. 
Figure 5.4
Relationship between PISA Scores and Spending (2003)9
Although these statistical correlations are good indications of the cost-eﬀectiveness 
of a given education system, a great deal of cautiousness is recommended about their 
interpretation. As will be seen later, there is no overlap between the factors that deter-
mine per capita funding and those determining learning outcomes. In other words, 
there are no shortcuts in this respect: the relationship between ﬁnancing and outcomes is 
remote and indirect; therefore, increasing funding does not necessarily result in better 
outcomes of any kind. 
350
400
450
500
550
600
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000
Korea
Finland
GreeceSerbia
Mexico
Spain
Portugal Italy
Czech Republic
Hungary
Ireland
Poland
Slovak Republic Germany
Sweden
Australia
Netherlands
United StatesNorway
Austria
Canada Japan
France
SwitzerlandBelgiumDenmarkIceland
PISA mathematics score
Cumulative expenditure per student between the ages of 6 and 15
R2 = 0.15
PA R T  T W O :  E D U C A T I O N  S E R V I C E  D E L I V E R Y
105
The expenditure on education can be compared with its external outcomes. For 
example, the impact of spending on education can be analyzed in relation to unem-
ployment, earnings, innovation, or other aspects of development. The challenge to the 
analysis is to ﬁlter out the impact of factors other than education. Nevertheless, the 
“educated guess” that impact analysis oﬀers is instrumental in understanding the eﬃ-
ciency of investment in education in light of its external eﬀectiveness.
Figure 5.5
Cost-eﬀectiveness in Education
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we measure cost-eﬀectiveness only. It has implications for certain principles of ﬁnancing, 
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Learning and Teaching
6.1 Learning: The Final Frontier
Learning is one of the basic functions of the human psyche, and it has a lasting eﬀect 
on one’s personality and is generated by any interactions with a person’s environment. 
Therefore, learning is change and the ingraining of change. In other words, learning is 
a process of perpetual socialization. But, how much does it help us? Widely understood 
as “acquiring knowledge” (whatever “acquiring” and “knowledge” mean), learning is 
very much connected to teaching: learning of what is taught. Also, identifying the 
results of learning is connected to assessment: what is demonstrated during assess-
ment is learnt (Winch and Gingell 1999). In this respect, the major consequence of 
the learning-outcomes approach is a greater emphasis on other elements of knowledge 
beyond information: understanding, behavior, skills, and values. However, much of 
our knowledge about learning is not new, simply reinterpreted in light of new research 
ﬁndings or new expectations of education. For example, the notion that the “learning 
curve” might diﬀer with diﬀerent types of knowledge with varying complexity, or with 
the very diﬀerent learning styles and capacities of individuals, is a sort of old triviality 
and notably has nearly no impact on policies that were based on rigid standardization. 
Learning has three major domains: cognitive (e.g., learning to solve problems), aﬀective 
(e.g., learning to reject sin), and psychomotor (e.g., learning to ride a bicycle). Learning 
knowledge—as we understand it, identical to acquiring competencies—requires all three.
Theories of learning are vital references for pedagogical practice but may have cer-
tain implications for the management of schools and the management of the work of 
their frontline professionals, too. What is important for the very practical purposes of 
a discussion on governance and management is what kind of implications they have on 
the conditions that should be provided for teaching and the work of schools? In order 
to grasp the most important implications, three matters are to be touched upon: (1) 
the key characteristics of eﬀective learning, (2) the various forms of learning, and (3) 
the basic conditions for successful learning.
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The Characteristics of Effective Learning: A Distillation
A useful concise overview of our contemporary understanding how students learn is 
provided by a discussion paper published by the Scottish Consultative Council on 
Curriculum. It is important to note that learning in diﬀerent ages is not fundamentally 
diﬀerent. When focusing on the learning of primary and secondary students, their way to 
succeed is not so diﬀerent from how the reader of this book learns. Another preliminary 
note is about the “what works in learning” nature of the following characteristics. The 
more we will learn about learning, the less we can guarantee that the following underlying 
assumptions for teaching and the organization of learning will prove themselves valid. 
The relevant features of learning are the following (Scottish CCC 1996):
 • Intelligence is not ﬁxed. We all have much greater potential for learning than 
is commonly recognized.
 • There is no such thing as a single, general intelligence, which we all possess to 
a greater or lesser degree.
 • Learning involves developing our emotions and feelings along with our ability 
to think and act.
 • We are more likely to learn when we are motivated to do so. Young people 
who feel good about themselves are much more likely to be highly motivated 
to learn.
 • We learn more eﬀectively when we think things through for ourselves.
 • Learning is messy. We rarely learn anything by proceeding along a single path 
to predetermined outcomes.
 • Most learning involves other people.
 • Self-awareness, including awareness of ourselves as learners, helps us to learn 
more eﬀectively.
 • We can learn how to learn by developing skills that help us to think, feel, and 
act more eﬀectively.
Apart from these characteristics of learning, there were four shifts in our under-
standing of how learning occurs, with major consequences to teaching during the last 
two decades (NEA 2006).
 • Learning as active engagement. The concept of learning as the passive absorption 
of information has shifted to a concept of learning as active engagement. Learn-
ers are attempting to make sense of incoming information by interpretation on 
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the basis of their prior knowledge and by questioning. Learning as an active, 
constructive process plays a critical role in transforming information into usable 
knowledge.
 • Learning as social. Learning in the classroom is traditionally an individual activ-
ity; students were expected to learn by listening to the teacher and working on 
their own. (Most classrooms are even furnished in a way that allows students 
to watch each other’s back only. Also, “cooperation among students in order to 
help each other is very often punished because it distracts attention from the 
teacher.”) In our contemporary understanding of eﬀective learning, however, 
social interactions such as discussion, debate, and joint work are essential.
 • Learner diﬀerences as resources. The education systems of the South Eastern Euro-
pean region tend to be oriented to minimize pupil diﬀerences in the classrooms 
because they are considered obstacles to teaching. (To a certain extent, this is 
the reason for the high selection pressure in the education systems, for example, 
from which Roma students suﬀer.) Due to the growing diﬀerences in student 
backgrounds, it is not a sustainable approach anymore. There is a great deal of 
pedagogical know-how already accumulated elsewhere on how to use student 
diﬀerences as a resource and how to build teaching strategies into them.
 • Knowing what, how, and why. It is, in fact, the previously outlined shift from 
acquiring information and the procedures of a discipline to learning that helps to 
understand facts and ideas on the basis of factual knowledge within the context 
of conceptual frameworks and allows for organizing knowledge in ways that 
facilitate their retrieval and application. 
The Forms of Learning
The three forms of learning are formal, non-formal, and informal learning. The distinc-
tion between the diﬀerent forms of learning is a little artiﬁcial. Although in diﬀerent ages 
there might be dominant ones, the three forms of learning are not separated, sequential 
settings; most of the time, they occur parallel to one another. Success in one form leads 
to success in other forms, while the lack of basic conditions in relation to one form 
leads to failures in the others. For example, a positive attitude towards learning is the 
precondition of any forms of learning in any kind of setting.
 • Formal learning takes place in hierarchical structures and the levels of learning 
are built according to a chronological logic; completion of a certain level is the 
admission criterion for the next one. Participation is mandatory to a certain 
age, and the content is determined by a state approved curricula. Teachers and 
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trainers in formal education are selected by oﬃcial qualiﬁcation requirements 
and are typically public employees. Participation in formal education ends with 
a state approved qualiﬁcation (i.e., a certiﬁcate or diploma issued on the basis 
of the state’s authorization). 
 • Non-formal learning is any organized learning experienced outside of the formal 
system that is directed towards any speciﬁc goal. It may occur along with formal 
learning but does not always end with formal diplomas. Participation in non-
formal learning is voluntary and, most of the time, takes a much shorter time. 
The typical non-formal learning opportunities are oﬀered in order to supple-
ment formal learning in educational institutions or provided in the workplace 
as human resource management instruments or by labor agencies as active labor 
market intervention tools. These learning programs are also delivered by pro-
fessional educators and trainers and are based on a curriculum, although they 
are typically much more ﬂexible. In most cases there are no formal admission 
criteria in non-formal learning and the participation is certiﬁed at the end.
 • Informal learning—in its broadest sense—is identical to the perpetual lifelong 
processes, through which the attitudes, values, and skills of the individuals are 
evolving or transforming. The most important feature of informal learning is 
that it occurs outside of the curriculum of any formal institutions. It is important 
to emphasize that we are not talking here about education; informal learning 
occurs during formal learning and parallel to the declared goals of formal learn-
ing, too. In terms of its impact, it might even conﬂict with the goals of formal 
learning. Therefore, informal learning can also be interpreted as a diﬀerent layer 
of the same learning experience. Though this understanding of informal learn-
ing is a little bit diﬀuse from a governance point of view, it is worth making 
distinctions among the various cases, according to the extent to which learning 
is intended and conscious. According to these criteria, the ﬁrst type of informal 
learning is self-instructed, autodidactic learning that is intended, conscious, and 
for which the learner determines its time, methods, and sources. (For example, 
learning how to build a sailboat in a glass jug.) The second type is accidental or 
spontaneous learning that may happen through observation, social interactions, 
or by solving a problem. These cases (such as learning that the new teacher does 
not like certain patterns of behavior by making mistakes during the class) are 
not intended but conscious. This type of learning is considered to be the most 
eﬀective one by many; it is situation-bound, contextual, and social. Learning 
that is not intended and not conscious (socialization) is typically out of the focus 
of educational policy (OPEK 2005).
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The discourse on non-formal and informal learning is very much preoccupied by 
issues related to adult learning and by the development of qualiﬁcation systems that 
are able to recognize the results of learning outside the formal system. Thus, these two 
forms often are regarded as much less relevant for formal learning that takes place in 
the classrooms of schools. However, in order to ensure the organic unity of learning 
supported by teachers and schools, they should be incorporated into the view of educa-
tors and deliberately built upon. This is the condition to eliminate the isolation of rich 
non-formal learning opportunities—what most schools in the South Eastern European 
region provide by various extracurricular activities—from the mainstream teaching and 
learning process. This “deliberation” may also contribute to better connecting formal 
learning with any kind of informal learning experiences of the students outside of the 
schools. The potential of building on the “alternative” forms of learning has not really 
been explored.
The Conditions for Successful Learning
All of the characteristics and forms of learning that have been outlined so far can be 
interpreted by teachers in order to develop teaching strategies and make choices among 
their teaching methods. The question is: how will it become relevant for policymakers 
and the managers of education? A possible answer is determining those conditions of 
successful learning and successful learning pathways from the point of view of individual 
learners that educational service provisions should guarantee. A public policy report 
from the Center for Educational Policy Analysis in Hungary (OPEK 2005) identiﬁed 
ﬁve conditions for successful learning: access, motivation, information, the return of 
learning, and the culture of learning. Although these conditions are analyzed by the 
report for the entire human life cycle within a lifelong learning framework, this reading 
focuses only on those aspects that are relevant to primary and secondary education.
 • Access to learning opportunities. Access to educational provisions has already been 
touched upon in relation to educational outcomes. The most obvious obstacle 
to access is paucity of available service capacities, that is, the disparity between 
demand and supply. However, there are several other constraints that create 
bottlenecks for certain pathways. In relation to the conditions of learning, the 
question is the choice of various learning opportunities that diﬀerent schools 
are oﬀering or that are available within one single school. The availability of 
learning opportunities can be constrained by distance, the price of the services, 
or by the fact that consecutive programs do not accommodate their students 
properly. Also, constraints to smooth progression within formal schooling can 
be regarded as obstacles to access. In addition to all these, failures during the 
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period of primary and secondary education are serious obstacles to access at 
later stages. Access can be coerced by another feature of the education systems 
of South Eastern Europe: the widespread practice of overt and hidden forms 
of discrimination.
 • Motivation to learn. Motivation is the primary condition of engagement in 
learning. Without being motivated, individuals do not make eﬀorts to learn. 
Motivation can be the result of interest or challenge, but also of a general posi-
tive attitude towards learning. Especially in primary and secondary education, 
motivation is not an independent factor that education is unable to inﬂuence. 
How teachers can generate interiorized (e.g., sense of duty), intrinsic (e.g., 
thirst for knowledge), and extrinsic (e.g., recognition by parents or teachers or 
avoiding bad results), or prestige motives is part of the methodological reper-
toire of teachers. The actual type of motivation may depend very much on the 
personality of the student and the circumstances of learning. Nevertheless, in 
most cases internal (interiorized and intrinsic) motives are more sustainable and 
stronger drives than the external ones.
 • Information for learning related decisions and on the results of learning. Develop-
ing individual learning strategies, considering options about education, and 
making decisions—regardless of whether made by parents or learners them-
selves—requires information. Of course, the most important information on the 
achievement of students is provided by the daily assessment practices of teachers. 
It is important to note here that the marks given to children are not objective 
measures of student achievement; it is not even necessarily the purpose. Parents 
and students also need information on the programs being oﬀered at the schools 
and guidance to support their decisions on which schools to attend. Keeping 
parents well informed may reduce the large role that informal channels play in 
orienting these decisions, leaving less-informed parents at a disadvantage.
 • The individual return of learning eﬀorts. While educational policy focuses on the 
public, economic, and social return of education, learners make decisions on 
the basis of the individual return of their eﬀorts. Although it is not very relevant 
for primary education, in secondary, and especially in vocational secondary 
education, the prospective employment opportunities and salaries matter very 
much. The individual return of educational attainment at diﬀerent levels and 
in diﬀerent parts of education is very diﬀerent from country to country. It very 
much depends on the structure and dynamics of the labor market, as well as 
the structure of education. However, in general, the individual return rate of 
primary education is typically declining, while that of secondary education is 
increasing.
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 • The culture of learning. The environment of learning created by teachers and 
schools is essential to inspiring and inciting students to learn. Also, the norms 
of students’ friends and parents are integral parts of this environment. Another 
aspect of the culture of learning is the learning strategies of students, rather 
directed to ﬁnd a strong connection between various learning strategies and 
high performance. For example, cooperative and competitive learning 
strategies may lead to good results. Nevertheless, it can be said, that those who 
consciously control their own learning and advancement generally perform 
better. In primary education strengthening the foundations of learning (i.e., 
learning competencies and motivation) has a great impact on the culture of 
learning during later stages.
Figure 6.1 
A Framework for Analyzing Learning10
6.2 Teaching 
It is not only formal schooling that contributes to students’ learning. And it is not only 
teaching that produces the leverage of formal schooling; for example, its role in creating 
a framework for peer grouping deserves more attention. Peer relationships provide a 
context for cognitive, social, and emotional development through reciprocity, coopera-
tion, and intimacy. “Peer pressure” also may create a favorable (or unfavorable) climate 
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for learning. There are several highly-valued competencies that are fast developing, 
because they are instrumental in maintaining peer relationships, such as those required 
for sport activities or for communication on the Internet. Teaching may ignore this 
aspect of learning—that happens too often—or may deliberately build on it. Other 
than teaching, teachers do not always emphasize the factors that contribute to learning. 
Stressing the positive role of their work in contrast to the “negative eﬀect” of parents 
(education at home), of the media and the Internet, or that of peer groups is a typical 
and traditional attitude of teachers and others, whose approach to education is very 
much teacher-centered. Sometimes politically appointed governors of national and local 
education systems are also much more concerned about the well-being of teachers than 
the learning of students—for obvious reasons. 
Nevertheless, the most prominent contribution of education to learning is the work 
of teachers, that is, teaching. Teaching is an extremely complex and, at the same time, 
very practical activity; it may have sound theoretical foundations, but much of the 
time it is directed towards daily routine practices on a “what works in my experience” 
basis. It is also very much oriented towards solving concrete problems, such as teach-
ing seven-year-old Branko how to somersault, motivating students to love the novels 
of Ivo Andric, or helping children to understand what holds an atom together. Experts 
of pedagogy have a tendency to listen only to the theoretical complexity of teaching, 
while managers of education may notice only its practical routine side. Even teachers 
are not overly occupied by the underlying and sometimes contradictory theoretical basis 
of their own work. For example, nobody can ride a bicycle without risking a fall if they 
were to think all the time about the complexity of maintaining their balance on two 
wheels.11 When we refer to the many years of induction for beginning teachers, we are 
referring to the process from theory-based design of a lesson to a routine-based lesson 
delivery. However, without grasping the depth of teaching, the appropriate institutional 
environment for daily routines cannot be created.
Another characteristic of teaching that we should be aware of is its soft nature; 
the relationship between teaching and its very purpose (i.e., the learning of students) 
is rather ambiguous. There are many people who assume that teaching per deﬁnition 
entails learning. However, we know that it is very often not the case. The question is 
therefore: where are the boundaries between the responsibility of the teacher and that 
of the learner? How much can we demand that teachers ensure the readiness of their 
students to learn? Undoubtedly, teachers are responsible for the learning of their students, 
and under ideal circumstances (e.g., with suﬃcient available time, with fully commit-
ted children, etc.), students may learn anything within the limits of their capabilities. 
However, circumstances are never ideal: teaching time is always limited and children 
cannot be fully committed to learn everything that they are taught. In practice, teach-
ing is always imperfect. All the uncertainties about the possible potential of teaching 
to ensure that learning will actually happen have implications on the instruments that 
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governance and management use. (For example, we will return later to the question: is 
the standard external assessment of the achievement of students a good and fair measure 
of the performance of teachers?)
Teaching is not simply “educating children and not subjects,” as child-centered 
educationalists suggest. It is teaching something to someone (Winch and Gingell 1999). 
Teachers are teaching subjects to students. Therefore, when determining the major func-
tions of teaching we should not ignore the previous one. The three major functions of 
teaching are the following: (i) curriculum, determining the content of education, (ii) 
instruction, the use of diverse methods in order to manage the work of the students in 
the classroom, and (iii) monitoring, the assessment of the learning of students.
Curriculum of Teaching
Regardless of the type of curriculum that teaching has to comply with, the ﬁnal and 
ultimate actor determining the content of education is the teacher. This is a rule if the 
curriculum to adapt to is a detailed national or even local school curriculum. This is also 
the case if the space for the teachers’ freedom to determine content is created formally 
by the type of regulation or informally by conscious deviation from the oﬃcial cur-
riculum. Purposeful teaching is based on planning. If the centrally-issued curriculum 
is in fact a detailed syllabus (generally called in the South Eastern European countries 
“plan and program”), planning done by (good) teachers determines when and how to 
deviate from it, even if the price to be paid is extra paperwork. (The extra paperwork 
is often called: “double-entry bookkeeping.” For the sake of assessment, the deviations, 
that is, progression, with the actual content should be registered privately.) If develop-
ing the syllabi is the task of the teacher, documenting planning is easier. When teachers 
complain about too much paperwork in connection to planning, it is either created by 
too much meaningless centralization, or it is a signal that teachers do not ﬁnd planning 
necessary at all. 
The content of teaching is very often determined and planned by the textbooks 
“on behalf ” of the teachers. Most textbooks organize the content according to the ap-
proximate number of annual lessons in order to make teachers’ work easier. For many 
teachers in many countries, the ultimate curricula are the textbooks that do not leave 
space for adjustment either to the perceived importance of certain themes or to the in-
terest of the students. What is even more important is the space within which teachers 
and students are able to interpret the “raw material” of learning. Textbooks providing 
“ready-made understanding” may impose a detrimental impact on the methods of 
teaching and learning. Generally speaking, the overuse of textbooks makes teaching 
content driven, while function driven teaching calls for the selection of content accord-
ing to the learning goals that teaching actually serves. This is the reason that many 
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European schools and teachers have access to print or online sources of alternative 
content from which they are able to construct content on their own. (Of course, this 
does not require certain teacher competencies; various technical facilities must be in 
place, too.) The more purposeful is the teaching, the larger the space that is necessary 
for content generated by the teachers, themselves. 
The instrument that makes teaching a regulated process is planning. Planning 
the progression with the content can be done at diﬀerent degrees of elaboration. A 
syllabus allocates teaching time to themes and topics (content units). This plan is not 
necessarily designed to be strict; rather, it serves the orientation of the teachers who 
have to manage the limited teaching time. The time allocated to certain themes may 
depend on the interest of students, their relative weight as perceived by the teachers, 
or—mainly in secondary education—the weight of the topic for examination require-
ments. Although it should not be completely determined by the textbooks that are in 
use in the classroom, too large a deviation from their structure is impractical. A deeper 
level of planning is the development of a thematic plan that is created only for larger 
themes (a unit of 10–15 lessons) and contains more than a syllabus. For example, it 
may contain the activities of the teachers and the students, the instruments used by 
the teachers and the students, the requirements for assessment, etc. (Thematic plans 
connect time allocation and the teaching methods to be used.) Thematic plans rarely 
develope for an entire school year, partly because they build on the progression of the 
students during the previous periods. The most detailed form of planning is the lesson 
draft. Most teachers with a certain routine do not ﬁnd the time to make it important; 
however, it is recommended for beginning teachers. 
Instruction
The key question in relation to the methods of instruction is how much is instruction 
multilateral and diﬀerentiated. The often-heard label of “frontal teaching” refers to 
a teaching style that is characterized by the exclusive use of a simple presentation 
method. In this case, teaching is unilateral (one-way communication between the 
teacher and the students) and uniﬁed (the entire classroom is taught without reﬂecting 
the diﬀerences among students). This teaching style (that according to experts still 
prevails in South Eastern Europe) is widely criticized for various reasons. For example, 
even if the presentation of the teacher is of a high quality, it does not allow room for 
feedback on the learning of individual students, students are isolated from each other, 
the absorption of the “alien knowledge” is weak, the presentation makes an artiﬁcial 
distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, and it represents a dominant 
culture and focuses on ready-made knowledge (Knausz 2001). Despite all these 
shortcomings, frontal teaching prevailed due to the pressure on teaching to transmit 
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more and more “knowledge,” that is, more and more predigested information. As a 
result of the reconsideration of the goals of education, all these shortcomings came 
into the spotlight. So-called “alternative” pedagogies responded to them by renewing 
the methods of instruction.
Various contemporary schools of teaching methodology emphasize the deﬁcien-
cies of traditional frontal teaching practices. (Most of these innovative schools organize 
themselves as radical “movements.”) Whatever is the underlying rationale for these 
“movements,” their common feature is the enrichment of the methodological repertoire 
of teaching in order to make the work in the classroom more unilateral and/or more 
diﬀerentiated. In fact, these are the two features of instruction that are to be empha-
sized, partly because of the much broader concept of desirable learning outcomes (i.e., 
competencies), and partly because of the characteristics of eﬀective learning described 
above. For example, cooperative learning, drama pedagogy, the project method, or 
learning by research all reconsider the traditional organization of learning; therefore, 
they change the role that teachers play in the process of students’ learning. It requires 
serious adjustments in the methods of instruction. Most of these schools are based on 
sound theoretical foundations and developed their methodological standards and the 
networks that support their dissemination and application. 
Applying any of these methods entails turning away from old teaching routines of 
the traditional daily instructional practice: they are time-consuming, ruinous to “order” 
in the classroom, labor-intensive, and hard to control. Therefore, these methods rarely 
replace the use of the presentation method completely, and it is not even desirable. 
What is important is the diversiﬁcation and enrichment of the instructional toolkit 
that teachers use on a regular basis.
There are also rather traditional requirements towards the management of work in 
the classroom, although their meaning is gradually being reconsidered. For example, the 
climate created in the classroom by relationships that are based on mutual appreciation 
ensures order, a good atmosphere, and satisfaction (the so-called “fun factor”). Another 
traditional feature of good instruction is the eﬀective use of learning time with the good 
integration of homework into the work in the classroom.
One speciﬁc and important aspect of instruction is organizing learning by grouping 
of the students. (It has implications for the work of entire schools, that is, the permanent 
grouping of student into diﬀerent classes that we will return to in the next chapter.) 
The grouping of students on the basis of their abilities creates homogeneous groups 
for which setting goals and selecting methods is much easier. However, its good 
results are documented mostly for student groups with good abilities, because the 
implication of this organizing method for weaker ability groups is typically a slower 
pace, more intervention, and less interaction among the students. Also, the expectations 
of these groups are also lower. Thus the use of ability-based groups raises serious equity 
concerns. 
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There are many innovative methods to organize students’ learning in such a way that 
can be used by individual teachers within the traditional framework of schools’ opera-
tion. However, others may require more than the reconsideration of teaching; they have 
implications for cooperation among teachers, the organizational processes of schools, 
or even the basic foundations of school operations, such as the length of a lesson or the 
school year. Those innovations that can be implemented and isolated from the rest of 
the schools (i.e., that can be considered as the “private aﬀairs” of individual teachers) are 
more likely to disperse (see Chapter 7). For example, integrating subjects or teaching 
subjects in epochal periods may clash with traditionally rigid organizational rules that 
in centralized systems are written in stone by central regulations.
Monitoring of Learning
In very general terms, assessment meets results with goals. Pedagogical assessment in 
the classroom is monitoring the performance of individual students (along with the 
performance assessment of larger student groups, too). Assessing the results of students’ 
learning can be done for various purposes. According to their aims, there are three types of 
assessment: (i) diagnostic assessment that may establish the grouping of students or sets the 
foundation for developing teaching strategies (i.e., the assessment information is mainly 
used by the teacher at the beginning of a learning process), (ii) formative assessment that 
mainly provides feedback to the learner in order to form his or her self-assessment through-
out the entire learning process, and (iii) summative assessment that provides “qualifying 
information” about the achievement of the students at the end of a period of learning. 
It is important to note that regardless of the actual purpose of the assessment, marks 
given by teachers to a student are always taken as summative assessment information. 
Assessment involves two components: gathering information about the achievement 
of students (e.g., by school exercises) and the assessment (evaluation) of the results. The 
question is: what is the basis for referencing the results of the individual students? The 
two ways of referencing assessment are: (i) criterion-oriented assessment when compar-
ing the results to certain criteria (requirements ﬁxed in advance), and (ii) norm-oriented 
assessment that compares the achievement of students to each other’s results. Very often 
there is a need to compare the results of the individual achievement of the students 
to his or her previous results, but this reference does not allow for comparison among 
the results of all students in the classroom. The selection among the various ways of 
referencing should depend on the actual purpose of the assessment. Again, the best way 
to minimize the shortcomings of the diﬀerent assessment types is their combination. 
Although the assessment practice of diﬀerent teachers is typically dominated by one 
form of references (most probably the summative type), in practice, the grades given 
by teachers are used for purposes that would require applying diﬀerent assessment 
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techniques. For example, the results of a test terminating a period of learning are often 
meant to inform the student about his or her progress. 
The fact that assessment results are determined to some extent by the expectations 
of the teachers is one of the very important features of pedagogical assessment. This is 
the so-called “Pygmalion eﬀect”: the expectations of teachers are working as self-fulﬁlling 
prophecies. High expectations of students result in high student achievement, while 
low expectations of certain students lower their performance. (Teachers very often 
unconsciously develop expectations that have nothing to do with the perceived cogni-
tive capacities of the students. This is the case when teachers lower their expectations 
for Roma students; due to the Pygmalion eﬀect, this mostly unconscious bias leads to 
lower achievement of Roma students.) Another, rather detrimental but common prac-
tice is using pedagogical assessment as a means of discipline (e.g., one grade reduction 
for bad behavior) that is typically caused by the perceived helplessness of teachers in 
maintaining order in the classroom. There is always a reward and punishment element 
in assessment, but it should be connected to learning achievement and not to compli-
ance with expected behavior. 
Obviously, grades given by teachers are far from “objective measures” of the per-
formance of students and, in the majority of cases, it is not the intention. (Expecting 
teachers to assess “objectively” is expecting them to forget about the developmental 
purpose of assessment.) Therefore—contrary to the belief of several laymen governors 
of education—pedagogical assessment in the classrooms does not produce information 
on the relative performance of larger student groups, schools, or teachers. It may sound 
trivial to an educationalist, but quite recently in a South Eastern European country, 
students’ grades were collected in a central database in a World Bank-ﬁnanced program 
as “student performance information.” Several analyses proved that there might be a 
huge gap between the results of a standard external achievement survey and the marks 
that were given by teachers.
The Changing Meaning of Quality Teaching
To sum it all up, the paradigm shift in education science and educational policy during 
the last two decades resulted in major consequences for our understanding of high-quality 
teaching. (Quality being determined by the purpose, this consequence is automatic if 
diﬀerent goals are emphasized.) In short, the shift can be described as moving from 
teaching that is unregulated, spontaneous, content-driven, unilateral, and uniﬁed to 
teaching that is regulated, planned, function-driven, multilateral, and diﬀerentiated.12
Changing the goals of education and the accumulation of knowledge on learning 
brought various elements of “alternative pedagogies” into the mainstream of our expec-
tations of teaching. “Good teaching” is very often described as diﬀerentiated teaching 
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that incorporates various content-related, instructional, and assessment innovations. 
Diﬀerentiation, that is, a type of teaching that oﬀers rich learning opportunities to all children 
in the classroom regardless of the talents, interest, or learning style is very often rejected by 
teachers on the basis of a misunderstanding. Many teachers think that it requires separate 
individual teaching of all students in the classroom that is obviously unfeasible. However, 
the meaning of diﬀerentiation is something very diﬀerent: it refers to the diversity of 
activities and methods used in the classroom that from time to time oﬀer learning opportu-
nities to all children. (In Serbia, diﬀerentiation is often used for the creation of ability 
groups within the classroom that is very far from the original meaning of the term.)
Diﬀerentiated teaching is the response to the very diverse needs of students. It diﬀer-
entiates the content, the teaching and learning processes, and the products that student 
produce according to their readiness, interest, and learning proﬁle. The most important 
characteristics of diﬀerentiated teaching are summarized by Carol Ann Tomlinson (1999):
 • Student diﬀerences are studied as a basis for planning.
 • Assessment is ongoing and diagnostic to understand how to make instructions 
more responsive to learners’ needs.
 • Focus on multiple forms of intelligence is evident.
 • Excellence is deﬁned in large measures by individual growth from a starting point.
 • Students are frequently guided in making interest-based learning choices.
 • Many learning proﬁle options are provided for.
 • Many instructional arrangements are used.
 • A student’s readiness, interest, and learning proﬁle shape his or her instruction.
 • Use of essential skills to make sense of and understand key concepts and prin-
ciples is the focus of learning.
 • Multi-option assignments are frequently used.
 • Time is used ﬂexibly in accordance with student need.
 • Multiple materials are provided.
 • Multiple perspectives on ideas and events are routinely sought.
 • The teachers facilitate students’ skills at becoming more self-reliant learners.
 • Students help other students and the teacher to solve problems.
 • Students work with the teacher to establish both whole-class and individual 
learning goals.
 • Students are assessed in multiple ways.
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Teachers
Teachers, being the frontline professionals of education, will appear in the following 
chapters in relation to various aspects of governance and management of education sev-
eral times. What is important here is the impact of our changing view on high-quality 
teaching. In other words: what are the implications of the expectations towards teachers 
in the discussion so far?
As far as the external expectations of teachers are concerned, everybody has a good 
idea about what teachers should do or what they should do diﬀerently. Experts of 
pedagogy argue for methodological reform, experts of various sciences would like to 
see the renewal of certain content, and representatives of social issues would like to see 
more eﬀort and consciousness for civic, environmental, health, intercultural, ICT, or 
entrepreneurial education. (For a sample list of contemporary expectations, see Box 6.1) 
The fact is that all these expectations are relevant and important. But are they realistic, 
too? Can anybody meet all these (among other) expectations? For two reasons, obvi-
ously not. On the one hand, these expectations are illusory because nobody is able to 
change his or her working routines to such a dramatic extent. On the other hand, there 
is something that we may label as the inﬂation of expectations; if there are too many, 
often contradictory expectations, all of them becoming ﬂippant, and nobody will take 
them seriously. 
Box 6.1
Contemporary Expectations towards Teachers
A sample list for demonstration purposes:
• Ability to use the whole methodological repertoire of differentiated teaching
• Ability to interpret national and organizational goals
• Awareness of own biases and stereotyped expectations, inclusive behavior, and 
teaching
• Ability to construct the content of learning in a multicultural manner
• Ability to compensate for personal and socio-cultural disadvantages
• Ability to provide inclusive education for special-needs children
• Ability to use information and communication technologies and to incorporate 
them into teaching strategies
• Ability to cross the borders of subjects and educational levels
• Ability to cooperate with others within and outside the school
—Radó 2006
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There are two questions that follow from the illusory and inﬂated quantity of external 
expectations: who is entitled to select them and what are the expectations that are not 
illusory? We will discuss the ﬁrst question in the chapter on the operation of schools. 
What we cannot avoid here is the second question, because the answer determines the 
required competencies of teachers that initial and in-service training should emphasize 
in order to enable high-quality teaching. 
Almost all European countries use regulatory instruments that determine the ex-
pected competencies for initial teacher training. These competency lists are based on the 
actual understanding of what constitutes “good teaching” that supports eﬀective learn-
ing. In most cases, these lists contain requirements in terms of professional knowledge 
and professional competencies, or simply competencies. Professional knowledge refers 
to in-depth knowledge of learners and learning, such as methods of recognition of the 
individual learners, the pathways and methods of learning, and the social, cultural, and 
psychological factors inﬂuencing it. Required knowledge also includes the knowledge 
of the speciﬁc subject or branch of study that teachers teach. Professional competencies 
include those for managing work in the classroom and the methodology of instruction, 
the use of a wide variety of assessment methods, and the competencies required for 
various teachers’ roles in both a narrow and broad sense. 
It is important to note that teachers do much more than teaching in the classroom, 
prepare for the lessons, and correct the written tests. Even if we discount the basic role of 
teachers, they still keep contact with parents, organize extracurricular programs, celebra-
tions or competitions, participate in in-service training, substitute for missing teachers, 
etc. There are also various organizational tasks (that we will discuss later) that have 
very little to do with their core functions, such as social work, organization of cultural 
programs, or health services, or simply “babysitting” the children at the playground. 
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C H A P T E R  7
Education Service Providers: The Schools
7.1 The Whole-school Approach
The whole-school approach, one of the pillars of contemporary education governance 
systems, is the underlying basis for separating the educational and public administra-
tion approach to decentralization. One of its major implications is the ﬁrm boundary 
between service delivery and the systemic environment of service delivery. After providing 
a brief outline on how the aims and goals of education are considered, as well as of the 
governance-relevant changes in terms of our understanding of eﬀective learning and 
teaching, this chapter oﬀers a more detailed justiﬁcation for the whole-school approach.
The implications of reconsidered educational goals. The assumption that learning is 
the result of the work of individual teachers did not cause any organizational diﬃculty 
until factual subject knowledge was emphasized in education. However, when the cross-
curricular competencies do show up on the horizon of education, especially since we 
determine goals in terms of competencies, it is increasingly clear that their development 
cannot be assigned to a speciﬁc subject of an individual teacher. For example, teachers 
of language and literature cannot take credit alone for the high literacy performance 
of students, because it’s the merit of teachers of history, math, and biology, too. It also 
means that the work of diﬀerent teachers educating the same students may amplify (or 
extinguish) each other’s impact on the development of certain competencies. Obviously, 
the outcome of learning is the result of the entire school. The implications of this statement 
for school operations are tremendous.
It is not only teaching that generates learning in a school. As has already been mentioned, 
teaching is not the only contribution of schools to learning. Apart from providing the 
setting for peer group relations, the organizational aspects of “living in a school” are 
intentionally, but more often than not unintentionally, teaching, too. Those who are 
interested in the development of various areas that hardly can forced into the child-mold 
of a single subject ﬁnd this trivial. For example, this is the case with civic education; 
what a school models probably has a much deeper impact on the political socialization 
of students than as a subject within which various electoral system are studied. 
The limits of individual methodological innovation eﬀorts. Our contemporary un-
derstanding of “good teaching” is based on the requirement of using a rich toolkit of 
methods for organizing learning and instruction. There are certain methods that call for 
a great deal of organizational ﬂexibility. The traditional rigid rules of managing time, 
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human resources, and space in a school are often the major obstacles to any meaningful 
change. For example, adjusting teaching to the social nature of learning would require 
violating one of the traditional success criteria for teaching: a low noise level in the 
classroom during the lesson. Overrunning the sacred pillars of school operations (such 
as the length of lessons or the traditional setting of how classrooms are furnished) does 
not only clash with the routine of old habits but also requires a high level of cooperation 
from teachers; these are not things that can be changed for the sake of a teacher minority. 
The limits of individual responsiveness to external expectations. We previously asked: 
are individual teachers able to adjust to all of the relevant contemporary expectations 
towards education? The answer was no. However, schools as organizations that build on 
the potential of teachers to cooperate in undertaking speciﬁc roles within a joint adjust-
ment eﬀort—at least, in theory—can. Therefore, while setting certain expectations of 
individuals beyond their capacity to become an active part of the required organizational 
change is increasingly regarded as unfair, the expectations towards schools are becoming 
even greater. If someone “Googles” the term “whole-school approach,” he or she will 
get huge amount of hits starting with the “whole-school approach” to almost any aspect 
of education. Of course, it has serious consequences to the required competencies of 
teachers, too. Organizational competencies are emphasized here as equally as the mastery 
of the methodology of instruction.
The limits of individual learning. When pronouncing that it would be unrealistic that 
all teachers will catch up to the many contemporary (legitimate) external expectations 
towards education, we do not mean to say that teachers should not develop perpetually. 
Teachers, who are in charge of supporting the learning of others, should be “lifelong 
learners,” too. Therefore, it is not unfair to apply the ﬁve conditions of successful learn-
ing to teachers:
 • Motivated learning: feedback on the results of the work, making success visible 
and rewarding high performance, reducing additional tasks and duties, etc.
 • The individual return of learning: career progress, diﬀerentiation of compensa-
tion, etc.
 • Access to information: individual performance evaluation, information about 
learning opportunities, access to good practices, primarily to those of other 
teachers within the school, etc.
 • Access to learning opportunities: a rich oﬀer and easy access to learning oppor-
tunities within and outside of school (in-service training and capacity building 
embedded into school activities), etc.
 • The culture of learning: “learning-friendly school policies,” sharing of knowledge 
among teachers, etc. 
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We will return to all of these aspects of teachers’ learning later. Here, it is important 
to draw attention to the fact that this (rather indicative) list does not contain anything 
that has something to do with the personality of the teachers. Of course, there are teachers 
who are more ready and able to learn than others for various individual reasons; teach-
ers are as diverse as students. However, the “personality” of the staﬀ of schools is not a 
governance matter; what is relevant from a governance point of view is the fact that all 
the previous conditions for teachers’ learning are the features of an organization within 
which teachers are working together. Therefore, the primary agent that is responsible 
for ensuring the condition for teachers’ learning is their own institution.
Who is holding teachers accountable? As a result of the whole-school approach, indi-
vidual teachers are increasingly being held accountable within quality evaluation systems. 
Indeed, many contemporary quality evaluation systems have been reorganized in order 
to enable them to hold entire schools accountable (see Chapter 12). However, parallel 
to the withdrawal of state institutions from the classrooms, schools should develop those 
internal mechanisms that hold individual teachers accountable. Ensuring professional 
accountability in the relationship between the schools and their employees—in spite of 
the diversity of approaches and actual technical solutions—became a basic requirement 
for schools in almost all European countries. (As will be seen, it is deﬁnitely not the case 
in most South Eastern European countries.) 
The poor impact of development. There is a speciﬁc type of experience that nurtured 
a whole-school approach long before governance and management systems took notice 
of the importance of realignment: that of educational development. Experts within 
various ﬁelds and topics of educational development readily acknowledge that schools 
cannot be “developed” from outside; it is only the self-guided and managed eﬀort of 
the management and staﬀ of the school that is able to change anything. In addition, 
individual change is limited and unsustainable. All sorts of innovations that remain 
isolated within the school are very limited in terms of their scope, very poor in terms of 
their implementation, and very short-lived. Therefore, eﬀective development, that is the 
implementation of innovations of any kind, is per deﬁnition an organizational process.
All these arguments for overstepping the traditional teacher-centered approach to 
education drastically overwrite the very foundations of educational governance. The 
individual teacher is not the primary target of governance of education anymore; it is the 
school as an organization. Obviously, it calls for reconsidering the traditional pattern 
of the organizational setting of schools. Also, all the functional instruments that will 
be discussed in the following section should be reset accordingly over the course of 
decentralization.
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7.2 The Organizational Architecture of Schools
Before describing how the schools that ﬁt into new organizational functions operate, 
we should address two questions: are the schools truly organizations and how much are 
schools able to exercise their organizational roles in centralized systems?
Are Schools True Organizations?
The assumption that schools are organizations is not as obvious as most of us would think. 
According to a very traditional approach, schools are the buildings where students come 
on a regular basis because teachers are giving their lessons there. This teacher-centered 
view of schools is not modulated very much by minor facts, like some administration is 
also involved, students have their meals in the school cafeteria, or some excursions are 
organized by the schools. To a certain extent, this view of schools as “non-organizations” 
is conﬁrmed by the nature of teaching that is often referred to as a lonely profession: 
when teachers actually teach, they are isolated from their colleagues, and their only 
immediate reference is the feedback they receive from students. In most other organi-
zations performing the core business of the organization requires cooperation among 
professionals and—even if the feedback to the individual is poor—the performance is 
visible and permanently judged upon by other professionals. 
The isolation of teachers is protection at the same time. As Michael Fullan and Andy 
Hargreaves wrote, this isolation and the uncertainty caused by the lack of feedback by 
other professionals make teachers individualistic and conservative. Although it is not 
the teachers who should be blamed if schools are not working properly, the schools 
consist of teachers that determine the character of the organization that they operate. 
This is the reason why Fullan and Hargreaves, when referring to schools, instead of 
using the term “organization” they speak of “work communities” and “school cultures” 
(Fullen and Hargreaves 1992). There are also others, who in connection with schools, 
constantly use the term “institution” in order to indicate that schools are not necessarily 
organizations in the narrow sense. In several countries the ruling climate of educational 
discourse rebuﬀs the labeling of schools as organizations. (”Schools are not business 
organizations and they should not be made so.”) As a result, what applies to any other 
service organization does not necessarily apply to schools and the instruments that are 
used to improve the quality of business services are not to be used in schools. 
So the question is: what makes an institution an organization? Since too many 
sciences are studying organizations from multiple, varied perspectives, providing a deﬁ-
nition that satisﬁes everyone and helps to determine whether schools are organizations 
or not would be a hopeless endeavor, and it is not the purpose of this text. Therefore, 
referring to its very general meaning, organizations are social constructs that pursue 
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common goals and have formal boundaries that separate them from their environment. 
Therefore, referring to schools as institutions (i.e., as structures and mechanisms of the 
social order that govern the behavior of individuals, such as marriage) sounds like the 
denial of both features of the schools. The second characteristic of organizations (clear 
boundaries) is hard to deny; not only because of the space that the school building 
deﬁnes, but also because of the regulations that all public institutions are subject to. 
However, a school as something that serves common goals is not that obvious. Disre-
garding the very general purpose of serving, teaching, and learning that do not make a 
diﬀerence among individual schools, in centralized systems the goals (i.e., the purpose 
that a speciﬁc school should serve) originate from outside. Therefore, since schools do 
not determine their own goals, they can appear to be less than an organization. Add 
to this the lonely character of teaching, and a school looks even less like organizations. 
(Schools being operated by highly-trained intellectuals who are striving to maintain 
their self-esteem, this “less than an organization” character is communicated as “more 
than an organization”: temple, workshop, second home, etc. Those, who do not share 
this elevated view rather observe schools as factories of the early twentieth century.)
This is precisely what decentralization mainly changes. When schools become re-
sponsible for the service they provide and start to determine the speciﬁc goals they pursue 
on their own, there is pressure on them to start to behave like “real organizations.” But 
still, even if they do so, those characteristics that are widely associated with organiza-
tions, such as internal functional departmental divisions or hierarchical management 
structures, oﬀer very little help to understand how schools are working. What may 
help is broadening the scope of our inquiry to the organizational architecture of schools. 
The organizational architecture is the framework within which an organization real-
izes its qualities throughout exercising its core functions. It includes its human resources, 
formal organizational relationships, informal relationships among the members of the 
staﬀ, the core activities of the service provided to the clients (often referred to as “busi-
ness processes”), and the strategy of the organization that determines the direction of 
activities within the organization. (School strategy can be a school-based curriculum, 
a mid-term school development plan, a quality management plan, or something that 
all these diﬀerent “strategic documents” conﬂate.) From this perspective, schools are 
organizations that are much less characterized by their formal organizational settings 
and much more by the informal net of personal relationships. 
The consequence of this feature of schools is that the traditional formal instruments 
(job descriptions, operational and organizational statutes, ﬁrmly determined manage-
ment authorities, formal organizational policies, etc.) do not seem to be eﬀectively 
determining the behavior of the staﬀ of the schools. Thus, what really matters is the 
organizational culture, that is, the speciﬁc and unique combination of values, norms, 
customs, and traditions that determine and control the behavior of the members. Not 
surprisingly, when we are talking about speciﬁc schools, we rarely refer to their actual 
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organizational settings: they are simple, not very diﬀerent from one another, and rarely 
are considered to be important. What makes a school unique, or what constitutes the 
diﬀerence between “good” and “bad” schools—whatever that means—in the great 
majority of cases is a combination of characteristics that has something to do with the 
organizational culture of schools. This is what educationalists describe as the “soft na-
ture” of education, and this is also the reason why educationalist professionals in public 
management often have diﬃculties understanding one another’s views.
Figure 7.1
The Organizational Architecture of Schools
The principal question is: do we consider this feature of schools a deﬁciency or the 
normal character of schools that should not be radically altered? This dilemma is not 
very striking in highly centralized governance systems, in which ministries of education 
are doing “micro-management” by a detailed regulation of all organizational aspects 
of the operation of schools. The fact that the organizational culture of schools in these 
systems almost completely overwrites the formal organizational rules that are external 
to the schools (i.e., foisted upon the schools in the form of regulations from outside) is 
widely known, but this is not made public because it would weaken the very founda-
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tions of the system. However, in the course of decentralization, along with deploying 
more and more responsibilities to schools, the expectations of the eﬀectiveness of their 
organizational operation are growing dramatically. 
There are two typical answers to this dilemma: one that aims at acculturation and the 
other that aims at improving organizational eﬀectiveness. Those whose point of departure 
is an educationalist view are not overly concerned with the technical realignment of 
school organization. As Michael Fullan (2002) writes: “… reculturing is the name of the 
game. Much change is structural and superﬁcial. The change required is in the culture 
of what people value and how they work together to accomplish it.” Their instrument 
is a “movement” that mobilizes the energy of the school staﬀ along pedagogical goals 
by generating high personal commitment among a critical mass of the teaching staﬀ in 
order to change the organizational culture. Since the traditional formal organization of 
schools is incapable of nurturing and implementing major changes, the high level of 
emotional and intellectual commitment of individuals is much needed for voluntary 
action that may oﬀer the reward of personal self-fulﬁllment, even at the cost of some 
overwork. (For example, the title of a book by Michael Fullan and Andy Hargreaves is: 
What’s Worth Fighting for in Your School?) 
Reform movements are really working as such: they have their organized voluntary 
networks, have their own symbols and rituals, and are led by their own priests or gurus. 
And what is even more important, they are very eﬀective—in schools that already have 
the potential and the desire to change. And this is exactly the point of departure for those 
who consider the formal organizational side equally (or more) important: decentraliza-
tion measures do not deploy more responsibility to only those schools that are capable 
of achieving it; it increases the autonomy of all schools. Therefore, all schools should 
establish those formal organizational (i.e., institutionalized) procedures and settings that 
ensure a minimum level of quality and eﬀectiveness. Those who support organizational 
eﬃciency call for less “ﬁght” and more professionalism. 
Even disregarding the personal view of the author on this matter, it is important to 
note that there is a dynamic between the formal and informal organizational aspects: 
while the organizational culture of schools largely determines the way formal procedures 
and relationships are actually operated, without inserting individuals into a diﬀerent 
organizational setting, acculturation (i.e., changing the norms, values, and customs 
widely shared in a school) can hardly be achieved. Organizational reform does not 
achieve acculturation, but it is an eﬀective ﬁrst step. In addition, a school manages all 
sorts of ﬁnancial and human resources, as well as its facilities; organizes and manages 
its core activities (instruction, organization of teaching and learning); and cooperates 
with its clients and external partners. All these activities entail a great deal of core or-
ganizational management.
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Typical Organizational Patterns
In part due to the “a little bit less than an organization” character of schools and partly 
due to the fact that schools are dealt with by many as black boxes, we do not have very 
much international comparative information about the inner organizational world 
of schools. Most comparative analyses focus on the management of schools that is 
widely considered identical to organizational structures and processes (see Chapter 8). 
Nevertheless, a few characteristics that are rather typical for the schools in South Eastern 
Europe can be shared. Bearing in mind what was said in the previous section, when 
describing these typical patterns of how schools operate, we cannot focus exclusively 
on the formal organizational aspects of their work.
Teacher-dominated organization. There is barely any other organization in which 
highly-trained senior professionals make up the great majority of the staﬀ. Even in a 
hospital, which is also dominated by frontline professionals, the number of support staﬀ 
(nurses, attendants, technical, and administrative staﬀ, etc.) might exceed that of the 
doctors. But in a school most of the supporting tasks that do not necessarily require a 
high level of qualiﬁcation are also performed by teachers; even the managers of schools 
are teachers. As a result, schools are extremely teacher-centered organizations, their 
interests often more decisive than the interests of the clients.
Teacher monopolies. In a traditional school setting, many decisions to be made on a 
regular basis are thought to be the monopolies of teachers. For example, even if some 
decentralization of the curriculum has already been implemented, the choice of textbooks 
and other teaching materials are not regarded to be part of the construct of a school 
program; it is dealt with as part of the “methodological autonomy” of individual teach-
ers. It often leads to rather interesting situations, when diﬀerent textbooks are used in 
the same school for the same subject at the same grade level. Another typical example 
is the choice of in-service training—of course, given that there is a rich supply of such 
programs. Due to this “freedom” enjoyed by teachers, decisions about in-service training 
are often based on the ﬁeld of interest of teachers and not the actual capacity building 
needs of the school as a whole. 
Personal relationships instead of organizational relationships. Any codes of “professional 
behavior” cannot be developed and applied in schools, because such norms are always 
based on clearly deﬁned organizational roles and responsibilities. As a result, all sorts 
of activities requiring cooperation among teachers have a very strong personal dimen-
sion or are exclusively based on personal considerations. Also, organizational conﬂicts 
immediately become personal conﬂicts that make their resolution extremely hard. This 
very personal character of the organizational life of schools determines all aspects of 
professional cooperation. For example, a systematic mechanism for information shar-
ing and open communication is typically replaced by the personal and selective use of 
information (i.e., gossip).
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The hidden departmental divisions. As organizations, schools have an almost com-
pletely ﬂat structure. There are no senior or junior positions and there is no middle-layer 
management with speciﬁc functional responsibilities. However, there are two aspects of 
the work in schools that create hidden departmental divisions, that is, the framework for 
daily cooperation among teachers. In all schools classroom teachers and teachers teaching 
the same subjects form semi-institutionalized departments, (such as Aktív in Croatia or 
Munkaközösség in Hungary), but their actual inﬂuence is rather limited. Another pos-
sible form of cooperation is among those teachers who are teaching the same students. 
Form masters are supposed to manage this cooperation, but since teaching is typically 
an isolated form of work, their initiatives to harmonize content or instruction and as-
sessment practices would be considered as incursion into the privacy of other teachers.
Collective rituals instead of organizational processes. Real cooperation among teach-
ers would require a lot of “extra time” and energy, as well as proactive management. 
Due to the voluntary nature of cooperation among teachers, it is inevitable that certain 
rituals are followed, such as the marking conferences at the end of each school year. In 
theory, in most educational systems a lot of decision-making authorities are deployed 
during these marking conferences. However, the preparation of the proposal discussed 
by the conference of teachers is not typically an open process and the discussion during 
the conference is rather formal. (A conference of 40–70 people rarely functions as an 
eﬀective decision-making body.)
A missing element: the lack of personal career perspectives. When a teacher retires, 
his or her status is the same as when he or she entered the profession about forty years 
earlier. As will be further discussed later in this reading, the progression of teachers on 
the grades of a salary scale is not considered as career improvement, the salaries are 
not diﬀerentiated, and the incentives for better and harder work are extremely weak. 
A career perspective for the members of the staﬀ, being the most important fuel of the 
organizational engine elsewhere, is almost non-existent in schools. The professional 
ethos of many teachers maintains a certain standard in connection to teaching but does 
not necessarily apply to organizational activities that are considered to be extra work.
The involvement of the clients in supportive roles. The consequence of the imbalanced 
power relationship between schools and teachers, on the one hand, and students and 
parents, on the other, is a very speciﬁc understanding of how the clients of the services 
(primarily parents) should be involved in the work of schools. According to this typical 
approach, students and parents are “involved” if they perform certain activities, the 
mere purpose of which is supporting the schools in performing their ordinary tasks. 
For example, student organizations might be expected to sanction the misbehavior of 
individual students or provide logistics to certain ritual activities of teachers. Often the 
only expectation towards parents is to organize catering for students and teachers when 
school-based examinations are held or to gather the money for the cost of extracur-
ricular activities or excursions. Such voluntary contributions are important; however, 
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constraining student and parent activities to those that are appropriate for the schools 
and teachers (i.e., liberating them from the burden of certain tasks) is not what “in-
volvement” really means.
School premises adjusted. The relationship between the style of teaching and the way 
classrooms are furnished was indicated earlier; there are classroom settings that hardly 
allow for anything but frontal teaching. The same applies to schools as workplaces. In 
an organization in which teamwork and cooperation among the members of the staﬀ 
is essential, there are a lot of common spaces designed for this purpose. Also, where 
employees are expected to work a whole working day, a certain amount of space and 
speciﬁc facilities are made available to them. The actual design of the majority of schools 
in the region is very diﬀerent. Teachers’ rooms are not designed for working there; the 
assumption is that all teaching-related work beyond delivering the classes is done at 
home. A teacher’s desk is the place where certain personal belongings can be stored for 
the duration of lessons and where teachers can have coﬀee while on break between two 
lessons. (The lucky ones are typically those teachers whose subject requires storage space 
for demonstration instruments, like maps, instruments for chemical experiments, or for 
sports.) School premises that are adjusted to the “lesson-factory” type of organizational 
life create a climate that freezes the atmosphere in the school. 
The mix of all these aspects of the work of the “typical South Eastern European 
school”—obviously an unfair generalization—have a very important consequence; when 
schools attempt to be successful, or—for the sake of more precision—school directors 
want to make their schools more successful, they can hardly draw on the internal po-
tential qualities of the organization. Whatever success in a certain context means, any 
change to improve the work of schools is somewhat hopeless without the instruments 
to mobilize the potential of the staﬀ. Therefore, schools seeking success are dependent 
on potential external advantages: students with a good family background, maximiz-
ing the approved number of teachers and lessons, obtaining the best teachers, getting 
prestigious experimental programs approved, and achieving outstanding results with 
talented students at competitions (Setényi 1999).
7.3 The Effective School
When exploring the secret of school eﬀectiveness, that is, the characteristics of schools 
that achieve high learning performance, the ﬁrst matter to be addressed is the latitude 
within which schools are able to inﬂuence students’ results. According to the analyti-
cal framework created for the interpretation of the PISA survey results, there are three 
groups of factors determining learning achievements: (i) student characteristics, such as 
the socio-economic and socio-cultural status of students, (ii) non-amenable contextual 
factors, such as the social composition of the student group enrolled, and (iii) amenable 
school factors, such as resources, climate, and school policies (OECD 2005). These 
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factors do not always inﬂuence student performance directly; in several cases contextual 
factors determine relevant school factors, like when students from an advantaged back-
ground improve the climate of the schools. Also, school characteristics may inﬂuence 
how contextual factors make an eﬀect on performance; for example, schools with better 
conditions may attract students from an advantaged background.
Figure 7.2
Interrelations among Various Factors Determining Student Performance13
A statistical analysis of student performance data may estimate the weight of the 
variables connected to each of the three factors in explaining the variance of results in 
diﬀerent countries. As the following ﬁgure shows, the relative weight of those factors 
that schools or educational policy through schools can directly inﬂuence is rather low. 
However, the direct and indirect impact on schools really does matter, and therefore 
the eﬀectiveness of schools is a valid and relevant concern.
Table 7.1
The Impact of Diﬀerent Factors Explaining the Variance of Student performance in 
PISA 2000 Reading Literacy Survey in Selected European Countries (in Percent)
Country Student characteristics Contextual factors School factors Non-explained variance
Albania 38 43 4 15
Bulgaria 22 56 9 13
Czech Rep. 60 24 4 11
Finland 14 3 16 67
Germany 36 44 7 12
Hungary 39 42 5 14
Macedonia 44 27 17 12
PISA average 46 26 9 20
Source:  OECD 2005.
School factors
School context
Student 
characteristics
Student 
performance
D + A = Indirect impact of school context
C + B = Indirect impact of school factors
D
C
A
B
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There is a great deal of literature on the factors that contribute to the eﬀectiveness of 
schools, that is, to their potential to achieve high learning performance in their students. 
The insight on school eﬀectiveness comes from multiple, varied sources, such as school 
eﬀectiveness research, functional economic analysis, program and policy evaluation, 
etc. Unpacking the various school factors and the analysis of their impact on student 
achievement gives us an insight into the characteristics that have the potential to make 
schools more eﬀective. 
The ﬁrst conclusion, however, that can be drawn from all this research is the iden-
tiﬁcation of those factors that have very limited impact on eﬀectiveness, or do not have 
a positive impact at all. These are typically those input-related aspects that are especially 
and often emphasized by educationalists in the South Eastern Europe. The great majority 
of research analysis proves that there is no substantial correlation between teacher salaries, 
building facilities, or teacher/student ratio and the achievement of students (Scheerens et al. 
2003). In other words: investing in school equipment or increasing the salary of teachers 
will not improve the performance of the students. Also, the argument that generous 
teacher/student ratios (i.e., a low average number of students in classrooms) create a more 
favorable environment for eﬀective learning is unjustiﬁed. The only consideration that 
modulates this statement concerns the correlation of material inputs and achievement 
in developing countries. The comparison between developing and developed countries 
shows that if very basic conditions are missing in certain segments of the education 
system, the correlation can be stronger. However, this deﬁnitely does not weaken the 
point that the eﬀect of input factors on learning is negligible, because these basic condi-
tions are typically in place in schools in South Eastern Europe.
Turning to those factors that have a positive eﬀect on the performance of students, 
they are all process related: either certain characteristics of teaching in the classrooms or 
characteristics of the schools as a whole. The most important factors that various school 
eﬀectiveness research results associated with school eﬀectiveness are listed in Box 7.1. 
(Instruction-related factors, such as classroom climate and diﬀerentiation were discussed 
in the previous chapter, and those related to leadership and evaluative potential will be 
touched upon later in this book.)
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Box 7.1
The Characteristics of Eﬀective Schools
General Effectiveness Enhancing Factors
• Achievement orientation and high expectations
• Educational leadership
• Consensus and cohesion among staff
• Curriculum quality and opportunity to learn
• School climate
• Evaluative potential
• Parental involvement
• Classroom climate
• Effective learning time
• Structured instruction
• Independent learning
• Differentiation
• Reinforcement and feedback
—Scheerens et al. 2003
To a certain extent, the boundary between instruction- and school-related factors is 
ambiguous; most school factors have implications for teaching and vice versa. However, 
when considering the appropriate instruments to be used in order to improve the quality 
of the educational service provided by schools, the following good practices are worth 
being considered (Scheerens et al. 2003):
 • Achievement-oriented school policy and high expectations. School policies must 
focus on the basic subjects as compared to other subjects and to general pedagogi-
cal aims, such as personal, cultural, and social development. Internal minimum 
requirements and internal measures of quality are to be focused on basic subjects, 
too. School policies should aim at reaching minimum competency objectives 
for all students. In addition to that, setting relatively high achievement levels 
motivates teachers and students; these high expectations are to be explicitly 
stated in all strategic documents. Becoming an eﬀective school is the central 
mission of the school.
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 • Consensus and cohesion among staﬀ. The extent to which schools achieve coherence 
and consistency in the work of teachers is an essential component of eﬀective-
ness. Therefore, the formal and informal types and frequency of meetings and 
consultations among teachers, the content of cooperation (e.g., pedagogical 
mission, aims, objectives, planning of lessons, teaching methods and materials, 
discussing pupils’ achievement, treatment of pupils with learning diﬃculties, 
subject matters, achievement testing, counseling of beginner teachers, etc.) the 
level of satisfaction with cooperation, and the importance attributed to coopera-
tion are all important indicators. Therefore, it is worth considering developing 
explicit school policies and concrete measures for the enrichment of cooperation.
 • Curriculum quality and opportunity to learn. This factor of eﬀectiveness at the 
level of schools refers to the composition of school curriculum and the choice of 
methods and textbooks. For example, one of the critical issues is how the school 
curriculum sets certain priorities within the existing framework of national 
curricula along core objectives of subjects. The curriculum is not implemented 
only through teaching; textbooks, alternative teaching materials, and internal 
assessment (testing) are instruments that should be selected and/or developed 
in line with the curriculum.
 • School climate (or school culture). The two most emphasized aspects of school 
climate are an orderly atmosphere in the school and climate in terms of eﬀec-
tiveness orientation and sound internal relationships. Orderly atmosphere refers 
to the importance given to good discipline, a consistent approach to pupils’ 
behavior, a safe environment, and to all sorts of rules and regulations, including 
the way absenteeism is handled, etc. The climate of eﬀectiveness orientation 
includes the characteristics of the schools in relation to prevailing priorities, 
the level of motivation, commitment, and personal eﬀectiveness of teachers. It 
also includes the quality of relationship between the teachers and the pupils, 
among pupils, and among members of the staﬀ. The engagement of students 
in the work of the schools and the appraisal of tasks performed by teachers, as 
well as the condition of facilities also contribute to a good school climate.
 • Parental involvement. Continuity in home and school learning and the active 
involvement of parents are important components of school eﬀectiveness. 
Schools can actively generate strong parental support. The involvement of parents 
should not be constrained to “logistical” support to school life but they can be 
involved in consultation on pedagogical matters, too. The facilities of schools 
should allow for the presence of the parents and their complaints should be 
taken seriously. A speciﬁc aspect of parental involvement is informing them on 
a regular basis about the learning progress, educational aims, and pedagogical 
starting points of the school. Also, parental involvement should be ensured in 
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decision-making on policy, curriculum, school organization, and ﬁnancing. The 
level of satisfaction of parents should be a major concern for the schools.
 • School aspects of eﬀective learning time. The management of learning time occurs 
primarily in the classrooms. However, active eﬀorts by the school as a whole to 
enlarge the instruction time and to minimize absenteeism by good registration 
and monitoring, as well as reducing the number of lessons that are cancelled 
for any reason, are instrumental.
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C H A P T E R  8
Operating Schools
8.1 Quality Management in Schools
After diﬀerentiating quality and eﬀectiveness in Chapter 5 for the sake of facilitating 
understanding, it is time to reconnect them: the school factors of educational eﬀective-
ness are in fact the characteristics of schools amounting to high-quality organizational work 
that results in a high degree of learning outcomes for students. Referring back to the most 
general deﬁnition of quality, these are the characteristics that make schools “suited for 
the purpose.”
In theory, the distinction between the acculturation approach (i.e., the school im-
provement movement) and the organizational eﬀectiveness approach (i.e., organizational 
eﬀectiveness technology) to schools as organizations (that was mentioned in section 
7.2) may imply diﬀerent methods of improving the quality of the work of schools. And 
indeed, this was the case for a long time; school improvement and quality assurance were 
genuinely diﬀerent and—depending on the alignment of policies—various countries 
opted for one or the other. However, during the last decade that was a remarkable con-
vergence between the two approaches. The reasons for this are manifold, but the most 
important ones are (i) the increasing focus of quality assurance systems on the improve-
ment learning (i.e., the impact of the learning-outcomes approach), and (ii) the eﬀect 
of the results of school eﬀectiveness research on both sets of instruments. In addition, 
school improvement and quality assurance mutually enrich their views and toolkits. 
As a result, quality management and school improvement/development are often used 
as interchangeable terms. However, from a governance point of view the advantage of 
the “technological approach” is that it allows for a systemic introduction: a clear man-
date can be deployed to schools with standard procedures, duties, and responsibilities, 
as well as the mainstream support system can be incorporated into the operation of a 
regular mechanism. (A large system such as primary and secondary education cannot 
be governed by the voluntary enthusiasm generated by “movements.”) Therefore, while 
acknowledging the essential input of school improvement, on the following pages we 
will focus on school-based quality assurance.
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The Meaning and Purpose of Quality Management
External quality evaluation as a functional governance instrument will be discussed 
in a separate chapter in the next part of this book. However, since school-based qual-
ity assurance and government-operated quality evaluation systems are complementary and 
interconnected mechanisms, before going into the outline of the organizational side, we 
should like to advance a few considerations that apply for both aspects. The evolution of 
industrial quality assurance systems from inspection, through quality control and quality 
assurance, till contemporary quality management systems, and also, their applications 
in education systems is brieﬂy summarized in Box 8.1 Of course, these changes are 
very much in line with those genuine educational paradigm shifts that were described 
in the previous chapters.
The most important changes from an organizational (school) perspective are the 
following:
 • The gradual shift from the control of the workforce to the external evaluation 
of the whole school.
 • The shift of responsibility for service quality from external evaluators to the 
service provider, from the individual professionals to the whole organization 
(to schools). 
 • The diversiﬁcation of the underlying basis: the shift from control on the basis 
of remote, state-issued requirements to broadly-deﬁned, various aspects within 
which the concrete requirements are set by the service-provider institution.
 • The standardization of processes instead of the standardization of content.
What follows from all these changes is the need to establish those internal or-
ganizational procedures in schools that allow them to catch up with their increased 
responsibilities. The set of such procedures are the quality management systems of 
schools. Quality management is a cyclical process of reﬂection, planning, changing, and 
checking. The primary aim of quality management is to narrow the gap between the goals 
and the actual daily practice of schools.14 The goals—as discussed earlier—are based on 
external references, such as national requirements and policy expectations, local require-
ments and expectations, and the expectations of the clients (i.e., parents and students). 
Since all these external references are perpetually changing, quality management is a 
continuous and systematic activity. 
The basis of quality management is self-evaluation done partly on the basis of un-
derstanding internal problems through the use of simple tools, as well as understanding 
external expectations, for example, by surveying the satisfaction of parents. The other 
major component of quality management is school development (quality improvement) 
that aims at solving the problems that self-evaluation reveals. One of the most important 
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features of quality management is its cyclical nature. This is what often emphasized by 
the “plan-do-check-act” (PDCA) cycles; the evaluation of the results of a multi-year 
quality management process is part of self-evaluation at the beginning of a new cycle. 
Box 8.1
The Evolution of Quality Assurance Systems
Inspection • Post-production review
 • Remote and absolute requirements
 • Acceptance of failure
 • Control of work force
In education:
The control of the work of teachers in the classroom is on the basis of centrally-issued 
syllabi; the framework of control is the subject.
Quality control • Concerned with product testing
 • Responsibility with supervisors
 • Limited quality criteria
 • Some self-inspection
 • Paper-based system
In education:
The introduction of standard examinations and achievement surveys, syllabi developed 
by the teachers, plenty of documentation of the work, and softer (partly supportive) 
inspection on the basis of subjects.
Quality Assurance • Use of statistical process control
 • Emphasis on prevention
 • External accreditation
 • Delegated involvement of the staff
 • Audit of quality systems
In education:
Increasing the role of school management and increasing the emphasis on 
organizational aspects, and the introduction of accredited quality assurance methods, 
inspection targets the whole school and strongly supportive, curricular bases is a 
framework.
Quality management • Involves suppliers and consumers
 • Aims for continuous improvement
 • Concerns products and processes
 • Responsibility with all staff
 • Delivered through team work
In education:
Introduction of cyclical and permanent quality management systems with the 
involvement of the entire staff, the measurement of the satisfaction of students 
and parents as part of self-evaluation, school improvement with strong focus on 
improving learning.
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Quality management is systemic because it covers all aspects of the work of the 
schools, involves the participation of the whole staﬀ, and supports responsible man-
agement with clearly-deﬁned tasks to be performed. In fact, operating a school-based 
quality management system became a distinct organizational function that integrates 
various organizational activities that were once rather isolated. Also, due to the incor-
porated mid-term planning process, quality improvement (i.e., school development) 
plans became equally important strategic documents as school-based curricula. (Taken 
together, school curriculum and school development plans are often referred to as the 
“strategy” of schools.) As a result, quality management is a very important source of 
routine annual planning of the school year that schools always do.
Quality Management Models in Europe
There are several models of quality assurance that were applied in education and used 
in the majority of schools of European countries. The major ones are the International 
Standards for Total Quality Management (ISO), Total Quality Management (TQM), 
and the so-called Scottish Model: the Quality Initiatives in Scottish Schools (QISS). 
The original two models (ISO and TQM) are industrial models that were adapted to 
the speciﬁc needs and language of education. Although there originally were signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences between the two models, their evolution made them very similar; the ISO 
2004-2 can be interpreted as a variation of TQM also combining process and product/
result management. Also, other aspects of these models (such as the importance of 
partnerships or social impact) became very similar in the two models. The ISO has 
an international audit system. The European Foundation for Quality Management 
(EFQM, also known as the European Business Excellence Model) is a TQM-based tool. 
It does not have an international audit system, but organizations (including schools) 
may compete for the European Quality Award. The main diﬀerence between the two 
models is that ISO is more standardized and linear, while TQM is circular (organized 
into quality management cycles). Whereas ISO sets standards against which organiza-
tion are compared, TQM is more open to organizational development; therefore, it is 
more easily applicable in organizations with less complicated administrative processes. 
Thus, according to many educationalists, TQM ﬁts better to the kind of service provi-
sion of education. The Scottish Model combines elements of How Good Is Our School 
(HGIOS) (a distillation of good practices in education) and TQM. The main purpose 
of the model is incorporating the experience of good practices extracted from inspection 
reports into quality management systems of schools (Kaposváry 2002). 
In order to ensure the free ﬂow of labor and services within Europe, ensuring qual-
ity is one of the rare educational areas in which the European Union developed a ﬁrm 
policy at a very early stage. In 1991, there was a shift in the alignment of the pattern of 
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how EU member countries cooperated in the ﬁeld of education. The longstanding goal 
of harmonizing content in education was abandoned, and the “principle of conﬁdence” 
was applied.15 This shift automatically drove the attention to the national quality guar-
antees that ensure trust among the member countries, ﬁrst of all in quality assurance 
in education. A long process of cooperation in this ﬁeld led to the development of a 
common policy in quality evaluation in education in 2001.16 The major pillars of the 
EU recommendations are the following:
 • The development of transparent quality assessment systems.
 • The involvement of all interested parties in external and self-evaluation.
 • Linking external and self-evaluation.
 • Supporting capacity building for those who are participating in quality 
evaluation.
 • Fostering horizontal learning among schools.
The key elements of the quality policy of the EU in education are institutional 
self-evaluation, the involvement of partners, and the development of the necessary 
competencies. (As will be seen in Chapter 12 on quality evaluation, other elements 
of quality evaluation systems have remained matters of national interest.) EFQM, the 
European instrument for quality management, ﬁts into this policy framework. EFQM 
is designed to orient self-evaluation that is followed up by quality improvement. Since 
results are produced by those who work in the organization (“enablers”), EFQM in-
cludes the areas related to “how” and “what”: their weight is equal. The instrument 
describes the self-evaluation process, and the various areas of quality are weighted. As 
can be seen in the following ﬁgure where “customer satisfaction” (i.e., the satisfaction 
of parents and students) received more weight than the actual “business results” (i.e., 
educational outcomes) that reﬂect the diﬀerence of the meaning of quality and eﬀec-
tiveness. Also, the satisfaction of school staﬀ has relatively high importance. As far as 
enablers are concerned, the weight of the various factors is more balanced; however, 
the importance of organizational and “business processes” (i.e., teaching and learning) 
are especially emphasized. 
The identiﬁcation of areas of quality applies well to education, and all of them eas-
ily “translate” to speciﬁc areas of the operation of schools. (EFQM instruments used in 
schools clearly apply the terminology of education.) However, the weights associated 
with the diﬀerent areas of quality in education—although accepted widely—are based 
on a certain point of view from a speciﬁc time period. For example, as the learnin g 
outcomes approach has begun to prevail, one might argue that the “business result” 
determined in terms of learning outcomes should have more weight. Since TQM-based 
instruments do not adhere to set standards, when adapting EQF—it is not necessary to 
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follow this weighting. For example, the Hungarian “Comenius 2000” instrument, an 
EFQM adaptation, ﬁne-tuned the original system by identifying more areas of qual-
ity (twelve instead of the original nine) and left the schools to decide what would be 
the actual weight associated with them. The underlying assumption was that certain 
aspects may have a very diﬀerent weight within the very speciﬁc context of diﬀerent 
schools. Another feature of the Hungarian adaptation is that the instrument was lev-
eled for “beginners,” that is, schools just starting to implement quality management, 
and for “advanced schools” that already have experience in self-evaluation and school 
development (Comenius 1 and 2). The ﬂexibility of the instrument in the course of 
experimental implementation proved to be eﬀective. 
Figure 8.1
The European Framework for Quality Management (EFQM)
In South Eastern Europe, the only education system that already introduced man-
datory self-evaluation and school development in schools is in Serbia. (Though even in 
Serbia, it is not a widely implemented instrument with the necessary competencies and 
support services in place.) All the other countries are lagging behind in this respect.17 
However, if the introduction of school-based quality management will be initiated, the 
countries of the region may turn to the many experiences other European countries 
have accumulated
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The Design of Quality Management Systems
The process of self-evaluation and quality improvement based on the ﬁndings of self-
evaluation can be organized into an algorithm of simple sequential steps. At certain 
points of the two connected processes, the involvement of the entire staﬀ is needed, 
and certain management decisions should be made. 
Conducting self-evaluation is worth considering as a project with a well-deﬁned 
beginning and end, the deployment of the necessary resources, actors who have speciﬁc 
tasks and responsibilities, and a well-designed timeframe and speciﬁc “products” at the 
end of each stage. The major self-evaluation steps are the following:
 (i) Preparation for the self-evaluation process.
  • Assignment of those who are participating in the self-evaluation process 
(evaluation team).
  • Communicating the purpose and process to the staﬀ of school.
  • Building the capacities of the members of the evaluation team.
  • Planning the self-evaluation process.
  • “Unpacking” the areas of self-evaluation by determining concrete evaluation 
criteria.
  • Selecting the methods of information gathering.
 (ii) Managing the self-evaluation process. The staﬀ of the school may have assump-
tions, views, and opinions in relation to all self-evaluation area and criteria. 
Self-evaluation is not simply collecting these views; in all cases the question 
should be asked: how do we know? Therefore, the most important activity in 
this stage is gathering information on the basis of evaluation criteria by simple 
instruments, such as SWOT, peer reviews, student and parent surveys, climate 
tests, etc.
 (iii) Gathering additional information. The collection of information over the course 
of self-evaluation allows for pre-selecting those problems that are regarded as the 
most important by the members of the evaluation team and the management 
of the school. It is especially important if the self-evaluation process reveals too 
many problems that may paralyze the team. There might be a need for further 
information-gathering in relation to these problems. Additional simple methods 
can be used in this stage, such as the Ishikawa diagram.
 (iv) Summarizing and analyzing the results of self-evaluation. The analysis of the 
gathered information and the preparation of the instruments for presenting 
the ﬁndings.
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 (v) Problem selection. Determining the most important (a limited number of ) 
problems revealed by the ﬁndings of self-evaluation that will be addressed by 
the school development process.
When designing self-evaluation systems as mandates given to schools by regulations 
or guidelines and manuals, there are several questions to consider. The most important 
ones are the following (Eurydice 2004):
 • Is self-evaluation compulsory or not? Although in most European countries, self-
evaluation is mandatory, there are countries where it is strongly encouraged or 
voluntary.
 • What is the basis for benchmarking? Performance references can be provided by 
annual national inspection reports, national performance benchmarks, national 
value added indicators, simple national quantitative indicators, or by something 
else.
 • What do schools evaluate? What are the underlying frameworks, standards, or 
criteria for self-evaluation? Are these identical to the inspection framework, or 
do separate guidelines lay the framework for self-evaluation?
 • What are the common key areas to be evaluated? Are they related to the teaching-
learning process, or do they include the management processes and educational 
output, as well?
 • Are alternative frameworks allowed? It is not necessarily a government priority 
that all schools use the same instruments. However, connecting external and 
self-evaluation is much easier if it is not only external evaluation that is stan-
dardized.
 • What are the methods for collecting information? For example, questionnaires, 
committees, surveys, interviews/discussions, tests, observation, analysis, etc.
 • Who are the relevant stakeholders in the process? For example, school manage-
ment, school boards, public administration oﬃcials, school directors, teachers, 
parents, pupils/former pupils, community, inspectors/advisors, etc.
 • Is reporting compulsory? If yes, what are schools to include to their reports? For 
example, schools may report the results of the whole self-evaluation process or 
certain outcomes for meta-evaluation, or they may report to the inspectorate. 
Also, there might be a limited internal reporting obligation for stakeholders. 
What is reported to the wider public, and how?
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The identiﬁcation of problems allows for the selection of those limited number of 
goals that the staﬀ of the schools decides to implement within a school development process. 
School development is a plan-based organizational and pedagogical change process with 
clear directions for action, deadlines, responsible persons, and required resources. The 
actions of the school development plans are either incorporated into the regular annual 
plans of schools (such as the annual decisions on the allocation of classes among the 
teachers of diﬀerent subjects or the selection of textbooks) or organized as development 
or innovation projects. There might be components of the school development plan that 
may require the revision of existing school policies or the development of new ones, 
and their implementation. (For example, the enrollment policy of the school, the way 
the performance of teachers is evaluated annually, or certain organizational statutes.) 
School development has its typical algorithm, too: (i) determining the develop-
ment areas and goals, (ii) gathering the best practices of other schools in relation to the 
development goals, (iii) the development and approval of the school development plan, 
(iv) implementation and monitoring, and (v) a ﬁnal evaluation of the development 
process that is already input into the next quality management cycle. The process of 
the implementation of the school development plan should be monitored on a regular 
basis. The ﬁnal evaluation of the results of school development provides input to self-
evaluation of the next quality management cycle. 
One very important aspect of school development is its required timeframe. Eﬀec-
tive change takes time. According to Michael Fullan, speciﬁc innovations need three to 
ﬁve years, and institutional reform takes more than ﬁve years (2006). The underlying 
notion of a multi-year timeframe for improvement is a speciﬁc feature of organizational 
change: the “implementation dip.” If an organization is working at a certain productiv-
ity level, it is to a large extent based on routine procedures and activities. Introducing 
any change in an organization wipes out these routines and causes a lot of resistance, 
uncertainty, and confusion. Also, organizational changes of any sort almost inevitably 
cause unintended eﬀects that may work against the initial purposes of the change initia-
tive. Although the expectation behind engaging in organizational change is improving 
productivity, in the ﬁrst period of the process it causes a temporary productivity decline. 
In the course of the process of change, these diﬃculties should be unfolded and dealt 
with, and that requires interventions and corrections, sometimes several times. These 
interventions may guarantee that the decline of productivity will be only temporary, 
and the overall result of the change process will be an improvement by comparison to 
the productivity of the organization at the starting point. Also, the results of the change 
process will be rather fragile, until new personal and organizational routines stabilize. 
The most important implication of the implementation dip is the timeframe of quality 
management cycles; it is never shorter than three years. Therefore, quality improvement 
cannot be squeezed into the Procrustean bed of annual planning exercises.
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Figure 8.2
The Implementation Dip18
It is essential to bear in mind that introducing such systems in schools in all the 
countries in South Eastern Europe requires the implementation of a wide range of mea-
sures of three kinds: (i) removing certain obstacles, (ii) deploying the relevant mandatory 
organizational tasks, and (iii) development to ensure the necessary conditions within 
and around the schools. As far as the existing obstacles are concerned, the most impor-
tant is the massive over-regulation that is characteristic of all these highly-centralized 
governance systems. In schools where detailed regulations stiﬂe their development, the 
process of self-evaluation and school development will always clash with problems that 
are external to the schools, matters that schools cannot always control. Thus, the ﬁrst 
condition of implementing school-based quality management systems is systematic de-
regulation that liberates all aspects of the work of the schools. Without this, introducing 
any form of quality management will only generate useless administrative paperwork 
that will further deteriorate the quality of the work of schools. 
The second set of conditions is implementing the regulations that determine the neces-
sary organizational tasks. For example, the descriptions of the duties of school directors 
and their qualiﬁcation requirements should be amended, the duties of teachers should 
be determined for the entire work week, not only for the period of contact hours in the 
classrooms, procedural rules should be set, etc. It is a complex package of connected 
policy measures. 
The third set of conditions is a large-scale development program: the development 
of the instrument used in the course of self-evaluation and school development (e.g., 
manuals), capacity building for all actors involved, development of the necessary 
external professional support services, development of the information and knowledge 
basis for quality management (e.g., indicator systems for benchmarking, collections 
of best practices, etc.), and the development of frameworks within which schools can 
Year one Year two Year three
Initiating change 
Stabilizing change
Intervention and correction 
Controlling processes
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cooperate. The most important external condition is the realignment of the external 
school evaluation that will be discussed in a separate chapter.
8.2 Management and Leadership
What has been said so far in Part Two about the changing scope of organizational 
autonomy of schools automatically leads to the redeﬁnition of the role that school 
directors play. In fact, over the course of decentralization, school leaders will face much 
more dramatic challenges than any of the teachers or other actors in educational man-
agement. School directors in South Eastern Europe countries are very much aware of 
the implications of the inevitable forthcoming changes, even if they cannot necessarily 
predict the direction or depth of the change. For instance, this is the reason that the 
number one request in Croatia or in Bulgaria is for an improved supply of training 
programs for directors. 
The distinction between organizational operation of schools and school manage-
ment is rather artiﬁcial, because there is no any aspect of the work of schools that is 
not subject to management. (Most comparative overviews on school organization focus 
exclusively on management structures.) However—apart from the thematic emphasis of 
this text—there are two reasons why separate discussion seems to be useful: the actual 
pattern of the institutional setting in schools largely determines the type of management, 
and the internal organization of schools is not the only reference that determines the 
latitude of management activities.
Organizations and Leadership
Certain types or leadership ﬁt to certain types of organizations and fail completely in 
other organizations. Therefore, the characteristics of “good leadership” are not indepen-
dent from the characteristics of the organization to be led. So far we may have created 
the impression that schools are the same, or at least extremely similar, wherever we go. 
At the surface it is true; however, good leadership must be judged bearing in mind the 
breadth and depth of an organization, where this similarity disappears. In fact, upon 
closer inspection, all schools are diﬀerent. 
In attempting to understand this diversity of organizational context of schools, some 
orientation is oﬀered by the “competing values framework” developed by Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh by analyzing the indicators of eﬀective organizations (1983). According to 
the model, there are two dimensions of organizational eﬀectiveness. The ﬁrst dimension 
is related to the organizational focus, changing from an emphasis on the people in the 
organization (internal focus) to emphasis on the organization itself (external focus). The 
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other dimension is the organizational structure preference: stability and control on the 
one hand, and ﬂexibility and change on the other. These two dimensions mark out four 
types of approaches to organizational eﬀectiveness:
 • The human relations model: emphasis on ﬂexibility and internal focus. The main 
objective is strengthening cohesion, commitment, and morale, as well as the 
participation of the staﬀ that leads to the development of the organization’s 
human resources.
 • The open system model: emphasis on ﬂexibility and external focus. The main 
objective is strengthening readiness and promoting innovation and adaptation, 
in order to ensure growth and resource acquisition.
 • The rational goal model: emphasis on control and external focus. The objective 
is planning and ensuring the clarity of goals, in order to ensure productivity 
and eﬃciency.
 • The internal process model: emphasis on control and internal focus. The objective 
is information management, documentation, and internal communication, in 
order to strengthen the stability of the organization.
Figure 8.3
The Competing Values Framework: Organizational Eﬀectiveness
Human relations model Open system model
Internal process model Rational goal model
Control
Flexibility
ExternalInternal
Means: cohesion, morale 
Ends: human resource development
Means: information management, 
 communication 
Ends: stability, control
Means: ﬂexibility, readiness 
Ends: growth, resource acquisition
Means: planning, goal setting 
Ends: productivity, efﬁciency
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Leadership behavior is very often dealt with as something that is determined by the 
personality and former experience of school directors. Indeed, these factors are extremely 
important. However, leadership strategies—at least in theory—are to be adjusted to 
the challenges that the organization faces. Sometimes bold decisions are required, 
while in other cases, small incremental changes are needed. Observing the big picture 
of strategic issues is equally as important as absorbing small details. The actual state of 
aﬀairs in a school may call for strong internal focus, while in other cases, adjusting to 
external expectations may require emphasizing the interest of the school as a whole. 
Contemporary research stresses the behavioral complexity of eﬀective leadership, that 
is, eﬀective leaders may play multiple, occasionally contradictory roles. Thus, what we 
may call good leadership is—and should be—very much contextual. (This is exactly 
the context that school directors may grasp through the regular use of insight resulting 
from self-evaluation.)
Returning to the competing values framework, the four models of ensuring organi-
zational eﬀectiveness lay out eight distinct leadership roles. The distinction between the 
diﬀerent leadership roles within the same model of organizational eﬀectiveness is estab-
lished on the basis of the proximity to the two dimensions that determine the models. 
Figure 8.4
The Competing Values Framework: Leadership Roles
Human relations model Open system model
Internal process model Rational goal model
Control
Flexibility
ExternalInternal
Mentor role
Facilitator role
Monitor role
Coordinator role
Innovator role
Broker role
Producer role
Director role
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The eight types of leadership roles and the related behavior patterns are the follow-
ing (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983):
 • Human relations model
  — Mentor role: understanding self and others, communicating eﬀectively, 
developing subordinates.
  — Facilitator role: building teams, using participatory decision-making, man-
aging conﬂict.
 • Open systems model
  — Innovator role: living with change, thinking creatively, creating change.
  — Broker role: building and maintaining a power base, negotiating agreement 
and commitment, presenting ideas.
 • Rational goal model
  — Producer role: working productively, fostering a productive work environ-
ment, managing time and stress.
  — Director role: envisioning, planning, and goal setting, designing and orga-
nizing, delegating eﬀectively.
 • Internal processes model
  — Monitor role: monitoring personal performance, managing collective per-
formance, managing organizational performance.
  — Coordinator role: managing projects, designing work, managing across 
functions.
The question in relation to the various types of leadership is not the choice of the 
appropriate model; each role refers to a set of instruments that might be more or less 
eﬀective within the actual speciﬁc context of schools. It is up to the directors to put 
together their “own packages” on the basis of their understanding of the situation and, 
of course, within the limits of their personal and professional competencies.
The Types of School Management Frameworks
The latitude within which school directors may consider diﬀerent leadership roles largely 
depends on the actual role that is determined by the allocation of decision-making 
authority among various actors. Of course, this space is radically diﬀerent in centralized 
and decentralized management systems.
In highly-centralized management systems, school management is a person whose 
authority is limited, so he or she cannot fully ﬁll any of the above mentioned leadership 
roles. The expectations towards school directors rarely go beyond the pedantic fulﬁllment 
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of various administrative tasks. Also, the criteria by which school directors are considered 
successful have very little to do with the core functions of the schools, partly because 
there is no information produced on the results of teaching and learning, and also 
because directors do not control any aspects of quality and eﬀectiveness.
These features of centralized management have two consequences for the actual role 
that school directors play. First of all, there might be a huge gap between the formal 
role and the informal role that school directors may play. For example, in Croatia the 
“governing body” of a school is the school board that consists of four teacher representa-
tives, three representatives of the owners of the school, and two parent representatives. 
The composition of decision-making competencies of the board is a typical mixture 
that corresponds to the authority of the owners of the school, such as appointing the 
director, and those decisions that are normally made by either the council of teachers 
or by the management of the schools. However, the underlying legislation is not very 
speciﬁc in listing the decision-making authority of the boards; it is regulated by the 
statute of the school that is approved by the owner. Therefore, in terms of the division 
of labor among the board, the director, and the self-government, there is a large variety 
of settings that leave a huge amount of space for informal power distribution and—in 
several cases—political inﬂuence on the management of schools. 
Although the actual settings vary across South Eastern Europe, there is one com-
mon feature: creating opaque situations that leave a large space for informal settings 
that are determined by the dynamics of the personal relationships among all actors who 
are involved. For example, this ambiguity is created in Bulgaria as a result of the dual 
responsibility of school directors: they report to the municipality regarding ﬁnancial 
management and to the regional inspectorate regarding “professional” matters. (Without 
empirical research in the region, an in-depth analysis of legal frameworks for manage-
ment does not help nor make it easier to talk about the patterns of personalized school 
management that ambiguous formal settings generate.) Another consequence of the 
centralized system on the alignment of school leadership is the fact that the actual level 
and type of education largely determines the directors’ perception of their own role: 
in primary schools, directors are considered to be the “number one pedagogue” of the 
schools, and their identity is based on professional leadership roles. At upper levels of the 
system, especially in vocational education training (VET) schools, their understanding 
of their own role is much closer to that of a manager.
In decentralized management systems, the possible leadership roles performed by school 
directors are no less diverse, but for very diﬀerent reasons. First of all, in the course of 
decentralization, parallel to increasing school autonomy and responsibility, more and 
more management functions are deployed to the schools that lead to the diversiﬁca-
tion of management authorities. (Managing autonomous schools that largely control 
almost all relevant aspects of their work is an extremely complex task.) As a result, school 
management is less and less a single person and more and more a pool of decision-making 
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authority that is distributed among various actors outside and inside of schools. This is why 
it seems easier to talk about “school management frameworks” than simply management 
in decentralized education systems. 
When describing school management frameworks, it is important to make a dis-
tinction between decision-making authorities that fall under the category of strategic 
management and those of organizational management. Although the distinction is rather 
ambiguous, strategic management means the authority of determining the mission and 
goals for an organization and ensuring the implementation of these goals, while orga-
nizational management means performing a narrow range of management functions 
such as planning, organizing, staﬃng, and controlling. There are three typical patterns 
of allocating school management functions among various actors: (i) sharing strategic 
management-related authority with other actors while keeping full responsibility for 
organizational management with the directors, (ii) sharing certain organizational man-
agement responsibilities with actors outside of schools, and (iii) sharing organizational 
management responsibilities with actors inside schools. 
The ﬁrst pattern is the most typical, based on the integrity of organizational man-
agement in the majority of European countries. The pool of strategic decisions is very 
much identical to the “ownership” that has already been described in Chapter 4. There 
are several countries where strategic decisions are made by the owners themselves, as in 
Poland (the “school running body”) or in Hungary (the “school maintainer”). In other 
countries, local authorities do not exercise this task directly; for example, in England, they 
establish intermediate governing bodies in charge of making strategic decisions. Even in 
these cases, the boundary between “macro-management” and “micro-management” is 
clearly delineated. Due to the heavy emphasis on the professional autonomy of schools, 
the staﬀ of the schools (mainly teachers, rarely non-teaching staﬀ) is involved in stra-
tegic decision-making. It may happen directly, as the full or shared decision-making 
authorities of the teachers’ conference (Germany), pedagogical council (Poland), school 
council (Czech Republic), or teachers’ council (Hungary). (In most cases these authori-
ties are shared; for example, the teachers’ council approves the “pedagogical program” 
of the school, but ﬁnal approval is given by the owner of the school.) The involvement 
of teachers in strategic decisions can be arranged indirectly, as in England, where the 
representatives of teachers are members of the governing body.
The other two patterns are deviations from the typical setting. The most important 
feature of the second is the emphasis on local ownership, which, to a certain extent, 
overwrites the integrity of school management. For example, in the Netherlands all 
schools have a “competent authority” (most typically, a school board) that is in charge 
of making various decisions that in other countries would be regarded as part of the 
mandate of directors. In relation to most of the classic management functions, the role 
of the directors is to support planning and implementation. The third type of deviation 
from the typical case is when, to a certain extent, the integrity of the management au-
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thority of directors is overwritten by the collective administrative management setting. 
For example, in Romania—apart from deploying quite strong authority to the teachers’ 
council—there is an administrative council consisting of the members of school man-
agement, elected representatives of the teachers and the parents, and the representative 
of the local authority. There are various management tasks and decisions in the narrow 
meaning of the term that are performed or made by the administrative councils, such 
as the annual performance evaluation of teachers, the decisions on teachers’ bonuses, 
controlling the syllabi, etc.
The actual characteristics of the school management frameworks determine the 
alignment of the school management. One aspect of this alignment is the question: 
what is the primary reference for the work of directors? On the basis of this aspect, we 
can make the distinction between internally-referenced and externally-referenced school 
management. If the work of the directors largely depends on the support she or he 
can receive from the teaching staﬀ (especially, if teachers play a role in the selection of 
directors), directors likely become the agents of the teachers. In this case, the interests 
and views of the teachers will overwrite almost anything from outside (expectations, 
goals, regulations, etc.) that directors are supposed to transfer into the operation of 
the schools. (For example, it is often remarked in Hungary that teachers do not even 
need a trade union: their interests are protected most eﬀectively by school directors.) In 
other cases, where the work and success of directors is largely determined by external 
governing bodies, such as the school owners or boards, directors perform their tasks as 
lower-level agents of public management. Externally-referenced school management is 
instrumental in the transmission of external expectations but might be a constraining 
factor towards ensuring the professional and organizational autonomy of schools. In 
practice—apart from the actual features of school management framework—behaving as 
an externally- or internally-referenced school director largely depends on the perception 
of the directors, as well. (This is why, in many countries, a heavy investment was made in 
the management competencies of directors, in order to balance the impact of selecting 
school directors from teachers.) Probably one of the implications of “good leadership” is 
balancing these two reference sources according to the actual needs of the organization.
In the discourse on decentralization in education in South Eastern Europe, references 
are very often made to the important role that school boards play in other European 
countries. However, it is important to recall that the primary condition of establishing 
high-functioning management systems is setting a clear division of labor among the 
various actors involved in the management of schools. (This is the basis for involving 
important stakeholders without ruining clearly deﬁned roles and functions.) On the 
contrary, the tradition of managing by collective bodies has been so strong (especially 
in the countries of the former Yugoslavia where the traces of the old “self-management” 
system are still active) that very little eﬀort had been made to determine the roles of 
individual actors with the necessary clarity. For example, school boards in Croatia are 
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very much designed and regulated in this fashion. As far as school management is con-
cerned, the integrity of the mandate of directors should be ensured, precisely because 
of poor trust and ambiguous circumstances; only clear mandates create the appropriate 
foundation of strong accountability.
The Management Authority of School Directors
The management authority of school directors is largely dependent on the way vari-
ous functional governance instruments in the systemic environment of the schools are 
organized and structured. For example, if ﬁscal decentralization deploys a great deal of 
ﬁnancial planning and ﬁnancial management duties to the schools, the scope and kind 
of work that directors perform also change a lot. Nevertheless, the basic features of the 
directors’ mandate can be outlined here because all ﬁve areas of organizational man-
agement (planning, organizing, staﬃng, directing, and controlling) are organizational 
processes, the characteristics of which were discussed earlier.
• Planning. The typical routine planning exercise that all schools are obliged to do is 
planning for the upcoming school year: grouping newly enrolled children, allocat-
ing teaching hours, determining the use of school facilities, etc. A routine exercise 
in which school directors are involved, even if the actual planning is not done by 
the schools, is annual ﬁnancial planning, that in centralized systems is not a so-
phisticated task. Although centralized management systems have the tendency to 
torture schools with unnecessary additional planning duties (very often duplicating 
reports they have already done), there is no real need to do more. The information 
that directors have access to matches the scope of planning they have to do: basic 
statistics and nothing else. The greatest planning-related challenge that directors 
face is solving scheduling conﬂicts among teachers generated by their new weekly 
schedule when they cannot satisfy all their conﬂicting claims. However, in the course 
of decentralization, planning becomes a complex task requiring speciﬁc skills, a 
great deal of external and internal support, and a much greater amount and type of 
information. Decentralization generates the demand for mid-term planning and for 
planning new aspects, such as that for quality management, individual performance 
evaluation, or internal school-based assessment. As a result, there is a radical shift 
from planning as an administrative obligation to planning as a strategic instrument 
of outstanding importance. 
• Organizing. While planning as a function automatically changes a lot, because of the 
impact of decentralization, it does not apply to organizing, that is, to establishing 
the internal organizational structure of schools. As has been seen earlier, schools 
are rather simple organizations with a very limited capacity for change. However, 
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beyond certain changes in the organization of teaching and learning that directors 
may initiate if they receive the necessary support from teachers, the space for orga-
nizing is very much limited to the creation of ad hoc task forces. For example, even 
if operating quality management procedures is an already well-established system 
in the schools, due to the lack of functional divisions within the schools, the staﬀ 
members who are actively participating in the work of the core teams on quality 
management are actually working on a voluntary basis or get only a temporary 
assignment. (Of course, their participation may become a “tradition.”) The point 
here is that increasing number of various organizational tasks that teachers should 
perform beyond the delivery of lessons also increases the number of organization-
related tasks of the directors.
• Staﬃng. In general, human resource management contains ﬁve kinds of activities: (i) 
selecting and hiring the staﬀ, (ii) determining the content of the work of the staﬀ, 
(iii) performance management, that is the regular evaluation of the performance 
of the staﬀ, (iv) compensation and the use of incentives, and (v) capacity building. 
If we look at these ﬁve areas of human resource management, it is obvious that in 
centralized management systems none of them are at the disposal of school directors. 
Even if human resources management authority is deployed to the directors in the 
course of decentralization (such as individual performance evaluation, the decision 
on salary diﬀerentiation, etc.), their latitude remains very limited by comparison 
to the human resource management mandate of managers in private organizations. 
In education, teachers are typically public employees for whom the qualiﬁcation 
requirements are set by the government and who enjoy substantial legal protection. 
The content of their work is mainly determined by state regulations, their salaries 
are typically determined by state-issued salary scales, and their participation in in-
service training is also based on a regulation-established mandate. Of course, this 
does not mean that decentralization cannot provide the space within which school 
directors are able to ensure that the human resources of the organization serve the 
goals of the organization. 
• Directing. Directing, that is, inﬂuencing the behavior of people in the organization 
through motivation, communication, group dynamics, leadership, and discipline, is 
the basic task of directors and the scope of this task is not really determined by the 
level of decentralization. What determines it is the actual composition of instruments 
that are at the disposal of the directors, partly by their formal management author-
ity, but probably much more by the actual type of the organization. Nevertheless, 
good leadership includes using the most appropriate means of directing, adjusted 
to the context. An important constraint on performing this function in schools is 
the extremely self-contained character of teaching. This is why a large number of 
school directors avoid entering the “private sphere of teaching.”
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• Controlling. In theory, controlling the work of the organization consists of three 
consecutive steps: (i) establishing performance standards, (ii) measuring and re-
porting actual performance, (iii) taking corrective or preventive action if necessary. 
Education being a public service, the latitude given for directors of schools in relation 
to controlling is much smaller than that of the directors of business organizations. 
In schools, most of the performance standards come from outside, and state-run 
organizations are taking over the role of measuring and reporting, and the space, 
within which corrective action can be considered, is dwindling, too. Nevertheless, it 
does not reduce the sole responsibility of the directors for the performance of their 
schools. “Luckily enough,” most South Eastern European education systems—as a 
large number of other countries in the rest of Europe—do not make the failures of 
the schools visible.
As this overview suggests, the management mandate of school directors in a 
centralized system is very limited, and in spite of its dramatic increase as a result of 
decentralization, it hardly measures up to the new and fast-growing responsibilities of 
directors. The main impact of the growth of management duties parallel to the strength-
ening of organizational autonomy of schools is the demand for greater internal support. 
Therefore, in most decentralized systems school management is no longer a lonely job; 
most school directors—beyond a certain school size—have assistant directors with a 
well-established division of labor among the members of the senior management, have 
ﬁnancial assistance directors in charge of ﬁnancial and facility management, and strive 
to delegate certain tasks to teachers or to groups of teachers.
Decentralization creates a situation that can be described as limited management 
authority mixed with large responsibilities. As a result, the gap is bridged by “leader-
ship,” for example, the charismatic pull of the personality of the school director. Thus, 
personality, that is, personal abilities, leadership style, professional capacities, and the 
experience of school directors, remain very important in decentralized systems, too. 
However, this importance is not justiﬁed by the ambiguity of their role anymore, but 
because they remain the focal points of school management. In fact, the stronger the 
organizational management authorities of the director, the stronger the role they may 
play in determining the strategic alignment of the work of the schools, even if strategic 
decisions are made by the owners of the schools or by teachers as the embodiment of 
professional autonomy of the schools. The distinction—created by greater school au-
tonomy between the narrow management authority of directors and their role in giving 
direction to the work of the others who are also involved in the management—is in 
fact identical to the distinction between management and leadership. There is a visible 
shift in the international literature and national policies from a narrow management 
approach to a much broader leadership approach that reﬂects the growing complexity 
of school management.
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Contemporary capacity building programs partly reﬂect the increasing scope of 
management authorities. For example, one of the largest Hungarian training organiza-
tions that oﬀers in-service capacity building for school directors updated the structure of 
its training program according to the latest challenges facing directors in a decentralized 
system. The new training modules, developed in a Dutch-Hungarian joint program, were 
the following: educational policy analysis and planning, school development, ﬁnancing 
of education, evaluation and quality management, service delivery and facility man-
agement, and managing human and social development. However, there is a growing 
demand for very personalized services, too that have been available to managers in the 
business sector for a long time, such as coaching.
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Schools as Learning Organizations
Organizational Learning in Schools
What was discussed in the second part of this text is in fact about a snowball eﬀect: 
the reconsideration of the very basic conceptual foundations of education results in the 
reconsideration of its all practical aspects. An attempt was made to demonstrate that 
rather conceptual alignments such as the learning outcomes approach to education or 
the whole-school approach to educational service delivery have concrete and tangible 
implications to the way teachers teach and schools operate. Also, the dynamic connec-
tion between the paradigm shift and decentralization was revealed; decentralization is 
partially justiﬁed by the implications of the paradigm shift, but also decentralization is 
the condition of the realignment of educational services according to the new paradigm.
If we try to grasp the essence of the ongoing changes in education, we end up re-
quiring educational service provider institutions that are learning for the sake of improving 
students’ learning through reﬂection, enrichment, and action.
• Reﬂection. The importance of hard evidence for the improvement of the work of 
schools has been emphasized by many people many times. However, we cannot take 
for granted that hard evidence carries any automatic meaning; the meaning that is 
attached to information is always ambiguous. Therefore, acquiring information in 
any systematic way is equally as important as the individual and collective interpreta-
tion of the information, as well as drawing the conclusions from the interpretation 
of the independent work of individual teachers and schools themselves. 
• Enrichment. Although it might not be obvious for those whose main concern is how 
to make teaching as structured as possible, the fact is that learning is messy. There-
fore, what is important is not necessarily the extent to which learning in schools is 
organized, but rather the extent to which it is intensive and rich. Individual learning, 
being genuinely social, occurs in a school through interactions. The enrichment 
of organizational learning in a school means intensifying interactions among the 
individual members of the staﬀ, as well as enriching the content of interactions. 
• Action. Learning in an organization should not encourage mere contemplation; it 
should be purposeful. What makes learning purposeful is follow-up action, that is, 
the practical application of acquired knowledge. It is the point where the extent to 
which things are managed and organized comes into play: it is essential to establish 
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those procedures that turn the results of messy learning into systematic action.
Learning in schools as organizations should serve three major purposes: 
 • It should promote individual learning in organizational context. As we saw earlier, 
contemporary expectations towards teachers’ learning are tremendous. When 
we looked at the conditions of eﬀective learning of teachers, all of them referred 
to the organizational context that their own schools can create. Schools should 
provide a learning-friendly environment not only to their students, but also to 
their teachers. As we also saw, the recent patterns of the operation of schools in 
most of the cases are far from being learning-friendly.
 • Schools should accumulate collective knowledge, too. They should do so in various 
teams (for example, in a group of teachers of the same subjects) and also across 
the entire school (such as accumulating and sharing good assessment practices). 
In fact, to build a school with a shared vision, shared principles, shared norms, 
and shared know-how is to operate a school with shared knowledge.
 • Learning should aim to connect external expectations and results. A widely-cited 
deﬁnition of learning organizations is “an organization and individuals within 
it with the capacity to create results that matter.”19 What matters in a school is 
that students learn. Therefore, learning, being in interaction with the environ-
ment of the schools (e.g., interpreting external expectations), should be aimed 
at improving students’ learning. 
There are certain organizational characteristics that are conditions for achieving 
these three goals of organized learning. They are the following:
 • Non-hierarchical relationships. Schools are typically per se non-hierarchical or-
ganizations. However, they are not very hierarchical because they are not really 
organizations. If the organizational dimension of schools starts to grow, it is very 
likely that it will result in hierarchical arrangements in order to break through 
the typically individualistic attitude of teachers. Decentralization within the 
organizational architecture of schools might be instrumental in avoiding this 
trap.
 • Information system and open communication. In this respect, the question is 
not only the accumulation of information; it also concerns its preservation 
and documentation, making the information available to all, and the use of 
information in open communication in such a way that weakens information 
monopolies.
 • Delegation, teamwork, and cooperation. The emerging organizational dimension 
of the work of schools that have no internal functional departmental divisions 
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may result in placing additional burden on the shoulders of individual teachers. 
Therefore, all ad-hoc assignments and permanent tasks are better delegated to 
teams of teachers.
 • Capacity building. By comparison to many other professions, education has the 
advantage of having a large scale, established in-service training system in place. 
In this respect, the question is the extent to which mandatory capacity building 
serves all of the three purposes of organizational learning. As was mentioned 
earlier, in many schools, it is part of the realm of teacher monopolies and not 
the instrument of a school-based human resource management regime. 
 • Incentives and rewards. Of course, incentives and rewards are very instrumental 
in generating the additional eﬀort that learning requires. However, from the 
point of view of organizational learning, not just any kind of learning should 
be incited and rewarded; it should be learning that serves the actual goals of 
the school as a whole.
Figure C.2.1
Organizational Learning in Schools
In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, it should be noted that all these 
major purposes for organizational learning and all of the above conditions are not 
simply designed to describe the characteristics of a “good practice” or to lay down the 
foundations of an educational reform movement. Education, being a public service 
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funded by taxpayer money, and all these features of organizational learning should be 
transformed into core governance expectations because they constitute that set of service 
characteristics that allow other public services to meet legitimate external expectations. 
In addition, these expectations must be realistic, although the number of schools that 
meet all of these requirements is relatively small. Wherever we go, the instruments to 
be applied are rather simple and user-friendly.
Systems in Schools Promoting Organizational Learning
After referring to “simple and user-friendly” instruments to be deployed to schools, it 
would not be fair leaving them out of focus. The next question is: what are the organi-
zational instruments widely applied in schools that are design to create that critical mass 
of organizational changes that move the whole construct of schools closer to the above 
pattern of organizational learning? The answer is a summary of various school systems 
and instruments applied to establish those features. The four organizational conditions 
to be established in schools are the following:
 • Professionalization of school directors
 • Professionalization of teachers
 • Alignment of the school program (curriculum) to the needs of the students
 • Operating a regular quality management mechanism.
The meaning of professionalism needs to be explained here. Its only meaning that 
is widely used in relation to education is the mastery of knowledge and skills that are 
required in order to be a “good school director” or “good teacher.” However, this nar-
row understanding of professionalism nicely coexists with the traditional “missionary 
ethos” of the teaching profession: teachers are victims who sacriﬁce their well-being for 
the sake of our children. It reminds us that professionalism has an equally important 
additional layer: accountability. That is precisely what the traditional ethos excludes, 
and holding teachers accountable for their work (as would be completely normal in any 
other organization) is still considered to be impolite. But holding individual teachers 
accountable for their work is not a government concern: it is the school that should 
operate an internal professional accountability system. The case of directors is slightly 
diﬀerent. Although the same concept of professionalism should apply, holding directors 
accountable is not an internal school matter. Schools should be held accountable by 
those who sign their contracts. The only aspect of the “professionalization” of school 
management that is related to the schools is capacity building: partly because it also 
refers to the assistants and internal support staﬀ of the directors, and partly because it 
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is the school that draws on the various types of services (training, counseling, coaching, 
consulting, etc.) that serve the professional development of the directors.
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the school curriculum was mentioned only 
in relation to the characteristics of eﬀective schools in Part Two. (School curriculum is 
part of the overall “content regulation” system that will be discussed in Chapter 11.) 
However, determining concrete educational goals for the schools and regulating the 
processes by the schools themselves is one of the basic tasks of schools in a decentral-
ized education system. 
In order to establish these organizational systems in schools, there are seven key 
instruments to be deployed to educational institutions as mandatory tasks: (i) capacity 
building for directors, (ii) individual performance evaluation for teachers, (iii) capac-
ity building for teachers, partly on the basis of organizational needs, and partly on the 
basis of the ﬁndings of performance evaluation, (iv) development and application of 
school-based curriculum, (v) internal assessment at the level of schools on the basis of 
school curriculum (i.e., determining the common principles of in-classroom pedagogical 
assessment and testing), (vi) self-evaluation, and (vii) school development on the basis 
of the ﬁndings of self-evaluation. 
Figure C.2.2
Major School Systems and Their Key Instruments
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The above key instruments are not identical to the entire toolkits of the organiza-
tional systems that they serve. They represent focal points that, if implemented, will 
(almost) automatically result in the reconsideration of the whole construct of the orga-
nizational system they refer to. For example, introducing annual individual performance 
evaluation as a management instrument has a major impact on all other components 
of the human resource management regimes of schools. Also, introducing a school 
curriculum—in theory—may have a major impact on how the “core businesses” of the 
schools are performed.
Of course, all of these instruments cannot be introduced overnight in schools that 
do not apply any of them, as is the case in the schools of most South Eastern European 
countries. Their implementation is a long and gradual process strongly connected to the 
reform of the functional governance instruments that will be discussed in Part Three.
The Absorption Capacity of Schools
Another aspect relevant to the governance and management of organizational learn-
ing is what we may call the absorption capacity of schools. Recall that the instruments 
composing the systemic environment of educational service delivery institutions set 
the goals for educational services and deploy various resources (ﬁnancial and human 
resources, services that schools consume, instruments used in teaching and learning, 
information, etc.) to the schools. In a governance perspective, one of the most important 
questions is: how eﬀectively are the schools using these inputs? The absorption capacity 
can be explained by a very simple example: if 100,000 Serbian dinars are granted to a 
high-quality “elite” school in downtown Belgrade, most likely the school will be able 
to use the money for developments that actually contribute to the improvement of the 
learning of its students. If the same amount of money were to be granted to a small, 
poorly-equipped, and poorly-performing school located in a small village of a remote 
mountainous area, most likely, the money would be used for the proper purposes, but 
with very little impact on learning. 
Increasing the absorption capacity of schools, that is, enabling them to purpose-
fully and eﬀectively use their inputs and produce educational results in line with the 
expectations set for them from outside, is not really diﬀerent from the organizational 
requirements of becoming a school with organizational learning. Generally speaking, 
there are four components of the absorption capacity of the schools, and all of them are 
mentioned in relation to organizational learning: (i) the capacity of the staﬀ to change, 
(ii) the willingness of the staﬀ to change, (iii) the quality and maturity of organizational 
processes in the school, and (iv) professional, legal, and ﬁnancial accountability. The 
question of instruments that have the potential to increase the absorption capacity 
of the schools already leads us to the discussion on the decentralization of functional 
governance instruments.
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Summary of the Key Points of Part Two
Partly due to the ongoing paradigm shift in education and partly because of the impact 
of decentralization, all aspects of educational services are changing. The key points of the 
chapters in Part Two in relation to the changing characteristics of educational services 
delivery are the following:
 During the last two decades, there was an emphatic shift from intrinsic aims of 
education to the instrumental ones. As a result, goals for educational services are 
increasingly considered on the basis of external economic and social references. 
 Although the weight of educational outcomes in terms of participation-related data 
is decreasing, they are still very much relevant in South Eastern Europe. The prevail-
ing educational policy paradigm (lifelong learning) is based on a systemic approach 
to learning, reconsiders the relationship between the supply and demand sides of 
education with a strong focus on learning, puts a great emphasis on autonomous 
and motivated learning, and reconsiders the goals of education accordingly.
 Due to the reconsideration of relevant knowledge in education, contemporary goals 
for educational services are set in terms of competencies (i.e., knowledge, skills, 
and attitudes). The learning outcomes approach to education assigns a determin-
ing weight on the development of basic and key competencies within educational 
outcomes.
 The learning outcomes approach leads to the reconsideration of basic requirements 
towards educational services, such as eﬀectiveness, quality, equity, and cost-eﬀec-
tiveness.
 The enrichment of our knowledge about eﬀective learning and the essential role 
that non-formal and informal learning plays has resulted in a reconsideration of the 
features of eﬀective teaching. It has major implications for all major functions of 
teaching: to the teaching curriculum, the instruction methods, and the assessment 
of learning. 
 As a result, approaching teaching as an isolated, self-contained activity became 
obsolete. Thus, our contemporary understanding of high-quality education is less 
and less teacher centered and is based on the whole-school approach.
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 A narrow, formal organizational approach to the work of schools does not help us 
to grasp the major characteristics of the way in which they operate. In a broader 
sense, the organizational architecture of schools is very much determined by the 
features of their organizational culture.
 There is a remarkable gap between typical organizational patterns of schools and 
the characteristics of eﬀective schools. The major instrument that has the potential 
to bring schools closer to educational eﬀectiveness is school-based quality manage-
ment. Quality management is a regular and cyclical self-evaluation based school 
development process.
 Due to the increasing expectations of schools, expectations of school directors are 
increasing dramatically, as well. The context, within which school management 
functions and leadership is exercised, is determined by the characteristics of school 
management frameworks.
 The essence of the ongoing changes in education is the growing expectation that 
education service provider institutions are learning for the sake of improving stu-
dents’ learning. Organizational learning entails three key elements: reﬂection (the 
individual and collective interpretation of information), enrichment (intensifying 
interactions among members of the school staﬀ in order to make their learning 
richer), and action (deliberate follow-up action that makes learning purposeful in 
the organization).
 Organizational learning in schools should serve three major purposes: (i) it should 
promote individual learning in organizational context, (ii) it should accumulate 
collective knowledge, and (iii) it should connect external expectations with results.
 The characteristics of a school that make organizational learning possible are: (i) 
non-hierarchical relationships, (ii) information systems and open communication, 
(iii) delegation, teamwork, and cooperation, (iv) capacity building, and (v) incen-
tives and rewards. 
 There are four systems that are essential for promoting organizational learning in 
schools; these are the professionalization of school management, the professionaliza-
tion of teachers, the alignment of school programs, and quality management.
 Promoting organizational learning is the condition of improving the capacity of 
schools to utilize all sorts of resources eﬀectively (ﬁnancial and human resources, 
services, instruments, information, etc.). The absorption capacity of schools includes: 
(i) the capacity of the staﬀ to change, (ii) the willingness of the staﬀ to change, (iii) 
the quality and maturity of organizational processes in the school, and (iv) profes-
sional, legal, and ﬁnancial accountability.
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C H A P T E R  9
Decentralized Management: 
The General Framework
9.1 The General Framework for Decentralized 
 Management
The “critical path” of the decentralization of the systemic environment of schools is 
the public administration system. Decentralization of the management of education 
creates the institutional framework for the decentralization of other functional gover-
nance instruments and marks out the space within which all other systemic changes 
can be considered. At the same time, any changes in curriculum, ﬁnancing, or quality 
evaluation automatically generate changes in the machinery of public administration. 
Local Accountability Relationships
When outlining the framework for educational management, that is, part of the overall 
public administration system, the point of departure in decentralized systems is the fact 
that primary and secondary education are locally provided public services. The basis for 
local service provision frameworks is the map of accountability relationships (World 
Development Report 2004).
In general, accountability is a speciﬁc relationship between the client, who holds 
somebody else accountable (principal), and another actor who is held accountable by the 
client (agent). The principal-agent relationship is based on accountability if it contains 
ﬁve components: 
 1. The principal delegates a task to the agent;
 2. The principal remunerates the fulﬁllment of the task;
 3. The agent performs the task;
 4. The agent provides information about the performance;
 5. There are enforcement instruments at the disposal of the principal if the agent 
does not perform at the required quality or does not perform at all.
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A relationship should have all of these components if it is based on accountability. 
No doubt, the “ideal type” of accountability relationship is the market relationship be-
tween consumer and service provider. However, the same simple requirements should 
be applied in the relationships between institutions participating in the provision of 
public services and individuals, who are the clients of the services.
Figure 9.1
The Content of Accountability Relationships20
The essence of accountability being that it is a relationship, the actors in local public 
service provisions should be mapped out. We have three major groups of actors: the 
state, in this case—with some simpliﬁcation that can be ﬁne-tuned later—local self-
governments; the service provider institutions, in our case the schools; and the citizens who 
consume the service, that is, the clients of the service, in our case parents and students. 
These groups are engaging in internal accountability relationships themselves; such as 
the relationship between the council and the administration of local self-governments 
and that between the schools and their frontline professionals (teachers). 
Ensuring accountability among the chain of actors in relation to local public 
services has a direct path, the short route of accountability between the clients and the 
service providers, as well as an indirect path, the long route of accountability between the 
citizens and the local self-governments, on the one hand, and between the local self-
governments and the service provider institutions, on the other. Thus, from the point 
of view of governance of education, we have four relevant accountability relationships: 
(i) the short route (i.e., between clients and schools that is based on the power of clients, 
(ii) the relationship between citizens and local self-governments (voice), (iii) the rela-
tionship between self-governments (the owners of the schools) and schools (compact), 
and (iv) the relationship between schools and their frontline professionals: teachers 
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(management). For the sake of a wider public administration analysis, addressing the 
problems related to the local political aggregation of the interests of clients in order to 
channel them into the “voice” of citizens and the accountability relationship between 
local politicians and the administration of the self-government would be important. 
However, they are less relevant for the theme here, so we are going to focus mainly on 
the four accountability relationships above.
Figure 9.2
Local Service Provisions: The Short and Long Routes of Accountability21
The short route of accountability is the relationship between the parents and the schools. 
There are certain public services with relationships between service providers and clients 
within which all necessary conditions of accountability can be ensured relatively easily. 
For example, one is waste management: the interactions between the service providers 
and the clients tend to be infrequent, and the client can easily judge the quality of the 
service; the garbage is gathered on time, or not. The situation with high added-value 
services requiring higher professional qualiﬁcations and that are much less standard-
ized (so-called discretionary services, such as teaching or healthcare) is very diﬀerent. 
Teachers and doctors make a large number of decisions on a daily basis that—due 
to the lack of suﬃcient information and knowledge—parents, students, and patients 
cannot judge easily. (We cannot even be sure, should the symptoms pass, whether this 
is a sign of regained health or the result of a doctor’s treatment.) As a result, the client 
is unable to determine the content of the work of doctors or teachers and cannot as-
sess the success or failure of that work. Therefore, in the case of discretionary services, 
we have unequally informed actors in a relationship within which the requirement of 
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enforcement cannot be exercised. The relationship between parents and teachers is an 
unequal power relationship.
The long route of accountability is the political relationship between the citizens and 
the self-governments. In this respect, the ﬁrst question is: how are the speciﬁc interests of 
parents integrated into the general interests of citizens as taxpayers, and how does the 
aggregation and articulation of citizens’ interests occur? In other words: how are citizens 
organized, and how much is their participation ensured? The other side of the questions 
in relation to voice is the openness and responsiveness of local self-governments in rela-
tion to local public services. Although this reading does not allow an in-depth discussion 
on these matters, it is important to emphasize that the long route of accountability is 
a chain, along which, if one link is weak or broken, accountability does not prevail.
The long route of accountability is the relationship between the local self-government and 
the service provider institution. The “compact” between the owners of the schools and the 
schools themselves is in fact a “contract” that determines the frameworks within which the 
service is provided. In very general terms, the question here is: who has how much of an 
inﬂuence on determining the content of the compact for the service provider institutions? 
Therefore, the most important question revolves around the actual weight of the central 
government and its deconcentrated agencies and that of the local self-governments, and 
the scope of the autonomy of schools within which schools can determine the content 
of the compact on their own. As in many other public services, there is not one single 
public actor in education that has exclusive authority in determining the compact for 
schools. This is the problem for multiple principals. However, in a decentralized system 
providing certain educational services is the task of self-governments; therefore, they are 
the owners of schools, and the primary accountability relationship is the one between 
self-governments and schools. The big question is the role of central governments. Too 
much central inﬂuence weakens or eliminates the local long route of accountability and 
the much needed autonomy of schools; therefore—as has already been illustrated in 
the ﬁrst part of this text—central government agencies should learn how to inﬂuence 
the work of the schools in an indirect way by inﬂuencing the behavior of the clients 
and the self-governments.
The long route of accountability is the relationship between the service provider institutions 
and their frontline professionals. The clients of public services are interacting directly with 
professionals: doctors, social workers, librarians, technicians of the utility companies, 
and teachers. (Especially in education, where probably the only non-teaching person 
they encounter is the gatekeeper at the school.) However, when they act in their best 
interests, they get in touch with the school as an organization (just like when we talk 
to the manager in a restaurant if we have a complaint about the behavior of the wait 
staﬀ). Parents are in a relationship with the entire school; in the great majority of cases 
we do not even choose the teachers who are teaching our children. In the same way, as 
emphasized in the previous chapters, the target of governance is the whole school, not 
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the individual teacher. Therefore, the relationship between the local or national agencies 
of the state is also indirect; it is conveyed by the management of the schools. (Four out of 
ﬁve areas of the previously mentioned school-based human resource management systems 
are equivalent with the above components of accountability relationships. The ﬁfth area, 
that is, capacity building, is not strongly connected to the problem of accountability.)
Shortcomings of the Long and Short Routes of Accountability
The short and the long routes are not mutually exclusive or alternative ways of ensuring 
accountability. Both routes are equally essential, especially because both have certain 
weaknesses. Mapping out the possible shortcomings is the basis that helps to understand 
contemporary public management changes that aim at overcoming the dysfunctionality 
caused by the weaknesses of accountability relationships.
As far as the short route of accountability is concerned, the perfect way to ensure the 
short route accountability is the market relationship determined by the opportunity of 
choice and the purchasing power of the consumer. The consumer buys services where 
his or her demand is satisﬁed and the service provider is strongly motivated to satisfy 
consumer needs. In addition, service providers on the market are working in an autono-
mous way and they can manage their human resources almost as they wish. However, 
for various reasons, most public services cannot be provided on the basis of market 
relationships. The most important reasons are the following:
 • Market relationships are open only to consumer demand, and they do not take 
into account the needs of all citizens without purchasing power.
 • They are not able to accomplish expectations based on collective goals.
 • If choice prevails in public services, it leads to inequalities, such as selectivity 
in education.
 • Market relationships work only if consumers have the necessary information; 
as we have seen, in discretionary services, this is not the case.
 • As a result, the unbalanced power relationship almost completely eradicates the 
power of the clients. 
 • Public services are funded by public resources; therefore, the most important 
decisions are per deﬁnition political decisions or based on political authoriza-
tion.
 • Due to public ﬁnancing, public service providers are much less motivated to 
satisfy the needs of the clients.
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Bearing in mind all these weaknesses, while insisting that the primary goal of edu-
cation as a public service is to respond to the needs of its clients, we should rely on the 
long route of accountability. Nevertheless, we should be aware that this accountability 
mechanism also supplies an endless list of possible failures. 
The most typical problems in the relationship between the citizens and the self-
governments (i.e., the failures of voice) are the following:
 • The poor response capacity of the self-government, for example, insuﬃcient 
resource allocation for the education of disadvantaged students;
 • Closed decision-making procedures, for example, the inadequate involvement 
of stakeholders;
 • Insuﬃcient available information on the operation of the self-government and 
weak transparency that leads to a lack of trust;
 • Weak self-organization of citizens;
 • Clientelism and corruption.
The typical and potential constraints of ensuring accountability in the relationship 
between the self-government and the service provider institutions (i.e., the failures of 
the compact) are the following:
 • The lack of clear mandate given to the service provider due to ambiguous 
expectations and goals, and a lack of service speciﬁcations and standards;
 • Overregulation that—in terms of its impact—is identical to the lack of eﬀective 
regulation;
  • In contrast to waste management or water supply, in education the targets of 
the service are not numerical, and the service provision is not logistical;
 • Lack or weakness of monitoring and control; in education, it means weak ﬁnan-
cial audit and legal control, weak external evaluation, and the lack of necessary 
professional capacities in local administration;
 • Having multiple principals that leads to a lack of coherence within the compact; 
local and national goals may overwrite each other or weaken each other’s impact 
due to ambiguous division of labor and contradictory expectations;
 • Locally provided public services may not respond to real-life needs due to the 
lack of synergy within the local public service portfolio;
 • Clientelism, corruption or service providers capturing local governance, such as 
a self-government council with members who are teachers of the local school.
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Several chapters in this book have already dealt with the management of schools. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, here are a few possible failures of the account-
ability relationship between the schools and their frontline professionals, the teachers:
 • Lack of clear objectives;
 • Lack of appropriate human resource management authority of directors;
 • Teachers—as in many cases doctors—are not accountable professionals;
 • Lack of incentives;
 • Lack of personal performance evaluation.
Although these lists of potential failures can be easily supplemented with new items, 
it must be already clear that both the long and short routes of ensuring accountability 
are full of potential dysfunctions. It would be not surprising if the Central or South 
Eastern European reader would ﬁnd almost all of these typical in his or her country. 
However, we should be aware that these potential failures, to a large extent, are ﬂowing 
from the very nature of traditional settings for local public service provisions, that is, 
they are not necessarily the speciﬁc features of certain countries. (Of course, there might 
be great diﬀerences in the extent to which the various failures prevail.) 
The Alternative Solutions: 
New Public Management and New Public Service
The answer to the failures of the long route of accountability—and, in general, to the 
failure of traditional patterns of bureaucratic public administration—is New Public 
Management that focuses on strengthening the direct client-service provider relation-
ship. As an answer to the failures of the short route, another school has emerged from 
the criticism of New Public Management: the New Public Service movement (OECD 
2005; Denhardt and Denhardt 2001). 
New Public Management (NPM)—that is, the almost prevailing approach to public 
management—is based on the assumption that strengthening “consumer” inﬂuence and 
expanding choice—that is, the stronger enforcement of individual interests—will solve 
the weaknesses of the long route of accountability. This school emerged from the crisis 
of the welfare state in the 1980s and incorporated various business mechanisms that 
were widely regarded as much more eﬀective than the operation of public institutions. 
Since New Public Management preferred ﬂat and autonomous organizations, it gave 
momentum to decentralization of public services. New Public Management brought 
various reforms both at the level of organizations by introducing instruments for greater 
eﬃciency, and at the macro-level by modifying the boundaries between public and 
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private sectors, by making tendering compulsory, by reducing public funding, and by 
deregulation.
New Public Service (NPS) was born in the early 1990s as a reaction to the increas-
ingly inﬂuential NPM school. In contrast to the focus of New Public Management on 
individual interest, the New Public Service movement emphasizes collective interests. 
Therefore, instead of greater eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, it is striving to achieve a greater 
responsiveness from national and local government agencies. It distinguishes business 
techniques from business values; it is open to the former and rejects the latter. As a 
result, its instruments aim to empower citizens to participate in the management of 
public aﬀairs by using the toolkit of the so-called “open government” model. Another 
set of instruments widely suggested by NPS promoters is quality evaluation (Denhardt 
and Denhardt 2001).
The typical instruments of New Public Management and New Public Service are 
summarized in Box 9.1. Both toolkits had a great impact on the work of contemporary 
governance and management systems.
Box 9.1
The Instruments of NPM and NPS
New Public Management
• Competition (privatization, 
contracting out)
• Stimulating market relations (free 
choice of primary health providers 
and schools)
• More demand-side ﬁnancing 
(vouchers)
• Managing by objectives
• Market incentives (performance 
contracting, performance 
budgeting, performance-related 
pay)
• Customer services
• Strategic planning
• Performance measurement
• Deregulations, standards
• Reducing and modernizing public 
employment
New Public Service
• Building coalitions of public, private, 
and non-proﬁt organizations to serve 
mutually agreed goals
• Making national governments 
and local self-governments more 
responsive
• Enabling citizens to participate in 
decision-making
• Ensuring access to information for 
citizens
• Easily accessible government services 
(user-friendly services)
• Quality evaluation of public services 
(avoiding the negative side-effects of 
performance measurement based on 
roughly-deﬁned proxies)
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Quite obviously, the alignment and the value basis of the two movements are rather 
diﬀerent. However, the instruments they oﬀer in order to improve the long and short 
accountability routes—at a very general level—are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
In addition to that, they intervene at diﬀerent points of the accountability circle. We 
saw earlier that in the case of high-intensity discretionary public services (such as pri-
mary and secondary education), we cannot aﬀord to rely only on the short or on the 
long route of ensuring accountability. Thus, regardless of our value judgments, we may 
consider drawing on both toolkits of instruments. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in 
the chapter on quality evaluation, there are a few concrete NPM and NPS instruments 
that are somewhat contradictory.
In relation to the South Eastern European context, three important warnings 
should be shared. First of all, from an educational point of view, the primary condition 
of experimenting with NPM or NPS types of reforms is to enable schools to respond 
to many of the “short route” or “long route” expectations. Therefore, decentralization 
is the necessary precondition of local public service modernization of any kind. The second 
contextual remark refers to the institutional and structural conditions for implementing 
any new types of instruments. The situation is very similar to that of former communist 
countries in Central Europe at the beginning of the 1990s, when a group of Western 
European experts made an inquiry about the possibilities of introducing some New 
Public Management reforms. Their ﬁnal recommendation was not to even try until 
certain structural changes, such as strengthening ﬁnancial accountability systems, over-
coming fragmentation by better coordination, and improving policymaking capacities, 
were not achieved (Verheijen 1996). For example, if a high level of local clientelism 
and corruption are present locally, contracting out certain services is “life threatening.” 
The third important feature that largely determines the contextual relevance of 
everything that was said about local accountability relationships is the large amount of 
municipalities in South Eastern European countries without eﬀective community-level 
representation. For example, in terms of their average population size, municipalities are 
sixteen times larger in Serbia and ten times larger in Bulgaria than that of the Hungarian 
local self-governments. Although it does not make ensuring long route accountability 
impossible in itself, there is a much larger emphasis in the region on the power of the 
clients of locally provided public services. In addition to these, in the former Yugoslav 
countries—with the exception of Croatia—there is no elected middle-tier government 
(counties), further weakening the indirect chain of accountability.
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9.2 National Governance and Local Accountability 
 Relationships
Central and Local Responsibilities
By deploying the majority of management tasks to local actors (Chapter 4), decentraliza-
tion changes the role of central governance agencies: the new primary role of ministries 
of education—together with other ministries with various education-related responsi-
bilities—is strategic steering and policymaking. It was also suggested that this new role 
be performed mostly by indirect means for which certain systemic conditions are to be 
developed. In the previous sections we described the framework of local management 
of educational services as the triangle of diﬀerent accountability relationships among 
autonomous actors. The next question is: how much does decentralization change the re-
sponsibility of central governments? In more concrete terms: how do central government 
agencies work through local actors in order to reach out to service delivery institutions 
without constraining autonomy and without reclaiming direct management authority?
Central governments are rarely inclined to take a backseat in an area of governance 
under their supervision. (This is the why decentralization should have a constitutional 
character.) Even the lower-level actors in the management of education often share 
the assumption that local accountability relationships can be substituted by direct, 
government-ensured accountability systems. However, since this was the everyday 
experience of teachers in Central Europe under communist regimes, direct central 
government operated systems are capable of providing only the illusion of account-
ability. In decentralized systems based on local accountability relationships, central 
governments are directly responsible for ensuring accountability only to the extent to 
which they determine the expectations towards educational service providers, that is, 
to which they determine the content of the “compact.” As a result, central governments 
should share responsibility for determining the compact for schools equally with the 
task of ensuring accountability. Central governments are no longer the only trustees of 
the common good in decentralized systems.
It is easier said, but much harder to translate this into the actual division of labor 
between ministries of education and school owners. To demonstrate this with a simpli-
ﬁcation: if school-based curricula (that are part of the compact for schools) are approved 
by a ministry or a deconcentrated agency of the ministry, central government is fully 
responsible for ensuring professional accountability. However, if school curricula are 
approved by local owners, they become responsible for professional accountability. In 
this case, even if external evaluation is still done by government-operated inspectorates, 
they are working “on behalf ” of the owners, and for the owners. This has major implications 
for reporting and for any intervention in case of poor performance, etc. If the owners 
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approve school curricula that in 90 percent of the cases are determined by centrally 
issued national curricula, the compact is still largely determined by the government, 
with all its implications for accountability systems. The same ambiguity applies to all 
other components of the compact, such as ﬁnancing or service provision standards. 
The point here is the fact that sharing responsibility between governments and lo-
cal self-governments is not a simple matter of authority distribution. In decentralized 
systems, the increasing responsibility of local self-governments does not reduce the responsibility 
of the central government that follows from public ﬁnancing. However, if public money 
is deployed to local self-governments for education, it is the local-self government that 
should be held accountable for the service that it provides through its schools. (In ad-
dition, the overall systems designed to hold local self-governments accountable are not 
operated by ministries of education in most cases.)
Major Management Functions with a Systemic Character
Decentralization deploys all management functions either to the schools or to self-
governments, or to agents operating on behalf of the self-governments. The primary cycle 
of management is that within the schools; this is the management of all processes that 
transform all inputs into educational outcomes. Therefore—as discussed earlier—school 
management performs the primary functions. The scope of management functions 
performed by local and regional self-governments in connection with managing local 
school network is narrower; it performs only a limited number of functions. However, the 
scope of these functions varies from country to country. For example, there are countries 
(or self-governments within the countries) that take advantage of economies of scale 
by managing the school facilities directly. In other countries, or other self-governments 
within the same country, the schools do it themselves.
Governance at the national level creates and operates the systemic frame for per-
forming management functions at the lower levels. Directing, that is, one of the ﬁve 
classic management functions, is a speciﬁc organization-connected activity. Directing the 
administration of a local self-government, a county pedagogical institute, or a regional 
inspectorate—apart from sometimes centrally set qualiﬁcation requirements and selec-
tion procedures—has very little systemic relevance. However, all the other four classic 
management functions compose major subsystems that are subject to major changes 
in the course of decentralization. 
The last function, controlling, has two major subsets that are typically separated in 
decentralized systems: ﬁnancial audit and legal control on the one hand, and external 
quality evaluation on the other. While not denying the importance of ﬁnancial audit 
and legal control, since the related institutional and procedural settings embedded into 
the overall public administration system, their detailed discussion would take us away 
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from the theme of this reading; in contrast, professional evaluation deserves a separate 
chapter (see Chapter 12). There are two other management functions with a strong 
systemic character that will be brieﬂy discussed in this chapter: planning and “staﬃng,” 
that is, human resource management in education. Although at an organizational level, 
ﬁnancial management is considered to be part of overall management, at the systemic 
level, it is a distinct functional governance instrument that also will be introduced in a 
separate chapter (see Chapter 10).
Figure 9.3
Governing Connected Management Cycles
National Governance and Local Contexts
The underlying logic of responsibility sharing with the primacy of local management 
cycles has widespread implications. In most cases, governors of education at the national 
level are reaching out to service providers by inﬂuencing or changing the behavior of 
other actors in local accountability relationships, such as local self-governments or par-
ents, who may have a direct impact on how schools are operating. Likewise, there always 
will be instruments at the disposal of central government agencies by which they can 
directly attempt to inﬂuence the behavior of service providers, such as school directors 
or teachers. However, as local accountability relationships are evolving in the course of 
decentralization, the behavior of all local actors will be increasingly determined by the 
dynamics of these local relationships.
With this, we arrive at the most diﬃcult aspect of governance in a decentralized sys-
tem. Central governments are not simply working through local actors; they are working 
Governance of education
Central government agencies
Manging local school network
Local and regional self-government
School management cycle
Inputs Processes Outputs
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through local “force ﬁelds” that determine the latitude within which individual actors 
can consider their goals. In other words, as a result of decentralization, the behavior 
of local actors becomes “locally referenced.” A frequent and frustrating experience for 
the staﬀ of ministries of education in decentralized Central and Eastern Europe is the 
fact that local contexts regularly overwrite central initiatives. This is especially obvious 
in Hungary, where actors at all levels have been living together uncomfortably in a 
decentralized system for two decades, and where the results of the growing number of 
policy evaluations are reporting a large number of implementation failures. But even in 
centralized systems the experts of central government agencies are often well aware that 
measures going against the grain of widely-shared views, sentiments, and interests (for 
example, anti-discrimination measures) are easily sunk by local “implementation.” There 
are countries (e.g., most of Scandinavia) where the willingness of local actors to behave 
in accordance with central government expectations is high, and there are others where 
this is extremely low. Although this matter is connected to the problem of willingness to 
comply with the law, it is much broader and much harder to grasp. However, an analysis 
of the cultural and attitudinal context of governance and management is far beyond 
the scope of this book. Therefore, we should acknowledge the fact that the appropriate 
instruments for central governance cannot be designed without understanding how the 
dynamics of local relationships and interactions interfere in the “chain of command” 
of governance of education in a decentralized system. This is why opening the “black 
box” of extremely diverse local contexts through empirical research, as well as through 
policy and program evaluation, is essential.
If it is the locally constructed context that determines the latitude for the behavior 
of individual actors, central governance should adjust its instruments to the “compliance 
spirit” of local actors. Therefore, in cases and in countries when and where central initiatives 
may meet resistance or low willingness to comply, or they clash with deep, vested interests, 
central governance should use the dominant and intelligent instruments (Radó 2008).
Dominant governance instruments are those that have the potential to overwrite or 
change certain components of the local context within which actors are interpreting central 
initiatives from their own perspective. These are the instruments that, in terms of their 
impact, are strong enough to overrule the reasons for low “compliance spirit.” These 
instruments are often called “high stakes” instruments, such as combined school leav-
ing and higher education entrance examinations that—because of the high stakes for 
students—impose a huge impact on teaching in general secondary education. However, 
even in countries with a low “compliance spirit”—in rare cases—low stakes and soft 
instruments can also be dominant; for example, persuading a critical mass of educa-
tionalists about something may increase their willingness to comply. 
Intelligent governance instruments are those that are open and ﬂexible enough to easily 
adjust to the local context and that are able to learn. These instruments serve their purpose 
by conforming and adjusting to the actual context, without attempting to overrule or 
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overwrite them. The best example for potentially intelligent governance instruments is 
the work of inspectors performing the external evaluation of schools. There are two fea-
tures of inspection that may make it intelligent. The ﬁrst is the underlying standards for 
inspection and the methodology that inspectors use that are open enough to incorporate 
contextual factors. It implies a high level of discretion and a high level of legitimacy. 
The other condition is the perpetual organizational accumulation of “whatever works” 
type of knowledge, that is, learning about what works in various contexts. 
Although the lack of empirical research and policy evaluation does not allow us to 
judge the compliance of informal local networks in South Eastern Europe, a large amount 
of anecdotal information and personal observations suggest that the underlying concern 
for building dominant and intelligent instruments in these countries is no less valid in 
Slovakia or Hungary. For example, when a group of Bulgarian experts of various ﬁelds 
developed their mid-term priorities for education sector decentralization measures in 
2008, they all agreed to focus on expanding the scope of school autonomy, because of 
the serious weaknesses in the long route of accountability relationships.
9.3 Opening Local Contexts: 
 Consultation, Development, and Planning 
The functional governance instruments that will be discussed in the following chapters 
of Part Three can be made dominant and intelligent to the necessary extent. However, 
beyond ﬁnancing, curriculum, and quality evaluation, there are three other mechanisms 
that are the necessary conditions of eﬀective governance at the national level: (i) the ag-
gregation of local interests and channeling them into central decision-making through 
formal and informal consultation systems, (ii) targeting the schools and their owners with 
supplementary central targeted development programs, and (iii) building a multilevel plan-
ning system based on a combination of top-down and bottom-up planning. These are 
the instruments that have the potential to create a more organic relationship between 
governance at the national level and the extremely diverse local contexts, within which 
management functions are performed. 
Consultation System at the National Level
Institutionalized stakeholder involvement was mentioned already in Chapter 4 in relation 
to the systemic conditions of eﬀective fulﬁllment of the redeﬁned role of ministries of 
education. The only aspect of such a consultation system that was discussed was their 
potential to make ministries of education the focal points of governance and policymak-
ing. Apart from this “side-eﬀect” of operating such mechanisms, their real purpose is 
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aggregating and channeling views, knowledge, and information into the decision-making 
process. It is important to emphasize here that the necessity of operating such systems 
does not simply ﬂow from democratic values. Having consultation mechanisms in place 
is a fundamental matter of eﬃciency. Making central governance more responsive, more 
open to diverse views, more capable of harmonizing with sometimes contradictory in-
terests, and more ﬂexible in relation to the diversity of various local contexts are the sine 
qua non conditions of eﬀective decision-making. Of course, many decisions are made 
“over a cup of coﬀee” in an informal setting. However, even informal deals should be 
formalized through formal consultation procedures in order to ensure their legitimacy.
 The four major types of mandatory institutionalized consultation at the national 
level are: (i) policy councils consisting of the representatives of major organized stake-
holder groups and ministries, (ii) educational (pedagogical) advisory councils consisting 
of individual experts, (iii) tripartite consultation councils consisting of teacher unions, 
employers, and the government representatives, and (iv) separate consultation councils 
for vocational education and training. These mechanisms serve diﬀerent purposes and 
their functions are supplementary.
• Policy consultation mechanism. This consultative form is designed to create an open 
and institutionalized space for policy bargaining among the most important interest 
groups. In most cases, the scope of the consultative mechanism is not limited to 
only speciﬁc types of matters. The government’s obligation in relation to the mat-
ters to be put on the policy consultation agenda in advance of a decision is most 
typically determined in terms of administrative steps: putting forth proposals to the 
government or initiating any amendments to the regulations. The typical groups 
that participate in policy consultation mechanisms are umbrella organizations 
and cooperative associations of school-maintaining self-governments, nonpublic 
school owners, youth organizations, professional organizations, teacher associations, 
minorities, academic institutions, parent associations, business chambers, and the 
government (i.e., ministries supervising education-relevant areas). Although non-
governmental organizations, as such, can hardly be regarded as distinct “stakeholder 
groups,” in South Eastern Europe they have a special reputation; therefore, they are 
invited to participate in such mechanisms. 
• Professional advisory councils. Since ministries of education and governments issue 
several instruments in the form of regulations that need professional legitimization, 
professional advisory pedagogical councils have been established with strong man-
dates. Curricula, performance standards, textbook accreditation criteria, assessment 
frameworks, output regulation of initial teacher training, and policies addressing the 
content of education typically undergo discussion in these councils. The members 
of the advisory councils are invited by the education minister, delegated by profes-
sional organizations, or the two methods are combined.
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• Tripartite consultation mechanism. Since teachers are public employees, the annual 
bargaining process for salaries or on any other employment-related issues takes 
place within the sectoral tripartite consultation mechanism. The participants in 
such mechanisms are the representatives of employers, that is, the self-governments 
maintaining the schools, the teachers’ trade unions, and the government representa-
tives in decentralized systems.
• Councils for vocational training. Vocational education and training ensuring the 
labor market relevance of education is essential. Therefore, in most cases, separate 
consultative bodies are established in order to involve employers (i.e., chambers of 
commerce and employer associations) in decision-making regarding vocational train-
ing. These councils are typically participating in determining the training proﬁles 
and curricular documents, examination and qualiﬁcation requirements, etc.
The feature that makes institutionalized consultation mechanisms diﬀerent from 
any other form of involvement (informal advisory or expert groups of ministers, task 
forces, etc.) is their mandatory character; therefore, these councils are established by 
law and have a legal status. 
There are various settings that are based on the misperception of the role of such 
consultative bodies. For example, consultative councils are sometimes given strong deci-
sion-making authority, and they are sometimes entitled to take over the responsibilities 
of ministries or the government. In other cases the tripartite mechanism (Bulgaria), or 
professional advisory councils (Serbia), are used as the frameworks for policy consultation 
that—apart from making teachers’ unions or the academic elite too inﬂuential—
obviously weaken the positions of other stakeholder groups.
Planning in Education
We referred to the new role of central governance in decentralized systems as “strategic 
steering.” It is not that diﬀerent from strategic management at the level of individual 
organizations: it means operating the cycles of strategic planning, operational planning 
and programming, implementation, and feedback. Therefore, strategic planning is not 
an exercise for its own sake; it is one instrument of the overall process of governance.
Disconnecting strategic planning from its owner, that is, from an organization that 
is able to make it operational, does not make any sense. But in centralized systems, it 
is not so obvious. Since central governance agencies are directly managing educational 
service providers (or at least think that they are managing the work of the providers), 
they are planning on their behalf, too. However, since ministries are not able to program 
all activities of all schools in detail, central planning in a centralized system occurs in 
a vacuum. This is why planning at the national level in all South Eastern European 
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countries has the tendency to create a virtual paper trail of cross-referenced documents. 
(For example, the strategic basis of the Action Plan for improving the education of Roma 
children in Serbia is a distillation of the related goals set by nine diﬀerent government-
approved strategies.) These strategic documents set broadly deﬁned goals, very often for 
long periods of time that nobody can grasp (such as the “National plan for school and 
preschool education development 2006–2015” in Bulgaria), because “implementability” 
is not necessarily the concern of planners. Another feature of planning in the region is 
that strategies almost always mix up goals with instruments. This confusion is not nec-
essarily caused (only) by the weakness of planning capacities, as many observers often 
interpret it; simply, in a centralized system in which instruments are not controlled by 
others, this distinction is often out of sight. 
A recurring complaint in the region is that the strategies are not implemented. 
Indeed, they go unimplemented because they are not designed for implementation. 
Centralized systems do not allow for implementation, because those who are running 
the business are not planning, and those who are planning do not control the means of 
implementation. (This is a situation somewhere in between the detailed central plan-
ning of the communist “planned economies” and the decentralized systems in which all 
organizations are planning for themselves.) Actual planning in the region is an activity 
performed in a vacuum not only because planning is disconnected from the means of 
implementation, but planning is also an isolated activity not based on feedback from 
earlier implementation attempts. Again, this is not overly surprising given that only 
implementation generates demand for information on implementation.
All autonomous organizations plan in a decentralized system. However, even if 
decentralization makes visible the organization-bound character of planning, it takes 
time until the pattern of central planning adjusts to the dramatically changed systemic 
environment. In the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe, the growing complexity 
of education systems became very obvious. However, for a period of time this made 
central development plans simply lengthier, but did not necessarily change the pattern 
of planning. (It was a period during which hundreds of white papers were written in 
the region.) For example, the pre-higher education development strategies of 1995 and 
1998 in Hungary were extremely long documents deploying tasks to all actors in the 
education system. The ﬁrst strategy of the Ministry of Education, which spoke only 
about what it intended to do, was only just issued in 2003.
Apart from planning by central government actors on their own behalf, what is 
important to ensure in the governance of education are two things: ensuring that clearly 
deﬁned planning mandates are deployed to all organizations of the systems and that 
planning activities are well-connected. This means a multilevel system of planning that 
is based on the combination of top-down and bottom-up planning procedures. Plan-
ning in education serves two distinct purposes: (i) medium- or long-term planning for 
development and (ii) annual or medium-term operational planning (i.e., planning how the 
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ordinary tasks of an organization are performed). Of course, the two types are intercon-
nected; in most cases operational planning also serves the design of the implementation of 
developmental planning, if implementation is partly or fully embedded into the normal 
operation of the organization and not done through separate projects. (A sample list of 
possible planning tasks performed at diﬀerent levels is oﬀered in Box 9.2.)
Box 9.2
Multilevel Planning System in Education
Level Operational planning Planning for development
National • Annual budgetary planning
• Annual planning of the school 
year (examinations, evaluation, 
centrally administered 
assessments, etc.)
• Thematic government strategies 
(LLL, social inclusion, etc.)
• Sectoral development strategies
• Subsectoral development strategies 
(e.g., vocational education 
development strategy)
• Subsectoral thematic strategies 
(e.g., special needs inclusion strategy)
• Strategies of large-scale development 
programs
Regional • Territorial development (NUTS 2)
• School network planning (NUTS 2 or 3)
Local • Annual operational planning
• Mid-term operational planning 
(quality management planning)
• Mid-term thematic planning 
(e.g., equal opportunity plans)
School • Annual operational planning
• Mid-term operational quality 
mangement program
• Pedagogical program or school 
curriculum
• School development plan (if not 
included in quality management 
program)
The purpose of strategic planning in education is not diﬀerent from planning in 
business organizations or in NGOs: choosing between alternative directions of develop-
ment and change, focusing the eﬀorts by setting priorities, deﬁning the organization, 
and bringing consistency to diverse courses of action. Planning is a disciplined eﬀort 
that shapes and guides the organization. 
PA R T  T H R E E :  T H E  F I V E  S T A N D A R D S  O F  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  I N  E D U C A T I O N
189
However, planning in public sectors has certain speciﬁc advantages and limits. The 
most important advantages of planning in public services are the following:
 • It reduces the conﬂicts of the various players. Of course, this potential of plan-
ning is prevailing only if planning is a participatory process.
 • In public services the number of potential goals to be pursued is substantial. 
Therefore, planning that helps to select among goals is essential.
 • The results of planning provide a good basis for control and evaluation. For 
example, a potential area for external evaluation is the implementation of the 
goals of the development plans of the schools.
 • Since strategies are also communication tools, in a decentralized system in 
which persuading lower-level actors is one of the most important governance 
instruments, planning is a much needed exercise.
The major limitations of strategic planning in public services by comparison to 
planning in business organizations are the following:
 • There are too many actors, and their authority is very often ambiguous.
 • The processes in the public sphere are not transparent enough.
 • Certain decisions in public services being per deﬁnition political, and due to 
the large number of actors, there are too many compromises that dilute the 
products of strategic planning.
 • By comparison to the complexity of the system, there is always a very limited 
time available for planning, which rarely allows for achieving the goals.
 • The timeframes for planning are very often artiﬁcial; they adjust to administra-
tive or political timeframes.
The quality of planning largely depends on the maturity of the basic “infrastruc-
ture” of planning: organizational settings, capacities, and information systems. There 
are countries in the South Eastern Europe where strategic planning at the national level 
is institutionalized. (For example, in Serbia, in theory, planning is the basic tasks of 
one of the background institutions of the Ministry of Education.) In other countries 
planning is basically managed by the staﬀ of the ministry with sporadic involvement of 
external experts, as in Bulgaria. Institutionalization is a very important condition of the 
professionalization of planning. However, due to the above characteristics of strategic 
planning in the region (i.e., planning in a vacuum), institutionalization improves the 
quality and eﬀectiveness of planning only to a limited extent.
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Box 9.3
Recommended Aspects for Hungarian
Local Self-governments on the Future of Small Schools
• Population trends: migration, social, educational, and age composition of the 
population, current demographics, and projections.
• Spatial characteristics of the settlement network of the region, the mass trans-
portation infrastructure.
• The expected number of school-age population in the upcoming six years.
• Parents’ satisfaction with the work of the school and with the performance of 
the self-government maintaining the school.
• Parents’ expectations of educational services.
• Village inhabitants’ expectations of the school.
• The opinion of parents who have enrolled their children in a school in another 
settlement about the quality of education provided locally and about the reasons 
for their decision.
• Employment in the village and the surrounding microregion and the reconnected 
opportunities and risks, development plans, and development opportunities.
• The effectiveness of the work of the school, the educational goals of the school 
and their fulﬁllment, the results of external evaluation.
• The supply of qualiﬁed teachers, expected opportunities and risks in relation to 
teacher supply, extra allowances provided to teachers.
• The quality of the equipment in the school on the basis of related standards, 
the condition of the school building, expected mid-term capital expenditure.
• The community services provided by the schools or expected to be provided in 
the future.
• The impact of various alternatives to local educational services on quality, effec-
tiveness, costs, and the burden on parents and children, the risks of alternatives. 
When considering alternative service providers, their external evaluation results 
and information on their effectiveness should also be considered.
• The projection of all incomes and expenditures of the self-government.
—OPEK 2006
At lower levels of management planning, the related mandates tend to be poorly 
set and deﬁned in all of the region’s countries. Although there were various capacity 
building types of investments funded by international donor organizations with strong 
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components aiming at developing the planning competencies of the staﬀ of regional 
and local administrations, training somebody who is not skilled is deﬁnitely an invest-
ment with poor results. The planning mandates deployed to local self-governments are 
sometimes quite meaningless. For example, in Croatia, a mandatory three-year budgetary 
planning task is deployed to all relevant levels of ﬁnancing. However, the actual system 
of allocation allows only for planning based on the previous year among perpetually 
changing parameters that make medium-term planning needless.
Many experts claim that the lack of information (i.e., the extremely poor informa-
tion production capacity of education systems) has an overly detrimental impact on the 
quality of planning, and they are correct. However, the relationship between planning 
and information systems is, rather, the opposite. The primary users of information in 
the governance and management of education are those who are planning. As a result, 
information systems should be designed and operated in a way that well serves planning 
at any level for any purpose. For example, an indicator system that provides the skeleton 
of an education management information system (EMIS) cannot be properly designed 
without mapping out the information needs of the planning duties of management actors 
at each level. (This is probably why the eﬀorts of World Bank funded programs aimed at 
developing education information systems in various countries of the region are widely 
considered to be investments with extremely limited success.) As will be discussed later 
in relation to the information feedback mechanism of quality evaluation systems, how 
information is collected should depend on the actual use of the information.
Targeted Development Programs
Central development programs reach out to schools directly and have the potential 
to generate change and interest in that change along central priorities. Therefore, in 
decentralized systems, where the direct impact on the operation of central government 
agencies is limited, development becomes one of the most important instruments. 
Due to the growing functional diﬀerentiation and scale of the “development indus-
try,” the meaning of development becomes increasingly ambiguous. It is important to 
bear in mind that it includes three diﬀerent components: 
 • School development. The heart and the focus of development systems is the 
institutionalized development done by the staﬀ of schools within schools. 
School-based development projects as such have their beginning and their end; 
in most cases, they start when the schools gain access to the resources deployed 
to them after the selection of their project proposals and end when the time 
limit for the use of the allocated funds expires, and the schools should report 
about their project. From the point of view of the schools, these timeframes 
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are too often artiﬁcial, have nothing to do with the timeframe of their internal 
development processes, and sometimes they do not even correspond with the 
beginning and end of the school year. In terms of development goals, they are 
driven by the agenda of the grant-giving program; therefore, it is diﬃcult to 
harmonize them with the developmental goals of the schools. Nevertheless, no 
school can be developed from the outside; eﬀective development requires the 
operation of the “engine” of self-evaluation-based school development.
 • Supporting school development. Schools require a great deal of external technical 
assistance to design and implement their development programs. As a highly 
knowledge-intensive activity, development’s external support requires specialists 
who have the knowledge and experience to work with schools. As a normal activ-
ity of schools even when extra resources are unavailable, school development, in 
theory, must be supported by an institutionalized professional service system. 
However, in many cases large-scale programs develop their own (temporary) 
networks of experts that cause great damage to the ordinary support system. 
(These problems will be further discussed in Chapter 13.)
 • Development of development. When the great majority of schools are doing some 
sort of development and when they are supported by an extended network of 
institutions and specialists, development addressing the needs of the develop-
ers themselves becomes a distinct function. The development of the necessary 
know-how by piloting experimental programs and by developing instruments 
for development (modular training programs, training of trainers and consul-
tants, guidelines and technical toolkits, program evaluation, the adaptation of 
imported know-how, and active knowledge management) is essential and the 
condition of the professionalization of developers.
Figure 9.4
The “Development Industry” in Education
Supporting 
school development 
(training, consulting, 
instruments, etc.) 
School development
Development 
of development 
(knowledge basis, methods, 
pilot models, evaluation, etc.) 
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The evolution of the main patterns of central development increasingly connects 
the development industry to all levels and both strands of planning. The three main 
patterns of development—representing three levels of intensity of the support provided 
to schools—in decentralized systems are the following:
 • Grant-giving schemes. For the sake of easy technical management, most programs 
are simple grant-giving schemes in which the major objectives and eligibility 
criteria are determined, and schools apply for grants with their project proposals. 
The grantees are selected on the basis of formal criteria and on the quality of their 
project proposals. The problems with pure grant-giving systems are manifold; for 
example, the quality and eﬀectiveness of the development completely depends 
on the actual absorption capacity of schools, and the local institutional context 
easily overwrites the original intentions. In addition to that, these projects are 
fully driven by the agenda of the central program; it creates a situation in which 
schools are proposing projects for which money is available, regardless of the 
institutional relevance of these objectives. Apart from planning at the level of 
schools, this pattern of development does not involve serious planning. The 
plans of the program are typically referenced to various central government 
strategies, but in most cases this is a mere formality. A special additional service 
often provided before launching grant-giving programs in order to increase the 
absorption capacity of potential grantees is the so-called project generation facil-
ity. This service oﬀers technical assistance to nurturing project ideas and to the 
design of the project plans.
 • Proactive central programs. Due to the weaknesses of pure grant-giving programs, 
several central government initiatives should be designed to be proactive. It 
either means a central staﬀ providing active professional support (e.g., train-
ing, consulting, instruments, etc.), or the program connects the grantees with 
contracted professional service providers who facilitate the application of the 
know-how of the speciﬁc development. This development pattern incorporates 
the component that improves the absorption capacity of the school. Obviously, 
it increases the costs of development. This type of development requires much 
more central planning because of the management needs of the proactive 
components. At the level of schools, it does not make any real diﬀerence by 
comparison to participation in grant-giving programs.
 • Network-based central programs. The intensity of organizational learning gained 
by participation in large-scale development programs can be dramatically in-
creased if the schools are organized into development networks, within which 
horizontal learning is deliberately supported. In this case, certain active pro-
fessional support activities are provided to the network and not to individual 
schools. Not only those individually selected schools are connected through a 
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development network; the most eﬀective way is the involvement of local school 
networks owned by the same local self-governments. This pattern even allows 
for addressing local self-governments as the target of development: they put 
together the project plan partly on the basis of their own plans, partly on the 
basis of the plans of their schools invited into the program, and the program can 
be managed by the self-governments. The great advantage of this pattern is the 
strong connection between local and school level planning and development.
The large-scale development programs of the European Union’s structural funds 
are a special case, because—regardless of the chosen type of development—access to 
these funds requires serious planning at the national and regional levels. EU-funded 
developments have given a large impulse to the development of planning competencies 
in all of the new member states.
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C H A P T E R  1 0
Governing Inputs: Fiscal Decentralization 
and Human Resource Management
10.1 The Costs of Educational Services
The Composition of Sources and Costs
The source of the money that is spent on education comes from either private or public 
sources. Private expenditure includes tuition fees and all other payments paid by families, 
businesses, and nonproﬁt organizations. Primary and secondary education is mainly 
funded by public resources. Education during compulsory schooling is free of charge 
everywhere in Europe, but that simply indicates a lack of tuition fees. There are various 
costs that are paid by the households: textbooks, transportation, meals, clothes, etc. 
Also, parents often pay for extracurricular activities or any extra services that schools 
provide. The share of private contributions also depends on the freedom of schools to 
engage in fundraising. There are countries where it is not allowed, while in others it is a 
deﬁnite expectation. Nevertheless, private contributions play a marginal role in ﬁnanc-
ing primary and secondary education.
Apart from “formal” private contributions of the families, there are certain costs 
that are not channeled into the ﬁnancing of school services. For example, the interests 
of Romanian teachers to ﬁnd supplementary sources for income creates a situation in 
which teachers are creating a market for “shadow education” (Bischoﬀ and Herczynski 
2009). From the point of view of families, the costs of private tuition are educational 
costs, too. The distinction between private and public ﬁnancing is not connected to the 
existence of private schools, because in the great majority of European countries private 
schools are also publicly subsidized. For example, in the Netherlands and Poland, there 
is no diﬀerence in the level of public funding between private and public schools. In 
other countries, such as in France, Portugal, and Hungary, private schools receive funds 
for all costs on equal terms, but not for capital investments. And ﬁnally, in Ireland or 
Austria, only the salary of the teaching staﬀ is subsidized in private schools (European 
Commission 2005).
As far as the composition of the costs of education are concerned, they fall into two 
major categories: recurrent costs that are to be paid year by year and capital investment, 
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that is, costs related to building or renovation of the school facilities or the costs of 
valuable new equipment. Generally speaking, recurrent costs typically constitute about 
90 percent of all educational costs. However, the share of capital investment ﬂuctuates 
in all Central and South Eastern European countries because public ﬁnancing systems 
do not recognize the amortization of buildings and equipment. Therefore, instead of 
spreading out capital costs across many subsequent years, they emerge again and again 
when the amortization reaches a certain level. For example, the share of capital invest-
ment in Albania has been between 10–20 percent over a long period of time, while 
the same ﬁgure in Macedonia is around three percent. Also, in many countries capital 
investment is the buﬀer of educational ﬁnancing: in “good years” more, and in “hard 
years” less, is spent on capital.
Education is a “labor intensive” service that requires a much larger amount of human 
labor than capital. Therefore, the biggest part of recurrent costs is deployed to salaries 
and various beneﬁts. The share of the compensation of teachers in most countries is 
more than 70 percent, and all salaries and beneﬁts that also include non-teaching staﬀ 
typically exceed 80 percent. The rest is called “other educational inputs,” mainly school 
maintenance costs and teaching materials not paid by parents. (In South Eastern Euro-
pean the share of compensation of teachers is higher, while that of maintenance costs 
is typically lower than the international pattern.) In the business sector, labor-intensive 
industries have the advantage of ﬂexibility; they more easily adjust their capacities to 
the demand than those with a high share of required capital investments. However, this 
does not apply to education because of the huge number of state regulations: ﬁxed salary 
scales, service provision standards, the protection of teachers as public employees, etc.
Figure 10.1
The Typical Composition of Costs in Education
Capital costs
Recurrent costs
Other educational inputs
Salaries of teaching and 
non-teaching staff
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Economists concerned with education distinguish between direct and indirect costs 
of education. Direct costs refer to the amount of money that is spent on the services 
from public or private resources. However, there are private and public costs that ﬂow 
from the fact that students are learning instead of being active in the labor market. 
Thus, the private indirect costs are equal to the amount of money that was unearned; 
the public indirect costs are those tax incomes that are foregone while learning instead 
of working. Nevertheless, the relevance of this distinction is quite limited during the 
period of compulsory education.
The basic indicators of the composition of resources and costs are rather simple ones, 
but they are not easy to interpret. The only comparison that allows for the assessment 
of relatively high or low shares of diﬀerent resources and costs is international. There-
fore, the most widely-used threshold of high and low income shares or spending is the 
related average ﬁgure of the developed OECD or EU member countries. However, a 
comparison of absolute ﬁgures does not reﬂect the actual ﬁnancing ability of diﬀerent 
countries. Therefore, all major indicators calculated at purchasing power parity are worth 
comparing as a percent of per capita GDP. Another diﬃculty in the interpretation of 
ﬁnancing-related indicators is that they result from three distinct factors that are very 
hard to separate: political priorities, the characteristics of the education systems, such 
as those determining the required number of teachers, and speciﬁc temporary factors, 
such as reconstruction costs caused by the deterioration of school buildings during a 
war. These political priorities are often indicated by expenditure shares within public 
funding, but this indicator does not allow any ﬁltering of the eﬀect of the two other 
factors. In addition to this, the income generation and redistribution capacity of the 
diﬀerent countries may vary signiﬁcantly
The Factors Determining Unit Costs in Education
When we calculate the cost of services or production of any kind, the primary indicator 
results from breaking down the cost to the basic single unit of the service; in the case of 
education this is the cost of the education for one student. The “unit cost” of education is 
the per student recurrent costs. Unit costs are comparable across diﬀerent countries if they 
are calculated with purchasing parity prices. However, in order to adjust the comparison 
to the very diﬀerent ﬁnancing ability of the diﬀerent countries, it is indicated by their 
relation to per capita GDP.
The actual level of per student spending is determined by three major factors: (i) 
the annual average compensation of teachers (basic salary and beneﬁts), (ii) the teaching 
requirements of the education of one class, and (iii) the per student cost of “other inputs.”
 • The compensation of teachers. To recap, the largest part of all the costs of edu-
cation is the money paid for teachers’ salaries. Therefore, the most important 
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determinant of unit costs is the average annual compensation of teachers that 
includes their salary and the costs of all allowances that teachers receive. The 
same applies to the level of compensation in relation to what was said about 
the comparison of per capita funding: since the amount of salaries in absolute 
terms does not reﬂect the ﬁnancing capacity of the diﬀerent countries, the most 
widely-used indicator of the level of teachers’ compensation is the comparison 
between their annual salary and the per capita GDP. For the sake of a rough 
outline: as professionals with a high level of required qualiﬁcations, if teachers’ 
salaries generally are higher than the per capita GDP, then their compensation 
more or less reﬂects the ﬁnancing capacity of the given country. The salaries 
of teachers corrected by the annual teaching hours are a good indicator of the 
eﬃciency of ﬁnancing, but they do not inﬂuence the unit costs, because the 
compensation of teachers and the number of lessons they teach are not con-
nected at all. Of course, lengthier school years have an impact on expenditure 
on other educational inputs (i.e., on maintenance costs), but this is a minor 
increment.
 • The labor intensity of education. The other factor determining unit costs is the 
labor force requirement of the actual service provision. Obviously, the more 
teachers employed to deliver the service to students, the higher the costs of the 
service per student. However, the required number of teachers in education is 
not determined by the number of students, but by the number of classes. It is 
easy to see that the required number of teachers is not diﬀerent in a classroom 
with 15 students and in another with 35. Therefore, when calculating the per 
capita costs, we do not divide the money spent on the salary of teachers with the 
number of students, but with the student-teacher ratio. The size of the classes 
has an impact on unit costs only in an indirect way: if a low average class size 
leads to a larger number of classes, it increases the labor intensity of the service, 
that is, it increases per student costs. This is the reason why the extent to which 
school structures are fragmented is essential from a ﬁnancing point of view. 
The required number of teachers depends on various factors; some of them are 
centrally regulated, such as class size standards, teaching time, etc. The other 
decisive factor is curriculum; if the structure of subjects is fragmented (e.g., 
physics and chemistry are taught as separate subjects instead of science), the 
teaching requirements are higher. Also, if ﬁnancing recognizes extra services, such 
as bilingual programs, zero preparatory years in primary education, or language 
preparatory years in secondary education, the required number of teachers is 
higher, too. The third factor inﬂuencing the labor intensity of educational ser-
vices is the system of allocation. And as will be seen in the following section of 
this chapter, soft budget constraints increases expenditure.
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 • Costs other than the salary of teachers. Apart from the compensation of teach-
ers, recurrent costs include various other components, such as the salary of 
non-teaching staﬀ, maintenance costs (heating, electricity, cleaning, cafeteria, 
transportation, etc.), and teaching materials, if they are not paid by families. 
Although the amount of certain inputs in this category depend much more on 
the number of classes than the number of students, their contribution to the 
unit costs can be calculated by dividing them with the number of students.
Figure 10.2
The Calculation of the Unit Costs in Education
Obviously, any change to teachers’ salaries or the organization of schooling that 
determines the required number of teachers has a direct and signiﬁcant impact on 
overall spending.
Financing Proﬁles in South Eastern Europe
The key indicators that compose the overall ﬁnancing proﬁle of a country are those that 
describe the level of overall spending and those that orient us in relation to the most 
important factors that shape the unit costs of education services: teacher salaries and 
the labor intensity of the service.
As far as overall spending is concerned, all the South Eastern European countries 
are spending approximately one to two percent less than the GDP proportional level 
of spending of developed countries. In terms of the student-teacher ratio, that is, the 
basic measure of the number of teachers who should be employed to deliver education 
services, there are much larger diﬀerences by comparison to the average labor intensity of 
OECD countries (i.e., 16.3 in primary and 13.9 in secondary education, respectively). 
For example, in Albania (18.8 and 21.9) and Serbia (17.2 and 15.6), these ratios are 
higher than the average of the OECD countries, that is, the labor intensity is lower. 
In Bulgaria (16.8 and 12.1), the student-teacher ratio is closer to the OECD average. 
However, lower student-teacher ratios indicate a higher labor intensity of pre-higher 
education in Croatia (12.8 and 12.2) and Romania (13.7 and 12.2).
In a GDP-connected comparison, the average level of the compensation of teachers 
is lower in most of the countries of the region than the averages of the more developed 
European countries. However, there are two countries that spend on teacher salaries 
far below their potential: Albania and Romania. The only country in the region in 
Unit costs = 
Average compensation of teachers
Student–teacher ratio
+ Per student costs of other inputs
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which the GDP proportional salary of teachers is higher than the European average is 
Croatia; although in relative terms the level of compensation of teachers was declining 
during the last decade, in 2005 the teacher salaries divided by the per capita GDP was 
still 1.78. By comparison, this rate in 2004 was 0.83 in Albania and 0.71 in Romania. 
These are the countries where—according to various sources—the extremely low salary 
of teachers has a devastating impact on the quality of education.22
On the basis of these data, an indicative proﬁle of educational ﬁnancing systems 
can be created for those countries for which data are available.
Table 10.1
Educational Financing Proﬁles of Selected South Eastern European Countries
Albania • Significantly lower than average spending
• Lower labor intensity
• Significantly lower teacher salaries
Bulgaria • Lower than average spending
• Average labor intensity
• Lower teacher salaries
Croatia • Lower than average spending
• Higher labor intensity
• Higher teacher salaries
Romania • Lower than average spending
• Higher labor intensity
• Significantly lower teacher salaries
Serbia • Lower than average spending
• Lower labor intensity
• Lower teacher salaries
On the basis of these proﬁles, we may presume very diﬀerent situations in the coun-
tries of the region. Although all of these countries are spending below their potential on 
education (i.e., their ﬁnancing capacity), the underlying reasons are very diﬀerent. For 
example, in Albania, there are no serious eﬃciency problems; the extremely low level of 
overall funding is caused by the extremely low level of teachers’ salaries. In Bulgaria and 
Serbia, the overall picture is similar, with the very important diﬀerence of the extent: 
teacher salaries are relatively higher than in Albania; therefore, overall spending is higher, 
too. The diﬀerence between Bulgaria and Serbia is that eﬃciency is slightly better in 
Serbia than in most OECD countries. In Romania the price for teachers’ substantial 
need to provide extra educational services is the very low salaries of teachers. This means, 
that beyond a certain point, improving the student–teacher ratio will be the only way 
to increase the salaries of teachers.
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The ﬁnancing proﬁle of Croatia is a very special case: in spite of higher labor in-
tensity and higher teacher salaries by international comparison, the country spends 
less than it potentially could. One of the possible explanations to this contradictory 
proﬁle is the shortage of school capacities; a large proportion of students are taught in 
two shifts. This does not reduce the required number of teachers signiﬁcantly, but does 
reduce all other costs.
10.2 The Financial Allocation Systems in Education
Fiscal decentralization, that is, decentralization of the ﬁnancial allocation system has both 
a narrow and broader meaning. In the narrow sense, it means the delegation or devolution 
of authorities in relation to planning, budgetary decisions, and ﬁnancial administration to 
lower management levels. In this case, we subtract the ﬁnancial allocation mechanism 
from the overall system of public ﬁnancing. Thus, the broader meaning of ﬁscal decentral-
ization also involves intergovernmental ﬁscal relations and revenue sharing among diﬀerent 
actors with ﬁnancing responsibility that largely determines how resources are transferred 
within the educational line of public ﬁnancing.
General Characteristics of Centralized and Decentralized Allocation 
Systems
The best way to grasp the essence of ﬁscal decentralization is a “where from—where 
to” approach: a short description of the underlying logic and major consequences of 
centralized and decentralized ﬁnancial allocation systems.
The point of departure in relation to the ﬁnancial allocation system is the extent to 
which processes in education are standardized. If centrally-issued curricula (syllabi) and 
other regulations create a high level of uniformity oﬀering the same service for all, quite 
logically inputs are standardized, too. In highly-standardized systems the required number 
of teachers is predetermined and the teaching to non-teaching staﬀ ratio is standardized. 
As a result, the actual number of employed school staﬀ depends exclusively on the size 
of the schools. This is the situation that allows maintaining a centralized ﬁnancial alloca-
tion system. In centralized systems the typical pattern of ﬁnancial planning is based on 
adjustments to the previous year’s budget (“planning on a historical basis”) and capital 
investment, while maintenance costs behave as buﬀers.
The negative consequences of centralized ﬁnancial allocation are manifold and 
impose a huge impact on all characteristics of education systems. The most important 
ones are the following:
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 • In these systems, schools are funded, and not the services they provide. In other 
words: service speciﬁcations (tasks) and ﬁnancing are not at all connected. As 
a result, quality and eﬀectiveness of the service that schools provide cannot be 
drawn into any form of accountability relationship.
 • Since schools are ﬁnanced, all speciﬁc educational-need student groups 
(e.g., minorities, special needs children, etc.) are sent to segregated schools, 
with the excuse that this is the only way to recognize the diﬀerent costs of their 
education.
 • In highly-centralized allocation systems, the basic requirements of eﬃciency 
cannot be ensured to not lead to the waste of a large amount of resources: not 
only because ﬁnancing is almost completely disconnected from the output of 
service provisions, but also due to the “soft budget constraint” problem related 
to the relationship between the state and the enterprises in centrally planned 
economies that also apply to the ﬁnancing of schools. There are no consequences 
to overspending, and it is easy to get access to the resources needed to maintain 
wastage.
 • Another implication of centralized ﬁnancing is the lack of space for using ﬁ-
nancial incentives or disincentives, without which policies cannot be eﬀectively 
implemented. The resources allocated within the mainstream ﬁnancing mecha-
nism serve the operation of the schools only. If more money were allocated, 
more would be spent on operation. The only way to connect funding with 
speciﬁc purposes is grant-giving through tendering that cannot be operated as 
a channel to fund basic services on a systemic scale.
 • Due to standardized inputs, all the services that schools consume (in-service 
training, consulting, etc.) are fully supplied by the state; again, the suppliers are 
funded and not their services. It is not considered problematic because additional 
resources have not been channeled into the internal services of education, and 
the supply of these services is typically poor and rarely meets contemporary 
quality requirements. This is why in-service trainings provided by NGOs and 
by international donor agencies are not integrated into the mainstream capacity 
building system in most countries of the region.
Generally speaking, any attempts to ensure school autonomy—that is the condi-
tion of improving the quality of educational services—with the centralized ﬁnancial 
allocation system in place are very much illusory.
As far as decentralized ﬁnancial allocation systems are concerned, the point of departure 
is the same: the extent of standardization. If choice and curricular diversity are recognized 
and schools are allowed to manage their processes on their own within broadly deﬁned 
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frameworks, expenditure at the level of schools begins to diﬀer. Since centralized ﬁnanc-
ing systems cannot manage the diversity of speciﬁc costs, the allocation system could 
be transformed into a three-layer mechanism, with suﬃcient ﬁnancial autonomy for 
school owners and schools. Finally, ﬁscal decentralization creates two distinct ﬁnancial 
relationships: one between the central budget and the school-owning self-governments, 
and another between the self-governments and the schools.
The reason for the distinction between the two ﬁnancial relationships is their distinct 
underlying logic. Central ﬁnancing should be easily manageable in technical terms and 
should meet the requirements of transparency, stability, and eﬃciency. Therefore, the 
basic ﬁnancial allocation from state budget to school-owning self-governments usually 
is a block grant allocation that is calculated on the basis of per student grant that is 
multiplied by the number of students enrolled. This “per capita” ﬁnancing is matched 
with centrally-issued standards that determine the parameters of service delivery with 
ﬁnancial relevance (e.g., annual and weekly teaching hours, number of lessons, class 
size, salary scales, etc.). 
On the opposite end of the allocation system, it is not the number of students that 
determines the costs: it is basically the cost of required teaching that follows from the 
number of classes. As a result, the underlying logic of ﬁnancial planning in schools is 
very much diﬀerent. With some simpliﬁcations, in a decentralized system, the skeleton 
of the ﬁnancial planning process consists of the following logical steps:
 • The number of lessons is determined on the basis of school-based curriculum 
and the number of classes.
 • The number and composition of the required teaching staﬀ is calculated.
 • The annual salary costs are calculated on the basis of the number of annual 
teaching hours and the positions of the teachers on the salary scale.
 • The annual salary costs are supplemented by capital investment (new and 
amortization) and maintenance costs.
These two distinct planning logics are too disparate to force either the central ﬁ-
nancing mechanism or the schools to adjust to the other. Thus, an intermediate agent is 
required that, by playing the role of ﬁnancial “interface,” is able to connect the central 
and school-level planning. This is the role that self-governments play in a decentralized 
system. Self-governments, by approving the school curriculum (that harmonizes govern-
ment regulated obligatory tasks and additional local tasks), by setting the ﬁnancial frames 
of school-level planning, and ﬁnally by approving the budgets of the schools, are able 
to balance the two sides of the ﬁnancial equation: (i) their incomes from shared public 
revenues (VAT or PIT), per capita grants received on the basis of central planning, and 
their own revenues; and (ii) their overall expenditures, with educational expenditures 
within that are determined on the basis of school-based planning.
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Without having these interfaces in place, the direct allocation to schools on a per 
capita basis would punish the schools with lower than average class size, and would reward 
others with higher than average class size. This system—apart from being fundamentally 
unfair—disconnects ﬁnancing from the service that schools provide as much as the old-
fashioned centralized allocation systems with almost the same consequences. Of course, 
direct per capita allocation with certain adjustments (e.g., by using sophisticated and 
complicated formulas) can be made more open to a variety of sizes and programs, as was 
recently attempted in Bulgaria. However, at a certain level of curricular decentralization, 
no central system can adjust to the ever-greater diversity of local, speciﬁc costs anymore, 
and if it is attempted, it ends up damaging the transparency and easy manageability of 
the system. In spite of these considerations, in the course of ﬁscal decentralization, direct 
“formula-based” allocation is a constantly emerging idea represented by economists 
with a narrow eﬃciency focus. (Although it is not very fair, this eﬃciency approach 
is called “World Bank fundamentalism” by many educationalists in Central Europe.) 
Partly due to the narrow eﬃciency focus, and partly because of the simpliﬁcation of the 
connections between ﬁnancing and other functional governance instruments, there is 
a sort of “formula fetish” in the discourse on ﬁscal decentralization in the region that 
narrows the scope of the process to technical issues.
The main advantages of the three-layer decentralized ﬁnancial allocation systems 
are the following:
 • At the national level they are technically simple, easily planned and managed, 
and are not confused by program diversity or the diversity of any other aspects 
of the local contexts that have an acknowledged impact on the speciﬁc costs of 
educational services.
 • Since the “money follows the student,” the basic requirements of ﬁnancial eﬃ-
ciency are automatically ensured, because it creates a “hard budget constraint” 
for self-governments. Ensuring eﬃciency in decentralized systems in either of 
them becomes a question of regulating the parameters for service delivery, as 
well of how resources are allocated from self-governments to schools.
 • By recognizing the diﬀerences in speciﬁc costs between diﬀerent programs, it 
allows for choice and curricular diversity that is the basic condition of school-
based quality improvement. Also, it better allows for the mainstreaming (i.e., 
inclusion) of the education of any student groups with speciﬁc educational 
needs.
 • Decentralized systems allow for strategic steering with a larger focus on the 
objectives (i.e., curriculum targets and service standards) because they create 
the space for schools within which expectations of learning outcomes are not 
unreal.
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 • This system has a larger potential to channel additional resources to the local 
level than those systems in which actors are conditioned to fully rely on central 
budget resources.
 • A normative allocation system allows for the use of incentives (e.g., supplemen-
tary per capita funding for speciﬁc programs or services deﬁned as a percent of 
the basic per capita grant). This makes ﬁnancial allocation a powerful policy 
instrument that eﬀectively inﬂuences the behavior of local actors.
 • It also can be supplemented by earmarked, targeted support in order to generate 
demand for diﬀerent services in accordance with the developmental needs of 
the schools.
In most of the cases, building the above type of allocation system is the result of 
the reform of the overall public ﬁnancing system that involves revenue sharing between 
the central budget and local self-governments. (Note that the ongoing full-scale ﬁscal 
decentralization process in Bulgaria has been implemented only in the ﬁnancing of 
education, without being complemented by revenue sharing. Constraining the scope 
of ﬁscal decentralization to the distribution of central budget resources is rather excep-
tional.) However, the growing share of own revenues of the local self-governments in 
the overall ﬁnancing of education increases inequalities that are caused by the diﬀerent 
income generation capacity of self-governments. When claiming that equalization is 
extremely important, a possible detrimental side-eﬀect should also be taken into account: 
these schemes may soften the budget constraints of self-governments, as took place in 
Hungary when the supplementary resources made available for self-governments were 
“disadvantaged through no fault of their own.”
Fiscal Decentralization Measures in South Eastern Europe 
Fiscal decentralization in the South Eastern Europe has two ends to its spectrum: Al-
bania made very minor steps towards the decentralization of the ﬁnancial allocation 
system, while Bulgaria undertook rather radical ﬁscal decentralization in a relatively 
short period of time. While in Albania, all ﬁnancial decisions down to the level of 
ﬁnancial “micro-management” are made by regional and district-level deconcentrated 
agencies of the central level, Bulgaria almost completely decentralized its ﬁnancial al-
location mechanism (Shehi 2009, Danchev and Ivanov 2009). All the other countries 
in the region fall somewhere between these two cases; for example, Serbia resembles 
the highly-centralized Albanian pattern, Croatia and Romania made limited steps with 
the decentralization of maintenance expenditure, and Macedonia slowly moves towards 
complete ﬁscal decentralization (Batarelo et al. 2009, Bischoﬀ and Herczynski 2009, 
Herczynski et al. 2009).
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• In Bulgaria,23 the ﬁrst major steps over the course of decentralization were made 
on the basis of the overall ﬁnancial decentralization concept that was adopted in 
2002. The new system is based on the distinction between delegated responsibilities 
from the central government to municipalities and local responsibilities. Disre-
garding kindergartens and certain supplementary tasks, such as school cafeterias, 
educational provisions fell under the category of “delegated tasks,” that is, remained 
fully funded by the state. It means that channeling resources other than those of 
the state budget—that might be one of the possible underlying purposes of ﬁscal 
decentralization—was dropped, and providing primary and secondary education 
did not become the mandatory task of municipalities. As a result, ﬁnancial resources 
allocated to municipalities are “delegated budgets” and not state budget contributions 
to the funding of municipality tasks, as is the case with kindergartens. In addition, 
despite the decentralization measures, according to how ﬁnancial resources are al-
located, most of the costs of educational services remained completely funded by 
the state budget. As a result, the only thing that really matters remains the amount 
of money that the central government is ready to deploy. In other words: expendi-
ture decentralization is not matched by revenue decentralization. (Municipalities 
in Bulgaria became entitled tax authorities only in 2008.)
 In 2007, uniﬁed cost standards and a new per-capita-based ﬁnancial allocation system 
were introduced to those “ﬁrst-level spending units” that directly ﬁnance schools: 
the Ministry of Education and the municipalities. The uniﬁed per capita standard 
is diﬀerentiated according to the density of the population, and not according to 
the speciﬁc tasks (program). This further strengthens the feature of the Bulgarian 
education system of standardizing inputs and processes (“categorical equity”), instead 
of emphasizing choice and outcomes (“ﬁscal neutrality”). This underlying approach 
can be maintained until the curriculum is also oriented to standardizing inputs and 
processes. However, transitioning to a per-capita-based allocation system is the ﬁrst 
necessary step towards ensuring a minimum level of ﬁnancial eﬃciency, even in a 
(future) decentralized governance and management system.
 In 2008, a further ﬁscal decentralization step was made, and the formula-based 
“delegated budget” was extended to the ﬁnancial relationship between “ﬁrst-level 
spending units” and the schools. This secondary allocation mechanism is also per-
capita-based and 100-percent earmarked, although with a 20-percent threshold/
buﬀer for ﬂexible adjustments. The new system does not increase the ﬁnancial space 
for the maneuver of the municipalities because it does not allow them to redistrib-
ute funds among diﬀerent institutions on the basis of local priorities. Additional 
restrictions further narrow the space within which municipalities may consider 
adjustments to local needs. On the other hand, it does increase the authority of 
the school directors, especially in the ﬁelds of human resource management and in 
shaping the enrollment policy of the schools.
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• In Croatia,24 the existing system of ﬁnancing educational services has three separated 
strands that are not connected at all. The ﬁrst strand of allocation is the centralized 
ﬁnancing of the salary of teachers. These resources compose a huge part of the annual 
budget of the ministry. The actual salaries are determined by a collective agreement 
(kolektivni ugovor) between the government and the teachers’ trade unions. The 
administration of payments is also centralized.
 The second strand of allocation is the decentralized funding of the operational cost of 
schooling. Within this strand the resources are deployed to the owners of the schools 
from two sources: a predetermined share of personal income tax (PIT) earmarked 
for educational services and from a central equalization fund. The actual contribu-
tion of the equalization fund to the educational expenditure of self-governments is 
calculated on the basis of the gap between the total earmarked PIT share gathered 
in the self-governments and the annually-determined minimum ﬁnancial standards. 
Of course, resources allocated to the owners through these two channels are often 
supplemented from other incomes of the self-governments, as well as from the in-
come of the schools. Most self-governments claim that they are able to fund their 
schools at the level (or almost at the level) of minimum funding standards. The 
amount of supplementary contribution from the owners very much varies across 
the country. There is no central regulation on the use of school revenues. There are 
self-governments that leave all the revenues of the schools at their disposal, and in 
other cases, 50 percent remains at the school. Since the Croatian public ﬁnancing 
system does not recognize amortization and does not incorporate it into the annual 
cost of maintenance, small capital investments compose a separate budget line.
 The third strand of allocation is the rather fragmented system of capital investments. 
Several ministries and central funds allocate capital investment grants to schools 
or to the owners of schools. In most cases, the procurement procedures and the 
management of the construction projects is done by central government agencies. 
The criteria for awarding capital investment grants are not always clear.
 The lines among the three strands of ﬁnancial allocation are ambiguous. For ex-
ample, the entire teaching staﬀ is not paid in the central compensation system; 
there are teachers (e.g., the majority of daycare teachers in the city of Zagreb) who 
are paid by the local self-government. However, due to rigid regulations, very often 
these locally paid teachers are not entitled to do the same job as those who are in 
the central compensation scheme. In spite of the ﬁnancial standards, due to the 
combination of overregulation and the lack of appropriate regulation at the same 
time, the funding of schools is arranged among very soft budget constraints. For ex-
ample, since collective agreements and local trade union intervention may overwrite 
legally-set service speciﬁcations (such as the weekly minimum teaching hours of 
teachers), the number of teachers employed in schools greatly exceeds that number 
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that would ﬂow from standards. The central compensation system “automatically” 
covers the salary of teachers employed beyond the standard needs. Another reason 
for soft budget constraints is the lack of a clear partition between the budgets of 
the owners and that of the schools. Again, due to lack of ﬂexibility in the public 
accounting system and other central regulations, ensuring the minimum eﬃciency 
of ﬁnancing enforces a “ﬂexible and creative exchange” of budgetary lines between 
the self-governments and the schools.
• In Macedonia, the decentralization process initiated by the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 
contained certain ﬁscal decentralization elements, too. Fiscal decentralization started 
in 2004 and was designed as a two-phase process. In spite of all sorts of regulations 
that deploy full management and ﬁnancial responsibilities to municipalities, in the 
ﬁrst phase implemented in 2005, only maintenance costs were transferred to the 
municipalities. It created a speciﬁc fragmentation: about 90 percent of the budget 
of the schools was allocated by the Ministry of Education in the old way, while 
maintenance costs were centrally allocated by categorical grants to the municipali-
ties, that—in certain cases—are supplemented by the municipalities from their own 
revenues.
 Interestingly, the second phase with further ﬁscal decentralization measures was not 
introduced in all municipalities. From 2007, in a pilot period of phase-two decen-
tralization, a small number of municipalities moved to a new system in which all 
costs were allocated to the municipalities in block grants calculated on a per capita 
basis and diﬀerentiated according to the level of education and population density. 
(The latter is in fact an interesting equalization measure built into the basic line of 
allocation.) The implementation of the second phase started in 2008 when additional 
municipalities were allowed to join the new ﬁnancing scheme, while others remained 
under the “phase-one” allocation system. Still, there are two parallel allocation sys-
tems in use that cause many problems. Nevertheless, the overall direction of ﬁscal 
decentralization in Macedonia is somewhat similar to the three-layer decentralized 
allocation system, with revenue sharing between the national and local levels that 
was described in the previous section (Herczynski et al. 2009).
• In Romania, the ﬁscal decentralization process started earlier than in other countries 
of the region but did not go any further. In 1994, county and local self-governments 
took over the responsibility for maintenance expenditures in primary and second-
ary education that they cover by shared local tax revenues. (Self-governments have 
remarkable discretion in using these revenues.) However, all other costs (approxi-
mately 95 percent of the recurrent budgets of schools) are still funded by central 
budget sources. Allocation decisions and the management of allocation is the task of 
the County Inspectorates (Inspectorul Scolar Judetian) that allocate resources on the 
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basis of required teacher inputs. This system is an attempt to incorporate the factors 
that determine unit costs in schools to a centralized allocation system. In 2004, 
per capita cost standards were determined, but they have not been applied because 
they would generate a large increment in the expenditure. Therefore, schools are 
still funded on the basis of “historical budgeting.” There is an equalization scheme 
in place, but it is rather weak (Bischoﬀ and Herczynski 2009).
• In Serbia, a recent amendment to the Law on Education prescribes the transition into 
a normative ﬁnancing system that will be implemented from 2012. The preparation 
of the outline of the new allocation system just began and it will be piloted in a few 
municipalities before full-scale implementation. Therefore, the future construct of 
educational ﬁnancing is not clear yet. What is interesting here is the fact that the 
current situation in Serbia oﬀers various examples of transitional diﬃculties. For 
instance, a policy of radical inclusion of special needs children is under way that 
clashes with the problem of how to allocate the necessary supplementary resources 
to mainstream schools that educate children with organic disabilities or learning 
diﬃculties in an integrated way in a system that allows only for individual allow-
ances on the basis of the applications of parents.
As this short overview demonstrates, it is too early to judge whether the expecta-
tions about ﬁscal decentralization have been proved valid or not. Nevertheless, there 
are certain signals that permit some cautious optimism. One of the most important 
underlying presumptions is that ﬁscal decentralization channels additional resources into 
the ﬁnancing of education. The experience of piloting the delegated budget system in 
Bulgaria provides some valuable insight. In spite of the fact that ﬁscal decentralization 
was not matched by revenue sharing in Bulgaria, those municipalities that were experi-
menting with the delegated budget system supplemented the central budget resources 
with more of their own contributions than those municipalities that remained out of the 
new allocation mechanism. The supplementary funding of the “pilot municipalities” was 
still only 2.6 percent of the overall spending on education, but the trend is promising. 
On the ﬂip side of the coin, there is a diﬀerent signal from Croatia: several oﬃcials of 
self-governments reported that the willingness of the counties and the municipalities 
to supplement central funding will remain limited until they are able to inﬂuence the 
service that their schools provide.
Fiscal Decentralization for Greater Efﬁciency
The eﬃciency of the allocation of ﬁnancial resources in education refers to two distinct 
layers: eﬃciency at the systemic and the school level. A very basic understanding of 
eﬃciency at the systemic level is eﬃcient allocation systems that ensure an optimal 
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balance between the school network and staﬃng on the one hand, and the number of 
students and the content of the program oﬀered to them on the other. For the time 
being, education systems in South Eastern Europe can be characterized by a serious 
shortage and serious wastage of resources at the same time. A speciﬁc aspect across the 
region is increasing ineﬃciency caused by demographic decline. This is further increased 
by the fragmented vocational education and training system in most countries and the 
generous practice of determining the minimum contact hours of teachers in a few oth-
ers. Thus, especially due to the decreasing number of children, there is more and more 
surplus capacity in all of the education systems of the region.
Figure 10.3
Proportion of Children under the Age of 14 in the Total Population 
in South Eastern Europe (1980–2007)25
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Statistical Database.
This problem to a certain extent ﬂows from the features of highly centralized systems. 
For example, the experiences of the Czech Republic and Slovakia proved that if paying 
the salaries of teachers is kept at the central level, the number of teachers grew. On the 
contrary, in those countries where the local level manages the resources of schools, the 
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number of teachers decreased (Bischoﬀ 2009). The explanation for this is the potential 
eﬀect of decentralized systems that allocated resources to self-governments on a norma-
tive basis: they create hard budget constraints for the owners of schools that they are 
rolling further towards the schools in order to ensure the balance of their own budgets. 
In Hungary, where the declining number of students causes similar eﬃciency problems, 
the press is full of reports on local conﬂicts caused by school closures or amalgamations 
at the beginning of each school year.
However, implementing per-capita-based central allocation systems does not au-
tomatically remove these surplus capacities. Thus, the school network “rationalization” 
question inﬁltrates the design of ﬁscal decentralization measures. The underlying prob-
lem is that municipalities—being very much interested in avoiding local conﬂicts—are 
not very enthusiastic about taking over the problem of large surplus capacities together 
with the ownership of their schools, and it would be unfair, indeed. In theory, it calls 
for central school network rationalization eﬀorts in advance of ﬁscal decentralization. 
Then, in a second phase, ﬁscal decentralization may create a ﬁnancing system, in which 
local actors having hard budget constraints are perpetually striving to maintain the 
balance between the supply (i.e., the capacities of schools) and demand. This is exactly 
what happened in Bulgaria, although this underlying logic most likely was not delib-
erate: between 1999–2007, drastic school closures began and 410 general education 
institutions were closed (mainly in rural areas) which resulted in student-teacher ratios 
closer to the average of developed countries. On the other hand, centrally-driven and 
centrally-administered rationalization initiatives proved to be ineﬀective, because of their 
extremely low sensitivity towards the local educational, economic, and social context. 
Even in Bulgaria, the protection of certain categories of schools is a policy priority. This 
is why the built-in equalization measure of the new allocation system sets four diﬀerent 
ﬁnancing standards on the basis of demographic and geographic criteria. Therefore, deci-
sions on school closure or amalgamation are worth deploying to the local level, where 
the involvement of all interested parties into the bargaining process can be ensured.
The situation is further complicated in Croatia, where the very generous student-
teacher ratios (and the inability of the system to control the labor intensity of educational 
services) is matched with serious capacity shortages. As a result, large capital investments 
are needed in a system that hardly controls its recurrent expenditures. Also, new schools 
should be established in certain places, while schools should be closed or amalgamated 
in others. These contradictions “pollute” the discourse on ﬁscal decentralization: any 
allocation schemes are immediately assessed through the lens of two questions: who 
takes the blame for school network rationalization and who makes the decisions on 
capital investments?
In almost all of the countries in the region, any attempt at centrally-managed 
school network rationalization or any measures aimed at reducing the labor intensity 
of educational services have become so politically sensitive that most governments have 
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avoided addressing the growing eﬃciency problems. In contrast, central regulations are 
very much concerned about the eﬃcient use of resources in the schools—in the wrong 
way. The administrative constraints to eﬃcient ﬁnancial management at the local level 
are extremely strong across the entire region: rigid rules on transferring resources from 
one budget line to another, extremely detailed “standards” for the use of resources, 
outdated reporting systems, etc. These inﬂexible systems are nicely “balanced” by the 
typical weakness of ﬁnancial audit systems that leave substantial space for creativity in 
ﬁnancial administration and budget implementation.
It is important to emphasize that ensuring the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial allocation 
system is a necessary yet insuﬃcient condition to ensure cost-eﬀectiveness in education; 
it also requires well-developed human resource management, performance management, 
professional support, and development mechanisms—all well connected to the system 
of decentralized ﬁnancing.
10.3 Human Resource Management in Education
Governing Human Resource Management on a Systemic Scale
In most European countries, the state is the largest employer and teachers represent the 
largest group of employees. In spite of the outstanding role of teachers and the large 
amount of money spent on the employment of teachers, human resource management 
in the education sector is rarely regarded as a distinct, strategically-applied functional 
governance instrument. The most important reason for this is the extremely fragmented 
character of the toolkit of managing human resources in education (see Figure 10.4). 
Most likely, there is no single person who can claim expertise in all the areas involved.
Although ensuring the appropriate supply of qualiﬁed teachers and promoting the 
professionalization of teachers is a concern of all governments, the policies addressing 
teacher supply, the balance between supply and demand, the preparation of teachers, 
the compensation of teachers, and their capacity building are typically disconnected. 
Paradoxically, it is even more typical for centralized systems in which all aspects of human 
resource management are dealt with centrally. It is not simply the eﬀect of poor policy 
coordination at the central level. The most important point here is the interconnected 
nature of the ﬁve components of human resource management that were brieﬂy mentioned 
already in Chapter 8: hiring and ﬁring, determining the content of the work, perfor-
mance evaluation, compensation, and capacity building. Changing something in any of 
these components should have immediate implications for the four others. For example, 
modifying the actual duties of teachers should have consequences for their salary, for 
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the underlying aspects of their performance evaluation, and for their capacity building. 
What ﬂows from this is the fact that the only actors who may fully connect the diﬀerent 
components of human resource management are those who are controlling all other aspects 
of service provision: the management of schools. The further the employers of teachers are 
placed from the management of service provider organizations, the smaller the chance 
of creating a full human resource management regime.
This is the theory. The practice shows a very diﬀerent picture in the great majority 
of European countries: all components of human resource management in education 
are subjects of strong central government intervention. The real diﬀerence between cen-
tralized and decentralized governance systems is not simply the space that is left for the 
school-based management of the work of teachers. (The case of non-teaching staﬀ is much 
easier; teacher unions are much less concerned about their speciﬁc protected status.) There 
are certain management tools that simply do not even exist in highly-centralized regimes 
for the employment of teachers. For example, in many countries, teachers would be very 
much surprised if someone asked to see their job descriptions; either because it would 
be evident for all that the content of the work of teachers is regulated in the country’s 
respective capital, or because they would consider any written record of their duties an 
insult and the violation of the autonomy of teachers. Also, in a very few (mainly South 
Eastern European) countries, the individual performance evaluation of teachers—that 
became a regular procedure in any sorts of organizations—is still kindly performed by 
inspectorates on behalf of the management of the schools, or not performed at all. A 
lot of managerial energy is also spared by the centrally-regulated salary scales that leave 
no space for rewarding high performance or following up on poor quality work. The 
conclusion that was drawn in the previous sections of this chapter was that centralized 
systems fail to create a balance between demand and teacher supply. We can add here a 
similar one: in spite of the large investments in initial and in-service training for teachers, 
centralized systems also fail to promote the professionalization of teachers.
Therefore, if space should be created for school-based human resource management, 
without which professional school autonomy would be as illusory as autonomy without 
space for curriculum design, decentralization measures (i.e., the partial withdrawal of 
central government from human resource management) should be supplemented with 
the implementation of new instruments within the schools.
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Figure 10.4
The Connections between the Human Resource Management Instruments of the 
Government and School-based Human Resource Management Systems
Compensation Systems: The Space for Differentiation
One aspect of human resource management that is closely connected to the governance 
of the ﬂow of inputs to schools is the compensation of teachers. As must be obvious 
after everything that has been said so far, the compensation of teachers, as well as the 
use of incentives within the remuneration system, is only one aspect of human resource 
management that can be used properly, if well connected with the other four areas. 
Diﬀerentiation for the sake of diﬀerentiation is meaningless; diﬀerentiation for the 
sake of promoting professionalization of teachers works only if matched with changes 
in the other four areas.
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The traditional diﬀerentiation within salary scales based on the level of qualiﬁca-
tion and time spent in the profession does not connect the quality of teaching with 
the income of teachers, and therefore does not allow for incentives for improvement. 
Merit-based diﬀerentiation has its two major types in connection with the two major 
European human resource management systems in the public sectors: the Continental 
European and the Anglo-Saxon. The continental HRM systems (e.g., in Germany and 
France) are career-based promotion ladders. In these cases, promotion is based on centrally-
set requirements connected to the requirements of high-quality teaching. These schemes 
often incorporate an induction period for beginning teachers and often reward activities 
that are not necessarily connected to the work of the teachers in the classrooms. Salary 
scales set the minimum basic salaries, and, in fact, reward expertise. (Due to the lack of 
resources in the South Eastern European countries, the minimum salary is, in fact, the 
average salary.) One of the basic questions of such a system is the diﬀerence between 
the salary level of beginning teachers and veteran teachers. In countries where retain-
ing teachers is a high priority, the diﬀerence is larger; where recruiting new teachers is 
emphasized more, it is less. Another question about salary scales: what is paid beyond 
the basic salary? In most countries, legislation sets a broad deﬁnition of the content of 
the work for the entire working week (not only for the contact hours). Tasks performed 
beyond this deﬁnition are compensated by various salary supplements.
The Anglo-Saxon HRM regimes (e.g., in England and in the Scandinavian countries) 
are position-based systems in which diﬀerentiation is based on regular performance evalu-
ation. In these cases, the criteria of evaluation may vary from school to school, and they 
are developed on the basis of the special environment and tasks of the individual school. 
The space for the diﬀerentiated (“dynamic”) salary component never goes beyond 15–20 
percent of basic salaries (Radó 2006b).
Clearly, centralized education systems are better at developing a career-based pro-
motion system that has the potential to better connect the quality of teaching with the 
compensation of teachers. The introduction of individual diﬀerentiation on the basis 
of performance evaluation is worth considering when the autonomy of schools is en-
sured and the in-school conditions are developed. Since promotion ladders with salary 
scales are national frameworks, but performance-based diﬀerentiation is a school-based 
managerial instrument, in decentralized systems—within certain limitations—they 
can be combined. The underlying purpose of introducing merit-based diﬀerentiation 
might be very diﬀerent: getting better value for money, changing the culture of schools, 
encouraging greater accountability, strengthening the relationship between individual 
and organizational goals, or enhancing job satisfaction.
There are various types of performance-related compensation schemes (of course, 
there might be various combinations, too) (Radó 2006b).
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 • Proceeding more rapidly up an incremental pay scale makes the typically rigid 
salary scales more ﬂexible by opening opportunities for faster merit-based pro-
motion.
 • Employees are paid between 80 and 120 percent of a midpoint. In this case, 
the salary scale determines the mass of resources for remuneration and the in-
dividual midpoints, while school directors are diﬀerentiating within this space. 
The problem is the fact that salaries are not ﬂexible “downwards”; those who 
would earn under the midpoint would feel that money had been taken away 
from them.
 • A performance-related increase available to the whole teaching staﬀ, in addition 
to the basic salary, if done on the basis of measured outcomes, channels more 
resources to well-performing schools instead of doing the opposite, not neces-
sarily desirable.
 • At the discretion of the school director, a less than 20-percent salary increase 
could be made available only for individual performance, but this requires an 
immediate, remarkable increase of the amount of money spent on salaries in 
order to create the ﬁnancial space for diﬀerentiation.
Previous experience shows that there might be certain unintended side-eﬀects that 
are worth keeping in mind when designing diﬀerentiated compensation systems. The 
most typical ones that have a negative potential to overwrite the original intentions are 
the following (Mahony et al., 2004; Wragg et al. 2004):
 • Neglect of unrewarded tasks. Diﬀerentiation is always based on a set of criteria 
that are connected to elements of the work that are to be emphasized. However, 
due to the complexity of the work of teachers, there are always other elements 
that remain unrewarded, that is, remain neglected. However, increasing the 
number of criteria too much would make the scheme hard to manage.
 • Unhealthy standardization. A diversity of children should entail a diversity of 
teaching styles and methods. Too much standardization by rigid criteria works 
against the quality, eﬀectiveness, and equity of teaching.
 • Lack of openness. The success of the work largely depends on the quality of 
cooperation among teachers. If diﬀerentiation generates competition among 
teachers, cooperation becomes poor.
 • High costs. Diﬀerentiation, as well as running the mechanisms that allow for 
diﬀerentiation (evaluation, assessment, external professional examination sys-
tems, etc.), increases the per student costs of educational services. The expected 
beneﬁts of the new system should be evaluated against their additional costs.
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C H A P T E R  1 1
Curriculum Decentralization
11.1 Regulating Content at the National Level
The General Framework: Content Regulation
Although the terms curriculum and curriculum decentralization are widely used in a 
very broad sense, in fact, curricula are only one speciﬁc instrument within a complex 
toolbar used to determine the goals for educational services and to determine the actual 
content of teaching and learning. Therefore, the title of this chapter is a simpliﬁcation 
that should be regarded more as a metaphor and less than as a term describing the whole 
system of regulatory instruments. The salient role associated to curricula originated in 
the low complexity and centralized past of education systems.
On the following pages we will oﬀer the outline of a content regulation system,26 that 
is, a connected set of various governance instruments by which the actors of governance 
of education: (i) determine goals for service providers, (ii) inﬂuence how autonomous ac-
tors are setting goals, and (iii) inﬂuence the actual content of the teaching-learning process. 
The primary conclusion that ﬂows from this deﬁnition of content regulations is that 
its instruments are not to be developed and implemented in a single project; operating 
these instruments is a perpetual governance task. The various instruments of content 
regulation are in continuous interaction; therefore, all instruments should be the subject 
of periodic revision and adjustment.
In decentralized education systems, the major components of content regulation 
are the following:
 • A multilevel system of input and process regulation. Curricula are planning in-
struments used to regulate the process of teaching and learning. In centralized 
systems, national curricula aim to regulate the teaching-learning process. In 
decentralized systems, however, the main instrument for process regulation is 
the school-based curriculum. National curricula, by setting the framework within 
which process regulation is designed, are providing input for the development of 
school-based curricula. There might be various instruments mediating between 
national and school curricula (such as guidelines, more detailed sample curricula, 
complex pedagogical programs, complex programs for speciﬁc subjects or areas 
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of studies, etc.), but these instruments do not necessarily have a mandatory 
character. The school-based curriculum might be part of a more complex school 
program that may include the principles and instruments of assessment, the 
selection of teaching materials, the description of extracurricular activities, or 
speciﬁc provisions for children with learning diﬃculties, or any other content-
relevant areas.
 • Output regulations instruments, that is, standards. A standard is a “cumulative 
body of knowledge and set of competencies (…) that express what all pupils 
should know and able to do, but not dictate pedagogy” (Steiner). As will be seen 
here, the distinction between curricula and standards is increasingly ambigu-
ous; however, their function is diﬀerent: standards determine the targets for 
teaching and learning and regulate the process through their retroactive impact. 
For example, the underlying standards of high stakes examinations or external 
assessment programs may completely determine the content of teaching and 
learning during the years prior to the point where their accomplishment is 
measured.
 • Qualiﬁcation system. Partly because of the need to grasp the complexity of con-
tent regulation systems and the interconnected nature of its elements—similar 
to the term curriculum—the term “qualiﬁcation system” is often used in an 
extremely broad sense that makes its meaning quite ambiguous. Here, qualiﬁca-
tion systems will mean the underlying standards, the process of validation, and the 
awarding of the qualiﬁcation itself. It means that qualiﬁcation systems compose 
a subset of content regulation instruments. Of course, the actual institutional 
and procedural settings, as well as how qualiﬁcation systems are connected to 
other instruments are very diﬀerent across Europe. For instance, a special in-
strument at the disposal of qualiﬁcation systems is the centrally-regulated list 
of vocational qualiﬁcations: the qualiﬁcations register. These registers serve the 
very purpose of qualiﬁcation systems: informing employers. Since they should 
ideally be easily digestible for all stakeholders, they cannot be too detailed or 
sophisticated. Therefore, they orient trainers in determining vocational educa-
tion and training proﬁles, but do not necessarily contain those standards that 
are required for curricula design.
 • The instruments for connecting central content regulation tools and service provision. 
There are various instruments that are designed and applied in order to bring 
educational targets into actual educational service provision, that is, to strengthen 
the impact of centrally-issued curricula and standards. The most important ones 
are the connected systems of external and internal quality evaluation and the 
external assessment of student performance. (These instruments are the pillars 
of quality evaluation systems that will be discussed in the following chapter.)
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Figure 11.1
The Toolbar of Decentralized and Intelligent Content Regulation Systems
Of course, this full system of content regulation exists only at those levels and types 
of education that states strongly control. In higher education, governments have set 
outcome expectations (qualiﬁcation requirements), while regulating processes have fallen 
under the autonomy of higher education institutions. Also, the instruments—at the 
disposal of governments making interventions in service provisions in order to ensure 
that external expectations are met—are much weaker in relation to higher education. 
The same applies to various forms of adult education that are typically provided by 
private organizations.
We will return to the function that the individual instruments should serve; how-
ever, the actual design of the individual instruments depends on their place within 
the overall content regulation system. Thus, what really matters is the construct of the 
whole content regulation mechanism. As far as the major trends of the previous decades 
are concerned, the main direction of change was curriculum decentralization, then cor-
rected with centralization by strengthening outcome regulation. The increasing curricular 
autonomy of schools was based on the recognition that there was a large gap between 
intended and implemented curricula. This recognition called for greater school autonomy 
that would allow greater room for adjusting teaching to the actual context by better 
connecting processes and outcomes. However, in spite of the increased autonomy, the 
measured performance of students did not accommodate so well the goals and targets 
that were set by curricula. Increased autonomy does not automatically lead to better 
alignment of teaching the great majority of schools. Consequently, from the beginning 
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of the 1990s, the main concern of educational policy was setting high expectations and 
ensuring professional accountability. Therefore, the key question for some time has con-
cerned the appropriate balance between process regulation and outcome regulation. If both 
instruments are soft, governments lose control over the performance of the education 
system. If both instruments are hard, the space within which schools and teachers ad-
just to external expectations is eliminated, and the autonomy of schools—emphasized 
throughout this text—is stiﬂed. 
Due to the extreme diversity of content regulation systems in Europe, it is extremely 
diﬃcult to speak about typical patterns. What emerges as a pattern is the growing focus on 
tools that are considered to be instrumental for promoting the realignment of educational 
services towards more complex educational targets. Parallel to the shift to educational 
targets determined in terms of competencies, the tools that have the potential to force, 
incite, or support the schools to better accommodate their work are very much at the 
heart of these policies. In those—rather few—countries where schools are more respon-
sive to curricular changes, this led to curriculum reforms. But in the majority of the old 
member states of the European Union, the trust in top-down modernization changes 
was already limited in the 1990s. As a result, most countries turned to output regulation: 
they developed standards and established the way to use the standards that turned them 
into high stakes and dominant instruments. The situation in the new member states was 
quite diﬀerent. In the 1990s, all these countries were busily abandoning the heritage of 
the former communist system that inevitably required major curriculum reforms. While 
in England and in Continental Europe the carriers of change were standards, examina-
tions, and external assessment programs, the wrestling over curriculum played a very 
similar role in a few Central and Eastern European countries. 
However, on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, the majority of countries ﬁrst 
encountered the need for major realignments only after the publishing of the results 
of the 2000 PISA survey. As educational policies in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst 
century became increasingly driven by performance indicators, the gap between changing 
external expectations and the low ability of schools to adjust to them became increas-
ingly visible and frustrating to policymakers. Whatever governments experimented 
with, any changes to any of the components of the content regulation system changed 
the dynamics of the entire system. 
In Chapter 9, we referred to intelligent governance instruments that are open and 
ﬂexible enough to adjust to local context and able to learn. Operating intelligent content 
regulation systems is a matter of main concern, too. The embedded contradiction is that 
although Continental Europe stresses the consistency of the education system as a main 
priority, most instruments (e.g., curricula or standards) are issued by law. The problem is 
that—regardless of its quality—regulation by law is blunt; when it is enacted, it does not 
learn anymore, and the only way to improve or adjust it is by issuing new regulations. 
(Bearing in mind the need for stability and transparency in large systems like educa-
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tion, too much ﬂexibility is not required.) Therefore, the system of content regulation 
becomes intelligent to the extent to which the schools are able to adjust and learn on 
the basis of external references that are provided by mechanisms that are connected to 
curricula and standards. This is why the underlying aims of contemporary governance 
systems are two, interconnected goals: promoting organizational learning and ensuring 
professional accountability in schools. The instruments that are designed to serve these 
major goals will be further discussed in the next chapter on quality evaluation.
The Instruments of Content Regulation
Curricula. National curricula describe the common goals and objectives and set content 
criteria of the education system. Most European national curricula may contain three layers:
 • They determine goals for diﬀerent levels of education for diﬀerent subjects or 
study areas at various levels of speciﬁcation.
 • They may determine the allocation of teaching time among subject or study areas 
in a rigid or ﬂexible way.
 • They may indicate how decisions are to be made at any lower level on curriculum 
content and/or time allocation. 
As the vagueness of this list already indicates, there is a huge variety in curriculum 
design at the national level across Europe. In fact, the extent to which national curricula 
contain detailed speciﬁcations and detailed timetables determines the space within which 
schools determine their curricula on their own. The space left for schools to determine their 
own objectives, subjects, and timetable is curriculum decentralization. Another dimension 
of central regulation and self-regulation in schools is the distinction between compulsory 
and non-compulsory curriculum; since the ﬁrst may not determine the allocation of the 
entire teaching time, school-based curricula may determine subjects and time for the 
remaining space. However, national curricula that leave some space for non-compulsory 
curricular elements might still be overly detailed in determining objectives, subject 
content, or time allocation (i.e., they might be still very “centralized”). 
As goals for education have changed, the design of the construct of curricula has 
changed, too. Traditional curricula based on the emphasis of subject knowledge and 
serving process regulation in centralized systems typically set very general goals, orga-
nize the content (concepts, names, places, events, formulas, etc.) into themes (units of 
studies), determine the connected teaching activities and assessment tasks, and provide 
a detailed timetable of which the basic unit is the lesson. (In most of South Eastern 
Europe this is called “Plan and Program.”) These are the centrally-issued curricula that 
teachers are supposed to “implement.”
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Later, curricula attempted to integrate certain competencies (such as problem solv-
ing) as cross-curricular areas, organizing the objectives into a matrix. More integrated 
curricula are completely based on the cross-curricular areas that are the points of de-
parture for identifying themes, from which subjects or areas of study are constructed.
Contemporary curricula determine concrete objectives (educational targets) in 
terms of competencies. The building blocks of these curricula are based on determining 
the concrete competencies by unpacking the items of lists of competency areas. These 
competencies are structured by deconvolution (i.e., determining their knowledge, 
skill, and attitude components). In competencies-based curricula, themes of content, 
development tasks, and student activities are attached to these bricks of the curriculum 
construct. There are national curricula of this kind that still contain the knowledge in a 
rather detailed way, and there are others (like the Hungarian National Core Curriculum) 
that are purely competencies oriented and abandoned to the prescription of content. 
Certainly, national curricula in Europe are very diﬀerent in terms of the degree 
to which they itemize educational targets; as a tendency, Scandinavian national cur-
ricula are rather short, the Austrian national curriculum and that of several Länder in 
Germany are still quite detailed, while the English curriculum is a sophisticated three-
dimensional construction of educational periods, requirements for subject, and levels 
of requirements (Knausz 2001). There are a few examples in Europe on the (partial) 
withdrawal of curriculum decentralization in the 1980s. One of them is the case of 
Norway, where the decentralization measures of the 1987 curriculum guidelines were 
partially revoked by the new guidelines that became eﬀective in 1997. There also are 
examples for the temporary return to more centralized curriculum policies in Central 
and Eastern Europe. For example, the Hungarian National Core Curriculum issued in 
1995 was supplemented by the mandatory “Framework Curriculum” in 2000, in order 
to ensure a greater consistency and a smoother horizontal and vertical student progress. 
In 2003, the mandatory character of the Framework Curriculum was abolished and a 
new National Core Curriculum was issued by the government, making further steps in 
curriculum decentralization, even by comparison to the 1995 system.
Standards. A wide variety of aspects of education might be standardized in educa-
tion, such as classroom space, teaching materials, or equipment. In relation to content 
regulation, we refer to student performance standards that are educational targets (con-
crete and speciﬁc expectations towards the outcomes of learning) that also may serve as 
benchmarks (performance references). The basic function of setting standards is ensuring 
equity by setting minimum requirements for all students. In this respect, performance 
standards serve a summative purpose by providing the basis for assessment. Parallel to 
the process of reconsidering goals in education, standards also became competency-
based. In addition, the purposes of using standards became increasingly diverse. In a 
sense, standards have taken over certain old functions of curricula as they are thought 
to be instrumental for formative, developmental goals, too. As the function of national 
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curricula shifted from being instruments of process regulation to that for input for 
school-based curricula, the emphasis on standards became ever stronger. It was caused 
partly by increasing doubts about the potential of curricula of any kind to inﬂuence 
teaching and learning in the classrooms. In fact, standards have also assumed the old 
role of curricula that were regarded as carriers of modernization “messages.”
The basic dilemma in relation to standards is the trade-oﬀ between the emphasis 
on high expectations and the original aim of setting minimum performance standards 
for all. As standards became the most important “currencies” of educational policies, 
the new prevailing “monetary policy” of the governance of education is regulating the 
expected achievement levels on the basis of suitability veriﬁcation (i.e., on the basis of 
the analysis of the information provided by external assessment). Apart from the actual 
policy priorities, the “calibration” of standards depends on their intended use, that is, 
the purpose of the examination, assessment, or type of knowledge validation they serve 
(see Chapter 12). Also, the dynamics between curricula and standards has changed. 
While earlier standards typically were translations of curricula, for a certain period of 
time curricula have often been revisited on the basis of performance standards.
There is a certain risk embedded in the widespread use of standards: their potential 
to be overused. As governments desperately try to regain control over teaching in the 
classrooms, sometimes they attempt to “implement” standards directly into the teaching-
learning process. The “implementation support” connected to this often targets the daily 
pedagogical assessment of teachers. The risk of overusing the standards is very much 
contextual. It may have a detrimental impact in countries where teaching already is an 
overregulated process with very limited space for diﬀerentiation. In content regulation 
systems that leave a much larger space for individual teacher discretion in selecting 
methods, this impact is much less a matter of concern. Nevertheless, regardless of the 
features of the overall content regulation systems, the direct implementation of standards 
has the potential to increase the likelihood of generating a predominantly summative 
pedagogical assessment of the repertoire of teachers.
Standards-based curricula. There are two possible ways to rebalance input/process 
regulation and output regulation and simultaneously maintain the consistency of the 
content regulation. The ﬁrst way is by developing a separate set of standards in connec-
tion to external assessment and examinations; in these cases, standards are having an 
eﬀect on the work of schools in an indirect way and their retroactive, content-regulatory 
potential is utilized. The consistency of the overall system is ensured if central curricula 
and standards are properly harmonized. The other possible way is incorporating standards 
into the curricula. The standards-based curriculum has its roots in the accountability 
systems developed in various states in the United States, where curriculum and standards 
are already used as interchangeable terms. In those countries that started to build strong 
accountability systems (like England), performance standards are also built into the 
curriculum. However, standards-based curriculum is in fact building the original retroac-
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tive impact expectations of standards back into the planning of teaching. This implies 
a very detailed, and in some cases leveled, description of concrete educational targets 
within the curriculum. In terms of its very purpose, the standards-based curriculum is 
a measurable curriculum; the composition and types of educational targets in the cur-
riculum are largely determined by the intentions in relation to what is to be measured.
Recently—interestingly enough—several countries are building standards into 
their curricula even without having regular external assessment systems in place. For 
example, in Central Europe the Czech Republic and Slovakia are in the implementation 
stage of major curricular reforms in which outcome standards are incorporated into 
curricular documents. This also is the case in Slovenia. In contrast, Austria has started 
to implement standards separate from the curricula for grades four to eight and for 
vocational education and training. But in Hungary, the only standards in place are the 
examination requirements for the school-leaving exam of general secondary education 
(i.e., the entrance examination to higher education), though Hungary has the only 
regular multilevel standardized external assessment system in the region (Radó 2009).
Incorporating standards into curricula may raise an equity-related issue. Separate 
standards may contribute to promoting equity in education by setting a minimum 
achievement target for all students. However, standards incorporated into curricula 
would imply the same curricula for all, not necessarily desirable because it does not 
allow adjustment to the speciﬁc needs of various student groups.
Qualiﬁcation systems. The key components of a qualiﬁcation system have been 
mentioned earlier: the assessment of learning on the basis of standards or criteria, the 
validation of the assessment by experts, and the reward of a qualiﬁcation by an author-
ity that recognize the value in the labor market for further education. In primary and 
general secondary education, it is rather simple: accomplished primary education is 
often recorded on the basis of (successful) participation, and accomplished general 
secondary education is typically certiﬁcated on the basis of successful school-leaving 
examinations. The qualiﬁcation awarded by formal vocational education and training 
is somewhat more diﬃcult, because examination requirements need to be developed 
and examinations need to be organized for each vocational proﬁle. 
As a matter of fact, certiﬁcation in primary and general secondary education was 
not regarded as part of qualiﬁcation systems until the need to better connect the frag-
mented qualiﬁcation systems of the various subsystems of education (general, vocational, 
higher, and adult education) emerged in order to make learning pathways smoother. 
When educational targets started to be determined in terms of learning outcomes (i.e., 
competencies) in all subsystems, it was a natural next step to ensure their alignment 
that had been impossible with earlier process regulations and programs. The strong 
momentum for the development of a National Qualiﬁcations Framework (NQF) con-
necting all subsectoral systems was created by a European Union initiative to develop 
a European Qualiﬁcations Framework (EQF). This instrument, using an eight-level 
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descriptor system, allows for cross-referencing the underlying learning outcomes of na-
tional qualiﬁcation systems. The implementation process of EQF highlighted the need 
to better connect internal qualiﬁcation systems within the individual member states. 
During the expert cooperation on the implementation of the EQF, a taxonomy 
was developed for the various types of national qualiﬁcation system.27 The four types 
of such systems are the following:
 • Implicit framework: no explicit expression of a framework, no links between 
diﬀerent education and training sectors.
 • Sector framework: deﬁned series of qualiﬁcation levels for one or more education 
sectors, some sector frameworks have descriptors. No explicit links between the 
diﬀerent education sectors.
 • Bridging framework: common levels and descriptors that allow for relating the 
diﬀerent descriptors of separate frameworks of education sectors. There is a 
formal link between the sectors of education.
 • Integrating framework: a single set of levels and descriptors covering all education 
sectors, no separate sectors frameworks exists.
11.2 The Interpretation Chain in Primary and Secondary 
  Education
Content regulation in education is a complicated process carried out on diﬀerent levels, 
over the course of which diﬀerent participants interpret certain educational targets into 
their own practices with a great amount of autonomy. The path from curricula and 
standards leading to classroom practices is a fragmentary chain of diﬀerent interpretations, 
which are aﬀected by a complicated set of interests, rather than an implementation 
project. This is particularly true for decentralized education systems that emphasize the 
participants’ autonomy and their sharing of responsibilities. The model applied here 
includes six distinct components of the interpretation chain (OPEK 2003).
There might be various and typical shortcomings in the operation of this chain of 
interpretation that may weaken the indirect connection between central content regu-
lation instruments and teaching and learning in the classrooms. A few of the typical 
problems encountered mainly in Central and Eastern Europe are the following:
 • Setting goals for education. Education should not be left at the mercy of edu-
cationalists. It does not only mean the genuine political nature of the most 
important decisions on education: those who have an interest in the outcomes 
of education should have a decisive voice in determining goals for education. 
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The involvement of “social partners” (as stakeholders are called in countries with 
strong corporative traditions) is essential, especially since educational goals are 
to be increasingly connected to external references. However, setting goals for 
education, that is, determining the expectations of educational services in many 
European countries with weaker traditions of social and public policy dialogue, 
is often an irregular practice. As a result, setting goals remains the monopoly 
of experts whose job in normal circumstances would be translating goals into 
speciﬁc educational targets or that of oﬃcials sitting in stuﬀy ministerial oﬃces. 
Also, very often the public debate on various reform initiatives focuses on the 
instruments, instead of on the goals that the instruments should serve.
 • Deﬁnition and operation of diﬀerent instruments of content regulation. All these 
instruments were brieﬂy described in the previous section. Thus, what is needed 
here is only to draw attention to certain problems that are typical to a few Eu-
ropean countries. One of the possible shortcomings ﬂowing from the growing 
complexity of content regulation systems is the lack of coherence among the 
various instruments, without which the system delivers diverse and contradic-
tory messages. If this is the case, the interpretation is extremely diﬃcult and the 
various instruments weaken or extinguish each other’s impact. For example, if 
secondary school-leaving examination requirements and curricula are not har-
monized, the high stakes examination completely overwrites the intentions of 
the curriculum. Another typical problem is the overestimation of the regulatory 
impact of centrally-issued instruments. In several countries, while governors of 
education happily dwell in the illusion that teaching is regulated by high-quality 
curricula, most teachers do not even read them. Finally, an oft-recorded phe-
nomenon—especially in Central and Eastern Europe—is “curriculum overload.” 
Since the development of curricula and standards is controlled by experts, they 
often set highly elitist expectations. As a result, “common minimum require-
ments” are often too high for the majority of students from a less favorable 
socio-cultural background. In these cases, not the lack of interpretation and 
application is the problem, but it is the results of the interpretation that aﬀect 
the process of teaching.
 • Developing and adopting local/institutional programs. There are serious concerns 
in many countries about the quality of school-based curricula and their accom-
modation to national curricula or standards. These problems can be eﬀectively 
tackled through quality assurance, external evaluation, available expert support, 
and capacity building. What seems to be more important in decentralized 
education systems is one of the most important questions of governance: how 
to ensure that school-based curricula have an internal regulatory eﬀect on 
teaching? There are evidences suggesting that the introduction of school-based 
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curricula often do not generate more than heavy “paperwork” (often referred 
to as “curriculum writing” instead of curriculum development). Moreover, the 
implementation of the two-level regulatory system may leave only a few weeks 
for schools to develop their curricula, as it took place in Slovakia in 2008. In 
this respect, the only guarantees are those organizational processes that were 
outlined in Part Two. 
Figure 11.2
The Interpretation Chain of Content Regulation 
in Primary and Secondary Education
Another concern in relation to the development and adoption of school-based cur-
ricula is related to the relationship between local self-governments—that are meant to 
approve the program of schools—and the internal development process. Under ideal 
circumstances, this process is an iterative one, within which a certain orientation stems 
from the owners of schools: local priorities, ﬁnancial frames, and quality expectations. 
However, the circumstances are rarely ideal. Due to the various potential weaknesses 
of local planning and decision-making procedures, teachers very often monopolize the 
program development process, just as it often happens with experts at the national level. 
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Also, there are certain ambiguities in relation to the desirable role played by teach-
ers. There are policymakers who consider school-based curriculum development as part 
of the work of teachers for which they should have the necessary expertise, or at least 
to which they can catch up with the appropriate capacity building and support. In the 
meantime, there are others who regard curriculum design as the task of specialists. The 
view of policymakers on the role that teachers should play largely determines the extent 
to which schools are involved in content regulation.
Development and production of content carriers28 and their selection in schools. The 
reason why this slightly artiﬁcial term is used instead of “textbooks” is the fact that their 
role in providing the raw material (content) for teaching and learning is declining for 
two reasons. First, as factual content is increasingly removed from national curricula, 
many teachers are liberated from the pressure of “covering” all the topics and facts. Still, 
the textbook remains the most important source of raw material for many teachers, and 
the degree to which teachers build on the input of textbooks depends on the teachers’ 
views on relevant and irrelevant content. The second reason is the availability of an 
increasing and enormous quantity of alternative content. It does not simply mean the 
enrichment of the available content; it entails a completely diﬀerent way of importing 
content into the teaching-learning process. A textbook is more than a compilation of 
facts; it is an organized, structured, and (pre)interpreted pool of facts. This is exactly 
what disappears if alternate texts are used, and even more, if digital content is imported. 
Especially when using digital sources, teachers and students construct for themselves 
the content from the bricks of “learning objects” (i.e. pictures, maps, quotations, short 
texts, etc.). This is the reason why many experts consider investment into the develop-
ment of digital content, as well as into the technical conditions and capacities required, 
a powerful driver of pedagogical change. (Due to the complexity of teaching, in many 
cases this is an illusion; sometimes the intensive use of information and communication 
technologies strengthens traditional frontal teaching.) The potential problems in relation 
to the selection of textbooks were mentioned earlier in this reading.
Not only teachers intepret the textbooks: the authors of textbooks also interpret the 
central content regulation documents. In many countries, the link between curricula 
and teaching is one of the weakest within the interpretation chain. Thus, this matter 
calls for a disproportionately large space within the discussion on the interpretation 
chain of content regulation. Problems ﬂow from the fact that textbook publishing is a 
market with publishers whose behavior is determined by the market. (Even if textbooks 
are published by publicly-owned companies—with all its detrimental impact on text-
book publishing—they are still business actors driven by legitimate vested interests.) 
It is not simply a business; it is a business with huge comparative market advantages 
by comparison to any other segments of the publishing market. The traditional way 
to ensure textbook quality and their alignment with content regulation documents is 
an oﬃcial approval procedure on the basis of detailed government regulations. Apart 
PA R T  T H R E E :  T H E  F I V E  S T A N D A R D S  O F  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  I N  E D U C A T I O N
229
from the fact that too much central control over the market does not usually work, 
the underlying licensing requirements are often trivial quantitative criteria that feign 
objectivity. On the other hand, soft criteria that leave a wide berth for expert discretion 
are likely to open a space for corruption and informal inﬂuence. As a result, European 
countries with disappointing experiences in making strong market intervention by 
regulation, moved to governance methods that are combination of consumer protection, 
development, and partnership frameworks with textbook publishers, all of them aiming 
to integrate publishers into the system, instead of overregulating the market. (A list of 
possible market compatible instruments is oﬀered in Box 11.1)
Box 11.1
Inﬂuencing Textbook Publishing:
A Few Possible “Market Compatible” Tools
• Inﬂuencing the behavior of textbook publishers through incentives, intensive 
consultation, and quality-oriented guidelines.
• Enforcing and/or inciting internal quality assurance within textbook publisher ﬁrms 
and those done by associations of publishing companies (e.g., only quality-assured 
textbooks are to be incorporated into a national register).
• Orienting and supporting the authors of textbooks, active knowledge manage-
ment in textbook methodology, and good practices.
• Orienting of and capacity building for expert participation in textbook evaluation.
• Orienting those who are selecting textbooks (i.e., inﬂuencing the behavior of con-
sumers) through external, independent, and regular monitoring of the textbooks 
on the market with wide dissemination and publishing of the results. 
• Field research for the suitability veriﬁcation of textbooks, incorporating information 
on the applied textbooks to the background variables of the analysis of external 
student performance assessment surveys.
• Overcoming the individual teacher monopoly on textbook selection (e.g., one 
textbook for one subject at the same grade, incorporating the selection into the 
pedagogical program of schools, incorporating the textbook selection procedure 
to the aspects of external evaluation, etc.).
• Building the competencies of teachers for the use of alternative texts and digital 
content.
• Development of alternative sources of content with the involvement of textbook 
publishers.
• In countries, where textbooks are paid for by parents, ensuring they have appropri-
ate information about the books and strengthening their weight in the selection.
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Teaching and learning: applying content carriers and accommodating to school-based 
curriculum. The real content is what a teacher ﬁnds important, relevant, or appropriate; 
as it is often said: teachers are walking and talking curricula. No matter what is writ-
ten in the textbooks or in the curricula, the ﬁnal content of teaching and learning is 
determined by teachers, even if they overuse the textbooks, which is typical in most of 
South Eastern Europe. The cultural code that the individual teachers represent is not 
something that governments have the power to change in any direct way. Governments 
can do two things (both have been discussed in detail earlier). They can invest in the 
enrichment of the methodological repertoire of teachers that makes them more open 
to the use of alternative sources of content and enables them to construct content on 
their own, and they can promote the internal operation of schools in order to ensure 
greater professional accountability.
Suitability veriﬁcation. Assessing the eﬀectiveness of interpretation and application of 
central government issued content regulation instruments provides the vital information 
necessary for operating and ﬁne-tuning these instruments. Sometimes it requires direct 
and targeted research and analysis built into the development and operation of these 
instruments, while in other cases this information is the by-product of tools primarily 
serving other purposes, such as testing the performance of students. 
11.3 Content Regulation in South Eastern Europe
A common feature of the countries of the region is that they all operate extremely or 
moderately centralized content regulation systems. There are countries (such as Romania 
or Serbia) that have already implemented curriculum reforms, while others (like Alba-
nia, Bulgaria, and Croatia) still operate old-fashioned, rigid content regulation systems, 
plus there is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where curriculum reform for the whole country 
is much more a constitutional matter than an educational one. However, in spite of 
the minor diﬀerences, the similarities of the overall characteristics of content regula-
tion systems are striking. For the sake of illustration, three examples will be described: 
Croatia, Bulgaria, and Serbia.
• Croatia.29 The actual system for setting goals for educational services is extremely 
centralized, rigid, and primarily oriented towards process regulation. The so-called 
“plan and program,” (that translates as “curriculum”) is in fact a syllabus; it deter-
mines compulsory and non-compulsory subjects, their distribution through classes, 
the weekly number of lessons for each subject, the total annual number of lessons 
for each subject, the connected extracurricular lessons, the content to be taught for 
all subjects, the aims of teaching and learning, and the homework—all for both 
compulsory and elective subjects. In addition, even “the manner by which a stu-
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dent is graded and observed” (Law on Elementary Education) is prescribed by the 
Ministry of Education. There are other, indirect ways of reducing the professional 
responsibilities of teachers. For example, until 2005, it was mandatory for textbook 
publishers to provide so-called “guidelines” (teacher handbooks) for each textbook 
title they published. These guidelines describe the structure of each lesson with the 
description of the content of the lessons, the method of assessment, and even the 
questions to be asked during the lessons. Although publishing these guidelines is 
not mandatory anymore, teachers do not opt for those textbooks which are not 
supplemented with this type of “support.” According to the observations available 
to textbook publishers, the great majority of teachers (especially at lower levels 
of education) make heavy use of the guidelines and only about 10 percent of the 
teachers do not use them at all. 
 Recently, Croatia started to build the basic instrument of output regulation by 
the impressive reform of secondary school leaving (matura) exam. However, there 
are two problems that make this move questionable: (i) examination reform is not 
matched by curriculum reform, and therefore the broken balance between process 
and output regulation will further narrow the free space for teaching in secondary 
education (i.e., in terms of impact, it is a change favoring further centralization); (ii) 
no standards (i.e., examination requirements) are made public for the introduction 
of each year’s new exam, leaving the teachers with no orientation about what they 
should prepare students for. 
 Since there is no operating institution for curriculum and program development 
in Croatia, the capacities for the development of achievement standards is not in 
place. (The Education and Teacher Training Agency evaluates teaching materials 
before ministry approval but does not do development.) The so-called “pedagogical 
standards” have nothing to do with learning outcome targets set for educational 
services. There is a document that holds the title of standards, the so-called HNOS 
(Horvatski Nacionalni Obrazovni Standard), but in fact this document is a knowledge 
inventory for secondary schools. The HNOS was not implemented in a gradual 
upward manner. Nevertheless, so far, it has made a direct impact only on textbook 
writing; all textbooks had to be revised on the basis on HNOS. According to aca-
demic experts of the ﬁeld, the education profession is still not ready for the shift to 
regulations based on learning outcomes (competencies) in general education, and 
even the concept of curriculum is widely misinterpreted.
 In vocational education and training, the ﬁrst preparations for the reform of the 
system of qualiﬁcation requirements have started at the Agency for Vocational Edu-
cation (Agencija za strukovno obrazovanje). With the involvement of social partners, 
13 sector councils were established that develop sample occupational standards 
within each of 13 sectors. On the basis of occupational standards, qualiﬁcation 
232
G O V E R N I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z E D  E D U C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
requirement will be developed that will allow for the development of new curricula 
for VET programs. The new standards will be determined in terms of competen-
cies (learning outcomes). Therefore, if the reconsideration of goals will not start in 
general education, there will be a mismatch between how the general and vocational 
components are regulated in the same VET schools.
• Bulgaria.30 The content regulation system in Bulgaria is very similar to Croatia, 
although in certain aspects, it is somewhat less strict for teachers and schools. The 
system for setting goals for education is centralized and rigid, but it is primarily 
process regulation oriented. The centrally-issued process regulation document that 
translated to English as “curriculum” is a syllabus; it determines compulsory and 
non-compulsory subjects, their distribution through classes, the weekly number of 
lessons for each subject, the total annual number of lessons for each subject, and 
the content to be taught for all subjects. This regulation is supplemented by State 
Education Standards that set targets in terms of knowledge, skills, and attitudes; 
however, these standards are still very much subject-based. (The relationship be-
tween the curriculum and standards is rather ambiguous.) In addition, the reform 
of the matriculation (secondary school leaving exams) in 2008 brought a new “high 
stakes” outcome regulation instrument. In Bulgaria, the emerging learning-outcomes 
regulation system left the old-fashioned process of control untouched, and that has 
reduced the professional responsibilities of teachers to a great extent. Therefore, the 
overall direction of change in this respect is further centralization: not only extremely 
rare among European countries, but also detrimental to the quality of teaching and 
learning. In theory, schools incorporate compulsory, optional, and freely optional 
subjects into their curriculum, but due to the limited space within which they may 
consider adjusting to the speciﬁc needs of the students they educate—or to the 
speciﬁc goals set on the basis of the needs of their environment—these optional 
elements basically serve to preserve the existing capacities of the schools.
 The development of standard achievement requirements (“standards”) that trans-
late the subject-knowledge-based curriculum (“plan and program”) to goals that 
are partly determined in terms of required competencies has begun. Emphasizing 
learning outcomes instead of inputs and processes, as well as setting goals in terms 
of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and aspirations (i.e., competencies), is a major shift 
towards a regulation system that may lead to more equitable goals and practices. It 
is a development of outstanding importance, especially in the case of Roma chil-
dren, because it allows for setting minimum achievement targets that the schools 
can promote in the case of children from any type of background.
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• Serbia.31 In Serbia a major curriculum reform was launched in 2003. The new cur-
riculum (“plan and program”) contains compulsory and elective subjects, and its 
content was modernized to a certain extent but still remained very much subject-
knowledge-based. Later, the development of standard achievement requirements 
(“standards”) started, in order to translate the subject knowledge of the curriculum 
into goals partly determined in terms of required competencies. Standards were 
developed for grade eight in mathematics, Serbian language, and science, and the 
development of standards for grade four also has been started. Also, sample-based 
student performance assessment surveys were conducted mainly in order to gather 
information about the regular revision of standards. On the basis of these standards, 
the central curriculum is scheduled to be revised, and that may strengthen the 
consistency within the content regulation system. (This did not happen in Croatia 
or in Bulgaria.) The use of these standards is based on the notion that they should 
connect the centrally-issued curriculum with in-classroom teaching practices, that 
is, standards should impose a direct impact on teaching and learning. This direct 
use of standards most likely will make teaching an even more regulated process, just 
as in Bulgaria and Croatia. In addition, the standards are organized into diﬀerent 
achievement levels. This is an appropriate technique if the standards serve as the basis 
for external assessment; but if they are to directly guide teaching in the classroom, 
they have the potential to strengthen the already dominant feature of education in 
the country: setting “double standards” for diﬀerent students groups generated by 
the biased expectations of teachers, such as the case of Roma students. 
• In general. Due to the lack of research evidence, the impact of these systems on teach-
ing cannot be assessed. Nevertheless, there are two features that most educationalists 
in all of the three countries agree upon. On the one hand, good teachers do not 
teach according to this rigid process regulation. On the other hand, most teachers 
were trained and “socialized” according to extremely limited professional expecta-
tions that may make it very hard to deploy much more professional autonomy for 
them in line with the contemporary understanding of the role of teachers. This has 
implications for the algorithm and speed of decentralization in education.
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C H A P T E R  1 2
Quality Evaluation in Decentralized 
Systems
12.1 The Wider Context of Quality Evaluation
Performance Management in Education
Accountability in education may signify three diﬀerent aspects: the deﬁnition of the 
content of the service to be provided, the information about the quality of the service, 
and those actions that are applied in the case of poor quality service provision (Scheerens 
et al. 2003). In fact, these three possible meanings refer to those three aspects that are 
to be considered when analyzing the framework within which the speciﬁc instruments 
of quality evaluation are operated. This broader framework is performance management 
in education. Performance management has three major elements: (i) setting goals, (ii) 
assessment of the extent to which an activity is adapted to the goals and oﬀering feed-
back on the results of the assessment, and (iii) intervention in cases when goals have 
or have not been poorly achieved. Translating this into educational services: quality 
evaluation is based on the goals (concrete speciﬁc targets or broader expectations) set 
by the content regulation mechanism, and followed up on, if giving feedback on the 
results of quality evaluation do not lead automatically to improvement or correction. 
In other words, the performance management framework connects content regulation 
with quality evaluation on the one hand, and quality evaluation with management and 
development on the other.
As far as goals are concerned, the previous chapter amply discussed content regula-
tion. But the point here is that all activities should be assessed (or evaluated) primarily 
against their own goals, regardless of who set them and how the goals were set. There-
fore, quality evaluation should produce information both on the basis of goals set at 
the national level and on the basis of those set by the schools themselves. Setting goals 
at the national level is not done always in the form of regulations. For example, a list of 
competencies to be emphasized that are incorporated into a development strategy of the 
ministry of education also may provide the basis for quality evaluation. The key question 
here is to what extent can the goals set for education service providers be interpreted? 
(Evaluating on the basis of goals that can hardly be translated into actual educational 
service speciﬁcations would be unfair and meaningless.)
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A complete quality evaluation system has three major pillars:
 • A national system for the external assessment of the performance of students that 
might be a regular system of external standardized tests or external examinations, 
and partially through this, the assessment of the performance of schools.
 • An external evaluation system of schools, in the great majority of European coun-
tries (with the exception of Finland and Hungary) performed by inspectorates.
 • The information system of education that is often supplemented with regular 
empirical research (sometimes called system monitoring research).
These pillars—if properly organized—compose a system within which the individual 
pillars are well connected. This system, however, cannot be integrated through its un-
derlying standards, because the pool of standards for all three pillars is too fragmented. 
The various standards for the various quality evaluation-related activities (i.e., those for 
the measurement of eﬀectiveness, evaluation of quality, service speciﬁcations, statistical 
classiﬁcations, etc.) cannot be uniﬁed. In addition, the connection between these stan-
dards and the quality of evaluation information is too remote and indirect. Therefore, 
what really integrates all these instruments is the information feedback mechanism of 
quality evaluation. It is either based on the reporting system of any of the individual 
pillars that incorporates information produced by other quality evaluation instruments 
(such as the regular reporting mechanism of inspections in several European countries) 
or organized as a separate functional mechanism (such as a multilevel indicator-based 
online and/or oﬄine system). Of course, all the individual pillars have their own 
reporting mechanisms, such as the online publishing of assessment results, the report-
ing of educational statistical data, or the dissemination of research results. The heart 
of the overall feedback mechanism is an educational indicator system that allows for 
the primary processing of the data and for benchmarking. Importantly, deﬁning and 
determining indicators that feedback into the quality evaluation information system is 
not an analytical or developmental enterprise; indicators are governance instruments. 
As a matter of fact, full-ﬂedged or “complete” quality evaluation systems, such as those 
of England or the Netherlands are rather rare. However, most European quality evalu-
ation systems operate most of these instruments (Radó 2008).
On the basis of the information provided by the quality evaluation system, there 
might be a need for targeted intervention in connection with low performance or poor 
quality. This intervention might be indirect (e.g., ranking the schools on the basis of the 
aggregated performance of their students or publicized ratings of the schools on the basis 
of external evaluation results) and may punish or reward the schools by inﬂuencing the 
behavior of other actors. But it might also be direct and targeted (e.g., the mandatory 
development of poorly performing schools or the replacement of the management).
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Figure 12.1
The Components of a Fully-ﬂedged Quality Evaluation System in Education
The Aims of Quality Evaluation
Whatever the source of quality evaluation information, the two major aims of its collec-
tion are the same as content regulation: supporting organizational learning and ensuring 
professional accountability. Many regard the aim related to organizational learning as 
the primary one, and for good reason. At the risk of repetition, the governance of most 
European education systems has been based on “empowerment” for decades. The key 
characteristics of these systems are: (i) school-based curriculum developed by the staﬀ 
of the schools, (ii) institutional self-evaluation, and (iii) the operation of school-based 
quality management systems (Bruggen 2000). This type of school autonomy placed 
organizational learning very much in the center, and external evaluation—once almost 
exclusively serving accountability purposes—became a major support instrument. Since 
organizational learning is heavily based on self-evaluation, of which the neutrality, 
objectivity, and knowledge base are hard to ensure, the external evaluation performed 
by inspectorates is realigned in order to support self-evaluation by providing external 
references. Its most obvious sign was the transformation of the content of inspection. 
Self-evaluation being an activity addressing the whole institution, inspectorates—
which used to be oriented to the evaluation of individual teachers—were refocused on 
whole school evaluation on the basis of all the criteria of quality that are considered 
to be relevant in the speciﬁc country (i.e., full inspection). Parallel to this, ensuring 
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the professional accountability of the individual teachers became an internal management 
task. In several countries, external evaluation also includes the evaluation of self-eval-
uation in the schools (“meta-evaluation”). It gave a greater emphasis to organizational 
learning within the inspectorates, themselves. This enables inspectors to transfer the 
experience accumulated in one school to others. (Central European observers are often 
surprised that certain western inspectorates are “doing research.” In fact, they do not; 
they accumulate and structure knowledge relevant to their mission in order to transfer 
good working practices to the schools with which they work.)
This view on the basic role of inspection was built into the quality policy of the 
European Union, too. One of the key elements of the recommendations issued by the 
Commission on Quality Evaluation in Education in 2001 is an emphasis on the support 
to self-evaluation that is provided by external evaluation.32 
The situation is quite similar in relation to the assessment of the performance of 
students. In all cases, when the results aggregated at the level of the schools are not pub-
licized, the main purpose of measurement is to provide external references for teachers 
and whole schools. In this respect, there is a diﬀerence in emphasis between the United 
States and most of the European countries; while American assessment policies rather 
focus on teachers, these policies in Europe emphasize much more informing whole 
schools, especially self-evaluation in schools.
The duality of organizational learning and accountability goals is present in all 
European systems; the number of countries that do not strive to serve both aims at the 
same time is quite limited. (One of them is the Hungarian quality evaluation system, 
within which actually the absolute dominance of the support function prevails. Therefore, 
building an accountability system is a high-priority matter on the Hungarian policy 
agenda.) But the problem is that the two aims can hardly be addressed with the same 
intensity. The required balance between the two aims, however, is too contextual and 
depends on the internal logic of the development of such systems. For example, while 
the dominant aim of the inspectorate in England is accountability, in the Netherlands 
the supporting character is stronger. 
The basic underlying question is: are there the conditions of organizational learning 
in place in the schools? If we recall these conditions from the summary of Part Two, this 
question can be easily answered country by country. In most of Central and all South 
Eastern European countries, schools are very far from being learning organizations. As 
far as Central Europe is concerned, self-evaluation is the mandatory task of schools in 
Austria, in Hungary, and since 2007, in the Czech Republic; but this activity is not yet 
properly supported or acted upon in any of these countries. It has been recommended 
for Slovenian schools but has yet to be made mandatory via legislation. In Slovakia, there 
is no such expectation of schools. But even in Hungary, where all the necessary instru-
ment are deployed to schools as a mandatory task, research results show that the great 
majority of schools do not make use of external measurement data with which they are 
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exceptionally well supplied. It is even more typical for South Eastern Europe. Serbia is 
the only country in the region where the task of self-evaluation and school development 
is deployed; all other countries in the region tried only pilot testing programs, at most. 
As a result, schools do not transfer any external expectations to their teachers, and they 
are not becoming outcome-oriented organizations. (This is the reason for the leverage 
of remarkably high investment into school-based development being so small; it only 
produces islands of innovation.)
The most important conclusion to be drawn from all this is that accountability systems 
create demand for the utilization of support from outside. Without accountability mecha-
nisms in place, the formal mandate of running self-evaluation and quality management 
does not automatically result in organizational learning. This is the reason for building 
“intelligent accountability systems” (Hopkins 2004) that eﬀectively supported schools’ 
own development eﬀorts that came to the forefront during the last decade. Thus, at 
the level of this basic rule of thumb, supporting organizational learning and ensuring 
accountability are not mutually exclusive aims. The point is just the opposite: they both 
require one another’s existence. However—as will be presented later—what nicely ﬁts 
at the level of the entire quality evaluation system creates a lot of trade-oﬀs in relation 
to speciﬁc concrete instruments.
12.2 Professional Accountability Systems
Performance- and Quality-based Accountability Systems
In line with the learning outcomes approach as the prevailing paradigm of educational 
policy, the measurement of students’ competencies has become the most inﬂuential 
policy instrument in those countries that can aﬀord the costs of large-scale assessment 
programs and, for any reason, that ﬁnd it important to invest in the modernization 
of their governance systems. One would assume that accountability systems are also 
realigned accordingly, building on the learning-outcomes targets determined by content 
regulation instruments and on an extended, regular measurement system (i.e., testing). 
But what we see is that—in spite of the spectacular popularity of measurement among 
most European countries—they tackle this shift with caution. While (with one exception) 
all states of the United States issued standards-based curricula and operate account-
ability schemes based on widespread external assessment—that was raised to the federal 
level by the “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB) initiative in 2001—the typical European 
pattern is still quite diﬀerent. The best way to grasp the characteristics of European 
quality evaluation systems is to compare between the performance-oriented accountability 
systems in the United States and the quality-oriented accountability systems in Europe.
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Brieﬂy summarizing the diﬀerences between the two kinds of accountability sys-
tems, performance-oriented accountability systems are based on student performance 
standards, on testing strongly connected to the standards, and on consequences con-
nected to the results of testing (Hamilton 2003). Contrarily, quality-oriented systems 
are based on quality standards (within these performance standards), on the external 
evaluation of schools and an assessment informing evaluation, and on consequences 
connected to external evaluation. It should be emphasized that those countries that can 
be clearly categorized into one or the other type are rather rare; however, on the basis of 
key characteristics of quality evaluation systems, all countries are closer to one of these 
accountability patterns.
Table 12.1
The Algorithm of Performance- and Quality-oriented 
Accountability Systems33
Performance-oriented accountability systems Quality-oriented accountability systems
Setting performance standards Determining quality criteria and setting 
performance standards
The external assessment of the performance of 
students 
External quality evaluation and external 
assessment informing evaluation
Publicized feedback of assessment results Publicized feedback of evaluation results 
(in certain countries also assessment results)
Setting benchmarks for the expected 
improvement of performance
Identifying schools providing poor-quality 
service
Punishing or rewarding consequences attached 
to performance
Mandatory development of schools with poor 
quality (developmental intervention)
It is important to keep in mind that the diﬀerence between both sides of the Atlantic 
cannot be explained by the “backwardness” or “tardiness” of Europe in this respect; the 
context is very much diﬀerent in two ways. The ﬁrst diﬀerence ﬂows from the diﬀerent 
ways policy decisions are made. Due to the much more limited role of governments in 
the United States, the primary ground of policymaking is not the public administration, 
but politics (Vass 2005). As a result, the knowledge base of policymaking is provided by 
committed albeit independent think tanks, and during implementation, the instruments 
that can be outsourced play an outstanding role. Responding to the demand generated 
by accountability policies in the United States and the ease of outsourcing such services, 
testing organizations built their capacity accordingly. (Many experts consider the “test-
ing industry” as one of the most inﬂuential interest groups in education in America.) 
Therefore, educational policies in the United States are largely determined by genuine 
public policy considerations, according to which ensuring the balance between expen-
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diture and outcomes is the highest priority. While saying that the American context 
heavily favors performance-oriented approaches, we do not suggest that the quality of 
educational services is less important in the United States; what we do say is simply that 
the sophisticated understanding of the quality of education approach does not really 
translate to politicians, lawyers, and economists.
By contrast, in the majority of European countries, the most important agents of 
educational policymaking are ministries that accumulate the necessary knowledge base 
and implement their policies according to their own publicly owned and managed 
agencies. Since policy decisions in Europe are much more “expert” decisions than in the 
United States, policies in Europe are much less inclined to put an equal sign between 
indicators and the indicated phenomenon. In other words: for educationalists, measured 
performance is one of many aspects of the quality of education that matter. Again, it 
does not mean that cost-eﬀectiveness is not an important concern in European countries 
that are less governed by lawyers and economists—not necessarily an advantage, anyway. 
We simply suggest that government-owned public agencies that have a monopoly on 
providing certain services on the basis of legal mandate (e.g., inspectorates, curriculum 
and/or qualiﬁcation authorities, national institutes for education, etc.) are much better 
suited to apply a sophisticated educationalist perspective. 
The three pillars of a quality evaluation system can be erected on the basis of both 
approaches. The choice between the two orientations should depend on the actual 
context: what are the purposes that the diﬀerent pillars of quality evaluation systems 
should serve, which pillar becomes the dominant element of the whole system, how 
are the possible connections among them arranged, and what kind of intervention is 
built on them?
Quality-oriented Systems: External Evaluation
Quality-oriented systems have certain valuable advantages. For example, these systems, 
by addressing both processes and outcomes, are much closer to the complexity and dis-
cretional character of educational services. Therefore, external evaluation leaves much 
more space for the alignment of accountability and developmental goals. In a sense, it 
is much more open and conducive towards large diversity within the network of edu-
cation service providers, thus it better suits the decentralized governance model based 
on school empowerment and autonomy. Also, external evaluation integrates student 
performance information more easily than performance-based accountability systems 
are able to integrate information on the operation of schools, teaching, and learning. 
For example, if external assessment of the achievement of students also collects contex-
tual information, such as background information about students or schools (as PISA 
and other international surveys do), they properly inform school evaluation (OECD 
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2004). And ﬁnally, since external evaluation—beyond standardization—is open to 
expert judgment based on observation and experience, the quality evaluation informa-
tion produced in this way is more easily digestible for the profession. (Evaluation is, by 
deﬁnition, expert judgment.)
However, a few considerations call for some precaution within certain contexts 
about the exclusivity of external evaluation within the quality evaluation system. The 
most important ones are the following (Radó 2008):
 • As was mentioned earlier, quality evaluation systems should operate as the 
dominant instruments. It will later be seen that, in theory, external evaluation 
can also be made dominant. However, the evaluation information produced by 
inspectors is much harder to digest by non-professionals; the results are not easily 
communicated to the other actors within the accountability relationships. As 
a result, the potential of external evaluation to inﬂuence the behavior of actors 
other than that of the service providers is limited.
 • Due to the relatively large number of quality criteria, it is much harder to 
decide where lies the threshold of performance below which service providers 
should count on the consequences. In other words: external evaluation makes 
benchmarking much harder, if at all.
 • If we strive too hard to make external evaluation a dominant instrument, the 
consequences attached to it will eliminate the “critical friend” role of the evalua-
tor, because the staﬀ of the school will perceive evaluation as a threat. As a result, 
the function of supporting self-evaluation and school-based development will 
be poorly achieved. It is a greater danger in countries where inspection played a 
much more controlling role up until currently. (The realignment of inspection 
is not only about the “resocialization” of the inspectors; it is also about that of 
the schools with which the inspectors are working.)
 • As will be seen later, the consequences attached to external evaluation inﬂuence 
the quality of teaching and learning via multiple, weak transmissions. The most 
important agents to be held accountable for the transmission of the “messages” 
of external evaluation are school directors. However, if directors’ perceptions of 
their own role are internally referenced (as is the case in many European school 
systems), this transmission will remain weak.
 • Regardless of the concrete parameters set for external evaluation, it usually ad-
dresses the connection between the use of available resources, organizational 
processes, and learning outcomes. However, revealing these connections is a 
sophisticated methodological task, about which European inspectorates have 
accumulated much experience (and research) for some time. If a country engages 
in the process of transforming a control-oriented inspection to a contemporary, 
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whole-school supportive inspection, the time needed to reach the full potential 
of external evaluation may require a decade or more. (Politicians who are con-
sidering investing in systemic changes are rarely so patient.) 
Performance-oriented Systems: External Assessment
The most important tool of performance-oriented accountability systems is the external 
assessment of students’ achievement by standardized tests. Various, sometimes contradic-
tory goals are thought to be served by testing: informing external and self-evaluation 
reliably, inﬂuencing and informing the in-classroom practice of teachers, motivating 
teachers and students to improve performance, informing parental decisions, inform-
ing the decisions of owners about rewarding or even closing schools, etc. In general, it 
often happens that policymakers—even in countries with a large testing industry—are 
not fully aware of the potential and limitations of the usefulness of information gleaned 
from external assessment. (This ignorance sometimes produces rather extreme ideas, such 
as the diﬀerentiated compensation of teachers on the basis of test results.) Large-scale, 
regular external assessment is a relatively new policy instrument; therefore, it often seeks 
to meet illusory expectations. For example, the main conclusion of the evaluation of 
the No Child Left Behind initiative was also that too many contradictory expectations 
weakened the impact of the test-based accountability system (Hamilton 2003; Darling 
and Hammond 2004).
This text is about the task to be commissioned to assessment experts and not about 
the methodology that experts use. However, since the selection of the method of testing 
should be based on the purpose of testing, and vice versa, where the applied method 
determines the use of the result, the diﬀerence between criterion-referenced testing and 
norm-referenced testing should be brieﬂy explained here (Hamilton and Korentz 2002). 
The diﬀerence between the two types of tests lies in their interpretability; therefore, 
they serve diﬀerent purposes. Criterion-referenced tests compare performance and 
knowledge against a level of expected achievement; thus, in theory, it may produce the 
same result with all the students, not to mention that the results do not disperse very 
much. The basis of criterion-oriented tests is a standard; the test measures how much 
the standard’s targets have been achieved. Therefore, the primary purpose of this test 
is accountability. In contrast, norm-referenced tests allow for the comparison of the 
performance of students; in the case of the use of standardized tests, the results show 
the curve of normal distribution. This test is not created on the basis of any standards, 
and it allows for performance comparison at diﬀerent levels of aggregation (schools, 
student groups, various management levels, etc.). 
Although in certain circumstances with certain limitations there might be “interpre-
tation trespassing” between two purposes and the results of two types of tests, in order to 
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deﬁne clear and unambiguous assignments for measurement experts, priorities should be 
set between the two distinct goals. In very general terms, from an accountability point of 
view, we should clearly determine what the priority goal is to ensure: the standard-based 
accountability of educational service provider institutions or—in order to strengthen 
the short route of accountability—to inform clients by allowing them to compare the 
performance of diﬀerent schools. (The accountability system of the United States is 
based on the use of criterion-referenced tests.) Of course, it sometimes happens that 
educational policy uses the result of norm-referenced tests as a performance criterion; 
this is the case, for example, with using a certain performance level of the PISA survey 
as the basis for benchmarking in the European Union, or when national policies set 
targets by the performance levels of the same survey. Nevertheless, the rule of thumb 
to be applied is one purpose, one test; tests are not designed to serve multiple purposes. 
Avoiding the ambiguity of the interpretation of test results is even more important in 
countries where national assessment programs are considered to be “research,” or—in 
slightly improved cases—an instrument for informing educational policies only, and 
not what they really are: governance instruments. Also, it helps to avoid situations that 
are not unprecedented in Europe, when test designers set the goals for measurement 
themselves due to the lack of clearly determined policy expectations. 
The advantages of accountability systems based on performance assessment are nu-
merous and attractive. As will be discussed later, the measurement of student achievement 
can be made dominant quite easily; in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the actors in 
local accountability relationships, in most cases it is enough to publicize the results ag-
gregated at the level of schools. It is also a very eﬀective instrument for shaping policies: 
it focuses attention, strongly determines the direction of the policy discourse, and is 
simple to communicate. Since it provides information for cost-eﬀectiveness indicators, 
it is an eﬀective policy instrument. Another advantage of the use of test results is that 
they eﬀectively direct attention to the underlying problems of eﬀectiveness deﬁciencies; 
therefore, they may generate demand for development. Several evaluations prove that, 
as a result of test-based accountability schemes, participation in in-service program was 
increased, curricula were revised, and underachieving students received more personal 
support. Also, research shows that testing for accountability purposes inﬂuences the work 
of teachers; in many cases, it results in a reorganization of the allocation of teaching time 
and a reconsideration of goals, as well as generates demand for more eﬀective teaching 
methods. From a governance perspective, test-based systems may strengthen the impact 
of content regulation instruments by forcing schools to adjust to external expectations. 
The risks of accountability systems operating with tests are no less numerous, 
and—paradoxically enough—they may ﬂow out of the same reasons as their advantages 
(Radó 2008).
 • The most important risk of test-based accountability systems is generated by 
the power of the consequences connected to the results: they may become too 
PA R T  T H R E E :  T H E  F I V E  S T A N D A R D S  O F  D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  I N  E D U C A T I O N
245
dominant. In extreme cases, teachers or schools may cheat in order the upgrade 
the results, reducing the reliability of the results and forcing the government to 
implement very expensive quality assurance guarantees.
 • Although test-based accountability systems may impose a substantial impact on 
the behavior of local actors, their behavior is inﬂuenced by many other factors 
that these systems are unable to control or inﬂuence.
 • If the school staﬀ is striving to achieve a short-term results improvement in-
stead of making eﬀorts for long-term improvement of the competencies of the 
students, the consequence is what the literature calls test result inﬂation: the 
reason for improved results is not improved learning but the improved ability 
of students to take tests. The reason for this is “teaching to the test”; teachers are 
focusing on the types of tasks that are applied in the tests, and they determine 
the allocation of teaching time and the selection of methods in relation to the 
purpose of training students to take tests. Rather than enriching teaching, this 
method narrows the scope of teaching. 
 • Test result inﬂation might be heightened if strong consequences are attached to 
test results and are coupled with overly high expectations of teachers. If teachers 
perceive expectations as impossible to meet, they will take shortcuts between 
teaching and tests.
 • The most important constraint encoded into testing is that it focuses attention 
too much: it makes the problems visible that we measure, but those that are 
unmeasured remain invisible. While quality evaluation has the potential to 
identify the very diﬀerent problems of diﬀerent schools, testing answers only 
those questions that were “asked.” 
 • The results of tests are not identical to the phenomenon that is measured. For 
the sake of measurability, the competencies to be assessed are split into subcom-
ponents among which the dominant ones are determined, and the test items 
measure these “particles.” On the basis of the results, we discursively judge the 
level of the development of the competencies. Therefore, test results are prox-
ies; they are not identical to the competence to be measured. However, the fact 
that we attach consequences to the results does not allow for their cautious and 
sophisticated interpretation. In other words, we are inclined to take assessment 
results too seriously.
 • Measurement by itself does not reveal those factors that explain the results. 
Therefore, the impact of accountability systems based exclusively on testing 
is rather controversial. Very often, the façade of performance is improved due 
to accountability measures. However, there is no shortcut between testing and 
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improved eﬀectiveness, and improved learning outcomes might also be explained 
by many other reasons. With external assessment, the targets of intervention can 
be determined, but not the means of intervention.
 • Several times test-based accountability imposed a very detrimental impact on the 
equity of education. For example, in the United States, the number of children 
enrolled in remedial programs has increased as a result of their deteriorated 
average test results in mainstream classes.
The more we learn about the potential detrimental side-eﬀects of a test-based ac-
countability system, the more is invested in order to deal with them. However, we do 
not know much about the impact of the various correction methods and policies. (We 
should count on the fact that it is impossible to create a trouble-free system with no 
negative side-eﬀects whatsoever.) There are three types of initiatives for reducing the 
risks of performance-oriented accountability systems: (i) the development of measure-
ment methodology in order to strengthen the connection between goals and methods, 
(ii) the secondary analysis of performance data (such as pedagogical added value), and 
(iii) the development of support services connected to measurement. 
What deserves further explanation here is making testing suitable for the purposes 
of secondary analysis. Very often, indicators produced by a secondary analysis oﬀer a 
much more accurate picture about the performance of schools than raw performance 
data. The two most often used derived indicators are the pedagogical value added and the 
socio-economic value added. Computing pedagogical value-added indicators is possible 
on the basis of several subsequent and connected assessments. It shows the positive or 
negative deviation from the expected progress of students in terms of their measured 
learning outcomes. (This requires a technical opportunity to connect the achievement 
data of individual students in several subsequent tests.) Another indicator is the socio-
economic value-added indicator (“SES index”) that compares the achievement of the 
student to the expected performance calculated on the basis of his or her socio-economic 
background variables. This indicator can be calculated on the basis of a single test if the 
required background variables are included. Both indicators can be applied at any level 
of aggregation, which makes them powerful instruments for informing policymaking.
Quality Evaluation in South Eastern Europe
The quality evaluation systems of the countries in South Eastern Europe are mixtures 
of old-fashioned, malfunctioning professional control mechanisms and embryonic 
elements of contemporary quality evaluation instruments. Just as in the case of content 
regulation, the similarities between the countries of the region are extremely salient.
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The actual system of inspection in all the countries in the region is subject-based, 
process-oriented, and teacher-centered. Therefore, the major alignment of inspectorates 
controls individual teachers, even if it were alleviated in most countries, partly by connect-
ing inspection with professional support functions. The employees of the inspectorates 
are subject specialists typically having little background, training, or experience in whole 
school evaluation. The basis of inspection is the curriculum and—in certain coun-
tries—the standards issued at the central level. So far, the only country that has started 
investing in the realignment of inspection is Serbia, in a Dutch-Serbian joint project.
Another common regional feature is the logjam of diverse and contradictory functions. 
The County Inspectorates in Romania and the Regional Inspectorates in Bulgaria are 
performing various administrative, information management, professional support, 
and evaluation functions. (For example, managing the ﬁnancial allocation to schools 
in Romania, or appointing the directors in Bulgaria.) In Croatia, professional support 
functions and external evaluation are combined in the work of the Education and 
Teacher Training Agency, within which the previous is dominant. As a result, there is 
no external evaluation at all in practice. In Serbia, the work of the inspectors in orga-
nizational terms is partially separated within the network of Regional Departments of 
the ministry, but it is still far from being a separate organization. The problem with 
placing all these functions within one organizational framework is a major obstacle to 
the professionalization of any of the tasks involved.
There is no regular, external monitoring of the performance of students of the 
countries in the region. There were some experimental assessment programs in most 
countries, and they participated in international surveys that were instrumental in build-
ing the necessary professional capacities. The secondary school leaving examination was 
introduced in Bulgaria and will soon be introduced in Croatia.
Generally speaking, the quality evaluation systems of the region have been able to 
maintain the illusion of maintaining control of the quality of educational services, yet 
are unable to serve any of the two major aims of such systems: they are neither able to 
provide external, reliable, and objective references to self-evaluation, nor are they able to 
hold schools accountable. In fact, none of the local actors receive reliable feedback on the 
quality or eﬀectiveness of the service that their schools provide. Various quality evalua-
tion substitutes are used instead, such as the results of students at subject competitions.
12.3 Quality-evaluation-based Intervention
A key question for ensuring professional accountability in education is: what is to be 
done, if quality evaluation information feedback to schools does not automatically en-
tail organizational learning and adjustment to expectations related to external quality 
and eﬀectiveness? The cases when schools are underperforming are called school failure; 
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the instruments to be used in order to overcome school failure are indirect or targeted 
intervention.
Identifying Schools Failure
We all know that there are schools that do not meet the minimum quality and eﬀective-
ness requirements. A full performance management system is not complete if failing 
schools are not identiﬁed, and failure does not entail consequences. However, when 
mapping out the possible tools for determining school failure, we face several problems 
and dilemmas.
The idea of declaring a school to be failing is based on three underlying assump-
tions (Spreng 2005):
 • In the given education system, there exists a universal and valid set of expecta-
tions of schools, and the management and staﬀ of the schools are well aware of 
them.
 • There is an agreement about the way of measuring and evaluating the extent to 
which these expectations are met.
 • It is clear to everyone how poor is the achievement of a school that already al-
lows for a declaration of failure. Also, quality evaluation instruments identifying 
schools under the threshold should be trustworthy.
If only one of these three conditions is not realized, it is already unfair to label 
schools as failing; as a matter of fact, they are never fully realized. However, since iden-
tifying school failure is inevitable, our point of departure should not be the statement 
of momentary failure. The solution to this dilemma is oﬀered by Michael Barber: the 
diﬀerence between bad schools and failing schools is the extent to which a school is able 
to take on sustainable and self-guided development (Quoted by Spreng 2005). Identify-
ing bad schools without attaching direct consequences to it can be done without serious 
risks. If after notiﬁcation, it can be documented that the school has been unable to 
improve its work along the aspects underpinning the notiﬁcation, we can already speak 
about failure. Therefore, school failure is the forgone opportunity to solve or to mitigate the 
problems that were indicated by any forms of external quality evaluation. But according to 
this deﬁnition, we did not solve the dilemma of identifying failing schools; however, by 
“leveling” failure and incorporating a procedural element, we reduced its possible risks. 
As far as South Eastern European—and most Central European—countries are 
concerned, none of the conditions that allow the just identiﬁcation of school failure 
exist: due to the lack of standards, there are no unambiguous performance requirements, 
and in terms of quality, only legal regulations oﬀer rather vague references due to the 
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lack of set areas and criteria for evaluation. There is no agreement about the type of 
quality evaluation systems to be operated; therefore, there is not even discourse on the 
measures of failure. Although a large segment of the school system in all of the countries 
of the region has failed to educate masses of students, no schools can be declared as 
failing with full conﬁdence, because such expectations have simply never been set for 
them—probably because it would have been insulting. Thus, the introduction of any 
form of intervention should be gradual; only those schools that received an opportunity 
to catch up to expectations and failed can be hit with serious consequences.
Identifying “bad schools” (of course, without using this label)—that is, those that 
should have the opportunity to avoid falling under the category of failing schools—can 
be done on the basis of external assessment results as well as on the basis of external 
evaluation. The assessment experts suggest that it would be unfair, again, to determine 
poorly performing schools on the basis of the results of one single test, because the 
contextual factors determining the results may change from year to year. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to do so by summarizing the results of at least three subsequent assessments. 
If norm-referenced tests are used—although this would be rather arbitrary—a threshold 
can be drawn on an annual basis under which the obligation of development has to be 
enforced. The disadvantage of this method is that the requirement of predetermined 
and known criteria does not exist, because the actual position of individual schools in 
the comparison with other schools is contingent. Identifying poor performance on the 
basis of standards with criterion-referenced tests appears to be a much fairer method, 
for example, as applied by the accountability system in the United States. Therefore, if 
building assessment-based accountability systems in the European countries, then this 
would also be appropriate. 
Determining the targeted schools for intervention can also be done on the basis 
of external evaluation. It appears to be the characteristic function of inspection in 
England, but this function is exercised by inspections in other European countries, 
too. (The label of “failing school” was ﬁrst used by OFSTED [Oﬃce for Standards in 
Education, Children’s Services and Skills, the non-ministerial government department 
of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of School in England] but it is no longer in use.). In 
the work of Continental inspectorates, due to the dominance of developmental goals, 
external evaluation itself is considered to be intervention. The recent British inspection 
makes a distinction between two categories: “schools with serious weaknesses” and 
“schools under special measures.” Schools falling under the ﬁrst category do not face 
any consequences and receive support for development. Schools in the second category, 
however, are subject to external intervention. As has already been mentioned, the weak-
ness of the identiﬁcation of poorly achieving schools on the basis of external evaluation 
is the large number of quality criteria that makes benchmarking very diﬃcult. Since 
building an inspection service that is capable of performing this on a regular basis takes a 
lot of time, it seems to be much more feasible in the countries of South Eastern Europe
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—as in many other European countries—to create a regular national assessment system 
that is capable of identifying poor-performing schools like, for example, Norway.
Indirect Intervention: The Impact of Publicity
Apart from supporting organizational learning, the aim of quality evaluation is to ensure 
professional accountability; in practice, it means the actual publicity of quality evalua-
tion information. When focusing on accountability purposes, the audience of quality 
evaluation information is not only the service provider institution, but also all other 
actors in the accountability relationships.
The same quality evaluation information “behaves” in a very diﬀerent way, depend-
ing on whether only the school staﬀ have access, or whether it is received by parents, 
local authorities, or the media. Informing the actors of local accountability relationships 
inﬂuences their behavior, but this impact is quite contextual. For example, if residing 
in a country where the option of school is free, and parents can consider alternative 
options for their children’s education, the impact of the publicity of assessment results 
aggregated at the level of the schools imposes a large impact on schools. In these cases, 
making assessment results public easily becomes a dominant instrument. The experience 
of several European countries proves that publicizing assessment data inevitably results in 
the publishing of school rankings even if it is not the intention of the assessment policy. 
Publishing school performance data is a pressurizing instrument; it does not simply 
inform decisions related to the use of the “ﬁnal weapon” of parents, that is, transferring 
their children to another school. The mere possibility that it may happen as a result of 
available information stimulates schools to better involve parents, a quality-improving 
factor in itself (Spreng 2005). The same pressurizing impact is often reached by present-
ing external evaluation information to parents and local authorities (Bruggen 2000).
Publicizing assessment data has an eﬀect not only on the movements of students 
within the system, but also on that of teachers. For example, Norway had to develop 
special policy measures in order to balance the ﬂux of teachers to better performing 
schools. In the same way, if local self-governments decide to reduce school capacities 
for ﬁnancial reasons, the content of external evaluation reports made available for them 
can play a decisive role. Consequently, the publicity of quality evaluation information is 
an intervention instrument, though indirect, untargeted, and hard to forecast its eﬀect. 
For example, the publicity of assessment data does not equally inﬂuence the behavior of 
parents with diﬀerent socio-economic backgrounds; parents with higher status beneﬁt 
more from the information because they can consider many more options than those 
with lower status.
Obviously, within certain circumstances, quality evaluation information has the 
potential to impose a radical impact on accountability relationships. However, publicity 
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always generates conﬂicts everywhere. This is why many experts are promoting “regulated 
publicity”; it may mean making only certain parts of evaluation reports public, while 
the full report is made available only to the staﬀ of schools. The most important argu-
ment in favor of regulated publicity is the fact that prevailing accountability measures 
weaken the function of organizational learning. Also, there might be concerns about the 
reliability (i.e., relevance and validity) of performance measurement data that may call 
for caution about their use. A speciﬁc reason in certain countries with limited profes-
sional capacities is the artiﬁcially-maintained knowledge and information monopoly 
of assessment specialists. Since assessment data both at the national and local levels has 
become an increasingly inﬂuential policy tool, specialists are not necessarily interested 
in sharing information by making it public.
To summarize, the extent to which the dominance of applied instruments really 
matters is in the setting up of the expectations towards schools in an unambiguous 
and easily decipherable way. As we have seen, external evaluation is less appropriate for 
making these expectations dominant; not only because it takes a lot of time to build 
up, but also because the supportive and developmental role of inspection prevails in 
all of Europe. (Recently, even OFSTED stopped publishing the list of schools falling 
under the categories of outstanding, good, satisfactory, or inadequate.) Therefore, what 
seems more eﬀective is setting expectations by standards, and making the standards a 
dominant instrument by publicizing performance assessment data.
Targeted Active Intervention
If the publicity of quality evaluation information has a giant eﬀect on local account-
ability relationships, the question arises: why do we also need to consider more active 
intervention? The answer is again very much contextual. There might be several education 
systems in which indirect and untargeted intervention will not ensure the required level 
of accountability or generate suﬃcient demand for organizational learning for various 
reasons. The most important ones are the following:
 • Beyond the available information, there are several things that inﬂuence 
the behavior of parents and self-governments. (For example, parents are not 
necessarily the most satisﬁed with the best-performing schools.) In addition, if 
parents leave the school, that does not solve the school’s problems. Several times 
the opposite happens; just like in the case of “white ﬂight,” when non-Roma 
parents remove their children to another school if the proportion of Roma 
students reaches a certain point. 
 • The relatively low or average performance of certain education systems by in-
ternational comparison can be explained by the large performance diﬀerences 
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within the system. In these systems (Bulgaria or Hungary) the variance of per-
formance diﬀerences among schools are much greater than the international 
average. In these cases, an eﬀective policy aimed at improving the performance 
of the entire education system is targeted development of the underperforming 
schools. Targeted intervention connected to quality evaluation results might be 
very instrumental in “elevating the system” from the bottom.
 • Not independent from the previous point, there is a side-eﬀect of publicizing 
evaluation data that should be counteracted. Large performance diﬀerences 
within these countries are generated by the extremely selective character of their 
education systems. The power of the publicity of performance data would even 
increase selection; therefore, using external evaluation and the improvement of 
low-performing schools is essential. 
 • In most of South Eastern Europe the socio-economic and socio-cultural back-
ground of students imposes a very strong impact on their results. In other 
words: the capacity of schools to compensate for the negative impact of social 
disadvantages on learning is rather weak. Again, improving this capacity can 
be expected from the targeted development of schools providing poor-quality 
service.
 • Setting unambiguous expectations towards schools and strengthening the 
impact of these expectations through dominant instruments does not improve 
the capacity of schools to solve their problems independently. The question is 
the extent to which schools can become competent to ensure the professional 
accountability of their own teaching staﬀ and to what extent they are able to 
transfer these external expectations. These may require more than delivering 
strong messages.
Bearing in mind all these considerations, it is worth mapping out the possible toolkit 
of active intervention. In this respect, we should think in two dimensions: the basis of 
intervention might be external quality evaluation or external assessment of the perfor-
mance of students, and the method of intervention can be developmental or incentives. 
In the ﬁrst case, the emphasis is on the support that is provided to the developmental 
eﬀorts of the schools; in the second case, generating momentum for development (by 
punishment or rewards) is emphasized. Of course, in both respects there might also be 
combinations. Evaluation-based intervention schemes are more likely to use developmen-
tal methods, while assessment-based systems are more easily connected with incentives; 
nevertheless, there are examples of any variations of the two dimensions.
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Table 12.2
The Basis and Method of Intervention
Basis of intervention Method of intervention
Developmental Incentive (punishing-rewarding)
External evaluation Mandatory development planning 
on the basis of self-evaluation
Additional resources serving 
school development 
(money, counseling, etc.)
Student performance 
assessment
Supplementary services for 
underachieving students 
(mentoring, catching-up 
programs, etc.)
Performance-based financing
Identifying the target group of intervention was already discussed in the previous 
sections, and in this respect, external assessment of the performance of the students 
appears to be the most appropriate. As far as the content of intervention is concerned, 
it is not obvious that testing provides the best point of departure. As it was indicated, 
consequences connected to assessment are rarely tailor-made. Dealing with schools as 
“black boxes” does not allow for adjusting the intervention to the unique institutional 
circumstances that explain poor performance. The approach behind test-based account-
ability systems is a kind of economic rationality: if a business organization goes bust, it 
does not happen without reason. Development of an organization that is on the decline 
contradicts this economic rationality. However, the problems of public services, espe-
cially education, cannot be dealt with according to this logic. The “nearest” school and 
the principle of easy access to educational services are protected in all countries. This 
is the problem that external evaluation can handle; it is capable of identifying school 
failure and revealing its reasons at the same time, because it covers all possible relevant 
deﬁciencies of quality. Intervention based on the results of external evaluation is less 
standardized and much less easy to manage but oﬀers a higher probability of success.
If the intervention is based on student performance assessment, it almost automatically 
assumes that such intervention can be standardized. This is the basis of all intervention 
methods when the consequences connected to poor school performance are built into the 
ﬁnancing of schools. There are two constraints on this logic that should be mentioned 
here. First, there is no shortcut between ﬁnancing and school performance: more money 
does not result in better performance. Second is the problem of ﬁnancial consequences 
that almost always strengthen the negative side-eﬀects of test-based accountability, such 
as test result inﬂation. In addition, if identifying school failure is based on the public-
ity of assessment data aggregated at the level of schools, there might be scant need to 
use additional incentives. (It would be detrimental, especially in a transition period, 
during which the actors of local accountability relationships learn how to coexist with 
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the fact that the eﬀectiveness of schools is made visible to everyone.) Another question 
is that whatever the method of intervention is, it has additional costs beyond the basic 
ﬁnancing of schools. These resources may allow for using ﬁnancial incentives, but they 
should serve for the motivation of teachers.
Developmental intervention may address schools, and also certain student groups. 
For example, a widely used developmental intervention instrument provides supple-
mentary educational services to disadvantaged students learning in poorly performing 
schools. Due to the individual and tailor-made character of these services, mentoring 
or catching-up programs proved to be eﬀective in improving the achievement of the 
students who were involved. Other instruments, such as transferring students to other 
schools out of the school district did not result in any documented improvement (Rand 
Corporation 2007).
Since school failure can be explained by many diﬀerent aspects of quality, develop-
mental intervention based on external evaluation follows a procedural logic. Therefore, 
in this case the modus operandi of external evaluation is standardized, though its 
content and methods are much less so. The basis of intervention is a development 
plan that schools are obliged to create. The implementation of the development plan 
is monitored and there is a follow-up evaluation made at the end of the development 
cycle. This system requires serious school improvement knowledge both on the side of 
the evaluators and the schools. 
There are countries where external evaluation itself is considered the instrument of 
intervention. For example, in the United Kingdom, if inspection reveals weaknesses, then 
there is a follow-up evaluation in the next year that addresses only the areas that were 
previously found to be weak. Beyond enforcing and informing school improvement, 
in the case of failure of mandatory school development, most European inspectorates 
have stronger instruments at their disposal. These instruments might be very diﬀerent: 
suspending the management of the schools and placing the schools under external 
control (Britain), withdrawal of the accreditation and certiﬁcation rights of the schools 
(Flemish Belgium), calling the minister to apply sanctions (Scotland), etc. However, 
most European inspections consider the actual use of these sanctions a failure; thus, 
they are only applied in extreme cases. These sanctions are rather used as a “sword in the 
scabbard”: they exist but are rarely used. These sanctions should not aﬀect the failing 
schools only; they should transfer an easily decoded message to all schools.
Clearly, the intensity of intervention follows a sequential pattern in general: in the 
case of the failure of the ﬁrst intervention with weaker consequences, then stronger 
instruments are used. It applies to interventions based on testing and on evaluations, 
too. The diﬀerence among the diﬀerent levels of interventions can be grasped along 
two axes: (i) how large is the subversive eﬀect of the applied intervention measures on 
the everyday operation of the schools, and (ii) how much are the necessary changes 
designed and implemented by the staﬀ of the school itself? The typical instruments 
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used independently or in a “package” in the two major types of accountability systems 
are summarized in Box 12.1 As can be seen, the intensity of consequences in the case 
of mild, moderate, or strong consequences is rather diﬀerent in the United States than 
in Europe: what is considered to be “moderate” in the USA is already a ﬁnal and radical 
sanction in Europe reserved for the cases of complete failure.
Box 12.1
Interventions in Failing Schools
Intensity of intervention Basis of intervention
Consequences connected to 
external assessment (USA)
Consequences connected 
to evaluation (Europe)
Mild consequences Mandatory school-based 
planning, external expert support, 
training, intensive and organized 
ivolvement of the parents, 
mentoring for underachieving 
students, supplementary financial 
resources or the withdrawal of 
certain financial resources.
Recommendations or instructions 
on the basis of external evaluation 
that are to be applied in school-
based quality management.
Moderate consequences Increased instruction time, 
“school audit” by external 
experts, implementation of 
a school reorganization plan, 
recommending other schools 
for the students, constraining 
the autonomy of the schools, 
replacing the director of the 
school.
External evaluation obliges the 
school to develop a development 
plan (action plan) that should 
contain the goals to be pursuit.
Strong consequences Replacing the (almost) 
entire teaching staff and the 
management of the school, 
an authority takes over the 
management of the school, the 
closure of the school.
Evaluation leads to disciplinary 
sanctions that are put in force 
by the inspectorate or other 
authorities. These may address the 
management of the school or the 
whole school. Possible sanctions: 
reducing financing, withdrawal of 
the right of issuing certifications, 
levying a fine, dismissal of certain 
actors
—Spreng 2005, Eurydice 2004
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The Accountability of Accountability Systems
Finally, there is one aspect of accountability systems that should be brieﬂy indicated: 
its very own accountability. Obviously, the instruments of quality evaluation are very 
complex and require a high level of professionalism and the application of an increas-
ingly sophisticated methodology. This matter raises a speciﬁc dilemma. On the one 
hand, in a decentralized education system, quality evaluation is too important to be left 
at the mercy of specialists. On the other hand, ensuring professional legitimacy of the 
tools that are used in the course of any type of quality evaluation is essential; somebody 
should guarantee the reliability and validity of these tools and that of the data produced 
by quality evaluation. Meeting both requirements calls for a balanced system with the 
following ﬁve key elements:
 • Evaluation policy mechanism: operating a quality evaluation system requires a high 
level of strategic guidance and policy coordination. However, the credibility of 
the tools can be guaranteed by independent organizations—independent from 
political inﬂuence or from the inﬂuence of interest groups. The function of an 
evaluation policy mechanism is to exercise professional control over the system 
without constraining the responsibility of policymakers in setting the overall 
goals. (For example, it can be performed by an Evaluation Council composed 
of members who are selected in a way that avoids any conﬂicts of interest.)
 • Suitability veriﬁcation: the standardization, testing, and regular ﬁne-tuning of 
the instruments used in external assessment of evaluation, methodological sup-
port, and the development of the instruments.
 • Internal professional publicity: since quality evaluation is not an academic but 
rather a governance matter, the applied methodology is not the private busi-
ness of experts. Therefore, open access should be ensured to all methodological 
aspects of the operation of quality evaluation instruments of any kind in order 
to eliminate professional information monopolies.
 • Program and policy evaluation: independent program and policy evaluation is 
able to provide feedback on the impact of any quality evaluation related initia-
tives or measures. A speciﬁc ﬁeld of evaluation is meta-evaluation: academic or 
practical purpose professional reﬂection on evaluation itself.
 • The capacity of end-users to interpret quality evaluation information: the audience 
of the information provided by quality evaluation consists of various professional 
and non-professional groups: parents, politically elected decision-makers, profes-
sional staﬀ of authorities, teachers, etc. All of these groups should be prepared 
to interpret the information and use it for planning and decision-making.
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Professional Services
From a narrow management point of view, the matter of professional support services 
may seem to be a secondary problem. However, from a wider governance perspective, 
decentralization makes professional support services an outstanding challenge. As the 
previous chapters of this reading may well demonstrate, decentralization increases 
expectations of teachers and schools to a huge extent. Obviously, without appropriate 
professional support, setting overwhelming demands on schools would be unfair, and 
what is even more problematic—it would be not realistic at all. 
13.1 Support Services in Centralized Education Systems
Professional support services in education are not determined by the agenda of the 
services providers, but by the demand for support originating from the work of 
schools and teachers. The consequence of this rather trivial statement is that the extent 
to which a diversiﬁed, specialized support network exists, with the potential to reach 
out to all schools, mainly depends on the tasks that are deployed to schools. For 
example, deploying mandatory self-evaluation to schools generates demand for counsel-
ing; a policy emphasis on gifted children generates demand for art and music education 
services, etc.
In highly centralized education systems, the scope and diversity of the activities of 
schools rarely goes beyond the delivery of lessons. This is the most important underly-
ing reason for foreign observers ﬁnding the supply of professional support services very 
poor in all centralized education systems. The two major characteristics of such systems 
are the following:
 • In fact, the only support service provided is in-service teacher training because 
the government artiﬁcially generates demand for it by prescribing mandatory 
participation.
 • Due to the lack of the “own agenda” of schools, the service is provided by public 
providers whose work and program are almost completely determined by the 
agenda of the central government.
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In short, in centralized education systems the low expectations towards the schools are 
matched with low support. In Part Two we have seen how the majority of schools in 
South Eastern Europe—and in a few other European countries—are barely more than 
the buildings where children are gathered because the teachers deliver their lessons there. 
This type of school does not generate demand for any external support, partly because 
teachers “know exactly” how to deliver lessons, partly because the success or failures of 
schools are not visible at all. What ﬂows from this is a support system, in which the sup-
pliers are funded and not the service, services are not quality assured, and their impact 
remains extremely limited because of the low absorption capacity of schools. There are 
several international donor programs investing heavily into the development of support 
services in the region, mainly into in-service teacher training. However, increasing the 
institutional and professional capacity of service providers (i.e., the supply side) only 
leads to increasing participation in capacity building programs that are important for 
somebody else outside the schools. 
The two most important features of in-service training systems in South Eastern 
Europe are that they are neither separated nor integrated. In several countries a large 
proportion of capacity building programs are provided by inspectorates (e.g., in Bulgaria 
or in Romania), by the advisors of central institutions (e.g. “savetnici” of the Education 
and Teacher Training Agency in Croatia, the same people who are—in theory—also 
in charge of the external evaluation of schools), or by university professors. All these 
people are not professional trainers; they are experts of various ﬁelds, most typically 
subject specialists. Therefore, their methodology is outdated, the training they provide 
in most cases is not more than one to two hours of lecturing on issues that they ﬁnd 
important. Since change is not a perpetual business in schools, it is not that surprising: 
there is very little to adjust to. In Croatia, even the Ministry of Education has no stake 
in determining the themes addressed by in-service trainings; it is completely ruled by 
the advisors that make even the policy relevance of capacity building questionable.
The lack of integration within the in-service training system means that the ca-
pacity building services of various suppliers are disconnected. The training programs 
provided by regional pedagogical centers (Bulgaria) or by NGOs in all of the countries 
are not integrated into the mainstream “oﬃcial” systems. There is an oﬃcially issued 
catalogue of available programs in Serbia and Croatia. However, in Croatia, for example, 
it is rather accidental which NGO program will be incorporated into the catalogue. 
(It largely depends on the actual lobbying potential of the NGO or the international 
donor agency that oﬀers the program.) Generally speaking, with very rare exceptions, 
only NGO-provided programs apply innovative approaches and use appropriate train-
ing methods. This creates a kind of double system of in-service training within which 
the more innovative segment hardly inﬂuences the traditional one. The only attempt 
to integrate the diﬀerent segments was the establishment of an in-service training ac-
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creditation mechanism in Serbia in the last decade. In Bulgaria, an additional obstacle 
to the modernization and professionalization of the in-service teacher training system 
is its rigid interlocking with the framework of teacher career development system. (It 
is called a “qualiﬁcation system,” but it is a progression scheme on a salary scale on the 
basis of somewhat artiﬁcial criteria with only symbolic salary increments.) It creates the 
rather unique situation in which any in-service participation related measures are based 
on the national collective agreement that has been developed in a bargaining system 
with extremely strong trade union mandates.34
The in-service teacher training system does not invest in the development of pro-
grams. Not only because of the lack of quality requirements that programs should apply, 
but also because the system is completely based on public funding of the operation of 
the suppliers. If there is any investment into program development, it is based on the 
charity of international donor agencies. Therefore, the resources available for the training 
“market” will remains very limited despite the eﬀorts of international donor agencies.
Something similar applies to support services provided to students. Centralized 
education is a teacher and teaching-centered system; therefore, what matters are statistics 
and not the individual student. In addition, due to the centralized ﬁnancial alloca-
tion system, those students whose speciﬁc educational needs are obvious are taught in 
separate schools. Therefore, the services that are provided to these students are typically 
in-house services. On the other hand, schools being funded on a “historical” basis in 
South Eastern Europe, especially in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, they are 
extremely generous in ﬁnancing the employment of various specialists for the schools. 
For example, in Croatia, the staﬀ of schools includes a large number of “expert associ-
ates” (strucni suradniki). These specialists are pedagogues (pedagog), teachers of special 
education (defectolog), psychologists (psiholog), logopedists (logoped). Also, schools can 
employ expert associates who are health and social workers, as well as librarians. This 
system has two characteristics that make the professionalization of the service they provide 
very hard: since they are part of the staﬀ, the relationship between them and those whose 
work they support is not a clear service provider–client relationship. Also, they do not 
have the institutional background that is essential to ensure their knowledge base and 
their speciﬁc own professional development. (A school is not designed to accumulate 
knowledge on the speciﬁc service these specialists provide.) In theory, this setting has 
the advantage of bringing the specialist closer to the teachers whose work they sup-
port. However, it has certain negative side-eﬀects, such as closing their expertise into a 
ghetto within the school. For example, subject teachers do not deal with pedagogical 
methodological problems because “it is the job of the pedagogist.”35 
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13.2 General Overview of Professional Support Services
In general, the only common feature of professional support systems is their extreme 
diversity in relation to their all relevant aspects: the types of services provided, the way 
how these services are institutionalized, and—as a result—the way how they are funded. 
For example, the extent to which certain services are developed very much depends on 
the policy priorities of the government and on the actual problems that schools have 
to solve. As a general pattern, it can be said that the more decentralized an educational 
system, the larger the role that non-public service providers will play.
Due to the diversity of professional support systems, it is hard to oﬀer a taxonomy 
of the various services. They can be grouped according to the clients of the services; there 
are services provided to self-governments (e.g., assessment or school audit), to schools 
(e.g., training and counseling in quality management or school supplies), to directors 
(e.g., coaching or training), to teachers (e.g., training on methodology or on ICT), or 
to students (e.g., social aid or mentoring). In several cases, there are multiple clients; for 
example, an advisor working with a group of teachers on self-evaluation may support 
the director simultaneously.
A possible basis of classiﬁcation might be the type of activity to be supported and that 
in several cases overlaps with the identiﬁcation of the clients. However, since services are 
determined by the activity that they support, this approach is much more accurate. The 
most typical activities that generate demand for external expert support are planning and 
management (at any level), organizational activities in schools, teaching, and learning. 
However, there are certain external support activities (often called development, but 
sometimes provided on a regular basis) that are connected to speciﬁc single issues, such 
as special needs inclusion, inclusion of immigrant or Roma students, health education, 
democratic citizenship, or environment. These developments often combine various 
types of services supporting various activities of various clients.
Another possible way is to classify the services according to the type of their provider. 
There might be service tasks performed by government-owned public providers, such as 
an institute maintained by the ministry with regional branches or a government-owned 
network of training centers. Also, there are public service provider agencies owned and 
operated by self-governments, such as a network of county pedagogical institutes or 
pedagogical support oﬃces operated by municipal self-governments. Apart from these 
public providers, there is a wide range of various organizations that oﬀer professional 
services: nongovernmental organizations, business organizations, higher education 
institutions, professional associations, trade unions, and schools providing services for 
other schools. The typical pattern is a mixed model in a decentralized education system 
in which the diverse support needs of schools can be best served. Professional service 
systems with very diﬀerent types of providers sometimes ensure better conditions for 
public providers (e.g., by ensuring ﬁnancing for operational costs), but there are other 
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systems that are completely sector-neutral, avoiding giving a market advantage to any 
of the actors. For example, some countries—instead of maintaining support agencies—
contract out even genuine public services via an open procurement process. In mixed 
professional service systems, the most important question is where to draw the line 
between services that are publicly funded and those that are completely marketized? In 
other words: what are the services that states are obliged to ensure within any kind of 
ﬁnancial construction? Also, there are certain expert services that are considered to be 
administrative tasks, while in another country it might be considered as professional 
support; one example for this is the work of expert committees that provide their expert 
decisions on enrolling children into special needs schools or programs. 
An additional aspect of the actual way the diﬀerent services are provided is the 
“historically” developed division of labor between external service providers and schools. 
There are certain services, such as social work, that are considered to be part of the work 
of schools, while in other countries it is not the business of the staﬀ of the schools at all. 
For example, in the Netherlands, all children eat what they bring from home, while in 
Hungary all schools have a cafeteria where lunch is provided to the students.
13.3 Main Types of Professional Support Services
There are certain professional support services that are provided in almost all of the 
European countries regardless of the actual pattern of service provisions. Without 
claiming even the appearance of completeness, the list of the most typical service types 
is the following:
 • In-service teacher training. In-service training (INSET), often called continuing 
professional development (CPD), is considered to be part of the mandatory 
tasks of teachers. Being public employees, teacher’s training is also directly 
(supply-driven systems) or indirectly (demand-driven systems) ensured by the 
state. In six European countries, participation is optional but linked to career 
advancement; in all other countries it is either mandatory or strongly encour-
aged. In most European countries, participation is based on planning either 
at the central/local level or in the schools. In several European countries, it is 
compulsory to develop INSET plans as a part of the school development plans.
 • School management training and coaching. As it was discussed already in this 
book, the expectations towards school directors, and by default, the require-
ments of holding this position are increasing. As a result, the in-service training 
for directors becomes increasingly similar to that of teachers. 
 • Counseling for teachers. Teachers may need support in a wide range of matters in 
relation to the subject they teach or teaching methodologies. Although this type 
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of support is often provided by inspectors or arranged within the schools, several 
countries operate a network of advisors who teachers can consult. Counseling is 
often connected to an innovation project or to speciﬁc problems that teachers 
face, such as behavioral problems of children. 
 • Assessment. Several schools are establishing their internal school-wide assessment 
systems with the support of external assessment specialists. Also, specialists often 
support teachers’ own pedagogical assessment practices. The assessment support 
can be remote, such as online “item banks” or “test banks,” from which teachers 
can download and construct their own assessment instruments.
 • Content development and application. As the role of textbooks has declined, the 
importance of oﬄine and online services oﬀering alternative “raw material” for 
teaching and learning is growing. Digital databases of “learning objects” for 
various subjects are becoming especially more popular among teachers. Since 
constructing content is a new task that teachers perform, more active profes-
sional support is also oﬀered to teachers in certain countries.
 • Infrastructure and professional support in extracurricular activities. There are various 
extracurricular activities (e.g., camps) that require special facilities. Very often 
not only the facilities are oﬀered to schools but also the learning programs are 
provided by the trained staﬀ of the facilities, such as in the case of “museum” 
pedagogy.
 • Innovation. While quality management is “doing the same better,” innovation 
is about “doing something new.” Any educational innovations require external 
support, not only in relation to the “content” of the speciﬁc innovation, but 
also for its adaptation and application. Experts supporting innovation projects 
are typically specialists in managing school or classroom level change.
 • Parent/family involvement. In countries where parental involvement is heavily 
emphasized, various organizations oﬀer support to organize activities that en-
courage parents to support their children’s schooling. 
 • Resource centers, libraries. Certain services do more than simply ensure the supply 
of school libraries or separate resource centers with books or other resources. 
They often provide support for the better use of such facilities for learning.
 • Induction support to new teachers. In most countries, the induction of beginner 
teachers is the task of the schools. However, special advisory support is made 
available to them in only a few countries.
 • Mentoring, tutoring, correpetition. Mentoring is a typical support oﬀered to 
students. Although in most cases it is the regular or extra task of teachers, it 
is often available for students as a service outside the school. The support that 
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mentors provide is often more than academic help; they often help children 
to overcome personal problems, improve their study skills and examination 
techniques, strengthen their self-esteem, etc. In several countries, this type of 
support is not institutionalized at all, because it is part of the “shadow economy” 
of education.
 • Guidance. These are programs or support services that provide advice and guid-
ance for students who need assistance in choosing the program of further studies 
that is suited to their abilities, interests, future plans, and general circumstances.
 • Disabled student services. Provisions that provide special assistance for students 
whose visual, hearing, or mental disabilities would prevent them from obtain-
ing education without support services. Disabled student services are especially 
essential if children with diﬀerent disabilities are taught in integrated settings. 
In these cases, working with teachers to strengthen the inclusive character of 
their work is of outstanding importance. At a certain point of inclusion, special-
needs schools that had been segregated then changed their primary function 
and became support service provider institutions in many countries. 
 • Special needs support. These are all sort of provisions that provide diagnostic and 
treatment services which combine psychotherapeutic and tutorial techniques for 
students who have learning disabilities, dyslexia, perceptual problems, emotional 
problems, or other diﬃculties that interfere with their ability to learn. External 
service providers work directly with children and, at the same time, support the 
work of their teachers.
 • Support to gifted children, art and music education. Supporting children with 
any type of talent is a high priority in all education systems. Apart from talent 
programs in schools, external support networks are established for this purpose 
in several countries. A network of art and music schools often provides classes 
for children.
 • Non-educational (social, health, etc.) services connected to education. In educa-
tion, social workers are supporting those children whose education is aﬀected 
by irregular attendance or absence from school. In most cases, they also serve 
as a liaison among families, teachers, social oﬃcers of local authorities, health 
organizations, etc. Also, schooling is very often connected to primary health 
services, such as regular student medical or dental checks.
 • School supplies. Various business organizations specialized in supplying schools 
with textbooks, notebooks, classroom furniture, pencils, calculators, or any 
other essential educational supplies. They are mentioned among professional 
services because supplying schools requires speciﬁc educational knowledge.
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Box 13.1
The Pillars of a Possible Demand-driven In-service Training System
• Mandatory participation. In most countries, teachers are obliged to participate in 
in-service training. This mandate is typically determined as a required (minimum) 
number of hours to be accomplished within a certain period of time. (For example, 
in the United Kingdom, the minimum participation prescribed is 35 hours per year, 
in Hungary it is 120 hours in seven years.) If these requirements are not realized, 
teachers often face serious sanctions.
• A free market of in-service training provisions. Establishing a free market of services 
has the advantage of making the supply of training responsive to the demand 
generated by the capacity building needs of the schools and channels in private 
resources to the development of training programs.
• Quality assurance of the training market. Government agencies are running in-ser-
vice training accreditation mechanisms. The agency may accredit training providers 
(licensing), individual training programs, or both. There might be additional tasks 
performed by the agency, such as an information service, monitoring the training 
market, evaluation, piloting or developing programs, or methodological support 
to training organizations.
• Allocating resources for in-service training. In demand-driven systems typically 
the clients of in-service training services (i.e., schools) are supported in order to 
stimulate the market. Supplementary ﬁnancial resources can be incorporated into 
the regular allocation system on a normative basis calculated according to the 
number of teachers. The state budget support for in-service training is typically 
earmarked. School may use any additional resources for training services, but 
public money can be spent only on accredited programs.
There is one speciﬁc matter that is worth mentioning in relation to the above kinds 
of professional support services. Almost all of these services are high value-added activi-
ties provided by highly-trained specialists. Ensuring the knowledge base of their work 
(e.g., connecting research and service provisions, collecting and disseminating good 
practices, ensuring mutual learning, and the exchange of experiences in conferences, 
etc.) is essential. As the professional service industry is growing in Europe, national 
educational and pedagogical institutes are working less and less with schools directly 
and focusing on the support of the many thousands of people who are working with 
schools and teachers.
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The New Pattern of Governance
The New Pattern of Governing Education
What is the pattern of governance that unfolds from the overview of the ﬁve decen-
tralization-relevant functional governance instruments? The transformation of the role 
of central governance agencies, that is, from administrative management to strategic 
steering, as well as the conditions of eﬀective strategic steering, were discussed in Chap-
ter 4. In Part Three, how most of these conditions ﬁt to the decentralized functional 
governance instruments was outlined, too. The question here is the entire construct of 
governance that applies to all these instruments.
An education system can be governed any which way; but governing the system in 
a way that ensures that the expectations of the governors are taken up in the schools 
and classrooms is very diﬃcult. So far, the most important conclusion is that all these 
systemic mechanisms must be interlocked in order to ensure this. They have to add 
up to an environment within which schools are driven through the perpetual cycles 
of organizational learning for the sake of improving the learning of students, and they 
should be properly supported to do so. Thus, ensuring organizational learning in schools 
has ﬁve major systemic conditions: (i) setting high expectations by determining easily 
interpreted goals, (ii) empowerment, that is, ensuring the necessary autonomy for the 
sake of performing mandatory organizational duties, (iii) quality evaluation and feeding 
back information about the successes and failures to each individual school, (iv) making 
the necessary professional support available, and (v) ensuring professional accountability 
by intervention in case of poor quality and performance (Radó 2008).
The eﬀective decentralized governance system is made up of the combination of 
high expectations, empowerment, solid support, and professional accountability; if any 
of these elements are missing, the eﬀectiveness of governance declines. In addition, as 
was emphasized several times, the individual instruments designed to ensure any of 
these requirements are to be properly harmonized and connected. What matters is the 
whole construct of governance, not necessarily the individual instruments alone. If a new 
instrument is incorporated into the governance system, or if any of them is modiﬁed, 
it has implications for all other components. For example, when the prime minister’s 
Delivery Unit was established in the UK in 2001 to monitor the progress on the deliv-
ery of the key priorities of the government in education, health, crime, and transport, 
266
G O V E R N I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z E D  E D U C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
the context within which inspectorates were operating had already rather dramatically 
changed. Therefore, the potential spillover of changes should be deliberately considered 
and built upon. However, the opposite conclusion might also be valid: it is important 
to consider using “system-compatible” instruments that ﬁt well with all the others. (In 
the case of the last example, the intention was to reconstruct the context for others, and 
the “incompatibility” was purposeful.) 
Figure C.3.1
The Systemic Conditions of Governing Decentralized Education Systems
In the previous chapters, almost the entire toolkit of contemporary governance sys-
tems was brieﬂy reviewed. However, the number of European countries that deploy all 
of them is limited, although most of them strive to ensure that all of the basic functions 
are performed. When selecting the targets of systemic development, answering certain 
questions may help to determine the most urgent functional governance instruments 
to be built. The ﬁrst question is how big is the pressure to adjust? In other words: can 
we imagine the improvement of the system’s performance (i.e., generating organiza-
tional learning development established in schools), without heavy investment into the 
modernization of governance? For example, in Finland or in Sweden, where schools are 
able to produce high performances without major systemic changes, this need is rather 
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limited, even if in the light of the previous chapters, their governance system may ap-
pear to be “incomplete.” However, in Bulgaria or in Serbia, where we are witnessing a 
dramatic decline in PISA results, major systemic change in all relevant governance areas 
seems to be inevitable. 
Another orienting reference might be the extent to which performance diﬀerences 
among various segments of the education system exist. For example, in Bulgaria, this 
matter may call for investment into those accountability mechanisms that have the po-
tential to improve the performance of underachieving schools. Even in Central Europe 
(e.g. Germany, Austria, Hungary, etc.), where the average performance of education 
systems is higher than in South Eastern Europe, large performance diﬀerences among 
schools are forcing governments to reconsider how the systems are governed.
The decentralized governance system that was outlined so far in this reading requires 
many new personal, procedural, and organizational competencies. Many of these com-
petencies are developed according to the reliable “learning by doing” pattern: individuals 
and organizations ﬁnd themselves in new roles and learn how to perform it. However, 
these changes require deliberate investment into these competencies. But even more 
essential is operating a governance system that is able to learn. 
Finally, the last question is: why do it? Decentralization does not leave any of the 
major components of governance systems untouched. In the course of decentralization 
expansive and sophisticated systems are to be built that impose a large adjustment ef-
fort on the side of all actors in education. All major steps deﬁnitely cause a temporary 
“decline of order” that carries the risk of discrediting the underlying intention of the 
changes, as happened several times in South Eastern Europe. Also, it inevitably leads to 
a temporary increase of the number of people who will feel they are losing a lot—for 
good reason. For example, the accumulated experience of whole generations might be 
devaluated. The question whether is it worth the risk should be answered. One of the 
possible answers is that it is worth to undertake all these risks because decentralization 
will result in improved learning outcomes. 
However, we should be aware that it does not happen automatically. In fact, some-
times even the opposite occurs; for example, in the ﬁrst part of the 1990s, the measured 
learning outcomes were declining in Hungary and the performance of the system was 
stabilized only in the last third of the decade. This phenomenon can be best described 
as the systemic equivalent of the implementation dip; initiating major changes leads 
to the temporary decline of quality and eﬀectiveness before the operation of newly 
established mechanisms are stabilized and ﬁne-tuned. (Small signs in the improve-
ment of the students’ performance suggest that Hungary has already passed the period 
of the systemic implementation dip.) Therefore, what realistically can be expected is 
that decentralization creates a systemic environment within which improving the learning 
of students is possible. In other words: systematic investment into the contemporary 
instruments of decentralized governance is about creating a favorable environment for 
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development (Radó 2004). Having many ministries of education that are watching the 
decline of quality and eﬀectiveness of education without having any eﬀective means at 
their disposal to do something, is a powerful argument in itself.
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Summary of the Key Points of Part Three
In the course of decentralization, all components of the systemic environment of the 
education service delivery institutions should be adjusted to the required change of the 
work of schools and their staﬀ. The key points of Part Three in relation to the adjust-
ment of the ﬁve relevant stands of decentralization are the following:
 The framework of decentralized public services management is a map of local ac-
countability relationships. It includes the short route of accountability between 
the clients and the education service provider institutions, and the long route of 
accountability, in which local self-governments transfer the voice of citizens to 
their service provider institutions through the compact that determines the major 
parameters of the work of schools.
 Both routes of ensuring accountability have certain shortcomings. The two 
contemporary prevailing schools of public management address diﬀerent account-
ability-related problems: New Public Management is striving to overcome the 
shortcomings of the long route of accountability by strengthening the power of 
clients, while New Public Service aims at solving the problems of quasi-market 
relationships by improving the functioning of the long route of accountability.
 A decentralized system that focuses on local management relationships overwrites 
the latitude of central governance; most of the means designed to inﬂuence the work 
of the schools directly are to be replaced with indirect means of working through 
other actors in local accountability relationships. The primary aim of the governance 
of education is to inﬂuence two connected management cycles: the management of 
schools and the management of local school networks.
 Governance should operate with intelligent instruments that easily adjust to the 
diversity of local and institutional contexts. Also, governance should use dominant 
instruments that have the potential to overwrite or change certain components of 
the local context. In both respects, building multilevel and well-connected systems 
of consultation, planning, and development are essential.
 The largest proportion of the recurrent costs of educational services is spent on the 
salaries of the teaching staﬀ of schools. Therefore, the three main factors that deter-
mine per student costs in education are the level of the compensation of teachers, 
the labor intensity of the service provided, and the amount of money spent on other 
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educational inputs. These three factors sketch out quite diﬀerent ﬁnancing proﬁles 
of the education systems in South Eastern Europe.
 In contrast to the centralized ﬁnancial allocation systems of most countries in the 
region, ﬁscal decentralization may create an allocation system that has the potential 
to ensure the eﬃciency of ﬁnancing and can adjust to the very diverse speciﬁc costs 
of educational services in diﬀerent schools. Although due to demographic decline, 
ensuring eﬃciency is on the policy agenda of almost all the countries in the region, 
the only country that made serious ﬁscal decentralization steps is Bulgaria.
 Since the instruments of human resource management at the national level compose 
an extremely fragmented system, within which creating strategic coherence is very 
hard, all of them should focus on ensuring the necessary conditions for a coherent 
and complete human resource management regime within the schools. One of the 
critical elements of such a regime in schools is the introduction of a diﬀerentiated 
compensation scheme for teachers that is well connected to other elements of hu-
man resource management. 
 The content regulation system serves three major aims: determining goals for lower-
level actors of the management of education, inﬂuencing how autonomous actors 
set their goals, and inﬂuencing the actual content of the teaching-learning process. 
The major components of content regulation are input and process regulation in-
struments (curricula), output regulation instruments (standards), the instruments 
of the qualiﬁcation system, and the instruments that better connect other content 
regulation tools with the provision of services.
 The mainstream direction of international trends in education is curricular decen-
tralization and extensive use of output regulation instruments (i.e., centralization by 
outcomes). This trend has a major impact on the function and design of curricula and 
increases the weight of those instruments that mediate between learning-outcomes 
targets and teaching and learning in the classrooms. Also, qualiﬁcation systems are 
becoming increasingly based on learning outcomes (“competencies”).
 Content regulation in primary and secondary education is a fragmented chain of 
interpretations; therefore, content regulation instruments should not be designed 
to be directly “implemented” in the classrooms. The outcomes of interpretation by 
diﬀerent autonomous actors (e.g., textbook publishers, schools) should be quality 
assured. All of the South Eastern European countries operate more or less central-
ized content regulation systems.
 Quality evaluation systems in education are parts of an overall performance manage-
ment system: evaluation of any kind should be based on the goals set for education, 
and any poor quality and ineﬀectiveness that has been identiﬁed should be followed 
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up by intervention. Quality evaluation systems have three major pillars: the assess-
ment of the performance of students, the external evaluation of schools, and the 
information system of education. An indicator-based information management and 
reporting system can integrate the three components of quality evaluation.
 Quality evaluation should serve two major aims at the same time: supporting orga-
nizational learning in schools and ensuring professional accountability of education 
service providers. At the level of the individual instruments, these aims are rather 
contradictory; they either serve support or accountability purposes. Therefore, the 
whole quality evaluation system should be operated in a way that balances the two 
aims.
 There are performance-based and quality-based accountability systems. Performance-
based systems operate by testing the achievement of performance standards and 
connect poor results with certain consequences. Quality-based systems integrate 
performance standards as one aspect of quality and the consequences of poor quality 
are connected to the results of external school evaluation (inspection).
 Bearing in mind the strengths and weaknesses of both types of accountability systems, 
in the South Eastern European context the most appropriate setting appears to be 
one that identiﬁes poor performance on the basis of external testing that is then fol-
lowed up by targeted and developmental intervention based on external evaluation. 
Building up this accountability mechanism from the somewhat old-fashioned and 
ineﬀective systems requires systematic investment and time in all the countries of 
the region.
 The scope and the level of diversiﬁcation and diﬀerentiation of professional support 
services that all actors of education service delivery consume primarily depends on 
the demand that the schools’ activities generate. In South Eastern Europe’s central-
ized education systems, professional support is demand-driven, hardly oﬀers more 
than relatively ineﬀective in-service training, and the support systems are typically 
neither separated nor integrated. 
 The pattern of governance that unfolds from all these points if based on ﬁve major 
systemic conditions: (i) setting high expectations towards schools by determining 
easily interpreted goals, (ii) empowerment, that is, ensuring the necessary autonomy 
for the sake of performing mandatory organizational duties, (iii) quality evaluation 
and feeding back information about the successes and failures to each individual 
school, (iv) making the necessary professional support available, and (v) ensuring 
professional accountability by intervention in case of poor quality and performance.
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Governance and Educational Policy
Decentralization of the governance of education completely reshapes the context within 
which educational policies are made and implemented. From a governance point of 
view, this is the most important implication of the decentralization process. On the 
following pages, in spite of the large pool of experiences about the few successes and the 
large number of failures that was accumulated already, very little will be said about how 
educational policies are actually developed and implemented in South Eastern Europe. 
An in-depth analysis of policy processes in the countries of the region is beyond the 
scope of this book. Instead, a general conceptual framework will be oﬀered about the 
key elements of policymaking in decentralized systems. Thus, the illustrations from 
recent policy practice will serve demonstration purposes only.
14.1 What Is Educational Policy?
Making the distinction between politics and policy is not easy due to the lack of 
separate words in most European languages. Therefore, the discussion on educational 
policymaking and implementation in decentralized education systems should start with 
a deﬁnition. However, since providing an overview of the large number of deﬁnitions 
produced by the literature goes far beyond the purpose of this reading, a deﬁnition 
(extracted from various attempts at deﬁnition) is oﬀered here that is easily translated to 
the activities in the practice. Educational policy is the use of authority and resources at the 
disposal of the governance of education to change or inﬂuence the behavior of the actors and 
institutions of education in order to solve problems. If this deﬁnition is unpacked a little 
bit, there are already a few simple messages that it carries. First of all, educational policy 
is a public policy area, that is, it ﬂows from the authority of constitutional governance 
and the political mandate for the use of public resources. The second message is the 
aim of policymaking: change for the sake of problem solving. Thirdly, policymaking is 
mainly an indirect instrument; it works through the changed behavior of others, such 
as teachers, parents, mayors, etc. 
Having said all this about policymaking, we still did not make a clear distinction 
between politics and policy on the one hand, and governance and policy on the other. 
Indeed, these distinctions are rather ambiguous, and whatever is said in order to separate 
them, the diﬀerence that is created can be immediately blurred. For example, the above 
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deﬁnition suggests that policy decisions are per deﬁnition political decisions because 
it is hard to imagine policies that have nothing to do with the use of public resources, 
especially in primary and secondary education that is almost completely funded by 
public money. (If private money is matched with public money, regardless of its ac-
tual proportion, private money starts to behave as public money, too.) In very general 
terms, the distinction is partly constructed by the purpose: politics is per deﬁnition the 
acquisition and application of public power. In contrast, policy is about application of 
power for governance purposes. It is important to emphasize again: even if the actors 
of policymaking are not necessarily the same, the distinction is very much relative. 
For example, planning, negotiating, and approving the annual education budget of a 
country are political decisions. However, decreasing the central budget contribution 
to vocational training and increasing the allocation to general secondary education is 
a political decision with policy relevance, that is, a policy incentive to change enroll-
ment patterns by inﬂuencing the decisions on the planning of vocational and general 
education capacities.
The same ambiguity applies to the diﬀerence between governance and policy, al-
though they may appear to be identical after reading the previous chapters. A certain 
distinction with limited value is created by the fact that governance, in the great majority 
of cases, is about operating the system, while policy is about change. For example, the 
appointment of the head of the inspectorate when the mandate of the previous chief 
inspector expired is a governance decision; it is the condition of ensuring the continuity 
of inspection. However, if the new head is selected and appointed on the basis of his 
capacity to implement necessary changes in how inspection works (that might be even 
proposed by the selected person in his application), the appointment is a policy decision, 
too. Consequently, the diﬀerence lies in the distinction between routine administrative 
decisions and the decisions for purposeful change. Still, policy remains a part of the 
governance of education since the obligation to intervene in the case of problems ﬂows 
from governance responsibilities.
Chapter 4 mentioned that making a distinction between governance and manage-
ment in centralized education systems has limited relevance; the diﬀerence between the 
two becomes visible when management functions are deployed to lower administrative 
levels. The case of the distinction between governance and policy is rather similar, not 
because of their distinct functions, but because of their diﬀerent instruments. Public 
policymaking is the function of governance in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, the actual 
characteristics of governance determine the context within which policies are made and 
implemented and the instruments that are at the disposal of policymakers. In centralized 
systems where the instruments of administrative management serve for policymaking 
and implementation, the tools of governance and policymaking are not completely 
diﬀerent. In decentralized systems, however, the indirect pattern of governance makes 
educational policies indirect, too. At the same time, policymaking gains relative inde-
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pendence, partly because of the large number of participants who are not necessarily 
involved in the day-to-day operation of education systems, and partly because of the 
tools that are required to manage change that, again, are not necessarily used in the 
daily business of administration. 
As it will be seen, policymaking in a decentralized education systems is a sophisticated 
art of change management on a systemic scale. But still, the focal point of policymaking 
is governance and management: the legal mandate deployed to the diﬀerent governance 
and management actors determines their policy responsibilities. Therefore, it is not only 
the national level that makes and implements policies; all management actors that face 
problems that call for initiating any sort of change within the realm of their respon-
sibilities are policymakers: local and schools’ policies are no less relevant than those 
developed at the national level. Educational policymaking being a governance instru-
ment, in decentralized education systems the general aim of policies is not diﬀerent: at 
the national level policies inﬂuence the connected local and institutional management 
cycles, while local policies address the management cycles of schools. In the following 
pages we will concentrate on policymaking and implementation at the national level, 
because the full scale of underlying concepts and the possible instruments are relevant 
only at the level of governments. However, it is important to bear in mind that the 
same concepts and instruments apply at lower levels, although with certain limitations.
14.2 Approaches to the Policy Cycle
The policy process is widely considered to be a cyclical one. It contains various func-
tions, stages, and steps, starting from placing a problem on the policy agenda till the 
evaluation of the actual impact of the implementation of those policies. In theory, and 
surprisingly quite often in practice, all policies build on the lessons learnt from previ-
ous policies, closing the loop. However, the way we understand, structure, and manage 
the educational policy process largely depends on our approach to it. With a mild risk 
of simpliﬁcation, there are three typical approaches to the public policy process: the 
rational, the incremental, and the analytical ones.
The ﬁrst typical approach to policymaking is often called the rational model of 
public policy (Hill 1997). This approach regards the policy process as a logical sequence 
of consecutive steps: policymaking is an algorithm, according to which one stage of 
policymaking is followed by another one in a rational order. Therefore, policymaking 
is a regulated process with a technical blueprint applied at each stage. This is the policy 
culture of “checklists” and technological descriptions of the steps of “high-quality” 
policymaking. For example, one of the most famous versions of this interpretation of 
the policymaking process is the “eight steps path” (Bardach 1996) that sets the follow-
ing iterative stages:
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 • Deﬁne the problem.
 • Assemble some evidence.
 • Construct the alternatives.
 • Select the criteria.
 • Project the outcomes.
 • Confront the trade-oﬀs.
 • Decide.
 • Tell your story.
According to this policy model, policies are rational choices among possible alterna-
tives. The emphasis in this algorithm is on the analysis and methodology of the design 
of policy and much less on the design of implementation. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the approach to public policy often called 
the incremental model. According to this, policymaking always occurs in a messy and 
unpredictable environment, within which the various steps and actions do not necessar-
ily follow any logical order. Sometimes goals are set before justifying them by research 
and analysis, while in other cases certain changes start to be implemented before any 
clear communication about the goals that the changes should serve. Due to the very 
nature of the context within which policies are made, rational choice and the algorithm 
of consecutive technological steps simply do not work. Instead, policies are constructed 
by incremental adjustments to the actual situation on the basis of “successive limited 
comparisons” (Hill 1997). In other words, in most cases policies are constructed on the 
basis of limited options and by ignoring most of the possible consequences, because they 
are based on insuﬃcient information and cannot aﬀord endless and costly analysis. Also, 
the underlying values that inﬂuence policy planning and decisions automatically limit the 
number of options that are even considered. As a result, goals are limited, too: instead 
of striving to create a future ideal situation in which problems are solved, policymakers 
keep returning to problems and attempt to ameliorate them. Therefore, the approach to 
the policy process based on incrementalism does not set technological algorithms that 
are to be followed; the only distinctive stages that are separated are policymaking and 
policy implementation, because in most cases—but not always—the latter starts when 
a formal decision that opens access to the mandate, for which resources are necessary.
What explains the diﬀerence between the two approaches is their relevance within 
certain contexts. In relation to the earlier diﬀerence between performance-based and 
quality-based professional accountability systems, the process of decision-making is 
rather diﬀerent at the two sides of the Atlantic; in the United States, it is a genuine 
political process that requires a great level of procedural rationalization, while in the 
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countries of Continental Europe, public administration procedures prevail. Most policy 
decisions in Europe are made in ministries or government-owned authorities. How these 
bureaucratic machineries operate and their interplay with politics allows much more 
leeway to follow a rather incremental approach to the policy process. This diﬀerence 
is reﬂected also in how the support to policymaking is institutionalized. In the United 
States, providing policy relevant information, preparing alternatives, and supporting the 
actors of decision-making is done mainly by independent (but committed) think-tanks, 
political parties, or governments that rarely have accumulated their own institutionalized 
capacities for such support. In Europe, all these functions are regarded as government 
tasks; governments themselves operate those institutions that are in charge of prepar-
ing for decisions, or to channeling the necessary information and knowledge into the 
administrative decision-making procedure.
14.3 The Approach That Fits the Context
There are two reasons why the relevance of both approaches is rather limited in the east 
of Europe. First of all, in most of the Central and Eastern European and South Eastern 
European countries, none of these clear patterns of decision-making prevail. Policy deci-
sions are mostly made through the administrative procedures of governments, but the 
relative detachment of governments from politics is weak and fragile; ministries depend 
on the political spoils system or on personal networks that appear to be constructed on 
a political basis. In several countries in Western Europe, the other reason for constrain-
ing the ambition of policymaking to an incremental level is a characteristic of normal 
everyday business in settled governance systems. However, the underlying assumption 
throughout this reading is the need of major structural and systemic changes in the 
South Eastern Europe. Even if the governance systems in South Eastern Europe will be 
decentralized, the scope of required changes must go beyond incremental changes for 
a long period of time. Managing changes of this scope and scale is impossible on the 
basis of a limited incremental approach. In addition, in an environment that is messy 
beyond the level of unpredictability in England or France, the rationality of the policy 
process very much matters. 
Thus, the third approach that seems to be a better ﬁt to the regional context is the 
analytical model of the policy process. According to this approach, the context within 
which policies are made and implemented does not allow for managing a rational 
process of consecutive steps. On the other hand, there are certain distinct functions 
that—even if not performed in a sequential manner—are to be separated, understood, 
designed, and managed. In brief, there are no policy steps to be followed, but there 
are policy functions to be performed. The underlying assumption of the analytical ap-
proach is that, in a diﬀuse environment, certain automatisms should be created that 
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ensure a minimum level of rationality in the process of addressing large-scale policy 
interventions. 
The major distinct (analytical) functions very much ﬂow from their very origin, the 
algorithm of applied problem solving: problem recognition, the proposal of solutions, the 
choice of a solution, putting the solution into eﬀect, and monitoring the results. Although 
the policy process can be structured in many diﬀerent ways following diﬀerent theoreti-
cal or practical purposes, there is a widely-shared agreement on its key components. 
In Chapters 15 and 16, a distillation will be oﬀered about each functional elements of 
the policy process (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, Dunn 1994, Haddad 1995, Colebatch 
1998). The major distinct functions within the policy process are the following:
 • Setting the policy agenda: identiﬁcation, understanding, and communicating the 
problems.
 • Policy planning: determining policy objectives and selecting policy tools.
 • Approval of the policy: policy consultation/bargaining and formal decision-making.
 • Policy implementation: managing the top-down and bottom-up implementation 
instruments, monitoring the implementation process.
 • The evaluation of policies: gathering information about the impact of policies 
and feeding back the results to the players in the policy process.
As suggested earlier, in many cases, separating the ﬁrst three functions that are 
bundled together as policymaking is rather problematic. However, the extent to which 
they are dealt with separately in policy practice largely determines the quality of policy-
making. Still, it is important to emphasize that these functions are not to be used as the 
blueprints for the management of policymaking: the activities connected to any of these 
elements of the policy process are iterative ones and rarely organized into a logical and 
chronological order in most cases. This applies even to the sequence of policymaking 
and implementation; in the course of implementation the underlying goals are often 
revisited. Sometimes rethinking the original goals does not occur simply because a new 
government reconsiders the goals of the previous one. It is often desirable in the light 
of new information that may emerge in the course of implementation.
A frequent ambiguity in South Eastern Europe confuses the role of actors of the 
policy process and that of those who are supporting these actors with information and 
analysis. The lack of clear separation of these roles often leads to the underestimation 
of the information and knowledge base of policymaking and the overestimation of the 
policy planning capacity of government agencies. Although it might be surprising to 
South Eastern European audiences, the academic researchers and experts of various 
ﬁelds are not the legitimate and substantive actors of the policy process: they are to sup-
port those stakeholders who are. (We will return later to the identiﬁcation of relevant 
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stakeholders.) The content of these support activities is determined by the content of 
the activities that are supported.
Figure 14.1
The Functional Elements of the Policy Process and Their Support
Many activities in relation to any of the functions in the policy process (such as 
problem analysis, cost-beneﬁt analysis, assessment of the performance of the students, 
or program and policy evaluation) require special expertise. Since the specialists of all 
these activities are not the audience of this reading, the methodology of policy support 
will not be discussed on the following pages. However, all support activities are com-
missioned by policymakers who should be aware of the underlying logic of the work of 
specialists. Thus, apart from brief descriptions of the key elements of the policy process, 
certain simple conceptual models will also oﬀered that might be instrumental in outlin-
ing the “terms of reference” for specialists.
Setting the policy agenda 
(selection and communication)
Planning
Approval 
(managing policy consultations, 
preparing decisions, 
decision-making)
Implementation 
(management and internal 
monitoring)
Evaluation 
(revision and correction)
The public policy process Supporting the actors of policymaking
Analyzing and structuring 
the problems
Forecasting, 
evaluating alternatives, 
supporting planning
Counseling
External monitoring
External evaluation
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15.1 Setting the Policy Agenda
Identifying and Selecting Policy Problems to Be Addressed
As the deﬁnition of educational policy suggests, it is about solving problems. The ques-
tion is: what do we regard as a problem that requires government intervention? Starting 
with the simplest answer, an educational policy problem is an educational service outcome 
that does not meet expectations. One component of this deﬁnition is obvious; the other 
calls for explanation. The obvious part is what we mean by educational outcomes, as was 
abundantly discussed earlier. The only thing that should be reiterated here is the impact 
of the learning-outcomes approach on policymaking: identifying problems in terms of 
measured competencies has become the ruling alignment in nearly all the European 
countries where participation-related problems are not especially striking. 
Determining the expectations against which we assess educational service outcomes 
is much more complicated. For this, the following question should be answered: whose 
expectations matter about what? The point of departure is considering expectations as 
needs expressed in various ways by the two most important stakeholders: the government 
and the clients of educational services. Therefore, when identifying the most important 
expectations, we can turn to the methods of needs assessment (McKillip 1987). The 
four major types of needs are the following:
 • Normative needs: educational service outcomes deﬁned by achievement standards 
or other instruments of content regulation, that is, by curricula or examination 
and qualiﬁcation requirements. These expectations are developed by experts and 
issued by regulations.
 • Felt needs: in this case, the evaluation of the service outcomes is based on the 
directly expressed expectations of the clients of the service. For example, parents 
may expect the schools to provide a larger number of English-language lessons 
or any other subjects that they ﬁnd essential for their children. Also, parents 
with minority aﬃliations may demand that their children be introduced into 
their own cultural traditions and respective language.
284
G O V E R N I N G  D E C E N T R A L I Z E D  E D U C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S
 • Expressed needs: expectations identiﬁed by the behavior of the clients. For 
example, over-application to schools oﬀering speciﬁc programs or the lack of 
willingness of students and parents to apply to certain vocational programs 
provides information on any possible mismatch between supply and demand.
 • Comparative needs: educational service outcomes compared with the achieve-
ment of a relevant out-group. For example, the achievement of Roma students 
by comparison to their non-Roma peers or the educational performance of 
students by comparison to those of other countries.
With a combination of planning at all management levels and of autonomous 
schools, it is possible to balance these expectations. However, we should be aware that 
all the four types of identifying expectations have serious limitations. The typical prob-
lem with normative needs is that, being developed by experts, they have the tendency 
to become elitist and are often based on expectations that has very little to do with the 
expectations of parents. These features of normative needs do not make them easily 
harmonized with the expectations of parents. The frequent problem with felt needs is 
that parents are not necessarily aware of the latitude within which schools and teachers 
can respond to their needs. Since education is a discretional service, parents often express 
expectations that do not ﬁt into the allocation of limited teaching time or contradict the 
methodological principles applied in the school. Therefore, felt needs are often unreal. 
The problem with expressed needs is that they are based on the available options that 
parents and students can consider in the existing system. Thus, the conclusions about 
their expectations only on the basis of their behavior would ﬁx the existing supply of 
programs, although oﬀering more or less of the same thing is not necessarily the solu-
tion to certain problems. And ﬁnally, the most important problem with comparison is 
that its validity is not always easy to ensure. For example, comparing the performance 
of Roma and non-Roma student will be valid only if we sort out the performance of 
those non-Roma students whose socio-economic background is the same as the group 
of Roma students. In general, making comparisons valid is expensive, and the more 
analysis we do in order to ensure validity, the less the probability to produce something 
that can easily be grasped by non-professionals.
Structuring Policy Problems in Education
Structuring the identiﬁed problems is not a pure academic research exercise. It should 
reveal the underlying cause-eﬀect relationships in a way that allows for determining the 
intervention required to solve or alleviate the problem. When structuring the policy 
problem that we intend to address, four questions should be answered:
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 • Whose problem is it? It is important to always bear in mind that if certain student 
groups have a problem related to education services, it does not necessarily 
mean that the target group of the policy is the student group itself; in most 
cases, policies are targeting teachers and schools in order to improve the result 
of students.
 • What are the reasons and the consequences of the problem? The sources of the 
problems are those cause-eﬀect relationships that explain educational outcome 
diﬀerences that we ﬁnd problematic on any basis. The need of intervention is 
not always justiﬁed by the extent of the problems; relatively large participation 
gaps may cause very little labor market or social impact, while relatively small 
diﬀerences may reduce the career chances of certain groups to a huge extent. 
 • What happens if we do not do anything? Policy intervention is often justiﬁed by 
the forecast consequences of the problems. Deliberately refraining from inter-
vention is also a policy decision.
 • What kind of information do we need to answer our questions? In most cases, 
we are driven by the available information. In order to ensure the appropriate 
design of the policy, sometimes we should part from the available information 
to be able to determine our information needs.
Figure 15.1
Structuring Educational Policy Problems
As it is can be seen in Figure 15.1, “unpacking” the problems we identiﬁed, that is, 
revealing the underlying cause-eﬀect relationships, should follow the same logic that 
was touched upon throughout this book. The point of departure is always a problem in 
relation to the very purpose of education: successful learning. Therefore, old-fashioned 
teaching, poor-quality schooling, a low level of funding, and an outdated curriculum 
are not policy problems. They are to be addressed if their negative impact on learn-
ing is clearly demonstrated. The primary reason for any failures of learning lies in the 
characteristics of the teaching-learning process. Deﬁciencies of teaching are explained 
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by how schools are operating, and in a decentralized system ministers of education can-
not be blamed for poor teaching anymore. (They can be blamed if they fail to address 
problems.) And ﬁnally, the reasons for shortcomings of the operation of schools should 
be identiﬁed in the systemic environment. 
Figure 15.2 contains a sample problem tree for the sake of demonstrating how 
problem structuring works in practice. There are three important rules for the use of 
this instrument that should be kept in mind:
 • In the great majority of cases in decentralized systems there are no shortcuts 
between the columns that do not neighbor one another. (In fact, the real 
meaning of decentralization is to harmonize responsibilities and authorities.) 
Revealing cause-eﬀect relationships is a level-by-level exercise starting from 
service outcomes, only at the end arriving at the functional governance instru-
ments of the systemic environment. For example, a statement like low-quality 
national curriculum causes poor results in the PISA survey is warmly suggested 
to returning for further consideration; it is not a basis for the design of any poli-
cies. Even if a direct relationship is detected between the systemic environment 
and teaching, or the schools and service outcomes, the policy should attempt 
to restore or strengthen the role of the level that mediate between them.
 • Simpliﬁcations that narrow the scope of interpretation should be avoided. It is not 
one single characteristic of any level that explains one single characteristic of the 
subsequent level. All identiﬁed characteristics of teaching explain the problem; all 
relevant features of the operation of schools explain all identiﬁed characteristics 
of teaching in relation to the problem, etc. For example, some suspicion should 
be reserved for statements like schools are segregating Roma students because 
of certain ﬁnancial incentives. There must be something else in the systemic 
environment that creates a space within which schools are segregating.
 • Identifying external factors contributing to deﬁciencies at any logical level of 
problem structuring is not done because educational policy controls these fac-
tors. There are always external partners to cooperate with in order to ensure that 
the impact of these external eﬀects is reduced. However, it is not the business 
of educational policy to address social, health, cultural, or economic problems 
directly. The responsibility of educational policy is “above the line” of external 
factors. (It does not mean, of course, that social or health policies cannot use 
the schools in order to reach out to the students directly.)
When structuring educational policy problems, using the logic of the problem 
tree is not only useful to unfold the underlying cause-eﬀect relationships. In the case 
of extremely complex problems (such as the school failure of Roma students), it also 
helps to identify the best points for intervention. For example, if the problem tree is 
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created for all speciﬁc participation and learning outcomes, failures of Roma students 
separately, the many problem trees can be superimposed. This will reveal that there are 
certain deﬁciencies that are very speciﬁc to individual problems, but also that there will 
be many common reasons that explain almost all of the problems. We may assume that 
policies targeting these common reasons for failure will improve the overall outcomes 
of the learning of Roma students by imposing a spillover eﬀect.
Figure 15.2
A Sample Problem Tree for the Poor Learning Motivation of Roma Students36
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Structuring educational policy problems is an exercise that has its rules of thumb. 
The most important ones are the following:
 • Identifying a problem is a value judgment. There are no value-free problems and 
the selection among the possible reasons is heavily inﬂuenced by values. For 
example, on the basis of diﬀerent value orientations, various reasons can be 
emphasized for dropping out of school: social problems, inappropriate teach-
ing, or poor parenting. Needless to say, diﬀerent value-driven understandings 
of the same problems may lead to very diﬀerent therapies.
 • A problem is always contextual. How we understand and structure a problem is 
valid only within one speciﬁc context and loses its validity in a diﬀerent context. 
Therefore, the solutions cannot be mechanically replicated in diﬀerent contexts.
 • The problem is not identical to its reasons or with its consequences. The best way 
to avoid the confusion created by mixing these up is to insist on identifying 
problems in terms of service outcomes.
 • The problem has a solution. In other words: if there is no legitimate public policy 
solution to a problem, there is no problem to be dealt with. For example, even if 
serious research would prove that children taught by brown-eyed kindergarten 
teachers are developing faster because these teachers are much more caring, 
there is no legitimate way to replace blue-eyed teachers.
 • The problem is not a private matter. We are talking about public policies serv-
ing public interests. Even if the border between private and public matters is 
extremely ambiguous, an attempt should be made to prove that intervention 
serves legitimate public purposes.
15.2 Policy Formulation
Determining Policy Goals
The advantage of the above way of structuring policy problems is that—if properly 
done—in most of the cases it makes setting goals for policies very easy. First of all, 
when setting goals, the same logic applies as for problem structuring: policy goals are best 
determined in terms of educational service outcomes. Goals related to any other level of 
this framework are instrumental ones that should be justiﬁed by their direct or indirect 
connection to the desired service outcomes.
As far as the justiﬁcation of goals is concerned, the most important thing is something 
that should be reiterated from the previous section: internal eﬀectiveness goals are to be 
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connected to goals related to external eﬀectiveness. (Promoting the future well-being 
of children does not contradict the public aims of public services. However, investing 
public money only into the future “happiness” of individuals sounds problematic.) 
When emphasizing the connection between internal and external goals, we do not 
mean to suggest that a shortcut can be made between considerations related to external 
eﬀectiveness and genuine educational goals. For example, calls that education should 
contribute to the social integration of immigrant children are frequent. It is typically 
an expectation that hardly can be interpreted in the actual teaching in a classroom or 
in the way schools are operated.
There are always many possible goals that educational policy may pursue. However, 
no governments can aﬀord to address too many goals at the same time. (A government 
without priorities is a non-governing one.) One of the hardest tasks is to set priorities 
among the possible goals. As an orientation, three aspects can be oﬀered here. First of 
all, values are automatic selection criteria. Although the ethos of public service often 
obliges it to maintain the pretense of value-neutrality, probably it is better to be overt 
about the underlying values—if they are legitimate ones. Another base might be the 
economic and social relevance of various goals. For example, how many people are ef-
fected and how? Selection among possible goals can also be done on the basis of the 
judgment about the extent of the problems. For example, the achievement gap between 
girls and boys is regarded to be large in certain countries and almost negligible in others. 
What is important is ensuring the legitimacy of the selected goals.
The technique of setting goals in less complex cases is simple: problems can be turned 
into goals. For example, if the dropout rate is high, let’s make it lower; if the literacy 
competencies of students are low, let’s increase them. According to the incremental ap-
proach to educational policymaking, we do not need more; if the identiﬁed problems 
are prioritized, they can be handled and targeted in a gradual and incremental manner. 
However, in many cases the scale and the complexity of the problems does not allow 
the use of this simple method, because incremental interventions do not produce the 
critical mass of required changes. (One of the examples for this is the two decades of 
policy failures in addressing the underachievement of Roma students in former com-
munist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.) 
Certain contemporary policy objectives cannot be dealt with easily; indeed, they 
aﬀect all (or almost all) schools and require a rather dramatic realignment of the way 
how the education system works, from teaching in the classrooms to all the instruments 
of governance. For example, if the inclusion of special needs children is to be promoted 
in a system that has segregated these students for many decades, all the schools should be 
targeted. Not only because all the schools should be prepared for this, but also because 
if only one student with special education needs is taught together with other children, 
the entire classroom should be taught in a diﬀerent way, and therefore the entire school 
should be operated in a diﬀerent way. In these cases, conceptualization, that is, building 
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a policy model, is inevitable. These models should be constructed on the basis of empirical 
evidence and should include external social and economic references, policy objectives, 
and the required instruments in a coherent framework. 
What makes this easier is that in several cases it does not mean more than apply-
ing the existing policy models to the context. These policy models were either born 
elsewhere or were nurtured in the course of international cooperation. A good example 
is aﬃrmative action, born in India and in the United States. In fact, almost all of Cen-
tral European and South Eastern European countries are applying the developmental 
or preferential instruments of aﬃrmative action to promote the education of Roma 
students, even if the whole policy model was not always properly digested. Likewise, 
another contemporary example is lifelong learning. However, when applying these policy 
frameworks, the concrete policy objectives that aim to solve the concrete problems 
identiﬁed in terms of educational outcomes and the overall goals of the policy models 
should be well connected. 
Again, there are a few rules of thumb for setting goals for educational policies:
 • As in the case of problem structuring, there is a hierarchical relationship be-
tween goals at the diﬀerent levels of logic. (Goals related to changing the way 
of teaching are ancillary to the goals determined for service outcomes, as well 
as goals set for changing how schools work should serve better teaching and 
learning, etc.)
 • The expected result should be measurable; they should allow for the use of 
indicators and for benchmarking.
 • If multiple goals are set, they should be coherent. For example, promoting 
smooth pathways for Roma students to general secondary and higher educa-
tion and supporting the revival of their traditional vocations—disregarding the 
underlying stereotype of the latter—oﬀer an easy way out from eﬀorts needed 
to achieve the former.
 • The target groups of all of the policies should be determined in an unambiguous 
way.
 • The process through which goals are determined should contribute to building 
consensus on the goals.
 • Goals should not go against certain processes in the systems that are not under 
the control of policymakers. For example, building new schools in small villages 
in order to encourage young couples to have more children would be a waste 
of money.
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Determining and Assessing Policy Instruments
Policy goals can be set in many diﬀerent ways; there are hard instruments that can be 
used, such as an amendment of a law, or rather soft ones, such as a ministry strategy 
that is used as a communication instrument. Nevertheless, regardless of how policies 
are set, they are mandates given to other actors in the education sector. Apart from set-
ting goals for others, these mandates often prescribe how the goals should be served, 
too. The diﬃculty is caused by the fact that we cannot assume that all the actors will 
automatically act according to the given mandate. For example, if the mandate is the 
use of the methods of diﬀerentiated teaching in order to make education more inclusive, 
it may happen that teachers understand the expectations but they are simply incapable 
of applying these methods. In this case, the mandate should be supplemented with 
capacity building for teachers. Assuming that teachers are aware of the mandate and 
they possess the required professional competencies, they are not necessarily ready to 
invest the extra eﬀort that is needed to meet the expectations. In these cases, policies 
should operate with various incentives that have the potential to increase the readiness of 
teachers to adjust to the mandate. Still, even if teachers have the necessary professional 
competencies and would be ready to do more and to work in a diﬀerent way, they might 
not be convinced about what the actual mandate suggests as the best way to deal with 
the problems. In these cases, policies should use the diverse instruments of persuasion. 
And ﬁnally, if teachers are able and ready to change and convinced about the direction 
of changes, they still may need a lot of help to do so. These are the cases when policies 
should make institutionalized support available for teachers. This support can be internal, 
for example, allowing schools to hire specialists, who work together with teachers, or 
can be ensured as an external professional support service.
In summary, educational policies have ﬁve types of tools at their disposal: (i) mandate, 
(ii) capacity building, (iii) incentives, (iv) persuasion, and (v) institutionalized support. 
In fact, all of these policy tools are groups of instruments; there are many ways how 
they can be applied—both in terms of the actual technical provisions and their actual 
content. Often the most appropriate instrument (e.g., a kind of training program, an 
online communication channel, or a network of an organization capable of providing 
a speciﬁc support service) is not at the disposal of policymakers; therefore, the policy 
should contain the development program that produces them.
Most policies combine these instruments. The underlying logic of selecting the 
required combination of policy tools is rather simple; it depends on two key elements 
of the absorption capacity of schools: the willingness and the capacity of the staﬀ of 
schools to change. In those very rare cases when we realistically can assume that both 
conditions are given, it is enough to deploy a clear mandate. However, if the information 
we have suggests that in a number of schools the willingness of the staﬀ to subscribe to 
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the required changes is weak and/or the capacity of the staﬀ to change is insuﬃcient, 
then much more is needed. 
Two of the policy instruments (capacity building and institutionalized support) 
serve to improve the required capacities, while the other two (incentives and persua-
sion) are used to strengthen the capacity of the staﬀ. Often, none of these conditions are 
available. The best example is again the education of Roma students in South Eastern 
Europe. Evidence has proved that this is typically a policy problem, and that if is ad-
dressed must have all the possible policy tools incorporated into a coherent package. 
Obviously, the design of the required policies largely depends on what policymakers 
think and know about the professional preparedness and the attitudes of teachers and 
other school staﬀ. Sometimes this “knowledge” is anecdotal or undocumented, and 
sometimes even stereotypes come into play, while in other cases this knowledge is 
well-founded by hard evidence, such as empirical research or opinion poll results. The 
more the underlying assumptions are supported with reliable evidence, the larger the 
likelihood of a successful policy implementation. In other words: investing in learning 
more about the capacities and willingness of the target groups of educational policies 
may save a large amount of public money.
Figure 15.3
The Aspects of Identifying the Necessary Policy Tools37
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There are always multiple policy instruments that can be applied to pursue certain 
policy goals. The decision on the choice of the instruments of the policy should be based 
on their assessment. Generally speaking, the more expensive the policy, and the larger the 
stake involved, the more time should be spent on assessing the alternative instruments. 
Apart from rather contextual aspects, there are four general and permanent aspects for 
the assessment of policy instruments:
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 • Anticipated impact. It is about forecasting on the basis of former experience: the 
estimation of the trajectory of changes as a result of the policy intervention.
 • Feasibility. Mapping out the possible obstacles (e.g., political resistance, the 
resistance of stakeholder groups, the sustainable availability of resources, etc.) 
and their potential to hamper the implementation of policies.
 • Cost-eﬀectiveness. The estimation of the direct costs of implementing alternative 
instruments and their impact on the level of mainstream ﬁnancial allocation in 
the light of the expected impact.
 • Sustainability. It may refer to the assessment of the potential sustainability of the 
program and services, as well as that of the impact of the policies. For example, 
the sustainability of extracurricular programs might be rather controversial be-
cause they cease to exist when the allocated supplementary resources run out, 
as well as because their impact on the eﬀectiveness of mainstream teaching is 
limited and temporal. 
When assessing the possible instruments, the critical issue is the knowledge basis of 
the policy formulation. Assessing the impact, feasibility, cost-eﬀectiveness, and sustain-
ability—apart from the use of sophisticated methodologies—requires a tremendous 
amount of the previous knowledge and experience that educational research, evalua-
tion, and consultancy accumulate. Illustrating it with a very simple example: if a policy 
contains school development projects that are planned for one year, on the basis of the 
“implementation dip” that was mentioned in Chapter 8, it can be forecast in high prob-
ability that the policy will bring far more negative results than positive ones. Therefore, 
investment into the knowledge basis of policymaking is essential. The good news is that 
the internationalization of education science and educational policy has made a huge 
amount of policy relevant knowledge produced elsewhere available. This “globaliza-
tion” of education has already reached the point when the isolation of policymakers 
and schools from international cooperation frameworks will result in a poor knowledge 
basis, regardless of the amount of resources deployed for research and evaluation.
There are various types of activities that contribute to the enrichment of the knowl-
edge basis of policy. Some of them are academic research activities, while others serve 
more practical purposes. The academic research activities that produce policy relevant 
knowledge are studying the content of policies, the policy process, or the impact of 
policies. Evaluation is a special activity, because in most cases it serves the policy and 
development praxis, but it also has its meta-level. There are various praxis-oriented activi-
ties that are called educational policy analysis; it might be oriented towards informing 
policymaking, may support the actors of the policy process, or might be built into the 
process. The actors of the policy process are often doing the analysis themselves.
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Figure 15.4
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Source: Hill 1997.
Parallel to the growing complexity of education systems, the complexity of 
educational policies is also increasing. As a result, the information and knowledge demand 
that policymaking generates is also growing. In those European countries where there is 
a long tradition of cooperation among academic research and policymakers educational 
policy analysis is rarely institutionalized. In contrast, in Central and South Eastern 
European countries, where education science and empirical research in education is rather 
limited and cooperation between governments and researchers is more problematic, 
there is a need to institutionalize the knowledge management for policymaking. In 
certain countries, this function is institutionalized in universities, in several countries 
independent NGOs are doing policy research and analysis, while there are others where 
ministries of education establish an internal educational policy department or within 
an institution aﬃliated with the ministry.
15.3 Policy Consultation and Formal Decision-making
Educational Policy Consultation
The third component of policymaking is the formal and informal process of decision-
making. What was said in Chapter 14 about the nonsequential nature of the key elements 
of the policy process especially applies to all sorts of activities that aim to prepare the 
policy for formal decision-making: planning and bargaining with the relevant stakeholder 
groups. Although stakeholder consultation is discussed together with decision-making, 
it is an iterative process strongly connected with the above elements: determining the 
policy agenda and the design of the policies. Also, consulting and involving the key 
stakeholders is essential after decision-making, too; it is instrumental in the course of 
implementation, as well as in the evaluation of policies.
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The major aim of policy consultation is ensuring feasibility. It is worth to recall 
everything that was said about the decentralized pattern of governance (i.e., working 
through the actors of local accountability relationships) and the “interpretation chain” 
of the operation of content regulation instruments that—in a diﬀerent way—applies 
to all other functional governance instruments. Bearing in mind the indirect character 
of decentralized governance, it is easy to see the reason behind the huge emphasis on 
stakeholder consultation. Therefore, the openness of policymaking is a genuine eﬃciency 
issue, regardless of what we think about the role that corporative organizations should 
play in operating political systems. There are three major questions to be discussed in 
relation to policy consultation: who are they, how to consult them, and how to ensure 
the publicity of policymaking?
When identifying the relevant stakeholders of the policy, it is important to bear 
in mind that they are not identical to the target groups of the policy, although there 
might be an overlap. The groups that “have a stake” in the actual policy are those who 
(i) are targeted by the policy (e.g., teachers, self-governments, etc.), (ii) those that not 
necessarily interested in the actual policy, but are playing a formal consultative role on 
a regulated basis (e.g., professional associations represented in a policy council), (iii) 
those who have vested interest in the impact of the policy (e.g., chambers of business 
organizations, employer organizations), and (iv) those who represent the beneﬁciaries 
of the policy (e.g., parent organizations or Roma NGOs). As can be seen, the possible 
stakeholders of various policies compose a wider pool of groups than are typically involved 
in any permanent and formal consultation system that was discussed in Chapters 4 and 
9. Therefore, the identiﬁcation of the stakeholder groups at an early stage of formulating 
policies that are relevant to the actual problem to be addressed cannot be spared, even 
if a full consultation system is operated at the national level. 
Another important point is that on the national level individual teachers, parents, 
or mayors cannot be consulted; only those groups can be involved that have organized 
representation. As often happens, especially in South Eastern Europe, ministries engage 
in one-way communication with teachers in large conference halls. Then by adding up 
the number of teachers who have participated in such conferences, ministries report 
that thousands of teachers were “consulted.” (These conferences, online forums, etc., 
are very instrumental to communicate the policies and their underlying goals, but they 
are far from being consultative events.) Therefore, when referring to stakeholder groups, 
we always mean organized groups; “consulting teachers” means a consulting teacher 
association and—in certain employment-related matters—teacher unions, “consulting 
Roma” means consulting Roma associations, councils, and self-governments, etc. The 
actual content of policies determines the circle of various stakeholder groups to be 
involved. 
In addition to all these, the actual weight of various stakeholder groups is also de-
termined by the content of the policy; in other words: stakeholder groups do not have 
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a permanent weight in relation to any sorts of policies. For example, the association 
of history teachers is to be taken very seriously if a new curriculum for history is to be 
approved; however, when policy is to be formulated for the diﬀerentiated compensation 
of teachers, this association is to be consulted but the weight of its voice should not be 
equally considered to that of trade unions, schools directors’ association, or local govern-
ment representatives. Generally speaking, the actual weight of diﬀerent stakeholders is 
always determined by their government recognition and involvement.
Frequently, certain individuals or organizations are involved in the consultation on 
the basis of their “problem generating capacity,” regardless of the degree to which they 
are aﬀected by the actual policy. This is why academic researchers or NGO leaders with 
“gravitas,” that is, with high prestige and good media and political access, are consulted 
by policymakers. It is not necessarily a problem, because the political marketing of 
policies is as important as anything else. However, deliberate investment into political 
marketing should not replace genuine policy consultation, because only real stakehold-
ers can really inform policy formulation, facilitate the implementation, and reduce the 
conﬂicts that most changes inevitably generate.
In theory, policy consultation is a two-way communication process. In one direction, 
stakeholder organizations aggregate the interests and the views of those they represent 
and channel them into the policy process through consultation and bargaining. Most 
policymakers in South Eastern Europe do not have illusions about the eﬃciency of this 
aggregation function, because it requires well-functioning, democratic self-organization. 
Often, government leaders regard certain stakeholder organizations as “one person 
businesses”—not always without reason. However, without the weight that government 
recognition ensures, the internal democratic self-organization will hardly evolve. Not even 
mentioning the fact that—apart from the well-documented violations of laws—govern-
ments are not in the position to question the legitimacy of stakeholder organizations. 
Nevertheless, there are instruments that have the potential to inform stakeholder con-
sultations. For example, opinion polls among teachers do not substitute consultation 
with teacher organizations and trade unions, but they have the potential to shape it. 
In the opposite direction, governments have many more options to consider. 
Stakeholder consultation is not directed only to the government that is the focal point 
of policymaking; it also supposed to help governments to reach out to those who are 
represented by the organizations involved. For example—again, in theory—the best 
way to ensure the support of teachers for certain changes is having teacher organizations 
as allies on the basis of an agreement made with them. However, it would be brave to 
overestimate the potential of these organizations. Therefore, the alternative channels of 
reaching out to the most important stakeholder groups are very important. There are 
direct and indirect ways of communication; information to the actors of the education 
system can be disseminated directly, and media communication can assist in reaching 
out to all other actors outside of the education system. Managing the “public relations” 
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of policies—apart from shaping the wider policy discourse—may impose an indirect 
impact on the “mandate” with which the representatives of stakeholder organizations 
engage in formal and informal consultation.
The last remark about stakeholder involvement is that policymaking should not 
be completely driven by consultation. When emphasizing policy consultation, it is not 
suggested that the ﬁnal responsibility for policies that lies with the government is to be 
handed over to the public. The best way to ensure the openness of the policy process 
and to keep the responsibility is to engage in a consultation from a well-developed posi-
tion. A policy paper or written proposal is an instrument of outstanding importance, if 
eﬀective consultation is the intention of policymakers. It may sound like a triviality for 
many; however, recent policy practice in most of South Eastern Europe is not necessarily 
based on policy discourse shaped by written documents.
Formal Decision-making
There is not much to add about formal decision-making procedures, because it should 
be a regulated process. The algorithm of decision-making in well-established public 
administration systems is a rather rigid procedure with responsible actors, internal 
deadlines, mandatory policy coordination at each stage, proposal templates, and 
decent documentation. Also, conﬁdentiality rules, access to information, internal and 
intermediary decision-making competencies, as well as certain mandatory components 
of a proposal (estimation of costs, regulations aﬀected, stakeholders to be consulted, 
etc.) are also regulated. Even if these processes are much less regulated in the “oral 
cultures” of most of South Eastern Europe, apart from signaling the importance 
of standardizing decision-making procedures in order to ensure predictability and 
administrative eﬃciency, this element of policymaking does not require detailed 
further discussion.
A clear distinction should be made between the administrative process of approval 
and using administrative procedures for policymaking and implementation. In relation 
to this distinction a short remark should be made about the possible shortcomings that 
mixing up various timeframes may cause. Any actions of the policy process are to be 
placed within three diﬀerent timeframes: administrative, political, and policy time. Ad-
ministrative time is determined by regulated administrative procedures, such as answering 
an incoming letter within 15 days. Obviously, certain policy steps are to be inserted 
into these timeframes. Political time is determined in government terms; governments 
are striving to compress as much as possible, typically into four years, because there are 
no guarantees for phasing out the intended changes beyond their term. Finally, there 
is a policy time that is determined by the amount of time that is needed to nurture, 
plan, approve, and implement certain policies. For example, the required time for a 
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curriculum reform that is gradually implemented in subsequent school grades might 
be a decade or even more.
A typical problem is the pressure to make things happen within a shorter timeframe 
than what is logically required. Changes requiring “policy time” often attempted to push 
through within the political timeframe, and policy matters that would be properly dealt 
with in a few years are often handled through administrative procedures. In both cases, 
the policy response to the matter under concern will be deﬁnitely inappropriate. There 
are certain guarantees that have the potential to counterbalance this pressure; the most 
important ones are high-quality policy planning and open policy consultation that 
were discussed earlier.
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C H A P T E R  1 6
Policy Implementation and Evaluation
Putting policies into eﬀect may happen according to two distinct logics: in a top-down 
manner by which central initiatives are rolled through the education system, and in a 
bottom-up manner, by which local but sporadic existing good practices are scaled-up to 
the entire system along central policy priorities. Although the devotees of democratic 
principles would immediately opt for bottom-up implementation just because of its 
direction, it is important to see that the great majority of policies are implemented 
top-down because the initiative comes from the center, even in decentralized systems. 
Evaluation is discussed together with implementation in this chapter, partly because to 
a large extent it is implementation that is evaluated, and partly because the manner of 
implementation largely determines the impact of policies.
16.1 Top-down Implementation
Implementing Policies through the Systemic Environment
In most South Eastern European countries, a lot of attention is paid to policy intentions, 
that is, the policies that governments decide to pursue, but very little to their actual 
implementation. The observer often has the impression that if everybody simply takes 
for granted that what the government wants to happen, it will automatically happen. 
Even if it is an obvious exaggeration, those who are watching whether government initia-
tives are implemented or not, typically do not look beyond regulation amendments and 
the amount of money that is deployed to “projects.” In general, the great proliferation 
of small-scale “implementation projects” masks that there are few examples in the last 
decade of educational policy in the region that attempted systematic implementation. 
In spite of the sporadic evaluation information, it is not overly bold to assume that 
the great majority of policies were not implemented, or are implemented with a huge 
“implementation deﬁcit.” It deﬁnitely applies to even those policies that are based on 
new or amended regulations.
Implementation is the achievement of the underlying objectives of the policy (Hill 1997). 
What matters in this respect is not the intention, but rather the extent to which the 
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intentions are accomplished: especially if the system, within which transmission of 
central initiatives to local services providers occurs, is not a hierarchical bureaucratic 
line of organizations, but a decentralized one as outlined by this reading.
Governance in decentralized systems is based on interpretation. The staﬀ of the 
schools and the actors of local accountability relationships interpret central initiatives 
through the lens of their own space for maneuver that is determined only partly by 
these initiatives. Since decentralization does not allow for eﬀective direct implementa-
tion via bureaucratic organizational structures anymore, the basic underlying question 
of implementation is not diﬀerent from that of governance in general: how to ensure 
the compliance of autonomous actors, whose behavior is determined by diverse local 
contextual factors? As the question is not diﬀerent from that of overall decentralized 
governance, the answer is quite similar, too. The best way to implement policies in a 
decentralized education system is making local actors interested in implementation on 
their own.
However, it is easier said than done. The many internal and external factors that 
determine the latitude within which local actors make decisions are hard to control. What 
is needed is a coherent package of changes in the systemic environment of schools that 
rearrange the conditions of local problem solving. In other words, the primary pattern 
of top-down implementation is working through the functional governance instruments 
in order to force, encourage, and support schools to solve problems in line with the policy 
mandate. It is achieved by coordinated changes within the systemic environment, that 
is, by an “implementation package.” The underlying assumption is that the cumulative 
eﬀects of all the changes in the system’s regulatory instruments (i.e., management, content 
regulation, quality evaluation) and in the manner of how various resources ﬂow (i.e., 
money, human resources, support, information, etc.) will add up to a rearranged latitude 
for local actors, especially that of schools. As a result, the impact of the implementation 
package is indirect and not very controlled. This is the type of implementation that is 
often referred to as “reform.” 
There are three important features of implementation through the systemic envi-
ronment. First, the “critical path” of the implementation process is the management 
system. Mandates are deployed to management actors at diﬀerent levels (with the 
management of schools included). These mandates should ﬁt into the horizontal scope 
of decision-making authorities. In other words, mandates should be deployed that are 
not contradictory or alien to the core management authorities of the respective actors. 
Another equally important requirement is that, no matter what is the policy mandate 
to which the functional governance instruments are adjusted, it is essential to preserve 
the internal coherence of the system. It equally refers to the internal logic of the sepa-
rate functional governance instruments, as well as to the coherence of the system as a 
whole. For example, standards for inclusion of special needs children should ﬁt into 
the overall content regulation system, on the one hand, and the ﬁnancial allocation 
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system should not keep schools interested in separation, on the other. The third feature 
of indirect implementation is a warning: what happens is never fully identical to what 
we expected to happen. An implementation deﬁcit is, to a certain extent, inevitable; 
what is important is how much are we able to monitor the implementation and how 
much are we able to make corrections, if necessary? 
Policymaking is about problem solving and not about problem creation. Therefore, 
it is important to bear in mind that policy instruments should be compatible with the 
existing governance system; they should ﬁt into the structural characteristics of the 
functional governance instrument through which they are implemented. (For the sake 
of solving one single problem, it is unwise to start to build a completely new system.) 
For example, at a certain point of ﬁscal decentralization, allocating large operational 
funds to the schools directly for any noble purposes goes against the basic structural 
features of the system. The problem is that managing major structural changes, such as 
decentralization of any of the strands of governance, together with managing policies 
for the sake of solving concrete problems, will inevitably cause some confusion. This 
can be reduced if decentralization is based on a clear strategy with an unambiguous 
description of the steps of the process. This may allow policymaking and implementa-
tion to adjust to the changing context.
Planning the Implementation Package
In Chapter 15, we saw that there are ﬁve types of policy tools that educational policy 
has its disposal: mandate, capacity building, incentives, persuasion, and institutional-
ized support. How the package of various tools is selected, as well as the determination 
of the concrete instruments, were brieﬂy discussed. When it comes to the design of the 
implementation of the policy that is planned according to this logic, a clearer picture is 
already created about what is to be done, but it is still not very instrumental in telling 
us how to do it. 
Ministries of education do not work with capacity building or incentives; this is the 
logic of how project organizations operate. Ministries are not NGOs or development 
agencies; they work with the functional governance instruments that are complex systems 
in themselves. Therefore, if the implementation strategy to be applied is a top-down 
transmission through the systemic environment, the policy should be made “consum-
able” for government agencies. A user-friendly implementation design deconstructs the 
various policy instruments to components related to the diﬀerent functional governance 
instruments. 
For example, if a Roma inclusion policy intends to oﬀer anti-bias training as a 
capacity building tool, it will have a ﬁnancing component (funding the development of 
anti-bias training and other instruments), a quality evaluation component (introducing 
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supplementary Roma inclusion self-evaluation instruments and supplementing the 
aspects of external evaluations), a teacher training component (accreditation of anti-bias 
in-service training programs, introduction of anti-bias training into the initial training of 
teachers), a textbook publishing component (publishing readings for anti-bias training 
and commissioning a thematic evaluation of the textbooks), a professional support 
component (training a network of trainers), and a research and development component 
(development of training programs, empirical research to monitor the attitudes of 
teachers). As this simple example demonstrates, the more detailed is the “unpacking” 
of the selected instruments, the better management that can be provided during the 
implementation process. Planning implementation produces regulation, ﬁnancing, 
training, and development packages, for which their timing can be set and the various 
actions can be designated to the organization in charge of their implementation. In 
short, this exercise creates the operational plan of implementation.
Table 16.1
The Framework for Planning the Top-down Implementation 
of Selected Policy Instruments
Components 
of the systemic 
environments
Policy tools
Mandate Capacity 
building
Incentives Persuasion Institutionalized 
support
Management
Regulation
Content regulation
Financing
Quality evaluation
Teacher training
Textbook publishing
Professional services
Research and 
development
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Implementing Policies through Development Programs
Another pattern of top-down implementation is directly reaching out to schools through 
large-scale targeted development programs. These programs are based on a combina-
tion of allocating small grants and making available professional support services and 
development instruments to the schools. The content, algorithm, and methods of 
school-based development programs are set in a contract, and the programs are oper-
ated by a management agency. In contrast to an implementation through the systemic 
environment, central development programs have the advantage of imposing a direct 
impact on the work of the schools and the impact is more easily controlled. The major 
disadvantage of operating with development programs is their relatively high costs; the 
direct and more intensive eﬀect has its price. 
In centralized systems in which the systemic environment does not allow for high-
quality, top-down implementation through well-functioning governance instruments, 
implementing policies through development programs is the only option that is worth 
considering. The problem is that the countries in South Eastern Europe with highly 
centralized governance of education are, at the same time, the countries with very lim-
ited development resources. (This is the main reason why policies are “implemented” 
by small-scale pilot projects in 10–20 schools.) Relying completely on the funds made 
available by international donor agencies or by the European Union does not oﬀer a 
way out from this trap; it simply weakens the pressure for decentralization and makes 
the already limited implementation capacity of government less visible.
There is another problem in relation to policy implementation in centralized 
systems on the “demand side”: the low absorption capacity of schools. It is obvious in 
the case of an implementation through the systemic environment: if schools are not 
autonomous organizations operating those mechanisms outlined in Part Two, it would 
be unrealistic that the “messages” coming from the environment will generate change 
oriented around problem solving within the schools. Although on the surface it is less 
apparent, it is the same with an implementation through direct development projects. 
A sustainable impact cannot be expected in schools in which development remains the 
private business and leisure-time activity of a few enthusiastic teachers who can aﬀord 
to be engaged in it for a while.
In decentralized systems, the two major types of top-down implementation strategies 
are rarely applied alone. First, many purely developmental instruments require minor 
adjustments in the regulations, ﬁnancing, or in the system of professional support 
services. For example, if a large-scale national program for promoting the inclusion 
capacity of schools creates a network of special needs school development advisors, 
the regulation that contains the list of advisors who are allowed to work with schools 
and teachers are to be supplemented with the new type of support role. In most cases, 
developments are also followed up by changes in the systemic environment in order to 
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make the changes of the program sustainable. New support capacities are incorporated 
into the mainstream professional support system, new in-service training programs are 
accredited and handed over to training organizations, textbooks that have been developed 
for a speciﬁc development project are handed over to textbook publishers, etc. Often 
shifting from the developmental pattern to the other implementation method is part of 
a deliberate strategy. For example, Hungary introduced school-based quality assurance 
in a large-scale development program in 1,700 schools that opted into the program 
on a voluntary basis. When the program phased out, an amendment to the legislation 
made running quality management systems mandatory for all schools.
16.2 Bottom-up Implementation
Bottom-up implementation is the transferring of good practices that exist in a school to all 
other schools with similar problems on the basis of central policy priorities. In other words, 
it is the systemic scaling-up of good practices. The history of the problem of scaling-up is 
rooted in the educational policies of the United States where the federal system and the 
large size of the country hardly allow for the eﬀective use of any top-down implementa-
tion strategies. Therefore, when the federal government became active in educational 
policies in the 1960s with the “Great Society” programs of Lyndon B. Johnson, the 
prevailing pattern of policy implementation was oﬀering small grants to a large number 
of schools for development. When the results were evaluated about a decade later, it 
turned out that the impact of “showering money on schools” was extremely limited. 
Thus, the second generation of bottom-up implementation policies was based on the 
extraction and standardization of the content of good practices and their transfer to 
other schools. As a result of this shift, evaluation proved that some improvement had 
occurred in some schools, but the impact of the money spent on development was still 
insuﬃcient. It led to a new shift in implementation methods; instead of focusing on 
the actual know-how that successful schools applied, a great deal of research and evalua-
tion were invested in order to ﬁnd out what were the conditions within and around the 
schools that make for the successful implementation of any sorts of know-how possible? 
Contemporary bottom-up implementation strategies have been built on this ex-
perience: there is a signiﬁcant emphasis on creating those conditions that are, in fact, 
identical to those characteristics that were described in Part Two of this book. Even if 
the actual instruments vary from country to country, the essence of these conditions is 
the same: self-evaluation-based school development in autonomous and accountable 
schools. Therefore, as far as bottom-up implementation is concerned, the instruments 
to promote the scaling-up of good practices are two diﬀerent kinds: (i) general ones 
aiming at improving the absorption capacity of schools (i.e., the use of those governance 
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instruments that were discussed in Part Three), and (ii) speciﬁc instruments aiming at 
scaling-up know-how in relation to speciﬁc policy problems in those schools that are 
aﬀected by the problem.
Bottom-up implementation also has two typical types, a “second generation” and 
a “third generation.” The diﬀerences between the two are very much similar to those 
of the two top-down implementation strategies. The ﬁrst focuses on the dissemination 
of know-how; it connects schools with development agencies of any kind that possess 
the necessary know-how and have the capacity to actively support its application. It is a 
rather “supply driven” implementation, because those project contents that are selected 
and disseminated ﬁt to the policy objectives of the policy center. 
The second promotes the free exchange and wide application of know-how on the 
basis of development needs identiﬁed by the schools, themselves. This systemic scaling-
up strategy is much less content-speciﬁc and shaped by rather indirect means, such as 
setting expectations towards schools through the means of content regulation or ac-
countability systems. The typical supplementary instruments used by this bottom-up 
implementation strategy make funds available for school-based development, generating 
a free market of working solutions and developmental know-how, evaluation of grass-
roots programs, collecting and disseminating good practices, investing in the support 
capacities serving school-based development, supporting cooperation among schools 
organized into development networks, investment into pilot developments and into the 
knowledge basis of the methodology of development, etc.
The advantages and disadvantages of the two bottom-up implementation strategies 
are summarized in Box 16.1, though it must be obvious by now that the scaling-up 
implementation pattern is not an option worth considering in centralized governance 
systems. The limitations that were mentioned about the targeted development pattern 
of top-down implementation in centralized education systems (i.e., ﬂowing from the 
low absorption capacity of schools and the scarcity of available ﬁnancial resources) also 
apply to the dissemination type of bottom-up implementation.
In centralized education governance systems, top-down and bottom-up imple-
mentation methods are often combined; in these cases bottom-up implementation is 
a supplementary line of action supporting the mainstream top-down implementation 
process.
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Box 16.1
Bottom-up Implementation Strategies
Dissemination
The central question: what are they 
doing and how?
The objective is the dissemination of 
know-how.
The most important tool is creating a 
network of cooperating schools.
In terms of adjusting to the local 
context, the policy is relatively 
inﬂexible.
The impact on the functioning of 
the schools is direct, intensive, and 
immediate.
The number of schools invilved is 
limited.
Due to the project type of operation, 
the innovation often remains isolated 
within the schools.
The speciﬁc costs of development are 
high.
Channeling in external resources is 
easier, the burden on the state budget 
is lower.
Ensuring cost-efﬁciency is easier.
Systemic Scaling-up
The central question: what are the 
conditions that allow them to do it?
The objective is to create the 
applicability of know-how.
The most important tool is modifying 
the systemic environment and the 
organization of schools.
In terms of adjusting to the local 
context, the policy is relatively ﬂexible.
The impact on the functioning of the 
schools is indirect, less intensive, and 
delayed.
The number of schools involved is not 
limited.
The innovation more easily inﬁltrates 
the entire functioning of the school.
Due to the use of existing institutions 
and services, the speciﬁc costs of the 
development are lower.
Channeling in external resources is 
harder, the burden on the state budget 
is larger.
Ensuring cost-efﬁciency is harder.
—Radó 2001b
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Selecting the Appropriate Implementation Strategy
Finally, in order to summarize the key points on policy implementation, when selecting 
the top-down or bottom-up implementation strategy that ﬁts both to the context and 
the problem addressed by the policy, the following aspects are suggested to consider:
 • The extent of decentralization, that is, what do the existing governance instru-
ments make possible?
 • The absorption capacity of the schools that are targeted with the policy in concern. 
(Even in highly-decentralized systems, there are a large number of schools with 
low absorption capacity.)
 • The scope and the scale of the problem. In other words, the implementation strategy 
has to be adjusted to the number of schools to which the policy should reach 
and the complexity of the problem that is to be solved.
 • The maturity of professional support services. The quality and availability of pro-
fessional support is critical in development, especially when low absorption 
capacity schools are targeted.
 • The amount of available ﬁnancial resources, that is, how expensive is the imple-
mentation process that the country can aﬀord?
 • The level of government commitment. If it is not obvious and long-lasting enough, 
implementation served by other means that project-based development may 
cause more harm than good.
 • The level of ﬁnancial accountability. In the case of implementation strategies, 
that include making additional resources available, the weakness of ﬁnancial 
accountability may call for implementation methods, within which money is 
allocated in an easily controlled contract-based manner.
16.3 Policy Evaluation
Without checking the impact of policies, policymaking and implementation is a hobby, 
or in a better case, a publicly-funded activity serving the good conscience of policy-
makers. Policymaking without policy evaluation can be happen only in those countries 
where policymakers are interested only in spending public resources, but not interested 
in the results of spending. Also, without the knowledge that policy evaluation provides, 
policymaking and implementation remain superﬁcial and unable to solve any problems 
that deserve the attention of governments. In short, what should apply to teachers and 
school directors (i.e., they should act as accountable professionals) should have been 
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applied to policymakers, too. Without evaluating the impact of policies, a minimum 
level of accountability of the governors of education cannot be ensured.
In normal circumstances, writing the previous paragraph would be a needless waste 
of ink. However, in some of Central and Eastern Europe and in most of South Eastern 
Europe, policy evaluation as an ordinary part of public policy simply does not exist. 
Therefore, there are few regional illustrations that are available for this short section 
on policy evaluation. (The rare examples of program or policy evaluation are mainly 
projects commissioned by international organizations.) The lack of policy evaluation 
is a common feature of countries with centralized education systems where the policy 
discourse is still very much input- and process-oriented.
Policy evaluation in education is based on the information provided by ﬁve major 
sources:
 • The external assessment of the performance of students.
 • The external evaluation of schools (inspection).
 • Program and policy evaluation.
 • The information provided by ﬁnancial accountability mechanisms.
 • Empirical research and the information system of education.
Most of this information (such as student performance data, school evaluation 
reports, ﬁnancial audit reports on the use of public resources, and statistical data) is 
produced in a regular and systematic way. Most of these sources of information were 
discussed already in this reading. Research results, if they provide policy evaluation 
relevant information, do it as a byproduct, disregarding direct policy research.
As far as the external assessment of students’ performance is concerned, beyond serving 
organizational learning and professional accountability, informing policy is the third 
major function of large-scale testing programs. As the concrete targets of policies are 
increasingly determined by learning outcomes, the most important feedback on the 
successes and failures of policies are measured learning outcomes, too. The dramatic 
increment of the weight of test results led to a new division in Europe; there are countries 
where the policy discourse is very much driven and shaped by performance data, and 
there are others where it is not. The policy discourse, even the language of the discourse 
in these two groups of countries, is extremely diﬀerent. Generally speaking, the more 
domestic assessment data that are available, the more informed is the policymaking. 
The experience of countries that operate their own national testing programs proves 
that—apart from the extremely valuable direct insight that assessment data oﬀer—this 
type of policy evaluation information generates a greater demand for evaluation and 
empirical research in order to widen the space for interpretation. (Better understanding 
deﬁnitely leads to more sophisticated policy formulation and implementation.)
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The other main source of policy-relevant information is provided by program and 
policy evaluation, that is, the systematic inquiry of the working and/or outcomes of a program 
or policy and the assessment of their results against their own overt and hidden expectations, 
in order to contribute the improvement of the program or policy (Weiss 1998). There are a 
few key elements of this deﬁnition that have certain implications. First of all, evaluation 
is systematic inquiry. Regardless of whether the applied methodology is quantitative 
(e.g., statistical analysis, survey, etc.) or qualitative (e.g., interviews, focus groups, docu-
ment analysis, etc.), evaluation uses the methodology of empirical social sciences. It 
means that the credibility of the evaluators is ensured by the same two factors as that of 
social scientists: the ability to use the required methodology and independence. These 
are the two characteristics that diﬀerentiate monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is 
mainly statistical reporting embedded into the process; therefore, those who are doing 
monitoring are not independent from the organization that commissions the program 
or made the policy, or from those who are implementing them.
The second element of the deﬁnition is about the purpose of evaluation. Evaluation 
either addresses the implementation process and the concrete outputs of the program or 
policy, or their outcomes. If those who are commissioning the evaluation are interested 
in the operation of program or policy, questions are answered, such as: was there any 
deviation from regulations, or what instruments were used during the operation? In 
the ﬁrst case, the evaluation serves accountability purposes; in the second case, it serves 
learning. If evaluation is oriented towards the inquiry of outcomes, the major question 
is whether the program or policy provided the expected beneﬁts to the recipients? In 
outcomes-oriented evaluation there might be goals related to development and account-
ability that are also pursued. 
The third feature of evaluation is its basis. Evaluation is always done on the basis of 
questions and criteria that those, who will commission the evaluation project, set for 
the evaluators. (In this respect, evaluation is very diﬀerent from research: the underlying 
questions are asked by somebody else.) The basis of evaluation might be a set of criteria 
prescribed in advance, or it can be done on the basis of the original goals of the program 
or policy, on the basis of the goals set when the program or policy was already underway, 
or on the basis of the hidden goals and expectations of the participants and beneﬁciaries. 
Whatever the methods that evaluation uses, evaluation is expert judgment. Therefore, 
beyond the assessment of the proposed methodology incorporated into the application 
for the evaluation project, evaluators are selected on the basis of their references that 
prove—or at least make plausible—that the evaluator accumulated the experience that 
is a sine qua non condition of this work.
Finally, what are the situations in which commissioning external (interim or ﬁnal) 
evaluation might be extremely instrumental? The four typical cases are the following 
(Weiss 1998):
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 • When the feedback of the market does not work out. For example, an evalu-
ation of textbook publishing or an in-service training system, if these services 
are fully marketized, is not necessarily reasonable, unless the cases concerned 
do not fall under the following three categories.
 • When the outcomes to be evaluated are very complex and hard to observe, such 
as learning outcomes.
 • When the decision to be supported is about spending a large amount of money, 
or the program or policy spent a lot of money. Evaluating low-cost programs or 
policies does not necessarily require spending money on expensive evaluations.
 • When we need to convince the public, decision-makers, or others who are 
ﬁnancing the program or policy.
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High-quality Policymaking
High-quality Policymaking in Education
Contrary to certain illusions, decentralization does not automatically improve learn-
ing outcomes; it is about creating a much more favorable environment for eﬀective 
policymaking and development that has the potential to generate improvement in the 
performance of schools. (For example, in Chapter 16, development is a policy instru-
ment.) 
Therefore, we should ask the question: what makes policymaking a high-quality gov-
ernance activity? Turning back to the very simple understanding of quality already oﬀered 
in this reading, it is something that ﬁts to the purpose. Applying this to policymaking, 
we are talking about a high-quality policy process if the following requirements are met:
 • Policies address well-documented and well-understood problems.
 • Policies operate with instruments that have the potential of aﬀecting the behavior 
of actors in the desired way and are working well within the given context.
 • Policies are able to gain the support of the most important stakeholders.
 • The implementation of policies is based on a strategy that ﬁts both to the context 
and the purpose, and is managed in an eﬀective way.
 • The policy process and the impact of the policies are evaluated and the results 
of evaluation are fed back to policymakers in order to ensure the learning of 
the governance system.
In short, on the basis of the common elements of this list of requirements, a high-
quality policy process is open and evidence-based.
The underlying logic of policymaking in a decentralized education system is not dif-
ferent from that of governance in general. Policymakers are working through the actors 
of local accountability relationships; therefore, the target groups of policies are often 
parents or school-maintaining self-governments (i.e., local policymakers). As the follow-
ing ﬁgure suggests, from the point of view of policies, the “black box” to be inﬂuenced 
is not only the school: it is also the local environment within which schools operate. 
Nevertheless, the eﬃciency of policies largely depends on the ability of policymakers to 
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open the black box, and understanding how the dynamics of local relationships work 
is essential for policymaking and implementation, too.
One of the special features of policymaking in relation to any other governance-
related activity is that, since policies are mainly designed to address service delivery 
outcomes, they are much more focused than the governance of education in general. 
But even with a strong focus on actual service delivery, contextual factors should not be 
ignored. For example, if a policy mandate ﬁts better to the decision-making authority 
of self-governments, it should not be deployed to schools. Another example might be 
the design of the most appropriate implementation process; in decentralized systems 
the involvement of the owners of schools, even in the case of development programs 
directly targeting a speciﬁc group of schools, is essential.
Figure C.4.1
The Policy Cycle in Decentralized Governance Systems
High-quality policymaking is often considered to be the matter of the development 
of the required capacities of the relevant actors. No doubt, these capacities are essential; 
however, as almost everything that was said in the previous chapters indirectly suggests, 
it is not that simple. A high-quality policy process has its systemic conditions beyond 
those of decentralized governance, in general. The most important ones are the following:
Policymaking
Setting the policy agenda 
and 
Policy formulation 
and 
Consultation and approval
Local accountability relationships
Local 
self-governance
Citizens/Clients Schools
Implementation Evaluation
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• Setting the educational policy agenda
 — The transparency and publicity of policymaking
 — Institutionalized system monitoring capacities
 — Policy evaluation
• Policy planning
 — Prevailing professionalism in the administration
 — Available policy analysis and planning capacities
 — Intensive participation in international cooperation networks
• Consultation and approval
 — Self-organized stakeholder groups
 — Open, institutionalized, and democratic bargaining procedures
 — Transparent and predictable decision-making procedures
• Policy implementation
 — Mature and well-functioning governance instruments
 — The institutional conditions of program-based development
• Policy evaluation
 — Well-functioning quality evaluation system
 — Well-functioning ﬁnancial accountability system
 — Available and heavily-used independent program and policy evaluation 
capacities
A few of these conditions are the characteristics of decentralized governance systems 
only. There are others that—in theory—can also be built in centralized systems, but 
they reach their full potential only in the course of decentralization.
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Summary of the Key Points of Part Four
 Educational policy is the use of authority and resources at the disposal of the 
governance of education to change or inﬂuence the behavior of the actors and in-
stitutions of education in order to solve problems. Educational policymaking and 
implementation is one of the functions of governance; therefore, how education 
systems are governed determines the context within which policies are made.
 The three main approaches to policymaking and implementation are: (i) the ra-
tional model that considers the policy process as a rational algorithm of sequential 
steps, (ii) the incremental model, according to which the unpredictable context of 
policymaking does not allow more than incremental, step-by-step problem solving, 
and (iii) the analytical model that separates certain functional elements within the 
policy process, although they cannot be organized into a rational algorithm.
 The major components of the policy process are setting the agenda, planning (i.e., 
policy formulation), policy consultation and formal approval, policy implementa-
tion, and the evaluation of the policies.
 Policy problems are educational service outcomes that do not meet expectations. 
Due to the prevailing learning-outcomes approach, expectations towards educational 
services are increasingly set in terms of measurable competencies. The expectations 
relevant to educational policies can be determined with the instruments of needs 
assessment, according to which there are normative needs, felt needs, expressed 
needs, and comparative needs.
 The underlying logic for structuring problems is to reveal cause-eﬀect relationships, 
according to four hierarchical levels: educational outcomes, the quality of teaching 
and learning explaining the outcomes, the quality of schools explaining the qual-
ity of teaching and learning, and the characteristics of the systemic environment 
explaining the quality of schools. The instrument of problem structuring is the 
problem.
 Problem identiﬁcation has certain rules of thumb: identifying a problem is a value 
judgment, a problem is always contextual, the problem is not identical to its reasons 
or consequences, the problem has a solution, and the problem is not a private matter.
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 In simple cases, policy objectives are determined by turning problems into goals 
using the same indicators that were used for the identiﬁcation of the problem. In the 
case of more complex and large-scale problems, setting the objectives requires the 
conceptualization and the application of a policy model that connects the desired 
external outcomes, educational service objectives, and the instruments to be used.
 The rules of thumb for setting policy goals are: when setting goals, the same hier-
archy of logical levels should be applied as for problem structuring; the expected 
results should be measurable to allow for monitoring and evaluation; if multiple 
goals are set, they should be coherent; target groups should be determined in an 
unambiguous way, the process of determining the goals should contribute to build-
ing a consensus; and undertaking goals against long-term processes that are out of 
the control of policymakers should be avoided.
 Policies may operate with ﬁve types of tools: mandate, capacity building, incentives, 
persuasion, and institutionalized support. The appropriate policy tools are to be 
selected on the basis of the willingness and the capacity of the staﬀ of the schools 
to change. The aspects of assessing alternative policy instruments are: anticipated, 
impact, feasibility, cost-eﬀectiveness, and sustainability. The assessment of a policy 
instrument requires a large knowledge basis.
 In order to ensure the feasibility of policies, several organized stakeholder groups 
are to be consulted and who are identiﬁed and selected on a case-by-case basis. The 
relevant stakeholder groups are those who are targeted by the policy; those who are 
not necessarily interested in the actual policy, but are playing a formal consultative 
role on a regulated basis; those who have vested interest in the impact of the policy, 
and those who represent the beneﬁciaries of the policy.
 The formal approval of policies is a regulated administrative or political process. The 
timeframes of administration, politics, and policy are diﬀerent. Pressure to make 
things happen within a shorter timeframe than logically required can be balanced 
by high-quality policy planning and open policy consultation.
 Implementation is the achievement of the objectives of the policy. Policies are 
implemented by local actors, who should be made interested as well as able to 
work along the goals of the policy. Most policies are implemented in a top-down 
manner in two possible ways: through a coherent package of modiﬁcations within 
the systemic environment of service delivery institutions that force, encourage, and 
support local actors; and through large-scale targeted development programs.
 If policies are implemented through the systemic environment, they have to be 
planned in a manner that allows for easy management. Therefore, the intended 
policy tools should be deconstructed according to the various functional govern-
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ment instruments available for governments. An action plan for implementation 
contains regulation, ﬁnancing, and professional service packages, etc. The impact 
of this implementation strategy is indirect, can be applied on a whole system scale, 
and its cost are lower.
 Implementing policies through large-scale development programs has a direct impact 
on schools and—since resource allocation is based on a contract—makes the control 
of processes and outcomes much easier. However, the speciﬁc costs of development 
programs are higher, and they can hardly target more than certain segments of the 
system. The connections between development programs and how functional gov-
ernance instruments operate should be maintained, even if development programs 
are not used as a supplement to the mainstream implementation process.
 Bottom-up implementation is transferring good practices that exist in a school to 
all the other schools with similar problems, on the basis of central policy priorities. 
Scaling-up good practices largely depends on the absorption capacity of schools. 
There are two bottom-up implementation strategies: the dissemination strategy 
that makes speciﬁc working know-how available for other schools and the systemic 
scaling-up strategy that creates the internal and external conditions for successful 
application of any sort of know-how.
 When determining the appropriate implementation strategy the following aspects 
are worth considering: the extent of decentralization, the absorption capacity of 
schools, the scope and scale of the problem to be targeted, the maturity of profes-
sional support systems, the amount of available ﬁnancial resources, the level of 
government commitment, and the level of ﬁnancial accountability.
 Policy evaluation is a key instrument of evidence-based policymaking. Policies can 
be evaluated on the basis of information provided by ﬁve major sources: the exter-
nal assessment of the performance of students, the external evaluation of schools 
(inspection), program and policy evaluation, the information provided by ﬁnancial 
accountability mechanisms, and by empirical research and the information system 
of education.
 Policymaking in education is a high-quality governance activity, if it is open and 
evidence-based. In more concrete terms, the requirements of the quality of the edu-
cational policy process are: (i) policies address well-documented and well-understood 
problems, (ii) policies operate with instruments that have the potential of aﬀecting 
the behavior of actors in the desired way within the speciﬁc context, (iii) policies are 
able to gain the support of the most important stakeholders, (iv) the implementa-
tion of policies is based on a strategy that ﬁts both the context and the purpose, 
and is managed in an eﬀective way, and (v) the policy process and the impact of the 
policies are evaluated and the results of evaluation are fed back to policymakers.
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 High-quality policymaking and implementation is not a simple question of the ca-
pacities of the participating actors; it requires that various systemic conditions should 
be in place. Apart from all the functional governance instruments, transparency, 
systematic monitoring of the education system, policy evaluation, self-organized 
stakeholder groups, open and institutionalized policy consultation, and intensive 
international cooperation are all essential conditions.
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Local Government
and Public Service
Reform Initiative
Many people working in central government are convinced that 
decentralized systems entail a loss of control for those who 
are supposed to govern. Not so argues Péter Radó in this new 
and outstanding contribution to how decentralized education 
systems can be successfully governed in South Eastern Europe 
where governments have struggled to manage the education 
sector that has traditionally consumed the largest amount of 
government funds. 
In a practical and scholarly manner, Governing Decentralized 
Education Systems attempts to prove that what is lost in the 
course of decentralization is nothing more than the illusion 
of control. The more we know about what are the effective 
ways to improve primary and secondary education, the 
more obvious it is that decentralization creates the systemic 
environment within which it becomes possible. Unsurprisingly, 
the decentralization of the education sector has also been 
given a prominent and stable position in the policy agenda 
across South Eastern Europe. 
Governing Decentralized Education Systems is a systematic 
and comprehensive overview of the relevant aspects of 
decentralization in education, the characteristics of educational 
services that determine their effective governance, the 
transformation of governance instruments, and policymaking 
in decentralized education systems. 
This book is an essential and valuable resource for policy-
makers, teachers, mayors, educationalists, managers, public 
administrators, and indeed anyone considering how to 
maximize the returns and successes of their education systems 
in order to guarantee a bright future for all.
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